Supreme Court of the State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
82951-9 |
Title of Case: |
In re Pers. Restraint of Scott |
File Date: |
03/01/2012 |
Oral Argument Date: |
11/16/2010 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
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JUSTICES
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Barbara A. Madsen | Dissent in part Author | |
Charles W. Johnson | Dissent Author | |
Tom Chambers | Lead Opinion Author | |
Susan Owens | Signed Lead Opinion | |
Mary E. Fairhurst | Signed Concurrence | |
James M. Johnson | Signed Dissent in part | |
Debra L. Stephens | Concurrence Author | |
Charles K. Wiggins | Did Not Participate | |
Steven C. González | Did Not Participate | |
Gerry L. Alexander, Justice Pro Tem. | Signed Dissent | |
Richard B. Sanders, Justice Pro Tem. | Signed Dissent | |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
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Counsel for Petitioner(s) |
| Michelle Hyer |
| Pierce County Prosecutor |
| 930 Tacoma Ave S Rm 946 |
| Tacoma, WA, 98402-2102 |
|
| Kathleen Proctor |
| Pierce County Prosecuting Atty Ofc |
| 930 Tacoma Ave S Rm 946 |
| Tacoma, WA, 98402-2171 |
|
| Thomas Charles Roberts |
| Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney |
| 930 Tacoma Ave S Rm 946 |
| Tacoma, WA, 98402-2171 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| Suzanne Lee Elliott |
| Attorney at Law |
| Hoge Building |
| 705 2nd Ave Ste 1300 |
| Seattle, WA, 98104-1797 |
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Scott (Joshua Dean)
No. 82951-9
C. JOHNSON, J. (dissenting) -- The issue in this case, properly
framed, is whether a judgment and sentence could ever be valid when a
judge sentences someone for something the jury did not find. The answer
to that question is, and should always be, no.
The lead opinion concludes correctly that we may consult the verdict
forms to illuminate whether the defendant's judgment and sentence is valid
on its face. The lead opinion then proceeds, however, to incorrectly apply
the information the verdict forms disclose. It is, or at least should be, self-
evident that a judge lacks authority to impose a sentence in excess of that
legally authorized. Yet that is precisely what the judge in this case did. And
the lead opinion, after consulting the verdict forms evidencing this
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Scott (Joshua Dean)
unauthorized act, concludes the trial court did not exceed its authority. This
conclusion is vexing.
That the judgment and sentence in this case was final before
Recuenco III is not dispositive of whether the trial court exceeded its
authority, which it necessarily did when it sentenced the defendant for a
crime not found by the jury. State v. Recuenco, 163 Wn.2d 428, 442, 180
P.3d 1276 (2008) (Recuenco III). Incredibly, the lead opinion concludes the
defendant in this case is not entitled the "benefit" of our holding in Recuenco
III. The lead opinion bases this conclusion on its view that our opinion in
that case is a static point on a Blakely Sixth Amendment jurisprudential
timeline. Because the defendant's judgment and sentence became final
prior to Recuenco III, the lead opinion reasons, the principles supporting our
holding in that case do not apply. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124
S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). This view is incorrect. In Recuenco
III, we concluded the error occurred when "the trial judge imposed a
sentence enhancement for something the State did not ask for and the jury
did not find. The trial court simply exceeded its authority in imposing a
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In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Scott (Joshua Dean)
sentence not authorized by the charges." Recuenco, 163 Wn.2d at 442. In
other words, we recognized that the error occurred after the jury verdict, that
is, after the rights the Sixth Amendment protects had been upheld.
Recuenco, 163 Wn.2d at 441. An error at sentencing, therefore, does not
implicate the Sixth Amendment exclusively. I believe it is also a due
process violation to convict a defendant of one offense and sentence for
another. That such a violation existed prior to Recuenco III should not be
remarkable or, in my opinion, even questionable. And our recognition of this
type of violation in Recuenco III did not somehow make it "new."
"[A] careful review of our cases reveals that we have only found errors
rendering a judgment invalid under RCW 10.73.090 where a court has in
fact exceeded its statutory authority in entering the judgment or sentence."
In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 135, 267 P.3d 324 (2011).
The lead opinion's conclusion that a court does not exceed its authority by
sentencing someone for something the jury did not find borders on
absurdity. A judgment and sentence should always be invalid following such
an act, regardless of when the judgment and sentence became final.
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In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Scott (Joshua Dean)
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In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Scott (Joshua Dean)
AUTHOR:
Justice Charles W. Johnson
WE CONCUR:
Gerry L. Alexander, Justice Pro Tem.
Richard B. Sanders, Justice Pro
Tem.
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