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PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and
Millette, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J.
PETER MARK MILAZZO
OPINION BY
v.    Record No.  080178                                            SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B.STEPHENSON, JR.
                                                                    October  31,  2008
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
The issue in this appeal is whether the evidence was
sufficient as a matter of law to prove that Peter Mark Milazzo
was guilty of felony hit and run, in violation of Code  §  46.2-
894.
I
Milazzo was tried without a jury in the Circuit Court of
Mecklenburg County.    The court found Milazzo guilty of felony
eluding the police, in violation of Code  §  46.2-817(B); felony
destruction of property, in violation of Code  §  18.2-137(B);
felony failing to stop at the scene of an accident, in violation
of Code  §  46.2-894; and misdemeanor reckless driving, in
violation of Code  §  46.2-852.
Milazzo appealed to the Court of Appeals his conviction for
failing to stop at the scene of an accident.    A judge of the
Court of Appeals, in a per curiam order, denied the petition for
appeal.    Milazzo v. Commonwealth, Record No.  0795-07-2  (Sept.
26,  2007).    Thereafter, a three-judge panel of the Court of




Appeals also denied the appeal.    Milazzo v. Commonwealth, Record
No.  0795-07-2  (Dec.  20,  2007).    We awarded Milazzo this appeal.
II
The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute.    On
August  9,  2006, Milazzo was the operator of a motor vehicle in
the Town of South Hill.    Corporal W.S. Johnson of the town
police department stopped Milazzo for speeding.    When Corporal
Johnson advised Milazzo why he was stopped, Milazzo became
belligerent, put his car in gear, and sped away.
Corporal Johnson pursued Milazzo’s car through several
streets of the town.    During this pursuit, Milazzo exceeded the
posted speed limit and ignored several stop signs and red
traffic lights.    He also crossed a double solid line to pass
several cars.    Eventually, Milazzo drove onto Interstate  85
where South Hill Police Officer Mike Waters joined in the
pursuit.    When Corporal Johnson endeavored to pass Milazzo’s
car, Milazzo swerved his car toward Johnson.    Milazzo drove his
vehicle onto an exit ramp where he lost control of his car
temporarily.    The car spun around and came to a stop.
Corporal Johnson placed his police car behind Milazzo’s
car, and Officer Waters placed his car in front of Milazzo’s
car.    Milazzo first drove forward and  “rammed” Officer Waters’
car.    He then backed up, striking Corporal Johnson’s vehicle,
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and again drove forward, striking Officer Waters’ car a second
time.
When Milazzo was unable to drive away from the scene, he
exited his car, jumped over a guardrail, and fled on foot into a
wooded area.    The police apprehended him later that night.
III
Code  §  46.2-894 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
.  .  . in which an attended vehicle  .  .  . is damaged
shall immediately stop as close to the scene of the
accident as possible  .  .  . and report his name,
address, driver's license number, and vehicle
registration number forthwith to the State Police or
local law-enforcement agency  .  .  . or to the driver or
some other occupant of the vehicle collided with.
In denying Milazzo's petition for appeal, the Court of Appeals
noted in its per curiam order that "[t]he purpose of Code
§  46.2-894 'is to prevent motorists involved in accidents from
evading civil or criminal liability by leaving the scene of an
accident and to require drivers involved in an accident to
provide identification information and render assistance to
injured parties.' "    Milazzo, slip op. at  2  (quoting Smith v.
Commonwealth,  8 Va. App.  109,  115,  379 S.E.2d  374,  377  (1989)
(decided under former Code  §  46.1-176)).    The Court of Appeals
also noted that the word "accident" is defined, in part, as
" 'an unfortunate event.' "    Id.  (quoting Smith,  8 Va. App. at
114,  379 S.E.2d at  377  (quoting Webster's Seventh New Collegiate
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Dictionary  5  (1963))).    The Court of Appeals determined that the
trial court could conclude, from the evidence presented, that
Milazzo had been involved in an "unfortunate event" and,
pursuant to Code  §  46.2-894, had the duty to remain at the scene
and provide information.
IV
On appeal, Milazzo contends, as he did in the Court of
Appeals, that his conduct was intentional and that, therefore,
he was not involved in an "accident."    The Commonwealth contends
that the term "accident," as used in a so-called hit-and-run
statute, is not limited to unintentional incidents.    The
Commonwealth relies, in part, upon State v. Smyth,  397 A.2d  497
(R.I.  1979).
In Smyth, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered the
meaning of the word "accident," as used in a statute that
requires a driver involved in a highway accident resulting in
personal injury to render aid to injured persons, to provide
certain information to the other parties to the accident, and to
notify the police.    Id. at  499.    The defendant had been charged
with, and convicted of, leaving the scene of an accident in
which personal injury had occurred, and he contended that the
collision, because it was intentional, was not an accident
within the meaning of the statute.    Id. at  498.    In affirming
the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
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stated that the purpose of the statute is to protect injured
persons and to assure the fair assessment of financial
responsibility.    Id. at  499.    The Court further stated that the
statute "is unconcerned with the cause of the accident—whether
it be by act of God, by negligent conduct, by willful or wanton
conduct, or by intentional act."    Id.    The Court explained its
rationale as follows:
We do not believe that the statute's reporting
requirements should depend on the mental state of the
actor involved in a vehicular collision.    From the
viewpoint of the perpetrator of an intentional act,
the act is surely not an accident within the more
common definition of the term.    But from the
perspective of the injured victim, the primary
beneficiary of the statute, he or she has been
involved in an accident and needs the same protections
afforded other highway casualties.    Therefore, we
believe that the Legislature intended the term
"accident" to include all automobile highway
collisions—intentional as well as unintentional—where
personal injury occurs.
Id.  (footnotes omitted).
V
In the present case, we agree with the Commonwealth and the
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Smyth.    The
purpose of Code  §  46.2-894 is to protect persons injured as the
result of, and to ensure the assessment of liability arising out
of, an unfortunate vehicular event.    The statute's primary
beneficiary is the injured victim, and it makes no difference
whether the collision was intentional or unintentional.
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Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Milazzo was
guilty of felony hit and run, in violation of Code  §  46.2-894.
VI
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
Affirmed.
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