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Present:    Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J.
ANGELA L. YOUNG                                                       OPINION BY
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL
v.    Record No.  071436                                              April  18,  2008
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
This appeal requires us to determine whether the evidence
at trial was sufficient to support a conclusion, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant, while in possession of a
controlled substance, was aware of its nature and character.
Facts and Proceedings
The facts will be stated in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.    See e.g.,
Parker v. Commonwealth,  275 Va.  150,  155,  654 S.E.2d  580,  583
(2008).    In the pre-dawn hours of November  24,  2005, Officer
S. Blystone, of the Portsmouth Police Department, stopped the
driver of a maroon Oldsmobile for failing to stop at an
intersection in Portsmouth.    The driver and sole occupant was
Angela L. Young, the defendant.    She was cooperative with
Blystone, who gave her a warning and told her she was free to
leave.    Blystone then told her that she was in a  “high-crime,
high-drug area” and asked for her permission to search her car
before she left.    She consented to the search.    Blystone
searched the car and found the defendant’s purse.    Among the




contents of the purse, he found a prescription bottle labeled
with the name of Stephanie Woody.    The label identified the
contents of the bottle as  “OxyContin,” which Blystone knew to
be a controlled drug.    The bottle contained two blue tablets
and six white tablets.    Blystone could not determine the
nature of the pills, but nevertheless handcuffed the defendant
and asked her about the bottle and its contents.    She
responded, but the trial court subsequently granted the
defendant’s motion to suppress her statements because she had
received no Miranda warnings before making them.
Subsequently, the blue tablets were identified as morphine, a
Schedule II substance, and the white tablets were identified
as Trazodone, a Schedule VI substance.    No  “OxyContin” or its
generic equivalent, oxycodone, was found in the pill bottle,
notwithstanding its label.
The defendant was indicted for possession of a Schedule I
or Schedule II controlled substance in violation of Code
§  18.2-250.    At a bench trial, she entered a plea of not
guilty but was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two
years, with six months suspended conditioned on supervised
probation.    The Court of Appeals granted her an appeal but
affirmed her conviction.    We awarded her this appeal.
At the trial on the merits, the only witnesses to testify
about the events of November  24,  2005 were Officer Blystone
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and Stephanie Woody.    The latter stated that she lived with
her uncle, Andre Gatewood, who was the owner of the maroon
Oldsmobile the defendant was driving, and that the defendant
was Gatewood’s girlfriend and would have had permission to
drive his car.    Stephanie Woody also testified that the pills
were hers, that she had inadvertently left them in her uncle’s
car when they had fallen out of her purse, and that the
defendant had called her, telling her that she had them.    She
stated that she carried different pills in one bottle so that
she would not have to carry multiple bottles with her.    She
surmised that the defendant  “must have picked them up to bring
them to me.”    The court received in evidence an exhibit
showing that Stephanie Woody had prescriptions for morphine,
trazodone and oxycodone, along with a large array of other
prescription drugs that she said she took for chronic migraine
headaches.
The trial court found from the evidence that the
defendant was in possession of the morphine at the time of her
arrest.    The court accepted Stephanie Woody’s testimony that
the pills were hers and that she had valid prescriptions for
them, but refused to accept her speculation as to how the
pills came into the defendant’s possession.    The court stated
that the finding of guilt was based upon the defendant’s
undisputed possession of the morphine, coupled with the facts
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that she had no prescription for it, that it belonged to
someone else, and that it was contained in a bottle labeled
with a different drug that was also a controlled substance.
The Court of Appeals noted that the defendant did not
contest the issue of her actual possession, dominion and
control over the drugs at the time of her arrest, and
concluded that the dispositive question was whether she was
aware of the nature and character of the morphine found in the
pill bottle.    In affirming the conviction in an unpublished
opinion, the Court of Appeals held that possession of a
controlled drug gives rise to an inference that the defendant
was aware of its character.
Analysis
On appeal, great deference is given to the factfinder
who, having seen and heard the witnesses, assesses their
credibility and weighs their testimony.    Thus, a trial court’s
judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.    Walton v.
Commonwealth,  255 Va.  422,  426,  497 S.E.2d  869,  871  (1998).
In a prosecution for possession of a controlled
substance, the Commonwealth must produce evidence sufficient
to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant’s possession of the drug was knowing and
intentional.    Burton v. Commonwealth,  215 Va.  711,  713,  213
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S.E.2d  757,  758  (1975).    Actual or constructive possession
alone is not sufficient.    Id. at  713,  213 S.E.2d at  759.         “The
Commonwealth must also establish that the defendant
intentionally and consciously possessed it with knowledge of
its nature and character.”    Id.  (citations omitted)  (emphasis
added).    That knowledge is an essential element of the crime.
Such knowledge may be shown by evidence of the acts,
statements or conduct of the accused.    Garland v.
Commonwealth,  225 Va.  182,  184,  300 S.E.2d  783,  784  (1983).
Other circumstantial evidence may also support a finding of a
defendant’s knowledge of the nature and character of the
substance in his possession, such as the drug’s distinctive
odor or appearance, or statements or conduct of others in his
presence that would tend to identify it.
The issue in the present case is whether the record
contains evidence from which any  “rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.”    See Jackson v. Virginia,  443 U.S.  307,  319
(1979).    The Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction,
relied on its decision in Josephs v. Commonwealth,  10 Va. App.
87,  390 S.E.2d  491  (1990), in which the court held that
“[p]ossession of a controlled drug gives rise to an inference
of the defendant’s knowledge of its character.”    Id. at  101,
390 S.E.2d at  498-99.    In Josephs, the defendant was a
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passenger in the back seat of a stolen rental car travelling
through Virginia en route from Florida to New York.    When the
car was searched, her luggage was found in the trunk,
surrounded by  130 pounds of marijuana packed in closed garbage
bags.    The marijuana nearly filled the trunk, leaving little
room for her luggage.    Id. at  90-91,  100-01,  390 S.E.2d at
492,  498.    When the trunk was opened, there was  “a strong odor
of marijuana.”    Id. at  91,  390 S.E.2d at  492. The defendant,
when asked about the marijuana by the arresting officer,
responded, according to the officer’s notes in evidence:
“Said she didn’t know about drugs.                                   1st time I’ve driven with
that stuff.”    The Court of Appeals held that statement to be a
proper basis for the trial court’s conclusion that the
defendant knew the marijuana was present in the trunk.    Id. at
100,  390 S.E.2d at  498.
In Josephs, there was ample circumstantial evidence to
support the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant was
aware of the nature and character of the drugs that she
jointly possessed, and it was unnecessary for the Court of
Appeals to rely on an inference of guilty knowledge based on
possession alone.    We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’
statement in Josephs that  “[p]ossession of a controlled drug
gives rise to an inference of the defendant’s knowledge of its
character,” insofar as that statement can be read to imply
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that bare possession, without more, may furnish proof, beyond
a reasonable doubt, of the essential element of guilty
knowledge.    Countless scenarios can be envisioned in which
controlled substances may be found in the possession of a
person who is entirely unaware of their nature and character.
We adhere to our holding in Burton, quoted above, that actual
or constructive possession alone is not sufficient.    To the
extent that the holding in Josephs is inconsistent with our
holding here, i.e., that possession alone, without more, is
insufficient to support an inference of guilty knowledge, we
overrule that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In the present case, after the trial court granted a
motion to suppress the defendant’s statements on Miranda
grounds, the record is devoid of evidence of any acts,
statements or conduct tending to show guilty knowledge on her
part.    Unlike the odoriferous contents of the trunk in
Josephs, the contents of the pill bottle in this case gave no
indication of their character.    Officer Blystone, after
examining the pills, could not determine their nature without
submitting them for laboratory analysis, and there is no
reason to infer that the defendant was any better informed.
The ambiguous circumstantial evidence concerning the
appearance of the bottle and its contents is as consistent
with a hypothesis of innocence as it is with that of guilt.
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It is thus insufficient to support the conviction in this
case.    See Yarbrough v. Commonwealth,  247 Va.  215,  218,  441
S.E.2d  342,  344  (1994)  (evidence must establish guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt and exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence).
Conclusion
Because we find the record devoid of evidence sufficient
to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant possessed morphine with knowledge of its nature and
character, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and dismiss the indictment.
Reversed and dismissed.
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