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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In Re the Dependence of M.S., (d.o.b. 10/29/05), A Minor Child, CARMEN SIGURDSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, Respondent.

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NO. 63495-0-I DIVISION ONE

PUBLISHED OPINION FILED: July 19, 2010

Lau, J. -- Facing the possible involuntary termination of her parental rights through a dependency termination proceeding, Carmen Sigurdson decided to voluntarily relinquish her rights to the Department of Social and Health Services in exchange for an open adoption arrangement. After a court commissioner approved the agreement, Sigurdson changed her mind and sought to revoke her consent to the relinquishment and adoption. She argued that duress exerted by her mother justified revocation. Interpreting the duress provision under RCW 26.33.160, the commissioner denied her motion, concluding that only duress exerted by the Department could

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establish grounds for revocation. We affirm. FACTS Sigurdson gave birth to M.S. on October 29, 2005. Nine months later, M.S. was declared dependent under RCW 13.34.030(5) based on Sigurdson's methamphetamine addiction and parental neglect. On August 29, 2006, a court commissioner ordered services to address Sigurdson's drug addiction and correct parental deficiencies and placed M.S. in foster care with her maternal grandmother, Bari Willard.1 When Sigurdson failed to participate in court ordered services, the Department petitioned to terminate her parental rights to M.S. on September 13, 2007.2 At a preliminary termination hearing on January 29, 2008, attended by Sigurdson, her attorney, M.S.'s guardian ad litem, the Department caseworker, and the Department's attorney, the commissioner ordered a termination trial be scheduled. But sometime before trial, Sigurdson agreed to relinquish her parental rights and consent to her daughter's adoption.3 At a court hearing on February 5, 2008, she

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As to the father, an order of dependency was entered on July 3, 2007.

Court ordered services included drug and alcohol evaluation and treatment, random urinalysis testing, regular attendance at AA/NA meetings, mental health evaluation and treatment, domestic violence assessment and treatment, and parenting classes. Because Sigurdson had expressed interest in voluntary termination of her parental rights and an open adoption agreement with prospective adoptive parents, the Department's attorney e-mailed draft relinquishment and open adoption documents to Sigurdson's attorney on December 14, 2007. The e-mail also said the potential adoptive parents had approved the open adoption agreement. Finally the e-mail requested Sigurdson's attorney to review these documents with her client.
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signed the "Relinquishment of Custody, Consent to Termination/Adoption & Waiver of Right to Receive Notice of Proceedings." This relinquishment document provided, in part, 3. I realize that it is not in the best interest of [M.S.] to reside with me, and I confirm that I desire to and hereby consent to relinquish custody of the child to the State of Washington, Department of Social and Health Services, and hereby authorize the Department of Social and Health Service to have custody of the child and to have the power and authority to authorize and provide all necessary care for said child which shall include but not be limited to, foster care, medical care, dental care, evaluations of the child and placement of the child with prospective adoptive parents. 4. I hereby consent to termination of my parental rights and request the court to enter an order permanently terminating all of my parental rights to the child. I further consent to the child's adoption and also authorize the Department of Social and Health Services to consent, on my behalf, to the child's adoption. .... 13. The foregoing consent has been given freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences, and the consent is not the result of fraud or duress nor am I acting under the influence of anyone.[4] On the same day Sigurdson relinquished M.S. to the Department, she also signed an open adoption agreement.5 While all parties expected Willard to adopt M.S., the agreement expressly stated that in the event of "a change in adoptive parents," the agreement would "not be binding on future adoptive parents." This agreement also provided, in part, 1.3 Right to Consult Attorney. All parties, including the prospective adoptive parents, have the right to consult with an attorney regarding the proposed terms of the agreement before they sign it, and before it is approved and signed by a judge. .... Sigurdson's attorney reviewed the relinquishment form with her and witnessed her signature. Sigurdson's attorney, a Department social worker, a Department attorney, M.S.'s guardian ad litem, and Bari Willard also signed the open adoption agreement. -35 4

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3.1 This agreement is entered into by all parties willingly, without force, duress, or coercion. . . .

In December 2008, the Department revoked Willard's foster care license after she was convicted for unlawful issuance of a check. Soon after, an addendum to the adoptive home study recommended against Willard adopting M.S. Then, on January 30, 2009, Sigurdson moved to revoke her relinquishment. At an evidentiary hearing on the motion, she claimed duress induced her to give up her parental rights and allow M.S. to be adopted. She testified that while in jail facing second degree robbery and reckless endangerment charges, she agreed to the relinquishment. The charges involved an altercation with Willard, who reported it to police. According to Sigurdson, Willard visited her in jail and threatened to tell the police about additional crimes she had committed if she did not consent to the adoption.6 Sigurdson testified, I talked to my mother and I did not want to relinquish my rights, I wanted to raise my daughter. But at that point I was looking at several, several years in prison and did not think I would be getting into drug court. And at that point in time my mother brought up the fact that I had done a lot of criminal activities and were never turned in for them, they were against her, and that I could possibly [be] facing more time had she turned them in. And she wanted me to relinquish my rights to her so that [M.S.] would have a stable place to be, and that she wouldn't be just up in the air. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Apr. 8, 2009) at 11. Sigurdson acknowledged the crimes Willard threatened to reveal were well founded and could have resulted in

It is undisputed that she never told her court appointed criminal defense attorney or dependency/termination attorney about Willard's alleged threats.

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additional convictions. She presented no evidence that the Department knew about Willard's threats or that Willard made the threats on the Department's behalf before she signed the relinquishment document.7 The commissioner denied Sigurdson's motion to revoke her relinquishment. He noted that Sigurdson's motion was timely because RCW 26.33.160(3) allows a birth mother to revoke her consent for up to one year based on duress, fraud, or mental incompetence.8 In a letter ruling, the commissioner determined, as a matter of law, that the statute limits revocation to duress "practiced by the person, department, or agency requesting the consent." RCW 26.33.160(3). Because the Department, as the party "requesting the consent" under this statute, exerted no duress, the commissioner denied Sigurdson's motion to revoke relinquishment. Sigurdson appeals. ANALYSIS Sigurdson contends the commissioner erred by limiting RCW 26.33.160's application to duress practiced by the Department. She argues that this statute allows a parent to revoke his or her consent to an adoption whenever any person uses duress to induce the parent to consent. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Calhoun v. State, 146 Wn. App. 877, 885, 193 P.3d 188 (2008). The court's goal in interpreting a statute is to discern and carry out the legislature's intent. Stephenson v. Pleger, 150 Wn. App. 658, 662, 208 P.3d 583 (2009). To determine

During the hearing, Willard invoked the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination to avoid compelled testimony. That issue is not before us. The motion was filed six days before the one-year statutory deadline. And Sigurdson does not allege revocation based on fraud or mental incompetence. -58

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legislative intent, the court looks first to the plain language of the statute. Estate of Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena, Inc., 166 Wn.2d 489, 498, 210 P.3d 308 (2009). As part of this inquiry, the court may look to the statute's context, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wn.2d 1, 11

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