59 Wn.2d 656, WILLIAM W. PARKS et al., Respondents, v. IRVING FARBER et al., Appellants
[No. 35743. Department One. Supreme Court March 16, 1962.]
WILLIAM W. PARKS et al., Respondents, v. IRVING FARBER
et al., Appellants.*
[1] AUTOMOBILES - LIABILITY FOR INJURIES - RIGHT OF WAY - DECEPTION - SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF - TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF SPEED LIMIT. In an action for personal injuries sustained in an intersectional automobile collision, the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider whether the disfavored driver was deceived by the conduct of the favored driver, where, although there was evidence that the favored driver was exceeding the speed limit by five miles per hour, there was nothing to indicate that the disfavored driver was aware of the alleged violation, since, in order to take the question of deception to the jury, the evidence must show that the favored driver's speed was so excessive that a reasonably prudent driver could have been deceived by it; and merely showing a technical violation of the speed limit is not sufficient.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 142180, Frank Hale, J., entered May 23, 1960. Reversed.
Action for personal injuries. Defendants appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.
Gordon, Goodwin, Sager, Hicks & Thomas, for appellants.
Edwin R. Johnson, for respondents.
FOSTER, J. -
In an automobile collision case, the defendants in the trial court appeal from a judgment for the disfavored driver and his wife, respondents William W. Parks and Grace Parks.1
The accident occurred at a nonarterial, uncontrolled, right-angle intersection in Tacoma. Appellant Stanley Farber, a minor and the driver of the appellants' car2 was the favored driver. RCW 46.60.150.3
* Reported in 369 P. (2d) 836.
[1] See Ann. 89 A. L. R. 838, 136 A. L. R. 1497, 164 A. L. R. 16, 59 A. L. R. (2d) 1218; Am. Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic 322.
1 Mrs. Parks joined as a plaintiff, but, because she is not an actor, is not referred to.
2 The car belonged to the parents, appellants Irving Farber and his wife Bess, but was driven by their son, Stanley Farber.
3 "`Every operator of a vehicle on approaching public highway intersections shall look out for and give right of way to vehicles on his right, simultaneously approaching a given point within the intersection. and whether his vehicle first reaches and enters the intersection or not: Provided, That this section shall not apply to operators on arterial highways or to vehicles entering an intersection which is posted with the `Yield Right of Way' sign." RCW 46.60.150.
Mar. 1962] PARKS v. FARBER. 657
At a point approximately forty feet before reaching the intersection, respondent William Parks looked to his right and did not observe any cars in that block up to the next intersection. Shortly before entering the intersection, he again looked right and observed the appellants' car to be "one hundred feet or more down the street," whereupon he started across North Sixth Street. There was nothing in the action of the appellant driver to indicate danger in crossing the intersection. The respondent did not form any opinion as to the speed of the appellants' vehicle, but there was evidence that it was traveling thirty miles per hour in a twenty-five-mile-per-hour zone. Respondent's car was partly out of the intersection when it was struck on the left rear fender by the bumper and right front fender of the appellants' car. Appellants' car left twenty-six feet of skid marks before the collision and six feet of skid marks thereafter. The respondent's car spun around, struck a curb and overturned on to its left side.
On the other hand, appellants' evidence was that their driver was not exceeding the speed limit. This was a dispute for the jury and not for the court, and here the evidence is viewed in the aspect most favorable to the respondent.
Both respondents, plaintiffs in the trial court, sued for personal injuries and property damage. The jury found for the respondents, and the appellants, defendants in the superior court, appeal from an adverse judgment upon the verdict.
Notwithstanding multiple assignments of error, the decisive issue is whether there was evidence that, upon entering the intersection, the respondent driver was deceived by the appellant driver.
[1] There was evidence that the appellant driver was
Mar. 1962] DAY v. FRAZER. 659
the judgment must be reversed with directions to dismiss the action.
FINLEY, C. J. HILL, WEAVER, and ROSELLINI, JJ., concur.
April 16, 1962. Petition for rehearing denied.