Opinion Information Sheet

			

   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

BONNIE ANTHIS, individually, and  )
as Personal Representative of the           )
Estate of HARVEY ALLEN                      )
ANTHIS,                                     )
                      Respondent,           )       No. 85230-8
                                            )
       v.                                   )       En Banc 
                                            )
WALTER WILLIAM COPLAND,                     )
                                            )
                      Petitioner.           )       Filed February 16, 2012
_______________________________)

       CHAMBERS, J.  --  Bonnie Anthis won a civil suit against Walter Copland 
for the wrongful death of her husband, Harvey Anthis.  Anthis sought to collect 
Copland's only known asset, his retirement pension, to satisfy the judgment.  
Copland, a retired police officer, argued that his Law Enforcement Officers' and 
Firefighters' Retirement System (LEOFF) pension money cannot be garnished even 
after it has been deposited into his personal bank account.  The trial court disagreed 
and ruled that the money in the account could be garnished.  Copland appealed, and 
the Court of Appeals certified the question to this court.  We accepted certification 
and now affirm the trial court.
                                             Facts
       Sometimes lives are altered, even destroyed, so suddenly and unexpectedly as 
to defy explanation.  Copland, a retired police officer from the city of Tacoma, spent  

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

the day with a friend, John Stevens, in Kennewick, Washington.  They spent some 
time at the Burbank Tavern in nearby Walla Walla County and then returned to 
Stevens' house in Kennewick.  In re Copland, No. 09-47782, 2010 WL 4809327, at 
*1 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Sept. 23, 2010) (unpublished).  
        On the way, Copland stopped to buy whiskey and vodka.  At Stevens' house 
Stevens' longtime friend Anthis joined the pair.  The three passed the afternoon on 
Stevens' outdoor deck drinking and eating and enjoying conversation about 
upcoming fishing trips.  That evening, in events described as "stunning both in their 
rapidity and unexpectedness," Copland said to Anthis, "'I could shoot and kill 
you,'" and Anthis responded, "'bring it on.'"  Id. Copland produced a .22 derringer 
and placed it up to Anthis' right temple.  No argument preceded the exchange, and 
Anthis did not move.  Stevens saw the flash, heard the shot, and saw Anthis fall off 
his chair to the floor.  Copland then returned to his seat, put the gun in his back 
pocket, placed his head in his hands and said, "'Oh, my God, I've killed Al.'"  Id.
In a flash, two lives were destroyed.
       Copland was convicted of first degree manslaughter and is serving time in 
prison.  See State v. Copland, noted at 140 Wn. App. 1006, 2007 WL 2254420.  
Separately, the Estate of Harvey Anthis obtained a civil judgment against Copland 
for the shooting death of Anthis.  See Anthis v. Copland, noted at 146 Wn. App. 
1020, 2008 WL 2933716.  After the civil judgment was upheld, Anthis attempted to 
collect Copland's pension funds.  Copland claimed his pension funds were exempt 
from garnishment or attachment.  The trial court disagreed and ruled that the funds 
were not exempt once deposited into Copland's personal bank account.  Copland 
                                               2 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

appealed the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals.  Br. of Appellant at 2.  
Copland also filed bankruptcy and attempted to discharge the estate's judgment.  
Resp't's Suppl. Br. (Ex. 1) at 7. The Court of Appeals stayed Copland's case 
pending determination of whether the bankruptcy proceedings precluded the Court 
of Appeals from asserting jurisdiction.  See id. at 1-3.  The parties provided 
documentation showing that the bankruptcy proceeding did not preclude the Court 
of Appeals from asserting jurisdiction.  See id.; see also Appellant's Suppl. Br. App. 
(Decl. of Lisa Worthington-Brown).  The Court of Appeals lifted the stay but
certified the matter to this court, and we accepted certification.1 We affirm the trial 

court.
                                     Standard of Review
       Construction of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo.  State v. 
Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 346, 68 P.3d 282 (2003) (citing City of Pasco v. Pub. 
Emp't Relations Comm'n, 119 Wn.2d 504, 507, 833 P.2d 381 (1992)).  A court 
interpreting a statute must discern and implement the legislature's intent.  State v. 
J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (citing Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n 
v. Riveland, 138 Wn.2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d 481 (1999)).  Where the plain language of a 
statute is unambiguous and legislative intent is apparent, we will not construe the 
statute otherwise.  Id.  Plain meaning may be gleaned "from all that the Legislature 
has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the 
provision in question."  Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 

1 The bankruptcy court eventually ruled the debt "arises from a willful and malicious injury and is 
not dischargeable."  Copland, 2010 WL 4809327, at *3.  
                                               3 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) (citing Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 
808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001)).  If the statute is still "susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation, then a court may resort to statutory construction, 
legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in determining legislative 
intent."  Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007)
(citing Cockle, 142 Wn.2d at 808). Exemption statutes should be liberally 
construed to give effect to their intent and purpose.  In re Elliott, 74 Wn.2d 600, 
620, 446 P.2d 347 (1968) (citing N. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kneisley, 193 Wash. 372, 
378, 76 P.2d 297 (1938)).
                                   Statutory Construction
       a. Plain Meaning of the Statute
       Chapter 41.26 RCW lays out the LEOFF retirement system.  The statute at issue 
in this case states:

       Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section, the right of a person to a 
       retirement allowance, disability allowance, or death benefit, to the return 
       of accumulated contributions, the retirement, disability or death allowance 
       itself, any optional benefit, any other right accrued or accruing to any 
       person under the provisions of this chapter, and the moneys in the fund 
       created under this chapter, are hereby exempt from any state, county, 
       municipal, or other local tax and shall not be subject to execution, 
       garnishment, attachment, the operation of bankruptcy or insolvency laws, 
       or any other process of law whatsoever, and shall be unassignable.
RCW 41.26.053(1). The question is whether this statute exempts the listed benefits 
from legal process even after the benefits have been distributed to the beneficiary.  
Copland argues that it does.  Br. of Appellant at 5-6.  But the statute by its terms does 
not indicate whether the legislature intended the various exempted rights listed to extend
                                               4 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

protection to the money after it has been distributed.
       Other benefits exemption statutes in Washington are similar, but not identical, to 
the LEOFF exemption statute.   RCW 41.40.052(1) exempts retirement benefits of 
members of the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS):2  

       Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section, the right of a person to a 
       pension, an annuity, or retirement allowance, any optional benefit, any 
       other right accrued or accruing to any person under the provisions of this 
       chapter, the various funds created by this chapter, and all moneys and 
       investments and income thereof, are hereby exempt from any state, 
       county, municipal, or other local tax, and shall not be subject to execution, 
       garnishment, attachment, the operation of bankruptcy or insolvency laws, 
       or other process of law whatsoever, and shall be unassignable.
There are several differences in language between the PERS statute and the LEOFF 
exemption statute.  Most significantly, the LEOFF statute exempts both the right "to a 
retirement allowance" and the right "to . . . the retirement . . . allowance itself."  
RCW 41.26.053(1) (emphasis added).  But some exemption statutes exempt only 
the right "to a . . . retirement allowance."  See, e.g., RCW 41.40.052(1) (PERS); 
RCW 2.12.090 (judicial pension exceptions).
       The exemption statute relating to private pension plans contains language similar 
to the PERS exemption statute:

       The right of a person to a pension, annuity, or retirement allowance or 
       disability allowance, or death benefits, or any optional benefit, or any 
       other right accrued or accruing to any citizen of the state of 
       Washington under any employee benefit plan, and any fund created by 
       such a plan or arrangement, shall be exempt from execution, 

2 The language used is identical to several other exemption statutes for other non-LEOFF public 
employee pensions.  See RCW 41.37.090 (public safety employees); RCW 41.32.052 (public school 
teachers).
                                               5 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

       attachment, garnishment, or seizure by or under any legal process 
       whatever. 
RCW 6.15.020(3).3 Again, like the PERS statute, this statute exempts only the right 

"to a . . . retirement allowance."  Unlike the LEOFF statute, it does not exempt the 
right to the allowance itself.
       Yet another statute lays out exemptions for federal benefits:

       Unless otherwise provided by federal law, any money received by any 
       citizen of the state of Washington as a pension from the government of 
       the United States, whether the same be in the actual possession of such 
       person or be deposited or loaned, shall be exempt from execution, 
       attachment, garnishment, or seizure by or under any legal process 
       whatever . . . . 
RCW 6.15.020(2). The difference in this language is immediately apparent; it 
plainly states that federal pensions are exempt whether they are "in the actual 
possession of [the pensioner] or be deposited or loaned."  That language is 
conspicuously absent in the nongovernment benefits subsection (3) above, 
which is essentially the same as the public employee statute in giving an 
exemption for the "right" to a "retirement allowance."  RCW 6.15.020(3).
       Copland in his briefing relies in part on the fact that the LEOFF exemption 
statute contains different language  --  "the right to the retirement allowance itself"  --  
than the PERS and other exemption statutes for both public and private employees.  
Br. of Appellant at 4-6 (emphasis added).  An examination of other state exemption 
statutes containing similar language reveals this is not a principled basis upon which 

3 This statute, like several others in this opinion, was changed in a recent legislative session.  
Some changes have already become effective while others are delayed until 2018.  See Laws of 
2011, ch. 162.  None of the changes are relevant to our analysis.
                                               6 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

to make a distinction.  
       Nearly all exemption statutes contain the same language, or substantially 
similar language, as the PERS or LEOFF statutes that exempt either the right to "a 
retirement allowance" or the retirement allowance "itself," and do not contain any 
language similar to that in the federal exemption statute suggesting that funds remain 
exempt postdistribution.  E.g., RCW 2.10.180 (judicial pensions); RCW 2.12.090 
(same); RCW 6.15.020(3) (pension money from employee benefit plan); RCW 
41.20.180 (police pensions in first-class cities); RCW 41.28.200 (public employees
in certain first-class cities); RCW 41.32.052 (teacher pensions); RCW 41.34.080 
(Plan 3 pension funds); RCW 41.35.100 (school employee pensions); RCW 
41.37.090 (public safety employee pensions); RCW 41.44.240 (city employee 
pensions); RCW 43.43.310 (Washington State Patrol).4  Some of the exemption 

statutes contain the "allowance itself" language.  E.g., RCW 2.10.180 (judicial 
pensions); RCW 41.26.053 (LEOFF); RCW 41.28.200 (public employees in certain 
first-class cities). Some contain only the "right to a retirement allowance" language.  
E.g., RCW 41.32.052 (teachers); RCW 41.37.090 (public safety employees); RCW 
41.40.052 (PERS). We perceive no reason why the legislature would provide 
substantially different protections for these various groups of beneficiaries.
       The legislature has given us no justification for treating the LEOFF statute 
differently from other benefits exemption statutes.  The question therefore becomes 

4 One exemption statute in Washington contains language found by the United States Supreme 
Court to protect funds after disbursement to the beneficiary in the context of Social Security.  
RCW 41.24.240 (volunteer firefighter and reserve officer pensions).  This is discussed further 
below at n.12.
                                               7 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

whether the language in the LEOFF exemption statute and the PERS and other 
exemption statutes -- "the right to the retirement allowance itself" or "the right to a 
retirement allowance" --  means the same thing as the language in the federal 
benefits exemption statute -- "whether . . . in actual possession . . . or be deposited 
or loaned."  Compare RCW 41.26.053(1), and RCW 41.40.052(1), with RCW 
6.15.020(2).  
       b. Case Law5
       This is a question of first impression in Washington.6 Because of the lack of 

Washington case law, we find it useful to explore how other federal and state courts 
have dealt with benefits exemption statutes in other jurisdictions to aid our interpretation 
of the statute at issue here.  
       Courts in other jurisdictions have generally, but not universally, held that 
some unambiguous reference to money actually paid to or in the possession of the 
pensioner is necessary in order to find that pension funds retain their exempt status 
postdistribution.  For example, in the federal courts, the language in the Social 

5 An extensive review of the legislative history of the exemption statutes sheds little light on the 
issue of whether funds may be garnished postdistribution.  We therefore do not address legislative 
history.  Similarly, there is no particular canon of construction that will aid us in determining 
whether language exempting a "right" to benefits continues to protect funds once they are in the 
beneficiary's bank account.
6 In its amicus brief, the Washington State Patrol Troopers Association directs the court's 
attention to a Court of Appeals case interpreting the PERS (rather than LEOFF) benefits 
exemption statute, which contains substantially similar language granting the "right" to a 
"retirement allowance."  RCW 41.40.052(1) . In Boronat, the Court of Appeals held that Mr. 
Boronat's pension could not be attached by Mrs. Boronat.  Boronat v. Boronat, 13 Wn. App. 
671, 674, 537 P.2d 1050 (1975).  But Mrs. Boronat "filed and served a writ of garnishment on 
the Washington State Employees Retirement System, seeking to recover from [Mr. Boronat's] 
contributions the amount owed her."  Id. at 672.  That is precisely the kind of action that the 
statute here plainly prohibits.  The question is whether such funds remain exempt once they leave 
the possession of the State and come into the possession of the beneficiary.
                                               8 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

Security Act prohibiting garnishment of "'the moneys paid or payable'" to a 
beneficiary has been held protected even after deposit.  Philpott v. Essex County 
Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 415-17, 93 S. Ct. 590, 34 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1973) (social 
security funds on deposit retain protection as "'moneys paid'" (quoting Social 
Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 208, 49 Stat. 620, 625 (1935))).  Similarly, 
language in the World War Veterans'Act of 19247 that funds were exempt "'either 

before or after receipt by the beneficiary'" has been held to protect funds 
postdistribution.  Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 160-62, 82 S. Ct. 
1231, 8 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1962) (veterans' benefits paid into savings and loan account 
were readily withdrawable and therefore retained protection (quoting World War 
Veterans' Act of 1924, ch. 510, § 3, 49 Stat. 607, 609 (1935))).
       In contrast, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th Circuits hold that language in the 
ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) statutes stating that "'[e]ach 
pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned 
or alienated'" does permit garnishment after the funds are deposited into the 
personal accounts of pensioners.  Hoult v. Hoult, 373 F.3d 47, 51 (1st Cir. 2004)
(alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)); see also id. at 54 ("If 
Congress had intended [the ERISA antialienation provision] to reach that far, it 
could easily have employed the type of language found, for example, in the Veterans 
Benefits Act . . . which prohibits attachment of benefits 'either before or after 

7 Since its inception, the World War Veterans Act of 1924 has undergone many amendments and 
now carries the popular name of "Veterans Benefits Act" or "Veterans' Benefits Act." The act is 
referred to in other cases cited herein by these later names, but the exemption language at issue 
has remained the same.

                                               9 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

receipt by the beneficiary.'  That Congress chose not to do so is 
significant."(citation omitted)).  But see U.S. v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 684 (4th Cir. 
1995) ("The government should not be allowed to do indirectly what it cannot do 
directly; it cannot require Smith to turn over his pension benefits in a lump sum, nor 
can it require him to turn over his benefits as they are paid to him.").8, 9

       Cases decided under state law have tended to follow the federal holdings
requiring explicit language to exempt benefit payments deposited into a personal 
bank account or otherwise placed into the personal possession of the debtor.1 A 

federal bankruptcy court applying Indiana law, for example, held that the Indiana 
statute at issue did not exempt funds postdistribution to the beneficiary because 
there was "no clear, explicit statement in [the statute] that the exemption provided 
for in an interest in a retirement fund applies to a distribution from such a fund in the 
hands of the participant."  In re Miller, 435 B.R. 561, 568 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2010).  
In an earlier case also applying Indiana law, the court noted that "[w]here the 
legislature of Indiana has given exemptions [to money in the hands of the debtor] it 

8 Only the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have addressed the issue.  The Fourth Circuit 
stands alone in its disagreement.
9 Although it has been characterized as dicta and thus not binding, the United States Supreme 
Court also appears to disagree with the Fourth Circuit, stating that "[The ERISA exemption 
statute] bars the assignment or alienation of pension plan benefits, and thus prohibits the use of 
state enforcement mechanisms only insofar as they prevent those benefits from being paid to plan 
participants."  Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 836, 108 S. Ct. 
2182, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
1 Some courts have also found significant language stating that an interest shall not be subject "'to 
garnishment, attachment or other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever . . . .'"  See 
In re Miller, 435 B.R. 561, 567 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting 45 
U.S.C. § 231m(a) (Railroad Retirement Act)).  This does at first seem similar to provisions in 
several of our state exemption statutes, which contain some variation of "or any other process of 
law whatsoever."  E.g., RCW 41.26.053(1).  But this argument fails because "any process 
whatsoever" is entirely different from "any circumstances whatsoever."
                                              10 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

has chosen statutory language which is clear and unequivocal."  In re Weaver, 
93 B.R. 172, 174 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988).  
       Courts in Michigan, Tennessee, and Kansas have similarly held explicit 
language is required.  A Michigan court of appeals recently held that garnishment 
was permissible after deposit of funds into the beneficiary's account where the 
exemption statute did "not include an express prohibition against garnishment of 
'moneys paid' as retirement benefits, but instead only protects a retiree's right to a 
benefit."  Whitwood, Inc. v. S. Blvd. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 265 Mich. App. 651, 655, 
701 N.W.2d 747 (2005). A federal bankruptcy court applying Tennessee law held 
that where one Tennessee statute expressly exempted all moneys received as a 
pension "'before receipt, or while in the resident's hands or upon deposit in the 
bank,'" another Tennessee exemption statute that did not contain such express 
language did not protect money after it came into the possession of the beneficiary.  
In re Lawrence, 219 B.R. 786, 794 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1998) (quoting Tenn. Code
Ann. § 26 -- 2 -- 104(a)). A bankruptcy court in Kansas adopted the reasoning of the 
Lawrence court in interpreting similar state statutes.  In re Adcock, 264 B.R. 708, 
711-12 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2000).11

11 Ohio is an exception to the general consensus.  The state courts there have held, even where the 
statutory language is somewhat ambiguous, that "statutorily exempt funds do not lose their 
exempt status by voluntary deposit into a checking account, as long as the source of the exempt 
funds is known or is reasonably traceable."  Haggerty v. George, No. 00-C.A.-86, 2001-Ohio-
3481, 2001 WL 1647216 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2001) (unpublished) (citing Daugherty v. Cent. 
Trust Co. of Ne. Ohio, N.A., 28 Ohio St. 3d 441, 504 N.E.2d 1100 (1986)). However, Ohio's 
statutory scheme is different from our own.  There, exempt funds are expressly listed under 
"property exempt from execution, garnishment, attachment, or sale."  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
2329.66(A) (emphasis added).  In Washington, however, the list of exempt property is separated 
from the pension exemption statutes.  Compare RCW 6.15.010, with RCW 6.15.020.  West 
Virginia has similarly held that placement of funds in a bank does not strip them of their protected 
                                              11 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

       Both federal and state cases generally indicate that statutorily exempt funds, 
whatever their predistribution nature, may be garnished after they come into the 
personal possession of the beneficiary, including deposit into a personal account, 
unless the legislature provides some express language to the contrary.12

       c. Other Exemptions in Washington
       In addition to the statutes already examined, other exemption statutes in 
Washington support the claim that the LEOFF exemptions do not continue once 
pension funds are deposited into the personal account of the beneficiary. First, the 
personal property exemption statute, which lists personal items exempt from 
attachment, does not mention money from retirement benefits.13 RCW 6.15.010.

       Second, the statute establishing the form that must be served as notice of 
garnishment to a debtor does not mention state pensions of any kind.  The codified
form in part tells the debtor what funds in a bank account may be claimed as 
exempt:

       If the garnishee is a bank or other institution with which you have an 
       account in which you have deposited benefits such as Temporary 
       Assistance for Needy Families, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 
       Social Security, veterans' benefits, unemployment compensation, or a 
       United States pension, you may claim the account as fully exempt if 

character.  See Billingslea v. Tartell, 127 W.Va. 750, 759-60, 35 S.E.2d 89 (1945). 
12 The dissent gives a long list of cases purportedly holding that the "exemption status of money 
is not destroyed upon its deposit in a bank."  Dissent at 14 n.1. Those cases are distinguishable 
because all but one of them interprets statutes that do not use the ambiguous language used by the 
Washington legislature.  Moreover, none of those cases address circumstances like those here, 
where another state exemption statute clearly and unambiguously exempts funds after deposit. 
13 The statute lists "personal property [that shall] be exempt from execution, attachment, and 
garnishment."  RCW 6.15.010(1). It includes items such as "wearing apparel," "private libraries," 
and "family pictures and keepsakes."  RCW 6.15.010(1)(a), (b). 
                                              12 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

       you have deposited only such benefit funds in the account.
RCW 6.27.140(1).  None of the funds mentioned include any state pensions.  
Moreover, everything on the list is related to a federal program, which accords with
the unambiguous statutory exemption of federal pension money even after deposit.
See RCW 6.15.020(2).
       We emphasize that the legislature may expressly extend exemption protection 
to state pension funds after they come into the personal possession of the 
beneficiary.  But here the legislature had a clear blueprint for express language that 
would grant pension moneys such protection.  Federal benefits are exempt "whether 
the same be in the actual possession of [the beneficiary] or be deposited or loaned."  
RCW 6.15.020(2). That language has been in place for well over a century.  Laws 
of 1890, § 1, at 88. The legislature chose to use different language for protection of
state retirement benefits, granting only a "right" to the benefits.  E.g., RCW 
41.26.053(1) (LEOFF exemption statute); RCW 41.40.052(1) (PERS exemption 
statute).  Other related exemption statutes similarly contain no indication that the 
state benefits exemptions continue beyond the point when the State disburses the 
funds.14 Federal and state case law interpreting similar statutes in other jurisdictions

14 One exemption statute in Washington contains the "paid or payable" language found by the 
United States Supreme Court in Philpott to protect funds after disbursement to the beneficiary in 
the context of Social Security.  Compare RCW 41.24.240 (volunteer firefighter and reserve 
officer pensions), with Philpott, 409 U.S. at 415 n.3, 416-17.  As noted above, all other 
exemption statutes are written in substantially similar language exempting either the right to "a 
retirement allowance" or to the "allowance itself" and do not contain the phrase "paid or 
payable."  E.g., RCW 2.10.180 (judicial pensions); RCW 41.26.053 (LEOFF); RCW 41.28.200 
(public employees in certain first-class cities); RCW 41.32.052 (teacher pensions); RCW 
41.37.090 (public safety employees pensions); RCW 41.40.052 (PERS).  Neither the statute nor 
the legislative history offers any reason why the legislature would provide greater protection to 
volunteer firefighters' and reserve officers' pensions than to full time firefighting and law 
enforcement employees, or other state and local government employees.
                                              13 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

have required express language for such heightened protection, especially where 
other statutes in the same jurisdiction explicitly and unambiguously grant that 
protection. We recognize the general principle that exemption statutes are to be 
liberally construed.  Elliott, 74 Wn.2d at 620.  But we decline to read into the 
statute language the legislature has omitted, whether intentionally or inadvertently, 
unless it is required to make the statute rational or to effectuate the clear intent of 
the legislature.  See State v. Taylor, 97 Wn.2d 724, 728-29, 649 P.2d 633 (1982).  
We hold that absent express statutory language to the contrary, Copland's LEOFF 
pension is not exempt from garnishment once it has been deposited into his personal 
account.
                                    Earnings Exemptions
       Finally, Copland argues that even if his funds are not exempt once placed in his 
personal account, he is entitled to an earnings exemption under chapter 6.27 RCW.  
RCW 6.27.010(1) defines "earnings" as "compensation paid or payable to an individual 
for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or 
otherwise . . . includ[ing] periodic payments pursuant to a nongovernmental pension or 
retirement program."  Since Copland's pension is a state pension, he cannot claim it 
as earnings.  Any other interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute 
and leads to absurd results. The statute by its terms applies only to "a 
nongovernmental pension."  RCW 6.27.010(1) (emphasis added).  In addition, 
"earnings" can be partially garnished while still in the hands of the employer, before 
it reaches the employee debtor.  RCW 6.27.150(4).  But the state pension 
exemption statutes plainly prohibit any garnishment at all of pension funds while 
                                              14 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

still in the hands of the State.  E.g., RCW 41.40.052.  Thus Copland's state 
pension cannot be earnings.15

                                         Conclusion
       Washington has one statute that exempts a beneficiary's money "whether [it] 
be in the actual possession of such person or be deposited or loaned."  RCW 
6.15.020(2).  Other exemption statutes exempt only "[t]he right . . . to a . . . 
retirement allowance." RCW 6.15.020(3). The survey of case law and the plain 
language in the LEOFF and related exemption statutes indicate that the latter 
statutes exempt funds before they are given into the hands of the beneficiary, but not 
after receipt.  We hold that the LEOFF exemption statute does not exempt 
retirement funds from garnishment after they have been paid to the retiree.  If the 
legislature wants to give such a privilege to police officers and firefighters, or indeed 
to any state employee, it must say so with the same unequivocal language used in 
the federal pensions exemption statute.  Copland's right to the retirement allowance 
itself was not disturbed -- the "allowance itself" was deposited into his personal 
checking account.  At that point, his right was satisfied and does not extend so far as 
to provide a permanent shield from all his debts.  Moreover, Copland's pension 
moneys are not earnings and are therefore not entitled to any earnings exemption.  
The trial court is affirmed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.

15 The word "nongovernmental" was inserted in 2003.  Laws of 2003, ch. 222, § 16.  According 
to the House Bill Report, it was added for clarity in light of the fact that government pensions are 
not subject to garnishment, at least while still in the hands of the State.  See H.B. Rep on 
Substitute S.B. 5592, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003).  
                                              15 

Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

AUTHOR:
        Justice Tom Chambers

WE CONCUR:
                                                         Justice James M. Johnson

        Justice Charles W. Johnson

                                                         Justice Charles K. Wiggins

                                                         Gerry L. Alexander, Justice Pro Tem.

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Anthis (Bonnie) v. Copland (Walter), No. 85230-8

                                              17