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PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Goodwyn,
JJ., and Stephenson and Russell, S.JJ.
DELTA STAR, INC.
OPINION BY
v.    Record No.  071674                                            SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B.STEPHENSON, JR.
                                                                    September  12,  2008
MICHAEL'S CARPET WORLD
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG
J. Leyburn Mosby, Jr., Judge
In this case governed by the Uniform Commercial Code  -
Sales, Code  §§  8.2-101 et seq.  (the UCC), we determine whether
the trial court erred in failing to apply the UCC's Statute of
Frauds, Code  §  8.2-201, to declare unenforceable a purported
oral contract for the sale of goods.
I
Michael's Carpet World  (Michael's) sued Delta Star, Inc.
(Delta Star), seeking to recover the unpaid balance Michael's
claimed was due on an alleged contract for the purchase and
installation of flooring in offices of Delta Star.    Delta Star
responded that it had paid Michael's for the purchase and
installation of flooring in its entryway and denied that there
was a contract for the purchase and installation of flooring in
two of its offices.    Delta Star also filed a plea in bar
contending that the alleged contract was not in writing as
required by the Statute of Frauds and, therefore, was
unenforceable.




The trial court heard the parties' evidence, found that
Delta Star had breached the contract with Michael's, and entered
judgment in favor of Michael's in the principal amount of
$2,565.58.    The court overruled Delta Star's Statute of Frauds
defense, finding that the contract "satisfied several of the
exceptions to the statute of frauds set forth in Code Section
8.2-201."
We awarded Delta Star this appeal in which Delta Star
contends that the trial court erred  (1) "in ruling that the
contract was enforceable under the statute of frauds on the
theory that the goods at issue were specially manufactured;"  (2)
"in finding that there was a confirmatory writing establishing
the existence of a contract for the purchase and installation of
flooring  [in the main office];"  (3) in relying "on the customary
manner of dealing between the parties to establish the existence
of an enforceable contract;"  (4) "in finding that three separate
work orders constituted a single contract between the parties
and by ruling that the purchase of the entryway carpet
constituted part performance of such contract, thereby taking
the contract out of the statute of frauds;" and  (5) "in ruling
that Delta Star, Inc. admitted in its testimony that there was a
contract for the flooring in  [the main office]."
II
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On April  22,  2006, Ivan Tepper, President and Chief
Executive Officer of Delta Star, visited one of Michael's
showrooms to view flooring options for his office, his executive
assistant's office, and the entryway to the offices.    Tepper was
met by Tommy Martin, Michael's sales manager, and viewed the
samples displayed in Michael's showroom.    Tepper requested
pricing information on the three types of flooring that he
selected for the two offices and entryway.    At that meeting,
Tepper told Martin that his only contact at Delta Star would be
Tepper's executive assistant, Donna Nash.
On April  25,  2006, Martin measured the three areas at Delta
Star and submitted three written proposals describing the work
to be done and the materials to be used for each area.    On May
2,  2006, Martin discussed with Nash revisions to the proposals.
On that same day, revised proposals, together with a credit
application, were sent to Nash.    On May  5,  2006, Nash sent a
credit application to Michael's seeking "90 days same as cash."
All transmissions between the parties were made via facsimile.
The conditional sales contract forms used by Michael's were
prepared on May  31,  2006, and contain a hand-written reference
to "P.O.  #T551" and the notation "Per Phone" in the block for
the customer's signature.    Delta Star sent Michael's, via
facsimile, Purchase Order No. T-551, dated July  25,  2006, which
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contains a reference to "[c]arpet for entrance to lobby" and the
price of  $832.22.
Michael's completed installation of flooring in Delta
Star's entryway and, on August  2,  2006, sent an invoice for
$832.22.    Nash told Martin to order the tile for the two offices
and subsequently paid the invoice for the entryway flooring.
Nash also told Martin that it was important to have the tile
installed by early November  2006.    When the materials arrived,
Nash telephoned Martin and told him to install the flooring in
her office, but not to install the flooring in Tepper's office.
Martin responded that he could not do what Nash requested
because the material had already been ordered.
Martin had never before ordered this type of flooring.    The
tile remains in Michael's warehouse.
III
Code  §  8.2-201 provides, in pertinent part, the following:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section
a contract for the sale of goods for the price of  $500
or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate
that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or
broker.  .  .
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time
a writing in confirmation of the contract and
sufficient against the sender is received and the
party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it
satisfies the requirements of subsection  (1) against
such party unless written notice of objection to its
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contents is given within ten days after it is
received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the
requirements of subsection  (1) but which is valid in
other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured
for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others
in the ordinary course of the seller's business and
the seller, before notice of repudiation is received
and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that
the goods are for the buyer, has made either a
substantial beginning of their manufacture or
commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise
in court that a contract for sale was made, but the
contract is not enforceable under this provision
beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has
been made and accepted or which have been received and
accepted.
In the present case, no written contract that satisfies the
requirements of subsection  (1) of Code  §  8.2-201 exists.
Michael's, however, relies upon the exceptions set forth in Code
§  8.2-201(3).    The trial court agreed with Michael's.
IV
We first consider the trial court's finding that the
flooring materials were "specially manufactured goods or
products for  [Delta Star] and not readily suitable for sale  [to]
others in the ordinary course of  [Michael's] business."    In so
finding, the trial court relied upon our decision in Flowers
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Baking Co. v. R-P Packaging, Inc.,  229 Va.  370,  329 S.E.2d  462
(1985).
In Flowers Baking Co., a bakery engaged a cellophane-
wrapping manufacturer to measure its cookie trays, determine the
appropriate size for cellophane wrapping, and design artwork to
be printed on the wrapping.    The bakery's manager placed a
verbal order for the wrapping, and the manufacturer sent the
bakery a written acknowledgement of the order.                           229 Va. at  372-
73,  329 S.E.2d at  463-64.    Thereafter, the manufacturer sent a
sample roll of unprinted wrapping to be tested for sizing on the
bakery's packaging equipment, and the bakery subsequently told
the manufacturer to proceed with the order.    The next day, the
parties met to discuss the proposed artwork.    Later, the
cellophane wrapping, printed with the bakery's logo, was
delivered to the bakery.    Id. at  373-74,  329 S.E.2d at  464.
Approximately ten days after receipt of the wrapping, which
conformed to the specifications of the order, the bakery's
manager notified the manufacturer that the wrapping was too
short and that the printing was not centered.    The bakery
returned the wrapping to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer
brought a breach-of-contract action against the bakery.    Id. at
374,  329 S.E.2d at  464-65.    This Court, relying upon Code  §  8.2-
201 (3)                                                                  (a), held that the parties' oral contract was enforceable
because the cellophane wrapping "was manufactured to the size
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required by  [the bakery's] containers, was imprinted with  [the
bakery's] name and unique 'artwork,' and was completely produced
by the  [manufacturer]."    Id. at  376-77,  329 S.E.2d at  466.
The trial court's reliance upon Flowers Baking Co. is
misplaced because the facts of that case are distinguishable
from the facts in the present case.    In the present case, the
flooring samples displayed in Michael's showroom are available
to all customers, but all flooring materials selected by
customers must be ordered directly from the manufacturer or
distributor because Michael's keeps no inventory.    The flooring
materials chosen by Delta Star were selected from the samples
displayed, were not altered in any way to suit only Delta Star,
and were suitable for sale to others in Michael's ordinary
course of business.    Therefore, the flooring materials were not
"specifically manufactured" for Delta Star, and the trial court
erred in ruling that the parties' contract was enforceable under
Code  §  8.2-201(3)(a).
V
We next consider the trial court's finding that there
exists a confirmatory writing establishing an enforceable
contract, under Code  §  8.2-201(2), for the purchase and
installation of flooring in Tepper's office.    We do not agree
that such a writing exists.
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At trial, Michael's contended that its written proposals
and its invoice for the purchase and installation of flooring in
Delta Star's entryway constituted confirmatory writings.    A
"writing in confirmation of the contract" presupposes that there
exists an oral agreement between the parties and necessarily
follows the formation of such an agreement.    The proposals,
however, by definition, cannot constitute confirmatory writings
because a proposal is an offer presented for acceptance or
rejection.    In submitting its proposals, Michael's sought to
form a contract, rather than to confirm a contract.∗    Michael's
invoice for the entryway flooring also cannot serve as
confirmation of a contract for the purchase and installation of
flooring in Tepper's office.    The invoice confirms only the
parties' agreement with regard to the entryway flooring.
VI
We now turn to the trial court's finding that an
enforceable contract was established by the parties' course of
dealing.    Code  §  8.2-202 provides, in pertinent part, that the
"[t]erms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement
∗ Similarly, the credit application submitted by Delta Star
and Michael's sketches regarding the proposed installations
cannot serve as confirmatory writings, contrary to the findings
of the trial court.
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.  .  . may be explained or supplemented  .  .  . by  .  .  . course of
dealing."    Pursuant to Code  §  8.2-202, therefore, the parties'
course of dealing is relevant only to explain or supplement the
terms of the parties' contract.    The parties' course of dealing
cannot establish the existence of a contract.    Therefore, the
trial court erred in finding that the parties' course of conduct
established the existence of an enforceable contract.
VII
Next, we consider the trial court's finding that there
existed a single contract between the parties and that the
installation of flooring in Delta Star's entryway constituted
part performance thereof.    Delta Star contends that, even if the
present case involves a single contract, rather than three
separate contracts, the purchase and installation of the
entryway flooring "does not take this case out of the Statute of
Frauds."    We agree.
Pursuant to Code  §  8.2-201(3)(c), a contract that is not
evidenced by a sufficient writing is enforceable "with respect
to goods for which payment has been made and accepted."    In the
present case, payment has been made and accepted for only the
entryway flooring.    Therefore, enforcement of any contract based
upon part performance extends only to the entryway flooring and
not to the purchase and installation of flooring in Tepper's
office.
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VIII
Finally, we consider the trial court's ruling that Delta
Star admitted in its testimony the existence of a contract for
the purchase and installation of flooring in Tepper's office.
At trial, Michael's contended that Nash's testimony regarding
her attempt to cancel that portion of the alleged contract
dealing with Tepper's office constituted an admission that a
contract existed because "you can't cancel something unless
you're admitting that you got a contract and you want to cancel
it."    Delta Star contends that Nash did not admit that there
existed a contract for the purchase and installation of flooring
in Tepper's office.
We agree with Delta Star.    A review of Nash's trial
testimony reveals that she stated that Delta Star "didn't want
to act on the estimate  [for Tepper's office]."    Nash further
stated that Delta Star "hadn't agreed to  .  .  . order  [the
flooring for Tepper's office] yet."    Therefore, Nash did not
admit the existence of a contract for the purchase and
installation of flooring in Tepper's office, and the trial court
erred in holding otherwise and in declaring the contract
enforceable under Code  §  8.2-201(3)(b).
IX
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court
erred in overruling Delta Star's Statute of Frauds defense and
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in finding that an enforceable contract existed between
Michael's and Delta Star for the purchase and installation of
flooring in Tepper's office.    Accordingly, we will reverse the
judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment in favor of
Delta Star.
Reversed and final judgment.
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