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PRESENT: Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn and Millette, JJ.,
and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ.
JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW
COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA
                                                                      OPINION BY
v.    Record No.  090845                                              JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
November  5,  2009
RAMONA D. TAYLOR, JUDGE OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission  (“the
Commission”) filed the present complaint against Ramona D.
Taylor, Judge of the Second Judicial District, pursuant to the
original jurisdiction of this Court set forth in Article VI,
§  10 of the Constitution of Virginia and Code  §  17.1-902.    The
Commission asserted that its charges against Judge Taylor for
allegedly violating the Canons of Judicial Conduct  (“the
Canons”) are well founded in fact and are of sufficient
gravity to constitute the basis for censure by this Court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On January  13,  2009, the Commission issued a Notice
establishing formal charges against Judge Taylor that she had
engaged in misconduct or engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice while serving as a judge in
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the
City of Virginia Beach  (“the juvenile and domestic relations




court”).    Judge Taylor was charged with alleged violations of
Canons  1,  2,  2A, and  3B(2).
The Commission alleged that on May  2,  2007, at the
conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing on a misdemeanor assault
charge against a  15 year old defendant  (“K.M.”), who was not
then in custody, Judge Taylor found K.M. guilty following his
plea of  “not innocent.”    During the adjudicatory hearing, the
Commission alleged,  “someone in the courtroom audience blurted
out that  [K.M] had used a racial epithet toward the victim of
the assault,” and Judge Taylor called witnesses to the stand
to testify about the use of the racial epithet.    According to
the Commission, Judge Taylor found that K.M. represented a
risk of harm to the community, and remanded him to custody
pending a sentencing hearing scheduled for May  24,  2007.
The Commission further alleged that Judge Taylor denied
K.M.’s request for immediate sentencing so that an appeal
could be noted, and ordered that a social history be compiled
for the sentencing hearing.    In addition, the Commission
alleged that Judge Taylor denied K.M.’s May  2,  2007 written
motion for bond and release pending the sentencing hearing by
order entered on May  3,  2007 that expressly stated it was  “an
interlocutory, non-appealable order”  (“May  3rd order”).
The Commission further contended that, by letter from his
counsel dated May  4,  2007, K.M. sought reconsideration of the
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May  3rd order.    The Commission alleged that K.M.’s four-page
letter outlined K.M.’s factual and legal argument in support
of bond, his appeal of the denial of bond to the next higher
court, and his request for an immediate sentencing so that he
could immediately appeal, because otherwise denying bail and
imposing incarceration would make K.M.’s right to a de novo
appeal meaningless.    However, according to the Commission,
Judge Taylor denied reconsideration by an order in which she
maintained her position that the denial of K.M.’s motion for
bond and release was interlocutory and non-appealable  (“May
8th order”).1    The Commission alleged that when K.M. attempted
to appeal his case, the clerk of the juvenile and domestic
relations court  (“the clerk of court” or  “clerk”) refused to
process the appeal, and K.M. filed a petition for writ of
mandamus against the clerk in the Circuit Court for the City
of Virginia Beach  (“the circuit court”).    The writ of
mandamus, which was granted by order dated May  11,  2007,
directed the clerk of court to process an appeal of Judge
Taylor’s order.    After a bond hearing also conducted on May
11th, the circuit court released K.M. to the custody of his
parents.
1 Judge Taylor entered a  “Corrective Order” containing the
same language that  “[t]his order is an interlocutory,
nonappealable order” on May  8,  2007 nunc pro tunc May  3,  2007.
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In Judge Taylor’s answer to the Notice of formal charges,
she maintained that she did not recall whether K.M.’s counsel
requested an immediate sentencing.    Judge Taylor admitted that
she entered the May  3rd order denying K.M.’s motion for bond
and release pending the sentencing hearing, and that K.M.
requested reconsideration of that order.    However, Judge
Taylor denied that K.M.’s counsel cited to authority that
clearly gave K.M. the right to appeal the decision denying
bail and asserted that the authority cited by K.M.’s counsel
is  “subject to contrary legal interpretations with regard to
its applicability to juvenile defendants detained post-
adjudication and pre-disposition.”
Judge Taylor admitted that at the mandamus hearing, the
attorney for the clerk of court asserted that the clerk was
“under a direct order by  [Judge Taylor] as the Chief Judge not
to process the defendant’s appeal,” but averred that the
attorney incorrectly stated the capacity in which Judge Taylor
served when she advised the clerk regarding the appealability
of the May  3rd order.    Judge Taylor asserted that she was
functioning as the presiding judge, not as the chief judge, at
all times when addressing the clerk regarding the
appealability of the May  3rd order.    Judge Taylor therefore
requested that the formal charges asserted in the Commission’s
Notice be dismissed.
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On March  10,  2009, the Commission conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the charges, at which time Judge Taylor
was present and represented by counsel.    The Commission
members voted unanimously to bifurcate the hearing as follows:
(1) evidence about a violation of the Canons, and if the
Commission found a violation, then  (2) other evidence
regarding the appropriate sanction, if any.
As part of the evidence before the Commission, the
parties stipulated that when K.M.’s counsel tried to file a
notice of appeal to the May  3rd order, the deputy clerk
advised Judge Taylor that K.M.’s counsel was attempting to
file a notice of appeal and Judge Taylor  “confirmed that the
order by its express terms was not appealable, but did not
state to the deputy clerk that the notice of appeal should not
be accepted.”    The parties further stipulated that  “[t]he
deputy clerk then informed  [K.M.’s counsel] that the order was
not appealable and, therefore, the notice of appeal would not
be accepted.”
Judge Taylor testified that at the conclusion of the May
2,  2007 hearing on K.M.’s misdemeanor assault charge, she
ordered K.M. securely detained  “in order to safeguard the
community” and ordered a social history, which is a complete
background investigation on K.M.    Judge Taylor testified that
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she did not recall K.M.’s counsel’s request for a final
appealable order.
Judge Taylor testified that in ruling on K.M.’s motion
for reconsideration, she said to his counsel:
[W]hat I’m going to do is I’m going
to put all of my authority  [in the order]
to make sure that  .  .  . just in case you
get a Circuit Court judge who we were
talking about, you know, perhaps a Circuit
Court judge shooting from the hip, and
that was the expression that I had used,
thinking that a lot of times they were
busy, they had a very hectic docket, and
because we deal with these juvenile codes
so frequently, I wanted to make sure that
the Circuit Court judge was aware I was
relying upon the Juvenile Code.
Judge Taylor stated that when the deputy clerk asked her
whether the May  3rd order was appealable, she  “may have said
something like, Well, I’ve already addressed that in my order,
and that was the end of it.”    Later in the hearing, Judge
Taylor testified that when the deputy clerk asked her if the
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order was appealable, Judge Taylor said,  “[a]s my order
states, no.    I don’t believe it’s appealable.”
When Judge Taylor was asked at the hearing if it was
apparent to her that the deputy clerk inquired into the May
3rd order’s appealability because the deputy clerk was trying
to decide whether to process the appeal, Judge Taylor replied,
“[y]es.”    Nevertheless, Judge Taylor testified that it was the
deputy clerk’s responsibility to consult the clerk of court on
how to proceed, and if doubt remained, it was the clerk’s
office’s responsibility to call this Court to obtain guidance
on the matter.2    Judge Taylor testified that she would not
2 Although Judge Taylor repeatedly asserted that the
clerk’s office should have contacted the Supreme Court of
Virginia to obtain guidance, she was presumably referring to
the Office of the Executive Secretary  (OES), which would be
the appropriate administrative department of this Court to
contact under these circumstances.    OES provides
administrative support for all of the courts and magistrate
offices within the Commonwealth.    Office of the Executive
Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia, The Official
Website for the Supreme Court of Virginia, Court
Administration—Office of the Executive Secretary  (OES),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/oes/home.html
(last visited Oct.  22,  2009).    Within the OES, the Department
of Judicial Services  (DJS) serves as the liaison between the
judiciary’s administrative offices and the courts throughout
the Commonwealth, providing administrative services through
publications, trainings, field visits, and the research and
support of various programs.    Id.  (follow  “Judicial Services”
hyperlink to
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/home.html
(last visited Oct.  22,  2009)).    The Juvenile and Domestic
Relations District Court Services division of the DJS provides
guidance and assistance to juvenile and domestic relations
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instruct the clerk’s office on what measures to take, as  “that
is not  [her] function as the judge” and  “frankly, as the
judge,  [she does not] get involved in the mechanics of
appeals.”    Judge Taylor reiterated her position by stating:
“What I have stated and what I sincerely believe is that my
duties as the presiding judge were to decide the case; my
duties were finished.”    In Judge Taylor’s opinion, the clerk’s
office had
the responsibility, independent of the language in the May  3rd
order, to accept or deny K.M.’s appeal, depending on the
guidelines the clerk’s office received from this Court  [OES].
Judge Taylor described her May  8th order denying K.M.’s
motion to rehear as merely a way to  “red flag that there was
an appealability problem” for the circuit court.    Judge Taylor
stated,  “I don’t believe that the legislators, for whatever
reason, intended juveniles to be included within the appeal
provisions for bond determinations under  19.2-124.”    Judge
Taylor continued,  “[s]o for whatever reason, juveniles, I
believe, are treated separately,” as she believed Code
§§  19.2-124 and  19.2-319 are inapplicable to juvenile
district court judges and clerks on caseflow management and
case processing, among other things.    Id.    We therefore
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detention.    Judge Taylor testified that  “[a]s the judge
interpreting the statute, what  [she] indicated to  [K.M.’s]
attorney was that  [she] did not believe that with regard to
where  [K.M.] was in the proceeding, that he had a right to
appeal his detention status.”    According to Judge Taylor,
“[i]t was a legal determination that because of his status,
post-adjudication/pre-disposition, that he didn’t have the
right to appeal.”
Judge Taylor maintained that when she entered the May  3rd
order she  “fully expected” K.M.’s counsel to appeal it.    For
that reason, Judge Taylor contended that she was merely
“flagging” the issue of the appealability of the order for the
circuit court, but did not  “rule” on that issue.    Judge Taylor
explained:
I wanted the Circuit Court judge to know I
had a concern about it.    So by saying this
order is an interlocutory, non-appealable
order, that wasn’t a ruling because that was
really for the Circuit Court to look at and to
decide whether this case should be properly
appealed to that court.
reference OES in brackets when Judge Taylor refers to this
Court in relevant portions of her argument.
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(Emphasis added.)
After the hearing, the Commission determined that Judge
Taylor violated Canons  1,  2A, and  3B(2), and  “that the charges
set forth in the Notice were well-founded and of sufficient
gravity to constitute the basis for censure.”    The Commission
made an express finding by clear and convincing evidence that
Judge Taylor had acted intentionally to thwart K.M.’s attempt
to appeal from the order that denied his request for bail.
The Commission then considered additional evidence and
argument regarding the appropriate sanction.    In determining
whether to file a formal complaint in this Court pursuant to
Article VI,  §  10 of the Constitution of Virginia and Code
§  17.1-902, the Commission considered two exhibits pertaining
to Judge Taylor’s two prior informal contacts with the
Commission.    Judge Taylor’s counsel objected to the exhibits,
because  (1) the informal contacts had resulted in dismissals,
arguing that dismissals are inappropriate for consideration by
the Commission, and  (2) the exhibits were irrelevant and more
prejudicial than probative.    The Commission received the
exhibits into evidence  “for the purpose of final disposition.”
Upon deliberation, the Commission decided that the charges of
violations of the Canons were well founded and of sufficient
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gravity to constitute the basis for censure and filed a
complaint against Judge Taylor in this Court.
Judge Taylor filed a post-hearing motion to dismiss and
for other relief, seeking reconsideration and dismissal of the
complaint on the basis that the evidence at the hearing
revealed  “nothing more tha[n] mere legal errors which cannot
support a finding that any of the pertinent Canons of Judicial
Conduct were violated.”    Judge Taylor asserted that there was
“no evidence in the record” that she  “knowingly and/or
willingly violated any statutes or legal rights,” and that
“she did not knowingly and/or willingly commit any legal
errors.”
Judge Taylor also requested that the Commission
reconsider the admission and use of documents relating to
“prior contacts” between Judge Taylor and the Commission,
contending that there is no legal basis for the use of such
documents.    Judge Taylor argued that any slight probative
value of the documents is substantially outweighed by their
prejudicial effect, the use of such documents violates her
right of confidentiality in the Commission’s review process,
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and denies her equal protection and due process rights under
the United States and Virginia Constitutions.3
Judge Taylor also asserted that an email written by the
chairman of the Commission, Judge Larry D. Willis, Jr., to the
juvenile and domestic relations court appeared to have
“prompted and/or played a role” in one of Judge Taylor’s prior
informal contacts with the Commission.    Therefore, Judge
Taylor argued that Judge Willis should have recused himself.
Additionally, Judge Taylor argued that as applied to the
facts of the complaint against her, the Canons are
unconstitutionally vague and without appropriately definite
standards, resulting in an arbitrary and capricious process.
The Commission denied Judge Taylor’s motion by order
dated April  14,  2009.    In an accompanying letter, which
addressed the admission of documents relating to prior
contacts, the Commission stated that, pursuant to Code  §  17.1-
913, whatever record the Commission files with its complaint
in this Court becomes public.    The Commission also maintained
that certain exhibits would not be sealed because they, or the
information they contained, had already become public as part
of the circuit court file.
3 Judge Taylor has abandoned her equal protection argument
in this Court.
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On April  28,  2009, the Commission filed its complaint
with this Court.    In her answer to the Commission’s complaint,
Judge Taylor alleged that the evidence in the record was
insufficient to establish that she  “knowingly and/or willingly
violated any statutes, legal rights and/or  [the]  [C]anons.”
In addition, Judge Taylor alleged that there is no factual
basis for any findings against her, that her motion to dismiss
and for other relief is well-founded, and that there is
insufficient basis for a censure.
II. CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
The relevant portions of the Canons at issue in this case
are:
Canon  1. A Judge Should Uphold the
Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary.
A. An independent and honorable
judiciary is indispensable to justice in
our society.    A judge should participate in
establishing, maintaining and enforcing
high standards of conduct, and shall
personally observe those standards so that
the integrity and independence of the
judiciary will be preserved.    The
provisions of these Canons are to be
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construed and applied to further that
objective.
Canon  2. A Judge Shall Avoid
Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All of the Judge’s
Activities.
A. A judge shall respect and comply
with the law and shall act at all times in
a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Canon  3. A Judge Shall Perform the
Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and
Diligently.
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.-
(2) A judge shall be faithful to
the law and maintain professional
competence in it.  .  .
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Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part  6,  § III, Canons  1,  2, and  3.
III. ANALYSIS
The Commission’s filing of a formal complaint in this
Court triggered our duty to conduct a hearing in open court
for the purpose of determining whether Judge Taylor  “engaged
in misconduct while in office, or  .  .  . has engaged in conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.”    Va.
Const. art. VI,  §  10.
In conducting the hearing on the formal
complaint filed by the Commission, this Court
considers the evidence and makes factual
determinations de novo.    The Commission must
prove its charges in this Court by clear and
convincing evidence.    The term  “clear and
convincing evidence” has been defined as  “that
measure or degree of proof which will produce
in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief
or conviction as to the allegations sought to
be established.    It is intermediate, being more
than a mere preponderance, but not to the
extent of such certainty as is required beyond
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a reasonable doubt in criminal cases.    It does
not mean clear and unequivocal.”
Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Lewis,  264 Va.  401,
405,  568 S.E.2d  687,  689  (2002)  (citations omitted).    Factual
determinations, findings and opinions of the Commission are
not accorded any particular weight nor deference.    Judicial
Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Peatross,  269 Va.  428,  444,  611
S.E.2d  392,  400  (2005).    If after conducting a de novo review
of the record and hearing argument of counsel, we find clear
and convincing evidence that the judge has engaged in
misconduct while in office or has engaged in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, we shall censure
the judge or remove the judge from office.    Va. Const. art.
VI,  §  10; Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Shull,  274 Va.
657,  670,  651 S.E.2d  648,  656  (2007).
Judge Taylor presents us with four issues to consider:
(1)   Whether the record proves by clear and convincing
evidence that Judge Taylor engaged in misconduct while
in office or engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice sufficient to prove
the charged violations of the Canons;
16




(2)   Whether the Canons, as applied to Judge Taylor and the
record in this case, are sufficiently definite and
certain for purposes of due process;
(3)   Whether it was lawful for the Commission to consider
evidence of Judge Taylor’s  “prior contacts” with the
Commission; and
(4)   Whether Judge Taylor is entitled to any relief based on
the conflict/recusal issue addressed in her post-
hearing motion to dismiss.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The Commission argues that the record proves by
clear and convincing evidence that Judge Taylor engaged in
misconduct while in office or in conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice.    As an initial matter, the
Commission asserts that K.M. had the right to appeal Judge
Taylor’s denial of bail.    The Commission maintains that  “it is
a fundamental precept of Virginia criminal procedure that all
decisions denying bail are appealable by the defendant, at
least until such appeals reach this Court.”    The Commission
contends that all criminal cases involve either pretrial bail,
the denial of which is appealable pursuant to Code  §  19.2-124,
or post-conviction bail in circuit court, the denial of which
is appealable pursuant to Code  §  19.2-319.    The Commission
17




further argues that because appeals from a district court
conviction are de novo, a defendant remains in pretrial status
for bail purposes throughout the district court proceedings.
The Commission cites Code  §  19.2-120(A) and  (E), which state:
A. A person who is held in custody pending
trial or hearing for an offense, civil or
criminal contempt, or otherwise shall be
admitted to bail by a judicial officer, unless
there is probable cause to believe that:
1. He will not appear for trial or hearing
or at such other time and place as may be
directed, or
2. His liberty will constitute an
unreasonable danger to himself or the public.
E. The judicial officer shall inform
the person of his right to appeal from the
order denying bail or fixing terms of bond
or recognizance consistent with  §  19.2-
124.
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(Emphasis added.)    Furthermore, the Commission points out
that Code  §  19.2-124(A) provides that
[i]f a judicial officer denies bail
to a person, requires excessive bond, or
fixes unreasonable terms of a recognizance
under this article, the person may appeal
therefrom successively to the next higher
court or judge thereof, up to and
including the Supreme Court of Virginia or
any justice thereof where permitted by
law.
According to the Commission, these statutes when read
together make it clear that K.M. had a right to appeal Judge
Taylor’s denial of bond, as he remained within the status of
“[a] person who is held in custody pending  .  .  . hearing  .  .  .
or otherwise.”    Code  §  19.2-120(A).    The Commission asserts
that K.M. falls within the definition of  “person” contained in
Code  §  19.2-119:                                                     “  ‘Person’ means any accused, or any
juvenile taken into custody pursuant to  §  16.1-246.”    The
Commission argues that nothing in the Code justified the
exception Judge Taylor carved out for a juvenile held  “post-
adjudication/pre-disposition.”    The Commission contends there
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is no plausible support in Virginia law for Judge Taylor’s
conclusion that a  “no appeal zone” exists in the juvenile and
domestic relations court when a juvenile is first taken into
custody at the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing and bail
is denied pending a final disposition hearing.
The Commission argues that even if this Court determines
Judge Taylor’s actions were  “mere legal error,” this Court
should not excuse the manner in which she  “arrogated to
herself the power to rule that her own decision was immune
from appellate review.”    At oral argument, the Commission
asserted,  “there’s a difference between wrongly concluding
that  [the May  3rd order] wasn’t appealable and ruling, putting
in your order that it’s not appealable and then taking action
subsequent[ly] that effectively blocked the appeal.”
Additionally, the Commission contends this Court should not
excuse Judge Taylor’s refusal to retreat from her untenable
position when given ample opportunity to do so.    The
Commission avers that Judge Taylor violated the Canons by her
clear misappropriation of judicial power, which constituted
“conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.”
Va. Const. art. VI,  §  10.
The Commission asserts that this Court should reject
Judge Taylor’s contention that she did not  “rule” that her
order could not be appealed and that she included the
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“nonappealable” language in the May  3rd order only to  “flag”
the issue for the circuit court.    As support for this
argument, the Commission points out that Judge Taylor referred
to her action as a ruling in an email to her fellow juvenile
and domestic relations court judges, in which Judge Taylor
wrote:
I found after an adjudicatory hearing that
[K.M.] posed a substantial risk of harm to the
community and ordered him to be securely
detained pending disposition.                                    [K.M.’s counsel]
filed a motion the next day requesting that
[K.M.] be released on bond.    I denied that
request and ruled that the order was
interlocutory and nonappealable.  .  .                           . I ruled
that the order was not appealable  .  .  .
(Emphasis added.)    Also, the Commission asserts that in
Judge Taylor’s answer to the Notice of formal charges, she did
not deny ruling that the order was nonappealable and did not
at that time state that she merely flagged the issue for the
circuit court.
The Commission argues that the clerk of court believed
that the clerk’s office of the juvenile and domestic relations
court was compelled by the May  3rd order to reject K.M.’s
21




notice of appeal, because the order stated it was  “an
interlocutory, nonappealable order.”    The Commission asserts
that when the deputy clerk consulted Judge Taylor about
whether the May  3rd order was appealable, Judge Taylor’s only
response of directing the deputy clerk to the order was
tantamount to insuring that the clerk’s office would decline
to process the notice of appeal.    The Commission contends that
Judge Taylor violated the Canons by directly thwarting an
appeal by ruling that her own decision was not subject to
appeal and by advising the deputy clerk that the order was not
appealable, when Judge Taylor knew the clerk was faced with
the decision whether to accept a notice of appeal from K.M.’s
attorney.
Judge Taylor contends that nothing in the record supports
the Commission’s assertion that she violated any of the
subject Canons.    Rather, Judge Taylor argues, the record shows
that she attempted to apply the law exactly as it is written
and the Commission offered no plausible theory to support its
assertion that she committed a clear misappropriation of
judicial power.
Judge Taylor maintains that a post-adjudication, pre-
disposition detention pursuant to Code  §  16.1-248.1(G) does
not implicate Code  §  19.2-124 bail appeal rights because the
proceeding is no longer in the pretrial stage.    Furthermore,
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Judge Taylor asserts that Code  §  19.2-120 distinguishes  “bail”
from  “detention,” and subsection E of that statute directs a
judicial officer to  “inform the person of his right to appeal
from the order denying bail or fixing the terms of bond or
recognizance,” but does not mention  “detention.”    According to
Judge Taylor,  “[g]iving due consideration to the words
actually used by the General Assembly in the subject statutes,
[her] reading of the provisions is correct or, at a minimum,
plausible and supportable.”
Judge Taylor reiterated that the language in the May  3rd
order that it was an  “interlocutory, nonappealable” order was
included to flag the order for the circuit court to ensure
that the appealability issue would be addressed.    Judge Taylor
contends that this Court’s prior opinions addressing
complaints brought by the Commission support dismissal of the
complaint against her.    Judge Taylor asserts that her case is
distinguishable from Lewis, as there is no allegation nor
evidence that she defied or disrespected an order of any
higher court.                                                       264 Va. at  406,  568 S.E.2d at  690.    Moreover,
according to Judge Taylor, the statutes at issue leave room
for a difference of opinion, and she argues that several of
her fellow judges on the juvenile and domestic relations court
agreed with her analysis.    She acknowledged, however, that her
legal interpretations could be mistaken.    In this manner,
23




Judge Taylor contends that her case is similar to Peatross, as
the record in this matter reveals, at worst, mistakes of law,
which alone do not warrant discipline.                             269 Va. at  447-48,  611
S.E.2d at  402-03.
As an initial matter, we note that it is difficult to
understand Judge Taylor’s position that the General Assembly
intended to create a  “no appeal zone” for juveniles held post-
adjudication, pre-disposition.    The weakness of Judge Taylor’s
argument can be demonstrated by one example, which in essence
was delineated in K.M.’s May  4,  2007 letter to Judge Taylor.
If a juvenile and domestic relations judge has the authority
to detain a juvenile in secure detention pending disposition
without review by the circuit court, the judge, by extending
the date of disposition, can effectively require the juvenile
to be detained indefinitely which would make the juvenile’s
right of appeal to the circuit court for de novo trial
meaningless.    Such a result is not only inconsistent with
Virginia’s statutory scheme providing for trial de novo for
appeals from district courts to circuit courts, it also flies
in the face of our commitment to allowing persons accused of
crimes to challenge the denial of bond successively to the
next higher court, and the statutory requirement that the
judicial officer denying bail inform the defendant of his or
her right to appeal.
24




However, the real issue in this case is not whether Judge
Taylor made a legal error in denying K.M. the right to appeal
his secured detention and denial of bail.    The issue at the
heart of this case is whether Judge Taylor thwarted K.M.’s
right to have her ruling reviewed and, if she did thwart the
appeal of her ruling, whether that is a violation of the
Canons.
We conclude the Commission has met its burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Taylor committed
the violations of the Canons charged in the Notice of the
Commission dated January  13,  2009.    Although the relevant
statutes support a finding that Judge Taylor erred in her
interpretation of the law, her actions rose to a level beyond
a mistake of law when she affirmatively blocked K.M.’s
attempted appeal to the circuit court.
Judge Taylor’s ethical violations began when she ruled
that her May  3rd order was interlocutory and nonappealable.
It is undisputed that when K.M.’s counsel attempted to file a
notice of appeal at the clerk’s office, Judge Taylor directed
the deputy clerk to the  “interlocutory, nonappealable”
language appearing on the order when the deputy clerk sought
guidance on whether to process the notice of appeal.
On May  4,  2007, K.M.’s counsel sought reconsideration of
Judge Taylor’s ruling by letter stating:
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I would respectfully ask that you
reconsider your ruling as represented by the
attached Order entered May  3,  2007 in this
case.    Please understand that I have the utmost
respect for the Court and it is because of that
I am asking this Court to reconsider its ruling
in light of what I feel to be clear authority
that would allow my client an appeal from your
denial of his request for a bond pending the
sentencing hearing in this matter, and also
your denial of our request of the Clerk to
appeal your ruling.
K.M.’s counsel cited Code  §§  19.2-120 and  19.2-124 in
support of his contention that K.M. was entitled to bail and,
if denied by the juvenile and domestic relations court,
entitled to an appeal to the circuit court.    K.M. asserted,
through counsel, that Judge Taylor’s rulings, while
interlocutory, were appealable both as to the denial of bond
and as to Judge Taylor’s ruling that  “[t]his order is  [a]
.  .  . nonappealable order,” which denied K.M.’s right to
appeal.    K.M.’s counsel also stated that he had  “previewed”
the issue briefly with the circuit court and that the circuit
court  “certainly felt that  [Judge Taylor’s] denial of  [K.M.’s]
26




right to appeal on the motion for a bond is an appealable
order.”    Judge Taylor did not respond to the letter.
K.M.’s counsel also wrote a letter dated May  4,  2007 to
the clerk of court stating that K.M. wished to appeal the May
3rd order as well as Judge Taylor’s determination that the
order was not appealable, and requested that the clerk’s
office  “forthwith today prepare appropriate appeal notices.”
K.M.’s counsel stated that if the clerk’s office did not
prepare the appeal notices, he would have no alternative but
to proceed with a writ of mandamus.    The clerk responded by
letter dated May  7,  2007 to K.M.’s counsel, stating:           “Please
be advised that I am compelled to follow the ruling entered on
May  3rd,  2007 by Judge Ramona D. Taylor, which states the
order is interlocutory and non-appealable.”    A copy of the
clerk’s May  7th letter was sent to Judge Taylor.    Judge
Taylor’s only apparent response was to enter her May  8th
“corrective order” nunc pro tunc to May  3,  2007, containing
the same language ruling,  “this order is an interlocutory,
nonappealable order.”
Judge Taylor’s testimony at the Commission hearing
further indicates her intention to thwart K.M.’s appeal.
Judge Taylor admitted she knew that when the deputy clerk
inquired into the order’s appealability, the clerk was trying
to decide whether to process the appeal.    At the hearing,
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Judge Taylor repeatedly stated her belief that it was not her
function as a judge to get involved in the processing of
appeals and that her duties ended when she decided the case.
Judge Taylor put the onus on the deputy clerk to consult her
supervisor and on the clerk’s office to consult this Court
[OES] to obtain guidance on the appealability of the order
irrespective of the language of the order.    However, Judge
Taylor never provided direction to either the deputy clerk or
the clerk of court to contact this Court  [OES].    Despite
denying responsibility for what occurred after she entered the
May  3rd order, Judge Taylor admitted to the Commission that
she was the chief judge at the time and in that capacity, she
had the authority to direct the clerk what to do.4
Judge Taylor does not deny that the clerk’s office may
have felt compelled to refuse K.M.’s appeal as a result of
Judge Taylor’s instruction to refer back to the language of
the order.    Judge Taylor also gave no indication of any
attempt on her part to correct what she now claims was the
clerk’s mistaken belief that she was compelled by Judge Taylor
to refuse to process the appeal.    Only four days after the
4 Judge Taylor became chief judge of the juvenile and
domestic relations court on July  1,  2006.    Her term was for
two years.
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order was entered, Judge Taylor was sent a copy of the letter
from the clerk of court, which clearly stated that the clerk
was  “compelled” to follow Judge Taylor’s ruling that the order
was nonappealable.    Even at oral argument, when Judge Taylor’s
counsel was asked,  “when  [Judge Taylor] said to the clerk that
the order by express terms is not appealable, wasn’t she at
least implicitly directing the clerk what to do with the
paperwork?,” her counsel responded:                                “I think it’s fair to say
that one could walk away with that message.”
It is clear from the record that Judge Taylor was well
aware of K.M.’s counsel’s efforts to secure K.M.’s release
either through an appeal of the denial of bond or an appeal of
Judge Taylor’s order that the denial of bond was
nonappealable, or by an appeal de novo of K.M.’s case to the
circuit court.    However, Judge Taylor did not seek to clarify
what she now argues was her position that she:  (1) did not
rule the May  3rd order was not appealable;  (2) did not direct
the clerk’s office to refuse K.M.’s notice of appeal; and  (3)
believed the clerk’s office should contact this Court  [OES]
for guidance on processing the notice of appeal.    In addition,
Judge Taylor had knowledge of the writ of mandamus filed
against the clerk of court and did no more to address the
matter than send an email to fellow judges explaining her
ruling and informing them that K.M.’s attorney had filed a
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writ of mandamus  “to compel the filing of an appeal from  [the
May  3rd order],” and stated that she  “ruled that the order was
not appealable.”    Judge Taylor subsequently sent another email
informing her fellow judges that the writ of mandamus had been
granted, and thanking the clerk  “for holding up so well under
the pressure of this litigation and for keeping  [Judge Taylor]
so well informed.”
Judge Taylor’s argument that she did not rule that her
May  3rd order was not appealable is implausible.    Judge Taylor
described her action as a  “ruling” in her email to her fellow
judges.    Thus, when the deputy clerk asked whether the order
was appealable, Judge Taylor reinforced the effect of her
ruling by directing the clerk to the  “nonappealable” language
that Judge Taylor herself typed on the order.    In addition,
Judge Taylor’s argument that her ruling that the order was
interlocutory and nonappealable was merely a  “red flag” for
the circuit court is equally implausible.    Judge Taylor has
produced no other examples of ruling an order nonappealable
for use as a  “red flag” to the circuit court.    Finally, what
makes her  “flagging” argument most implausible is that her
actions prevented the order from ever reaching the circuit
court where it could purportedly serve as a  “red flag.”    If
the interlocutory and nonappealable language was truly
intended as a  “red flag,” Judge Taylor should have promptly
30




advised the deputy clerk to process the appeal so that the
circuit court could rule.
A judge may not prevent the appeal of his or her own
decisions.    More than a century ago, we recognized the basic
principle that a court cannot prevent its own decision from
being reviewed on appeal by refusing to certify the facts
proved and the evidence in the case.    Powell v. Tarry,  77 Va.
250,  264  (1883).    Therefore, it is clear that a court cannot
expressly rule that its own decision is not subject to
appellate review, by ruling the order is interlocutory and
nonappealable.
We do not agree with Judge Taylor’s argument that she did
not thwart K.M.’s appeal because once she made her ruling, the
case was out of her hands.    It is disingenuous of Judge Taylor
to claim that when she responded to the clerk who asked her
whether the appeal should be processed, Judge Taylor was not
in a supervisory position over that clerk.    Her argument that
she was acting as the presiding judge and not the chief judge
with supervisory authority over the clerk’s office was
certainly never made clear to the deputy clerk or the clerk of
court.    What is clear is Judge Taylor knew that when she
pointed the deputy clerk to the language of her ruling that
the deputy clerk was not going to process the appeal.    Judge
Taylor also knew in the days following that the clerk of court
31




had refused to process the appeal because the clerk felt
compelled by Judge Taylor’s order not to process it.
Judge Taylor’s argument that she believed the clerk’s
office should contact this Court  [OES] for guidance on
processing the appeal is equally disingenuous.    Although she
now states that processing the appeal is in the nature of a
ministerial act under the supervision of the clerk, she never
made that statement to the deputy clerk when the deputy clerk
asked about processing the appeal.    Furthermore, Judge
Taylor’s position that the clerk should have brought any
questions to this Court  [OES] was never communicated to the
clerk, despite K.M.’s concerted efforts to obtain review by a
higher court in order to secure his release from custody.
Finally, Judge Taylor’s argument that she had nothing more to
do with whether the case was appealed after her entry of the
May  3rd order is belied by her entry of the corrective order
on May  8,  2007 nunc pro tunc to May  3,  2007 amidst the threat
of a pending writ of mandamus.
Judge Taylor’s actions in thwarting K.M.’s appeal of the
denial of bond and even of his appeal of her interlocutory and
purportedly nonappealable ruling violated the law.    When K.M.
and his family were prevented by Judge Taylor’s actions from
obtaining appellate review of her rulings, public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary was
32




diminished.    Judge Taylor violated Canons  1,  2A, and  3B(2) and
these violations constituted conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
B. Due Process
Judge Taylor asserts that the Canons are
unconstitutionally vague and without appropriately definite
standards as applied to the facts in the complaint against
her, and that vague and indefinite laws and regulations offend
due process rights.    Judge Taylor argues that  “[a] close
reading of the subject Judicial Canons reveals that they are a
mix of clear standards and vague aspirational statements.”
According to Judge Taylor, Canon  1’s requirement that a judge
“shall personally observe  [high standards of conduct] so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be
preserved” does not describe a meaningful standard of conduct
for purposes of a disciplinary case.    Judge Taylor argues that
Canon  2’s requirement that a judge act  “at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence” likewise sets forth no
particular standards or guidelines.    Lastly, Judge Taylor
contends that Canon  3’s requirement to  “be faithful to the
law” is  “far more aspirational than measurable.”    Therefore,
Judge Taylor maintains that the subject Canons are
33




unconstitutionally vague and insufficiently definite to
satisfy due process rights in a disciplinary matter.
The Commission asserts that Judge Taylor cites no
authority holding that the Canons violate due process because
they are impermissibly vague.    According to the Commission,
courts in other jurisdictions have rejected due process
challenges to codes of judicial conduct, and thus it urges
this court to likewise reject Judge Taylor’s vagueness due
process argument.
We hold that the Canons are sufficiently definite and
certain to withstand Judge Taylor’s due process challenge.
“The procedural due process requirements of the Constitution
of Virginia compel the Commission, and this Court, to
recognize the balance that must be struck between protecting
the integrity of the judiciary and the rights of individual
judges.”    Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Elliott,  272 Va.
97,  114,  630 S.E.2d  485,  493  (2006).
Courts in other jurisdictions that have considered
whether canons of judicial conduct violate  “due process”
because they are impermissibly vague have rejected such
claims.    See In re Assad,  185 P.3d  1044,  1052  (Nev.  2008)
(Canon  2A not vague); In re McGuire,  685 N.W.2d  748,  762  (N.D.
2004)  (“courts in other jurisdictions appear to have routinely
rejected vagueness challenges to codes of judicial conduct”);
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In re Hill,  8 S.W.3d  578,  582-83  (Mo.  2000)  (rejecting
“vagueness” challenge to Canons  2A and  2B, holding that
“[n]either absolute certainty nor impossible standards of
specificity are required,” and that  “[t]his is especially true
in judicial discipline.”); Comm’n on Judicial Performance v.
Spencer,  725 So.2d  171,  176  (Miss.  1998)  (rejecting
“vagueness” challenge to Canons  1,  2A,  2B, and  3B, holding
that  “the Canons are sufficient to put  [persons] of common
intelligence on notice of what type of conduct is
prohibited.”); In re Young,  522 N.E.2d  386,  387-88  (Ind.  1988)
(rejecting  “vagueness” challenge to Canons  1 and  2, holding
that  “a greater degree of flexibility and breadth is permitted
with respect to judicial disciplinary rules and statutes than
is allowed in criminal statutes.”).
“The test for determining whether the Canons are vague is
whether they convey to a judge a sufficiently definite warning
of the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice.”    In re Hill,  8 S.W.3d at  582.    As
relevant to the issues in this case, all three Canons which
the Commission alleges Judge Taylor violated require a judge
to comply with the law so that there will be public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The Canons for the Commonwealth of Virginia contain a
Preamble, which provides in relevant part that
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[t]he Canons of Judicial Conduct are
intended to establish standards for ethical
conduct of judges.    They consist of broad
statements called Canons, specific rules set
forth in Sections under each Canon and
Commentary.    The text of the Canons and the
Sections is authoritative.    Each Commentary, by
explanation and example, is advisory and
provides guidance with respect to the purpose
and meaning of the Canons and Sections.    The
Commentary is not intended as a statement of
additional rules.
Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part  6,  § III, Preamble.
The Commentary to Canon  1 includes the following
language:                                                           “Although judges should be independent, they must
comply with the law  .  .  .                                        .  [V]iolation of this Canon
diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and thereby does
injury to the system of government under law.”    Canon  2A
requires a judge to comply with the law in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.    Canon  3B(2) requires a judge to be faithful
to the law.
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The Commission has alleged that Judge Taylor’s thwarting
of K.M.’s appeal was a violation of law which diminished
public confidence in the judiciary, an allegation that we have
concluded has been established by clear and convincing
evidence.    The relevant Canons clearly prohibit a judge’s
failure to follow the law in such a manner as to fail to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.    There can be no  “vagueness” in the application
of the relevant Canons to the conduct in question.
C. The Commission’s Consideration of  “Prior Contacts”
Judge Taylor cites Code  §  17.1-913 to support her
argument that it was improper for the Commission to admit and
consider evidence of Judge Taylor’s prior contacts with the
Commission.    Specifically, she notes that the statute provides
that all prior contacts  “not filed with the Supreme Court in
connection with a formal complaint filed with that tribunal,
shall be kept in the confidential files of the Commission.”
Code  §  17.1-913(A).
Judge Taylor contends that Rule  16 of the Rules of the
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission applies and requires
that the records of a proceeding concluded  “without an adverse
finding by the Commission against a judge  .  .  . be maintained
in the Commission’s confidential files.”                            15 VAC  §  10-10-10.
37




Judge Taylor asserts that neither Code  §  17.1-913 nor
Commission Rule  16 allow for the removal of the
confidentiality of records of complaints that were not deemed
“well founded,” and the  2002 and  2006 prior contacts were not
determined to be well founded.
Additionally, Judge Taylor argues that unlike Shull, in
which Judge Shull’s demeanor was discussed in a prior informal
proceeding and that proceeding was later considered by this
Court for purposes of disposition, the  “prior contacts” Judge
Taylor had with the Commission were not  “directly relevant” to
the issues now before the Court.    Rather, Judge Taylor states
they are irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative of any
issue in dispute.    The prior contacts, Judge Taylor contends,
are irrelevant because the  2002 contact related to an in
camera interview and the  2006 contact related to a complaint
about starting court late, and both were resolved in her
favor.    Judge Taylor asks this Court to disregard the prior
contacts evidence when determining whether she committed any
violation during the  2007 events at issue.
The Commission relies on Shull to support its argument
that consideration of Judge Taylor’s prior contacts with the
Commission was appropriate.                                       274 Va. at  676-77,  651 S.E.2d at
659.    According to the Commission, this Court expressly
referred to and relied upon evidence of prior contacts in its
38




decision to remove Judge Shull from office.    The Commission
maintains that with regards to the issue of disposition, this
Court should be presented with evidence regarding a judge’s
past contacts with the Commission.    The Commission cites Rule
13(B) of the Rules of the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Commission, which provides that any  “material  [and] relevant”
evidence may be admitted.                                          15 VAC  §  10-10-10.
Additionally, the Commission contends that evidence
surrounding Judge Taylor’s  2002 informal contact with the
Commission was relevant to show whether she was amenable to
discipline by the Commission or whether the matter needed to
be referred to this Court.    The Commission maintains that Code
§  17.1-913, regarding confidentiality of the record sent by
the Commission to this Court in support of a complaint, and
Commission Rule  16, regarding preservation of files at the
Commission, are not relevant to the admissibility of evidence
of prior contacts at the evidentiary hearing.
We hold that the evidence regarding Judge Taylor’s prior
contacts with the Commission was properly admitted by the
Commission and is now properly before us for review.    At the
outset of the Commission hearing, counsel for the Commission
stated that  “the exhibits are all in the red binder there on
the witness desk.  .  .                                            . But the sides are in agreement that
there’s no objection to the admission of any of the exhibits.”
39




Counsel for Judge Taylor acknowledged the agreement as to the
exhibits contained in the binder.    The binder, which is part
of the record before this Court, contains the Commission’s
exhibits described as  “[c]orrespondence related to judge’s
2001-02 informal contact with JIRC,”  “[r]edacted annotated
agenda from JIRC meeting  4-19-02,”  “[t]ranscript of judge’s
informal meeting with JIRC dated  5-21-02,” and
“[c]orrespondence related to judge’s  2006 informal contact
with JIRC.”    Judge Taylor’s agreement to the Commission’s
admission of the exhibits is fatal to her argument that the
Commission erred in admitting those same exhibits.    Rule  5:25.
D. Recusal of Commission Chairman
Judge Taylor argues that the Commission’s chairman, Judge
Willis of the Chesapeake Juvenile and Domestic Relations
District Court, should have recused himself due to his status
as complainant in a prior contact with the Commission.
According to Judge Taylor, Canon  3E requires disqualification
of the judge from any proceeding in which his or her
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including
instances in which the judge has  “personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” is a
“party to the proceeding,” or is likely  “to be a material
witness.”    Judge Taylor contends that the proceedings before
40




the Commission were tainted by Judge Willis’ involvement and
therefore seeks dismissal of the complaint.
The Commission maintains that it can be reasonably
inferred that Judge Taylor was aware of Judge Willis’
involvement in a prior informal contact since  2006 and
therefore knew of the purported grounds for Judge Willis’
recusal at the outset of the Commission’s evidentiary hearing
in  2009, but failed to timely object to his participation.
Judge Willis’ role in Judge Taylor’s  2006 prior contact with
the Commission is reflected by an email dated January  26,  2006
from Judge Willis to Judge Deborah M. Paxson, who at the time
was the chief judge of the Virginia Beach Juvenile and
Domestic Relations District Court, regarding an issue of
delays in that court which adversely affected proceedings in
the Chesapeake Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court.
The email did not name any judge responsible for the delays
and expressly stated:                                               “I do not want any information about
who the judge was  .  .  .”    However, Judge Willis requested in
his email that Judge Paxson notify the judges of the juvenile
and domestic relations court of its contents.    The Commission
argues that it may be inferred that Judge Paxson did notify
the judges, including Judge Taylor, of Judge Willis’ complaint
in  2006.
41




We agree with the Commission’s waiver argument, and hold
that Judge Taylor did not timely object to Judge Willis’
participation in the present proceedings.                               “A motion for
disqualification  [of a judge] must be made when the movant
learns the grounds upon which the motion is based; thereafter,
the motion comes too late.”    Mason v. Commonwealth,  219 Va.
1091,  1098,  254 S.E.2d  116,  120  (1979).    We therefore will not
consider this issue.    Rule  5:25.
IV. CONCLUSION
In considering the record before us, we note letters from
attorneys who have appeared before Judge Taylor.    These
letters offer testaments to Judge Taylor’s professionalism as
an attorney and as a judge of the juvenile and domestic
relations court.    We have reviewed those submissions as part
of our consideration of the proper disposition of this case.
Addressing the issue of disposition, Judge Taylor asks us
to compare the facts in four published opinions by this Court
addressing complaints brought by the Commission, and conclude
that the record in this case supports a dismissal of this
Complaint.    In addition, Judge Taylor argues that her  “prior
contacts” with the Commission should not be construed as a
lack of amenability to informal discipline on her part, but
rather, a lack of courtesy on the part of the Commission.
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The Commission also directs us to a comparison of prior
disciplinary complaints brought by the Commission and
specifically, to the case of Judicial Inquiry & Review
Commission v. Lewis.    In addition, the Commission asks us to
consider Judge Taylor’s prior experience with the Commission
as an indication of her lack of amenability to informal
discipline.
We agree with the Commission that this case is very
comparable to Lewis, in which we censured a district court
judge.    Id. at  407,  568 S.E.2d at  690.    As in Lewis, Judge
Taylor violated the Canons by improper conduct in a single
case.    Id. at  405-07,  568 S.E.2d at  689-90.    In both cases,
the judges involved violated Canons  1,  2A, and  3B(2).    In
Lewis, the judge enforced a contempt order that he knew had
been stayed by the circuit court.    Id. at  403-04,  568 S.E.2d
at  688.    Here, Judge Taylor thwarted any review of her secure
detention order by the circuit court through appeal of her
denial of bond and appeal of her order denying appeal.
In Lewis, the direct harm caused by the judge’s ethical
violation was a father’s incarceration for several hours in
disregard of a circuit court’s stay order.    Id. at  404,  568
S.E.2d at  688.    In this case, Judge Taylor’s ethical violation
blocked appellate review of her rulings and forced K.M. to
remain in secure detention for nine days before his writ of
43




mandamus was reviewed by the circuit court and he was released
to the custody of his parents.
Judge Lewis was censured with no evidence of prior
disciplinary contacts with the Commission.    In this case, we
do not believe it is necessary to consider Judge Taylor’s
disputed prior disciplinary record to conclude that censure as
sought by the Commission is the appropriate remedy.
In Lewis, we stated that  “[p]ublic confidence in the
judiciary and the administration of our legal system depends
upon faithful adherence to the law  .  .  .                        . Courts cannot
reasonably expect citizens to comply with their orders if the
courts themselves do not yield to the orders of higher
courts.”    Id. at  406,  568 S.E.2d at  690.    Although Judge
Taylor was not faced with an order from the circuit court
reviewing her decision and compelling K.M.’s release, she did
impermissibly shield her ruling from any review.    Judge
Taylor’s actions, which prevented K.M.’s attorney from seeking
his release from secured detention by means authorized by law,
impair public confidence in the judiciary and the
administration of our legal system.    Unless citizens can trust
that judges will follow the law, our courts will lose the
public’s respect and confidence upon which our legal system
depends.
44




Accordingly, we order that Judge Taylor be, and hereby
is, censured for engaging in  “conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice.”    Va. Const. art. VI,  §  10;
Code  §  17.1-906.
Censure ordered.
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.    In my view, upon a de novo
review, the evidence in this case falls short of clear and
convincing evidence that Judge Ramona D. Taylor, a judge of
the City of Virginia Beach Juvenile and Domestic Relations
District Court, violated the Canons of Judicial Conduct.    I
therefore do not agree that censure of Judge Taylor by this
Court is warranted under Article VI, Section  10 of the
Constitution of Virginia.
Many of the historical and procedural facts which
ultimately led to the charges against Judge Taylor by the
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission  (“the Commission”) are
not in dispute.    On May  2,  2007, Judge Taylor conducted an
adjudicatory hearing on a misdemeanor assault charge against a
fifteen year old juvenile  (“K.M.”).    K.M. was represented by
counsel at that hearing.    Upon K.M.’s plea of  “no contest” and
the evidence presented, Judge Taylor found K.M. guilty of that
charge.    K.M. had previously been before Judge Taylor on
45




February  5,  2007 regarding a child in need of services
petition  (“CHINS petition”) filed by his parents.    With regard
to the CHINS petition, Judge Taylor had ordered, among other
things, that K.M. be on good behavior and to refrain from
illegal substance abuse.    At the conclusion of the
adjudicatory hearing on the assault charge, Judge Taylor, as
authorized by Code  §  16.1-273, ordered that a  “social
history,” which she described as a  “full background
investigation,” be prepared and set the matter for final
disposition on May  24,  2007.
Finding that K.M. posed  “a substantial risk of harm to
the community based upon the egregious nature of the assault,”
Judge Taylor remanded him to secure custody pending the
dispositional hearing scheduled for May  24,  2007.    K.M.’s
counsel requested Judge Taylor either to enter a final
disposition or to release K.M. on bond pending the hearing
scheduled for May  24,  2007.    In an order entered on May  3,
2007, and subsequently amended nunc pro tunc on May  8,  2007,
Judge Taylor denied K.M.’s request for bond pending the May
24,  2007 hearing.    In Judge Taylor’s order, she stated her
reasons for denying the request for bond in the following way:
Section  19.2-120 of the Virginia Code addresses the
factors a judge should consider in determining the
bond of a person  “held in custody pending trial or
hearing.”    The defendant in this case is being held
post-trial and pre-disposition pursuant to  §  16.1-
46




248.1                                                              (G) of the Virginia Code.    The right to appeal
a pre-trial bond determination provided in section
19.2-120(E) of the Virginia Code does not apply to a
juvenile held post-adjudication/pre-disposition.
The order further states that  “[t]his order is an
interlocutory, nonappealable order.”
Given the fact that K.M. had assaulted a younger boy to
the extent that the victim required medical attention and the
fact that Judge Taylor was aware K.M. had not responded
favorably to the conditions previously imposed upon him as a
result of the CHINS petition, the Commission concedes that
Judge Taylor acted within her authority in finding K.M. guilty
of the assault charge and in finding that he posed a risk of
harm to the community.    Additionally, the Commission does not
contest that Judge Taylor was authorized by statute to deny
K.M.’s request for the immediate disposition of the assault
charge without having the benefit of a social history to guide
that disposition.    Moreover, the Commission also concedes that
Judge Taylor did not act improperly in denying K.M. a bond.
Rather, the Commission’s claim of misconduct is based on the
allegation that Judge Taylor intentionally  “thwarted” K.M.’s
attempt to appeal the order denying his request for bond to
the circuit court.
As to that allegation, the undisputed material facts and
the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts
47




do not establish, in my view, that Judge Taylor intentionally
thwarted K.M.’s attempt to appeal the order denying his
request for bond pending the scheduled dispositional hearing
on May  24,  2007.    It is undisputed that a number of Judge
Taylor’s colleagues on the City of Virginia Beach Juvenile and
Domestic Relations District Court shared her view that an
order such as the order at issue in K.M.’s case was
interlocutory and nonappealable.    Code  §  16.1-248.1(G)
provides, in pertinent part, that:                                 “The court is authorized
to detain a juvenile  .  .  . at any time after a delinquency
petition has been filed, both prior to adjudication and after
adjudication pending final disposition subject to the time
limitations set forth in  [Code]  §  16.1-277.1.”                  (Emphasis
added.)    The latter Code section establishes a time limitation
of thirty days for the completion of the dispositional hearing
in a case involving a juvenile held in secure detention.
However, with reference to the issue of bond, Code  §  19.2-119
defines, for purposes of Code  §  19.2-120, a  “Person” to mean
“any accused, or any juvenile taken into custody pursuant to
§  16.1-246.”    The provisions for bail contained in Code
§  19.2-120(A) reference  “[a] person who is held in custody
pending trial or hearing for an offense.”
These statutory provisions were the basis upon which
Judge Taylor and her colleagues concluded that a juvenile held
48




in secure detention following an adjudicatory hearing and
prior to a final dispositional hearing was not entitled to
rely upon the appeal provisions of Code  §  19.2-120.    In a
prior opinion, however, this Court has made it clear that
mistakes of law alone do not warrant discipline.    Judicial
Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Peatross,  269 Va.  428,  447-48,  611
S.E.2d  392,  402-03  (2005).    These statutory provisions are not
so readily apparent in their application to the circumstances
of K.M.’s case as to be totally inconsistent with Judge
Taylor’s assertion that she  “sincerely believed” that her
order denying bail was interlocutory and nonappealable.
As suggested by the majority, the issue at the heart of
this case is whether Judge Taylor’s actions rose to a level
beyond a mistake of law.    The focus of that issue rests
principally upon Judge Taylor’s response to the deputy clerk’s
inquiry regarding whether K.M.’s notice of appeal of the
denial of bond should be accepted and processed.    By
stipulation, Judge Taylor and the Commission agree that the
deputy clerk went to Judge Taylor and advised her that K.M.’s
counsel was at the clerk’s office to file a notice of appeal.
“Judge Taylor confirmed that the order by its express terms
was not appealable, but did not state to the deputy clerk that
the notice of appeal should not be accepted.”    The deputy
clerk did not accept the notice of appeal.    As a result,
49




counsel for K.M. successfully obtained a writ of mandamus from
the circuit court and K.M. was released on bond from
detention.
Beyond question, the deputy clerk’s refusal to accept and
process K.M.’s appeal resulted from Judge Taylor’s response to
th

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