DO NOT CITE. SEE GR 14.1(a).
Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
66943-5 |
Title of Case: |
In Re The Welfare Of: C.a.h. Jr., Carey Hayes Sr., App V. Dept. Of Social & Health Services, Resp |
File Date: |
03/05/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Snohomish Superior Court |
Docket No: | 10-7-00563-0 |
Judgment or order under review |
Date filed: | 03/31/2011 |
Judge signing: | Honorable Ellen J. Fair |
JUDGES
------
Authored by | Mary Kay Becker |
Concurring: | Linda Lau |
| Ann Schindler |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| Washington Appellate Project |
| Attorney at Law |
| 1511 Third Avenue |
| Suite 701 |
| Seattle, WA, 98101 |
|
| Monty James Booth |
| Monty J Booth - Attorney at Law PS |
| 3014 Hoyt Ave |
| Everett, WA, 98201-4005 |
|
| Sarah Mcneel Hrobsky |
| Washington Appellate Project |
| 1511 3rd Ave Ste 701 |
| Seattle, WA, 98101-3647 |
|
| Nielsen Broman Koch PLLC |
| Attorney at Law |
| 1908 E Madison St |
| Seattle, WA, 98122 |
|
| Peter Carl Lawson |
| Attorney at Law |
| 11335 Ne 122nd Way Ste 105 |
| Kirkland, WA, 98034-6933 |
|
| Casey Grannis |
| Nielsen Broman & Koch, PLLC |
| 1908 E Madison St |
| Seattle, WA, 98122-2842 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| Arlene K Anderson |
| Office of the Attorney General |
| 3501 Colby Ave Ste 200 |
| Everett, WA, 98201-4795 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Dependency of )
C.H., DOB 1/1/09; R.P., DOB 4/15/01; ) No. 66943-5 (consolidated
and R.W., DOB 4/12/06. ) with 67047-6, 67048-4 & 67049-2)
)
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) DIVISION ONE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND )
HEALTH SERVICES, )
)
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
TAJANA WALLACE, )
)
Appellant. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
------------------------------------------------------)
In the Matter of the Dependency of ) FILED: March 5, 2012
C.H., DOB 1/1/09. )
)
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND )
HEALTH SERVICES, )
)
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
CAREY ALLEN HAYES, SR., )
)
Appellant. )
________________________________)
Becker, J. -- The trial court terminated Tajana Wallace's parental rights
to three of her children. The trial court also terminated the parental rights of
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Carey Hayes, father to the youngest of the three children. Because substantial
evidence supports the trial court's termination orders, we affirm.
FACTS
According to the findings of fact not challenged on appeal, Tajana
Wallace, 37 years old, is the biological mother of nine children. None of her
children are in her care. Three of Wallace's children are at issue in this
consolidated case: RP, a boy age 9; RW, a girl age 4; and CH, a boy age 2.1
The biological father of CH is Carey Hayes, 45 years old. The biological father
of RP and alleged father of RW is a different man whose parental rights were
terminated by default; he is not a party to this case. Hayes is also the biological
father of Wallace's two youngest children, ZH and AH. At the time of trial, these
two children were subject to different dependency proceedings. They are not at
issue in this case.
According to testimony at trial, Wallace met Hayes through mutual
friends. They had a romantic relationship from 2007 into 2010. At trial in
December 2010, both said that they were not in a relationship, but considered
themselves friends.
Wallace is divorced. Hayes is married. Hayes has no biological children
with his wife. He has a son from a previous relationship, age 19. His wife has
children from another relationship.
Hayes has a significant history of felony convictions and of selling drugs
1 Ages are as of the time of the termination trial which started in December
2010.
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to support himself. Hayes' testimony indicates that he has not had steady
employment. He most recently did seasonal work, including lawn and ground
maintenance.
Wallace has a 20 year history with the Department of Social and Health
Services (Department), including a previous termination of her parental rights.
She has struggled with substance abuse and addiction. She has tried drug
treatment at least five times between 2001 and 2010.
In December 2008, Wallace was admitted to a residential chemical
dependency treatment program for pregnant women. During her stay there, she
gave birth to CH in January 2009. Shortly thereafter, the State filed dependency
petitions against Wallace for RP, RW, and CH in Snohomish County. RP and
RW were placed in protective custody on March 9, 2009. These children were
found to be dependent as to Wallace on April 14, 2009.
The Department identified Wallace's parental deficiencies as including a
long and extensive history of drug addiction and abuse, mental health issues,
parental incompetency or a general inability to parent, legal problems, and a
lack of safe, stable, and suitable housing. Services offered to Wallace included
the dependency process workshop, drug and alcohol evaluation and treatment,
random urinalysis testing, parenting classes, parenting assessment, mental
health therapy, and casework management.
After CH was born, Hayes did not initially establish paternity. According
to the dependency petition filed by the State against Wallace, Hayes was asked
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to take voluntary urinalysis testing shortly after the birth of CH. But in March
2009, he told a Department social worker that he would no longer do urinalysis
testing and would not cooperate with the Department. According to Marie
Ramirez, the social worker assigned to CH's case in 2010, Hayes did not
communicate further with the Department until August 2009. In that month, he
finally established paternity.
Wallace's substance abuse problem continued in 2009. After she
completed the residential treatment program in June 2009, she was abusing
substances again by the next month. CH was removed from her care on July 20,
2009, and placed elsewhere. In July and September of 2009, Wallace was
arrested for probation violations. Her drug treatment sentencing alternative was
revoked, and she was sent to prison.
Hayes was served with a dependency petition in August 2009. He did not
file a response. CH was found dependent by default as to Hayes on October 27,
2009. The court ordered Hayes to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation,
participate in random urinalysis testing, and complete a mental health
assessment.
Wallace, still in prison, gave birth to their second child, ZH, on January 8,
2010. ZH was released into Hayes' care.
Wallace's substance abuse problems continued. After her incarceration,
she was released to a clean and sober house in March 2010. A couple of
months later in May, however, she was found in her room, unresponsive, with
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numerous narcotic prescriptions. Paramedics were called and were able to
revive her with a treatment used for narcotic drug overdose. The State moved to
terminate Wallace's parental rights on May 6, 2010. In August 2010, she
completed an inpatient treatment program. By September 2010, she was using
and abusing prescription pain medication.
Meanwhile, Hayes initially appeared to be making some progress. In the
first half of 2010, he appeared to be taking good care of ZH and was also
involved with CH. Asked when Hayes started his visits with CH, Ramirez
testified it was her understanding that, excluding Hayes' absence and
noncooperation with the Department from March to August 2009, Hayes was
"involved pretty much all along." According to Ramirez, Hayes' visits were
reported to go well and were regular from August 2009 up to May 2010. A letter
from the Odessa Brown Children's Clinic, where CH had been seen from
January to May 2009, stated that Hayes was an involved parent and active in
CH's health care. Ramirez admitted the Department was considering the
possibility of transferring CH to Hayes' care in 2010.
Ramirez testified that the Department began to take a less favorable view
of Hayes in April and May 2010 upon learning that he had recently been in jail.
The record indicates Hayes was in jail from May 3 to May 6, 2010, for failure to
appear at a probation violation hearing in October 2009. Ramirez heard from a
Department of Corrections employee that ZH had been left in Wallace's care by
Hayes while he was in jail. Moreover, according to an unchallenged finding,
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Wallace herself voiced concerns to department staff in May 2010 about Hayes'
drug use, his temper, and his behavior around his stepchildren.
The State filed its petition to terminate Hayes' parental rights with CH on
May 6, 2010. The petition stated in part that Hayes was currently parenting his
youngest child, ZH, but it had not been determined whether he is capable of
parenting more than one child. The petition also stated Hayes was mainly
compliant with court ordered services.
According to an unchallenged finding, in May 2010, someone at the
Department called the police to conduct a welfare check on ZH because Hayes
had not complied with a request to bring ZH to meet with a Department social
worker. On May 13, police went to an address provided by Hayes, but it was
actually the home of Hayes' wife. Police found Hayes and his wife there with
ZH. Police arrested Hayes after discovering that he had a no-contact order with
his wife. A police report states that as Hayes was being arrested, Hayes
pleaded, "please don't do this, they're gonna take my kids." Hayes elbowed one
of the officers in the face. The State charged Hayes with assault and violation of
a no-contact order. Hayes pleaded guilty, and his suspended sentence on the
previous domestic violence charge from 2009 was revoked. As a result, he was
incarcerated from May 2010 to January 2011. He was unable to participate in
services because there were no services reasonably available to him in jail.
A consolidated termination of parental rights trial began on December 2,
2010. It was interrupted in mid-December because of the impending birth of
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Wallace's and Hayes' third child. This child, AH, was born in January 2011,
addicted to opiates that Wallace ingested while pregnant. Because AH had
withdrawal symptoms at birth, the child was required to stay in a pediatric interim
care center unit in Kent for 24 days. Hayes, recently released from jail, was able
to visit the baby, but lost his temper with the staff and was banned from further
visits unless accompanied by a professional supervisor. Hayes missed three out
of six postrelease urinalysis tests despite being warned that unexcused tests
would be considered positive.
Trial resumed and concluded in February 2011. The trial court terminated
Wallace's parental rights to RP, RW, and CH on March 25, 2011. At the same
time, the court terminated Hayes' parental relationship to CH. Both Hayes and
Wallace appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The paramount goal of child welfare legislation is to reunite the child with
his or her legal parents, if reasonably possible. In re Dependency of K.N.J., 171
Wn.2d 568, 577, 257 P.3d 522 (2011). Procedures used to terminate the
relationship between parent and child must meet the requisites of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d at 574.
To terminate the parent-child relationship, the State must satisfy two
prongs. K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d at 576. The first prong focuses on the adequacy of
the parents and requires proof of the six elements set out in RCW 13.34.180.
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K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d at 576. These elements must be proved by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence. K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d at 576-77. Clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence exists when the ultimate fact in issue is shown by the
evidence to be highly probable. In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wn.2d 129, 141,
904 P.2d 1132 (1995). The six statutory elements are (1) that the child has been
found to be a dependent child; (2) that the court has entered a dispositional
order pursuant to RCW 13.34.130; (3) that the child has been removed or will, at
the time of the hearing, have been removed from the custody of the parent for a
period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency; (4) that the
services rendered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and
understandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably
available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable
future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided; (5) that
there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be
returned to the parent in the near future; and (6) that continuation of the parent
and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early
integration into a stable and permanent home. RCW 13.34.180(1); K.N.J., 171
Wn.2d at 577. If the State satisfies the first prong, the court proceeds to the
second prong, determining if termination is in the best interest of the child. RCW
13.34.190(1)(b). K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d at 577. The second step need only be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wn.2d
908, 911, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010).
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If substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings in light of the
degree of proof required, an order terminating parental rights must be affirmed.
In re Dependency of T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149, 161, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001).
Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded rational
person of the truth of the declared premise. In re Welfare of C.B., 134 Wn. App.
942, 953, 143 P.3d 846 (2006). In this review, we do not make credibility
determinations and we do not weigh the evidence. C.B., 134 Wn. App. at 953.
Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Welfare of C.B., 134
Wn. App. 336, 349, 139 P.3d 1119 (2006). Whether a termination order
satisfies statutory requirements is a question of law. K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d at 574.
We review questions of law de novo. K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d at 574.
Both Wallace and Hayes argue the State failed to provide all necessary
services in accordance with the fourth statutory element. Additionally, Hayes
contends that as to him, the State failed to prove the last two statutory elements
and that the trial court erred by concluding termination was in the best interests
of CH.
WALLACE
The State has a duty to provide all court ordered and necessary services
and to offer services that are tailored to each parent's needs. In re Dependency
of D.A., 124 Wn. App. 644, 651, 102 P.3d 847 (2004), review denied, 154 Wn.2d
1030 (2005). At trial, Wallace argued that a psychological evaluation was a
necessary service that the State failed to offer in a timely manner as required by
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the fourth statutory element.
In relation to RP, RW, and CH, Wallace was not ordered to participate in
a psychological evaluation until January 2011, which was during the termination
proceedings. However, Wallace was earlier ordered in the King County
dependency of ZH to participate in a psychological evaluation in July 2010. The
trial court found that a psychological evaluation was not a necessary service in
the present case in light of Wallace's "fairly complete failure to access services":
The mother has not accessed the services that were ordered
throughout the dependency. The mother has had multiple failed
treatment attempts and has been incarcerated more than once
during this dependency.
. . . .
Given the mother's fairly complete failure to access services while
this case was pending, along with the seriousness and
pervasiveness of her parental deficiencies, the court finds that the
psychological evaluation is not a necessary service that is
reasonably capable of correcting the mother's parental deficiencies
within the foreseeable future.
Wallace challenges these findings.
Wallace maintains a psychological evaluation was necessary as a matter
of law because if offered earlier, it could have led to uncovering problems that
might have prevented her from completing other services that were offered. She
contends that a psychological evaluation is a service uniquely capable of
identifying impediments that prevent a parent from accessing other services.
To support her argument, Wallace relies principally on In re S.J., 162 Wn.
App. 873, 256 P.3d 470 (2011). In that case, SJ was removed from his mother's
care due in part to his mother's drug use. Under the agreed dependency order,
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the mother was to complete a substance abuse evaluation and treatment, submit
to random urinalysis testing, complete a psychological evaluation and participate
in mental health services. The Department did not refer the mother to a
psychological evaluation until about six months later because the order stated
the evaluation was not to be conducted until the mother was sober. When the
mother completed the evaluation, she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and
borderline intellectual functioning. After this diagnosis, the mother actively
participated in counseling sessions. Despite her earlier failures, these sessions
led to improvement and successful inpatient treatment. This court determined
that the State failed to provide timely mental health services. The termination
order was reversed. In re S.J., 162 Wn. App. at 882-84.
S.J. does not hold that a psychological evaluation is required as a matter
of law in all cases to satisfy the fourth element. S.J. is materially distinct from
this case. The mother in S.J., unlike Wallace, was fully engaged in her services.
Wallace, in contrast, declined services on numerous occasions. When a parent
is unwilling or unable to make use of the services provided, the Department is
not required to offer still other services that might have been helpful. In re
Dependency of T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149, 163, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001). The record
indicates that Wallace's primary deficiency was substance abuse. Wallace was
offered random urinalysis testing, substance abuse treatment, and mental health
counseling. She did not make use of these services with any consistency, and
she did not progress to any significant degree in treatment. These facts support
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the determination that no other services available to Wallace were capable of
correcting her parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.
Also unlike the mother in S.J., Wallace did have the opportunity to receive
mental health services without the condition that she first deal with drug abuse.
Barbara Hinchcliffe, a mental health counselor for the perinatal services
program, testified Wallace had a referral for a psychiatric assessment during her
six month stay at the program. She was found to be depressed and was
prescribed an anti-depressant.
Wallace challenges the finding of her "fairly complete failure" to access
the services while the case was pending. The record defeats the challenge, as it
shows that she was unwilling to make use of many of the services provided to
her, including those that might have remedied her substance abuse issue.
Community corrections officer Michelle Brown testified that Wallace came to her
office and said she did not think she needed treatment. Wallace does not deny
that her participation in the provided services was inconsistent. Wallace's
failure to engage in the services provided supports the conclusion that a
psychological evaluation was not a necessary service.
In summary, Wallace fails to provide a basis for overturning the trial
court's determination that all necessary services were provided.
HAYES
Hayes contends the State did not establish the last three statutory
elements of RCW 13.34.180(1). He also argues termination of his parental
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rights is not in the best interests of CH.
The trial court identified Hayes' parental deficiencies as "domestic
violence as a perpetrator; substance abuse; ongoing criminal behavior which
affects his ability to parent, and lack of safe, stable and suitable housing." Like
Wallace, Hayes contends the Department failed to provide reasonably available
services capable of addressing these alleged deficiencies. Specifically, he
contends the Department should have timely offered him a psychological
evaluation and domestic violence treatment.
The trial court entered findings stating that Hayes did not access the
services ordered, that he failed to engage in any services after release from
incarceration in January 2011, that a psychological evaluation was not a
necessary service, and that Hayes was at best only marginally engaged in
services. Hayes challenges these and other findings. The State responds there
was substantial evidence showing Hayes was largely unwilling or unable to
make use of the services provided, and therefore, the Department was excused
from offering other services.
The record shows that Hayes did access some services. For example, a
permanency planning hearing order, filed February 11, 2010, describes Hayes'
compliance and progress as "partial." The order states that he participated in a
drug and alcohol assessment, completed a dependency process workshop on
December 18, 2009, and participated in random urinalyses.
Nevertheless, the trial court did not err in finding that Hayes' failure to
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access services was "fairly complete." For example, Hayes went to a drug and
alcohol evaluation on January 7, 2010, at Catholic Community Services. The
social worker doing the evaluation was unable to determine whether Hayes had
sufficient symptoms to indicate abuse or addiction. She wrote a letter to Hayes
and the Department challenging his report of his drug use, noting that he did not
disclose he was subject to four charges involving controlled substances between
1992 and 1999. The letter advised Hayes that it would be beneficial for him to
return, but he did not, and there is no evidence that Hayes ever had another
evaluation.
Hayes also missed many urinalysis tests. His record of complying with
random urinalysis tests throughout 2009 was sporadic. After being released
from jail in January 2011, he missed three out of six.
Hayes also failed to complete a mental health evaluation. He testified
that he had problems securing a medical coupon to pay for an evaluation, but
the trial court was not obliged to accept this excuse as it was Hayes'
responsibility to contact the Department about payment issues. His failure to
follow through, on this record, is substantial evidence of a failure to access
services. Moreover, Hayes testified he did not think he needed mental health
treatment.
In general, Hayes resisted the need for services and stated more than
once that he did not think he needed services. At trial, he first denied he had
any problems. But he later acknowledged that drugs caused him problems.
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Despite admitting that he tested positive for cocaine in a urinalysis test in 2009
(and that he missed many urinalyses), Hayes maintained his only problem with
drugs was that he sold them, not that he used them.
On the domestic violence issue, Ramirez testified at trial that she and the
Department were unaware that Hayes had a history of domestic violence until he
was arrested at his wife's residence in May 2010. Until then, Ramirez knew of
his criminal history up to January 2009, the month when the dependency
petitions were filed against Wallace, but did not know that Hayes assaulted his
wife in March 2009, setting in motion a domestic violence case that resulted in
Hayes pleading guilty in June 2009. After learning that Hayes had a history of
domestic violence, Ramirez considered adding a service to address the issue,
but testified that she decided not to because Hayes was ordered to get domestic
violence treatment as part of his sentence for assaulting his wife. Hayes paid
$100 for a domestic violence assessment on May 12, 2010, but he was unable
to follow through with treatment because he was arrested the following day and
held in jail where no services were available. Thus, the trial court properly
attributed his inability to obtain services for domestic violence to his own
misconduct rather than finding the department failed to offer the service.
Even if the record had compelled a finding that the Department did not
timely offer services aimed at addressing the issue of domestic violence, mental
health, and drug abuse, termination is appropriate if the service would not have
remedied the parent's deficiencies in the foreseeable future. See In re
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Dependency of T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 164. The trial court determined that the
foreseeable future for CH was six months or less. The evidence shows that
when Hayes was offered services, he made little progress in correcting his
parental deficiencies. For example, he missed three urinalysis tests while the
termination trial was pending. There was also evidence that domestic violence
treatment for Hayes would take one year.
Hayes argues there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the
foreseeable future for CH was six months or less. The foreseeable future is
determined based upon the age of the child at the time of the proceedings. In re
Dependency of T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 164. Here, CH was two years old at the
time of trial. He has been in out-of-home care since he was six months old,
when his mother was released from the residential drug treatment program
where she was staying at the time of his birth. At the time of termination, CH
had been in foster care for most of his life. Given these facts, the trial court
reasonably determined that the foreseeable future was six months or less for
CH. See In re Dependency of P.A.D., 58 Wn. App. 18, 27, 792 P.2d 159 (six
months not in the "near future" for a 15-month-old child), review denied, 115
Wn.2d 1019 (1990).
We conclude the evidence satisfies the fourth statutory element. More
services would not have corrected Hayes' parental deficiencies in the
foreseeable future. The fifth element is also supported by the record. There
was little likelihood that the conditions of Hayes' life would change such that he
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could assume the responsibility of providing a home for CH in the near future.
Hayes also argues that the State failed to prove the sixth element -- that
continuation of the parent-child relationship would clearly diminish the child's
prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.
CH was in a stable placement with a relative who was agreeable to
providing a long-term placement. Hayes contends that because terminating his
rights would not result in change to CH's living situation, the court should have
given him more time to prove his readiness to be a parent.
The main focus of the sixth statutory element is the parent-child
relationship and whether it impedes the child's prospects for integration, not
what constitutes a stable and permanent home. In re Dependency of K.S.C.,
137 Wn.2d 918, 927, 976 P.2d 113 (1999). This factor is mainly concerned with
the continued effect of the legal relationship between parent and child, as an
obstacle to adoption; it is especially a concern where children have potential
adoption resources. In re Dependency of A.C., 123 Wn. App. 244, 250, 98 P.3d
89 (2004). Foster care is not a permanent home. Here, CH was in a placement
with relatives who were willing to adopt him. He had been there for over a year.
The trial court did not err in finding that the parent-child relationship between CH
and Hayes would clearly diminish CH's prospects for early integration into a
stable and permanent home.
The final issue is the court's determination that termination was in the
best interest of CH. This depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
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In re Dependency of A.M., 106 Wn. App. 123, 131, 22 P.3d 828, review denied,
144 Wn.2d 1015 (2001); In re Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. 562, 572, 815
P.2d 277 (1991).
There was evidence that Hayes was an engaged parent and his visits with
CH were consistently loving and appropriate. By all accounts, Hayes cares for
CH, wants to be a good parent, and has generally been capable of managing
very young children. The trial court acknowledged as much while making its oral
ruling. However, this does not mean the court erred in deciding that termination
was in the best interests of CH. Love and the ability to manage a visit do not
overcome a history of drug involvement, resistance to services, and domestic
violence, all of which contributed to the fact that Hayes had no contact with CH
at all for nearly eight months. At the time of termination, these problems were
largely unaddressed. CH, according to the guardian ad litem, was happy and
bonded with his foster parents. Termination means that CH will have a stable
home with consistent parenting. The trial court's ruling that termination was in
the best interests of CH will not be disturbed.
The orders of termination are affirmed in both cases.
WE CONCUR:
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