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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present:    Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
FELIX ASCHER MORENO
OPINION BY
v.                                                                   Record No.  1643-96-4   CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON
                                                                                             FEBRUARY  18,  1997
BARBARA J. MORENO
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
James H. Chamblin, Judge
Richard P. Buzan  (Kellogg, Krebs & Moran, on
briefs), for appellant.
Walter C. Jacob  (Walter C. Jacob, P.C., on
brief), for appellee.
Felix A. Moreno  (husband) appeals the trial court's finding
of contempt for husband's failure to pay child support.    Husband
raises the following questions:  1) did the trial court's denial
of husband's motion to dismiss the court's show cause order for
failure to pay child support constitute a final appealable
decree;  2) was the trial court's final decree of divorce,
incorporating the parties' property settlement agreement
including child support payments approximately twice the amount
required by statute, void; and  3) did the trial court err in
finding husband in contempt for failure to pay child support
pursuant to the final decree of divorce.    We find that the trial
court's denial of husband's motion to dismiss the show cause
order was not an immediately appealable order.    We further find
that the trial court's final decree of divorce was not void and
that the court was not obligated to make a determination of the




presumptive amount of child support under the statutory
guidelines where the parties had agreed to the amount of support
and did not seek the court's determination of the matter.
Accordingly, we affirm.
On July  20,  1993, a decree of divorce was entered which
incorporated the parties' property settlement agreement.    The
property settlement agreement provided that husband would pay
child support to Barbara J. Moreno  (wife) for the parties' two
children in the amount of  $1,800 monthly.    No exceptions were
noted to the decree, and no appeal was taken.    Notice of the
decree being presented for entry was not given to husband
pursuant to a waiver of notice executed by husband on May  28,
1993.
At wife's request, on July  17,  1995, a show cause order was
entered against husband for his failure to pay child support.
Husband moved to dismiss the show cause order arguing that the
underlying decree of divorce was void because the award of child
support did not comply with the provisions of Code  §§  20-108.1
and  20-108.2.    Husband asserted that the court's final decree of
divorce was void because the divorce decree made no reference to
the presumptive child support guidelines and because the trial
court failed to make written findings that application of the
presumptive child support guidelines would be unjust or
inappropriate.    A decree denying husband's motion was entered
November  6,  1995.    Subsequent to trial on the issues relating to
the show cause order, the trial court issued a letter opinion,
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dated December  4,  1995, finding husband in contempt for failure
to pay child support in accordance with the provisions of the
final decree of divorce.
Timely Appeal
Wife asserts that husband failed to timely appeal the trial
court's November  6,  1995 denial of husband's motion to dismiss
the show cause order.
This Court
has appellate jurisdiction over final decrees
of a circuit court in domestic relations
matters arising under Titles  16.1 or  20, and
any interlocutory decree or order involving
the granting, dissolving, or denying of an
injunction or "adjudicating the principles of
a cause."    Code  §§  17-116.05(3)(f) and  (4).
A final decree is one "`which disposes of the
whole subject, gives all the relief that is
contemplated, and leaves nothing to be done
by the court.'"
Erikson v. Erikson,  19 Va. App.  389,  390,  451 S.E.2d  711,  712
(1994)  (citations omitted).    The trial court's denial of
husband's motion to dismiss the show cause order did not
constitute a final decree because it did not dispose of the whole
subject and leave nothing to be done by the court.    See id.    To
the contrary, the trial court had to proceed with the show cause
hearing.    Nor was the court's order an interlocutory decree
granting an injunction.    Accordingly, unless the trial court's
denial of husband's motion constituted an interlocutory decree
that "adjudicate[d] the principles of the cause," this Court does
not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the denial.
An interlocutory decree adjudicates the principles of a
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cause where "`the rules or methods by which the rights of the
parties are to be finally worked out have been so far determined
that it is only necessary to apply those rules or methods to the
facts of the case in order to ascertain the relative rights of
the parties, with regard to the subject matter of the suit.'"
Pinkard v. Pinkard,  12 Va. App.  848,  851,  407 S.E.2d  339,  341
(1991)  (quoting Lee v. Lee,  142 Va.  244,  252-53,  128 S.E.  524,
527  (1925)).    The trial court's denial of husband's motion to
dismiss the show cause order did not adjudicate the principles of
the cause.    The denial of the motion did not determine whether
husband had cause for failing to pay his child support or what
terms the court would impose for such failure.    Further, the show
cause order required husband to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt for violation of provisions of the final decree
of divorce pertaining not only to child support but payment of
unreimbursed medical expenses, use of the parties' joint credit
lines, and adjustment of life insurance benefits.    The court's
denial of husband's motion to dismiss did not address these
matters as well.
Because the trial court's denial of husband's motion to
dismiss did not adjudicate the principles of the cause, husband
was without obligation or ability to appeal the court's denial.
Accordingly, we find husband's appeal timely made.
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Child Support
Husband argues that the trial court's decree of divorce was
void because the court incorporated in the decree the parties'
property settlement agreement containing a child support
obligation approximately twice the amount required by statute.
Husband asserts that the trial court erred in not determining
child support in accordance with Code  §§  20-108.1 and  20-108.2 or
by failing to provide written findings that application of the
presumptive child support guidelines would be unjust or
inappropriate.
In relevant part, Code  §  20-108.1 provides that "[i]n any
proceeding on the issue of determining child support  .  .  . the
court shall consider all evidence presented relative to any
issues joined in that proceeding."                                     (Emphasis added.)    Code
§  20-108.2 provides that "[t]here shall be a rebuttable
presumption in any judicial or administrative proceeding for
child support under this Title or Title  16.1 or  63.1  .  .  . that
the amount of the award which would result from application of
the guidelines  .  .  . is the correct amount of child support
."    Although both code sections serve to provide a
rebuttable presumption of the amount of child support to be paid,
a trial judge may determine that the contractual amount of child
support is fair and equitable without requiring evidence and
without determining the precise presumptive amount of support.
Where, as here, the trial judge can determine that the amount of
agreed child support is fair and equitable insofar as the child's
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best interest is concerned, the court may approve the agreement
and deviate from the guidelines.    Neither parent will be heard to
complain that an agreed amount of child support exceeds the
presumptive amount under the guidelines and should be set aside
in the absence of fraud, coercion, or overreaching.    The cases
relied on by husband involved instances where child support was
in dispute or where a party had specifically requested the court
determine support.    Such was the case in Scott v. Scott, where we
found that "[a]s of the hearing date  .  .  . no child support award
was in effect and none had previously been entered.    Since the
[trial] court was setting child support for the first time, the
hearing was an initial child support hearing and the trial court
erred in considering only those factors relevant to a change in
circumstances."                                                        12 Va. App.  1245,  1247,  408 S.E.2d  579,  581
(1991)  (emphasis added.)
Here, the trial court incorporated into its final decree of
divorce the parties' property settlement agreement which
specifically provided for child support.    Prior to the decree of
divorce, husband voluntarily executed a waiver of notice.
Unlike the circumstances in Scott, at no time did husband object
to the decree provisions as they pertained to child support nor
did he request that an amount of child support different from
that provided for in the property settlement agreement be
entered.    Further, at no time prior to husband's motion to
dismiss the show cause order was the amount of child support ever
disputed or in any way questioned.
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In Spagnolo v. Spagnolo, we held that:
a trial judge is not required to accept or
adopt an agreement made by the parents
regarding child support if the amount of
child support is in dispute.  .  .                                       . "[I]f the
amount of child support is in dispute, in
spite of a prior agreement, the trial court
must address  `the issue of determining child
support.'"
20 Va. App.  736,  743-44,  460 S.E.2d  616,  619  (1995)  (citations
omitted)  (emphasis added).    Accordingly, if the husband or wife
had disputed the amount of child support, despite the parties'
property settlement agreement, the court would have been required
to apply the guidelines in determining support.    However, as the
parties did not dispute support, we find that the trial court did
not err in accepting the parties' mutually agreed upon child
support provisions.    We are aware of neither holding nor statute
that requires a trial court to hear evidence on the matter of
child support where the parties have agreed to the amount of
support and do not seek the court's determination of the matter.
Further, we concur with the trial court's finding that the
resources of both the court and the parties would be wasted by
requiring a trial judge to sua sponte require parties to litigate
a settled matter.
We also note that assuming, arguendo, that husband or wife
had disputed the amount of child support, the trial court, once
it had determined the presumptive amount of child support, could
have deviated from that amount if such deviation was justified by
the Code  §§  20-108.1 and  20-108.2 factors.    Because these factors
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may be reflected in the property settlement agreement, the
agreement may therefore be the basis for deviating from the
guidelines.    See id. at  744,  460 S.E.2d at  619.
Contempt
Finding the divorce decree was not void and that the record
contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding
of contempt, we hold the trial court did not err in holding
husband in contempt.
Affirmed.
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