Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
41361-2 |
Title of Case: |
Ks Tacoma Holdings Llc, Appellant V Shorelines Hearings Bd Etal, Respondents |
File Date: |
01/24/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Thurston Superior Court |
Docket No: | 10-2-01918-6 |
Judgment or order under review |
Date filed: | 10/29/2010 |
Judge signing: | Honorable Carol a Murphy |
JUDGES
------
Authored by | Marywave Van Deren |
Concurring: | Joel Penoyar |
| Lisa Worswick |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| David Alan Bricklin |
| Bricklin & Newman, LLP |
| 1001 4th Ave Ste 3303 |
| Seattle, WA, 98154-1167 |
|
| Claudia Macintosh Newman |
| Bricklin & Newman, LLP |
| 1001 4th Ave Ste 3303 |
| Seattle, WA, 98154-1167 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| Molly Anne Lawrence |
| GordonDerr LLP |
| 2025 1st Ave Ste 500 |
| Seattle, WA, 98121-3140 |
|
| Duncan Mcgehee Greene |
| GordonDerr LLP |
| 2025 1st Ave Ste 500 |
| Seattle, WA, 98121-3140 |
|
| Jeff H Capell |
| City of Tacoma Atty Office |
| 747 Market St # 1120 |
| Tacoma, WA, 98402-3726 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
KS TACOMA HOLDINGS, LLC,
Appellant. No. 41361-2-II
v.
SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD; DAVID PUBLISHED OPINION
MURPHY; MURPHY VAREY, P.S.; SITE-4
FOSS WATERWAY, LLC; HOLLANDER
INVESTMENTS, INC.; and CITY OF
TACOMA,
Respondents.
Van Deren, J. -- KS Tacoma Holdings appeals the Shorelines Hearings Board's summary
judgment order in favor of Hollander Investments and the city of Tacoma (City). The Board's
summary judgment order found KS Tacoma did not have standing to appeal a permit revision
granted to Hollander for development on the Thea Foss Waterway in Tacoma, Washington.
Because KS Tacoma did not raise any genuine issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment on the issue of its standing, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal concerns proposed development on the Thea Foss Waterway in Tacoma,
Washington. The Thea Foss Waterway consists of approximately 3.5 miles of shoreline adjacent
No. 41361-2-II
to downtown Tacoma. The Thea Foss Waterway is an important development area for the City
because of its proximity to the central business district, Union Station, the Tacoma Dome, and the
port industrial area. AR 398. The record in this case indicates:
The [Thea Foss] Waterway visually and physically connects surrounding
districts. The Waterway's historic past and working waterfront, combined with
new cultural, recreational, residential, office and retail uses, will create a lively,
urban environment. A linear waterfront park will link together a variety of
attractive, ground level public activities and uses accessible to all of Tacoma's
citizens and to the region.
Administrative Record (AR) at 396. At one time, Thea Foss Waterway was a federally
designated Superfund1 site but the City's comprehensive design and development plan has
envisioned "turn[ing] Thea Foss Waterway into a showcase for Tacoma" through coordinated
environmental clean-up efforts and mixed-use public and private development. AR at 396.
Toward that goal, the City has constructed a 120-foot wide public esplanade adjoining the
waterway and has facilitated the development of the Museum of Glass and residential buildings
such as Albers Mill Lofts, the Esplanade, and Thea's Landing.
On February 9, 2007, the City approved a shoreline substantial development permit (2007
SSDP) authorizing the construction of a 120,000 square foot mixed-use building that included
100 hotel rooms, 22 residential units, and retail/commercial uses on vacant property at "Foss Site-
4." AR at 573. Foss Site-4 is located between the Esplanade building, which contains 176
condominium units and a restaurant, and the Thea's Landing building, which contains 236
residential units and retail space.
KS Tacoma owns the Hotel Murano, which is located approximately five city blocks from
1 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
sections 9601-9675.
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No. 41361-2-II
Foss Site-4. KS Tacoma did not appeal the 2007 SSDP. On March 27, 2008, the City approved
a permit revision that decreased the number of residential units to 16 and increased the number of
hotel rooms to 160. KS Tacoma did not appeal the 2008 permit revision.
Sometime after the City approved the first permit revision, Hollander purchased Foss Site-
4. Hollander applied for a second permit revision (2009 revision), which the City approved on
December 17, 2009. The 2009 revision eliminated the 16 remaining residential units and
increased the number of hotel rooms to 256. The 2009 revision also changed the configuration of
the building, replacing the single tower in the original design with two towers connected on the
first floor by a single story structure. Additionally, the 2009 revision increased the first floor
space by five percent,2 and increased the total floor space from 180,000 square feet to 213,000
square feet.
On January 8, 2010, KS Tacoma filed a petition for review of the City's approval of the
2009 revision, asserting that it was inconsistent with the Shorelines Management Act (SMA)3 and
the City's Shoreline Master Program.4 AR 1-8. On March 11, 2010, Hollander and the City
brought summary judgment motions to dismiss KS Tacoma's petition for review, asserting that
KS Tacoma lacked standing to challenge the 2009 revision. Hollander and the City also argued
that several of KS Tacoma's contentions were not properly before the Board because they sought
to challenge the 2007 SSDP, which KS Tacoma did not appeal.
On June 10, 2010, the Board issued an order dismissing KS Tacoma's petition for lack of
2 KS Tacoma does not challenge the Hollander revision's proposed five percent increase in the
groundfloor space.
3 Chapter 90.58 RCW.
4 Chapter 173-26 WAC.
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No. 41361-2-II
standing. In reaching its decision, the Board stated that it considered only alleged injuries
stemming from the 2009 revision because KS Tacoma did not appeal the original 2007 SSDP or
the 2008 revision. The Board found that KS Tacoma's asserted injuries to its recreation, view,
and aesthetic interests were experienced by third parties and that the general standing doctrine did
not allow KS Tacoma "to establish standing by asserting other's legal rights." AR at 561.
Alternatively, the Board found that, even if it were to consider the alleged injuries to third
parties, KS Tacoma failed to establish that the 2009 revision would cause any cognizable harm to
those interests. The Board further ruled that "[t]he only injury specific to KS Tacoma is the
impact the corporation claims to its reputation, tenor of the community, and diminished future
investment," and that this claimed injury is "both speculative and economic and fail[s] to form the
basis for KS Tacoma's standing." AR at 567.
KS Tacoma unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the Board order dismissing its
petition for lack of standing. In its order denying reconsideration, the Board clarified its previous
decision:
The Board is not ruling that a corporation could never assert a concrete injury
within the zone of interests protected by the SMA. The Board, however, is ruling
that a corporation must establish a specific injury that is related to an identifiable
corporate interest or right protected by the environmental law at issue.
AR at 575. The Board's order denying reconsideration also reiterated that KS Tacoma had failed
to establish associational standing and, thus, it could not assert the interests of third parties to
establish its standing to appeal the 2009 revision.5
On August 24, 2010, KS Tacoma appealed the Board's orders to Thurston County
5 KS Tacoma assigns error to the Board's order denying reconsideration, but "[a]n order denying
reconsideration . . . is not subject to judicial review." RCW 34.05.470(5). Accordingly, we limit
our review to the Board's original summary judgment order.
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No. 41361-2-II
Superior Court. Hollander and the City applied for direct review to this court under RCW
34.05.518. On October 22, 2010, the Board entered an order granting a certificate of
appealability, and we accepted direct review.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter 34.05 RCW, controls our review of
agency actions, including that of the Board. Former RCW 90.58.180(3) (2003); Batchelder v.
City of Seattle, 77 Wn. App. 154, 158, 890 P.2d 25 (1995). In reviewing an agency action, we
apply the APA standards directly to the agency record. Burnham v. Dep't of Soc. &Health
Servs., 115 Wn. App. 435, 438, 63 P.3d 816 (2003). To grant relief from the Board's summary
judgment order, we must determine that "[t]he agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law; [t]he order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole
record[; or t]he order is arbitrary or capricious."6 RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), (e), (i).
We review de novo dismissals of claims on summary judgment under CR 56. Reid v.
Pierce County, 136 Wn.2d 195, 201, 961 P.2d 333 (1998). Summary judgment is appropriate
only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c).
Although the APA does not expressly authorize summary judgments, case law has
established that agencies may employ summary proceedings. Kettle Range Conservation Grp. v.
6 Although KS Tacoma asserts that substantial evidence does not support the Board's summary
judgment order dismissing their claim for lack of standing, it does not assert that the Board relied
on any disputed facts in reaching its decision.
5
No. 41361-2-II
Dep't of Natural Res., 120 Wn. App. 434, 456, 85 P.3d 894 (2003). When reviewing an
agency's summary judgment order, "we consider the APA standard of review together with the
summary judgment standard of review, viewing disputed facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party while considering whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law if based on undisputed facts." Kettle, 120 Wn. App. at 456. But the nonmoving party
"may not rely on speculation, argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain, or
having its affidavits considered at face value." Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106
Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986).
II. Standing under the SMA
The SMA limits standing to persons "aggrieved by the granting, denying, or rescinding of
a permit on shorelines of the state." Former RCW 90.58.180(1). RCW 34.05.010(14) defines
"[p]erson" as, "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision or
unit thereof, or public or private organization or entity of any character, and includes another
agency." KS Tacoma, a corporate entity, has the same rights and protections under the SMA as
an individual person. To qualify as an "aggrieved" person for purposes of establishing its standing
under the SMA, KS Tacoma must put forth factual allegations demonstrating the following
conditions:
(1) The agency action has prejudiced or is likely to prejudice [KS Tacoma];
(2) That [KS Tacoma]'s asserted interests are among those that the agency
was required to consider when it engaged in the agency action challenged; and
(3) A judgment in favor of [KS Tacoma] would substantially eliminate or
redress the prejudice to [KS Tacoma] caused or likely to be caused by the agency
action.
RCW 34.05.530.
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No. 41361-2-II
These statutory standing conditions are largely drawn from federal case law, and the APA
expressly states the Legislature's intent that "courts should interpret provisions of [chapter 35.05
RCW] consistently with decisions of other courts interpreting similar provisions of other states,
the federal government, and model acts." RCW 34.05.001. The first and third prongs of the
APA standing test are collectively referred to as the "'injury-in-fact'" test, and the second prong is
referred to as the "'zone of interests'" test. Allan v. Univ. of Wash, 140 Wn.2d 323, 327, 997
P.2d 360 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allan v. Univ. of Wash, 92 Wn.
App. 31, 36, 959 P.2d 1184 (1998), aff'd, 140 Wn.2d 323). KS Tacoma bears the burden of
establishing its standing to contest the 2009 revision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992).
A. Zone of Interest
To meet the zone of interest test for standing, KS Tacoma must show that the legislature
intended the SMA to protect its asserted interests in the land use, aesthetics, and view impacts of
the 2009 revision. Save a Valuable Env't (SAVE) v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn.2d 862, 866, 576
P.2d 401 (1978). The City appears to concede, and Hollander does not contest, that KS
Tacoma's asserted interests are within the SMA's zone of interests. We agree.
RCW 90.58.020 states in relevant part:
The department . . . and local government . . . shall give preference to uses in the
following order of preference which:
(1) Recognize and protect the statewide interest over local interest;
(2) Preserve the natural character of the shoreline;
(3) Result in long term over short term benefit;
(4) Protect the resources and ecology of the shoreline;
(5) Increase public access to publically owned areas of the shorelines;
(6) Increase recreational opportunities for the public in the shoreline;
(7) Provide for any other element as defined in RCW 90.58.100 deemed
appropriate or necessary.
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No. 41361-2-II
In the implementation of this policy the public's opportunity to enjoy the
physical and aesthetic qualities of natural shorelines of the state shall be preserved
to the greatest extent feasible consistent with the overall best interest of the state
and the people generally.
RCW 90.58.020's hierarchy of land use preferences and stated policy of protecting the
public's enjoyment of our State's shorelines clearly show that the legislature intended to protect
KS Tacoma's asserted interests in land use, aesthetic, and view impacts of shoreline development.
See also Hunt v. Anderson, 30 Wn. App. 437, 440-41, 635 P.2d 156 (1981) (SMA and general
shorelines use activities regulations demonstrated intent to protect use of public and private
property preventing obstruction of scenic views). "[A]lthough the zone of interest test serves as
an additional filter limiting the group which can obtain judicial review of an agency decision, the
'test is not meant to be especially demanding.'" Seattle Bldg. &Constr. Trades Council v.
Apprenticeship & Training Council, 129 Wn.2d 787, 797, 920 P.2d 581 (1996) (quoting Clarke
v. Sec. Ind. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S. Ct. 750, 93 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1987)). Accordingly, we
hold that KS Tacoma has met the zone of interest test.
B. Injury-In-Fact
KS Tacoma contends that the land use, aesthetic, and view impacts of the Hollander
revision show that it will suffer an injury-in-fact sufficient to demonstrate its standing to challenge
the 2009 revision. Hollander and the City argue that KS Tacoma, as a for-profit corporation, has
failed to show it will personally suffer any injury from the 2009 revision apart from a speculative
economic injury as a competitor to the proposed hotel development.7 To the extent this argument
would diminish KS Tacoma's rights as a "person" under RCW 34.05.010(14), we reject this
7 As the alternative to standing in its own right, KS Tacoma asserts it has associational standing to
represent its owners, employees, and guests. We address KS Tacoma's associational standing
argument below.
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No. 41361-2-II
argument based on an asserted distinction between a corporation and an individual.
To meet the injury-in-fact test, KS Tacoma must put forth material issues of fact showing
that (1) the 2009 revision prejudices or is likely to prejudice it and (2) a decision revoking the
2009 revision would redress such prejudice. RCW 34.05.530; Allan, 140 Wn.2d at 327. The
prejudice prong of the injury-in-fact test requires KS Tacoma to allege that it will be "'specifically
and perceptibly harmed'" by the 2009 revision. Trepanier v. City of Everett, 64 Wn. App. 380,
382, 824 P.2d 524 (1992), (quoting SAVE, 89 Wn.2d at 866). When a person or corporation
alleges a threatened injury, as opposed to an existing injury, the person or corporation must show
an immediate, concrete, and specific injury to themselves. Trepanier, 64 Wn. App. at 383 (citing
Roshan v. Smith, 615 F.Supp. 901, 905 (D.D.C. 1985)). "If the injury is merely conjectural or
hypothetical, there can be no standing." Trepanier, 64 Wn. App. at 383, (citing United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688-89, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 37
L. Ed. 2d 254 (1973)).
The redress prong of the injury-in-fact test requires KS Tacoma to put forth material
issues of fact showing that it is "likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 -- 81, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560 -- 61).
As an initial matter, KS Tacoma contends that we should examine the 2009 revision's
impact on the entire Foss site-4 project to determine whether it has sufficiently alleged an injury-in-
fact to defeat summary judgment for lack of standing. The City and Hollander assert that,
because KS Tacoma did not appeal the original 2007 SSDP or the 2008 revision, we must limit
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No. 41361-2-II
our review to KS Tacoma's alleged injuries stemming from the 2009 revision's changes to the
2008 revision. We agree with the City and Hollander.
Former RCW 90.58.180(1) provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved by the granting . . . of a
permit on shorelines of the state . . . may . . . seek review from the [Board] by filing a petition for
review within twenty-one days of the date of filing [of the Board's decision]." Because KS
Tacoma did not appeal the City's grant of the original 2007 SSDP or the 2008 revision within the
statutorily required time period, it cannot now challenge the validity of the 2007 SSDP or the
2008 revision. Moreover, WAC 173-27-100(8) provides that appeals from permit revisions "shall
be filed within twenty-one days from the date of receipt of the local government's action by the
department. . . . If an appeal is successful in proving that a revision is not within the scope and
intent of the original permit, the decision shall have no bearing on the original permit." Thus,
even if KS Tacoma prevails in proving the invalidity of the 2009 revision, such invalidity would
have no bearing on the 2007 SSDP.
KS Tacoma argues that, notwithstanding WAC 173-27-100(8)'s limitations on the effect
of a successful appeal from a permit revision, Hollander could not proceed under the original
2007 SSDP if the 2009 revision were voided because of the two-year time limitation for
commencing construction activities (with a potential one-year extension) under RCW 90.58.143.
KS Tacoma contends that a revocation of the 2009 revision would result in Hollander having to
apply for a new SSDP and, thus, would allow KS Tacoma to broadly challenge the impacts of the
entire Hollander proposal as not being consistent with the SMA or the City's Shoreline Master
Program.
But KS Tacoma ignores subsection (4) of the statute which states in part:
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No. 41361-2-II
The permit time periods . . . do not include the time during which a use or activity
was not actually pursued due to the pendency of administrative appeals or legal
actions or due to the need to obtain any other government permits and approvals
for the development that authorize the development to proceed, including all
reasonably related administrative or legal actions on any such permits or approvals.
RCW 90.58.143(4).
KS Tacoma's argument that defeating the 2009 revision would vacate the original 2007
permit and require a new permit application process allowing it to challenge the scope of the
entire Hollander proposal fails. Accordingly, in determining whether KS Tacoma has sufficiently
alleged an injury-in-fact to establish its standing to challenge the 2009 revision, we examine only
KS Tacoma's claimed injuries stemming from the 2009 revision's changes to the 2008 revision.
We now address each of KS Tacoma's claimed injuries.
i. Land Use Injury
First, KS Tacoma alleges a threatened injury stemming from the 2009 revision's proposed
changes in land use that eliminate residential units and increase the number of hotel rooms. KS
Tacoma asserts that the 2009 revision's proposed change in land use injures it because "the
decision to create a limited service, branded hotel will lessen appeal for future development and
investment, will impact the land uses in the immediate vicinity, and will frustrate the City's efforts
to develop this area with a mix of high-end residential and commercial uses." Br. of Appellant at
41. Because KS Tacoma's alleged land use injury is speculative and lacks factual support, it fails
the prejudice prong of the injury-in-fact test.
Trepanier is instructive when addressing threatened injuries arising from land use actions.
In Trepanier, the owner of a civil engineering and land use consulting firm appealed the City of
Everett's determination of nonsignificance (DNS) under the State Environmental Policy Act
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No. 41361-2-II
(SEPA).8 64 Wn. App. at 381. Trepanier alleged that Everett's new zoning code, which reduced
development potential within Everett, would cause adverse environmental impacts in
unincorporated Snohomish County. Trepanier, 64 Wn. App. at 382. Division One of this court
held that Trepanier lacked standing because he failed to allege an injury-in-fact stemming from
Everett's issuance of a DNS:
[T]he only threatened injury alleged is that several sections of the new zoning code
will reduce allowable densities and development potential within Everett, thereby
transferring growth that cannot occur in Everett to unincorporated Snohomish
County. His argument is based on the unsupported assumption that reducing
densities in some areas will necessarily result in reduced development potential
within Everett to such an extent that development will be forced into
unincorporated Snohomish County. Trepanier's argument is fatally flawed
because his bare assertion that the new code will likely create serious adverse
impacts on unincorporated Snohomish County has absolutely no factual support in
the record.
Trepanier, 64 Wn. App. at 383-84. KS Tacoma has similarly failed to support its bare assertion
that the Hollander revision will have a serious adverse impact on future development in the area
with any facts in the record.
To support its assertion that the 2009 revision will negatively impact future development,
KS Tacoma cites only the affidavits of Howard Jacobs, part owner of KS Tacoma, and Mark Van
Cooney, general manager of the Hotel Murano. Br. of Appellant at 41; AR 159, 176. Both
Jacobs's and Cooney's affidavits conclude that the decision to create a limited service hotel will
lessen appeal for future development and investment but they do not provide factual support for
their conclusions. AR 159, 176. KS Tacoma cannot rely on Jacob's and Cooney's bare
assertions, nor can they rely on the affidavits being considered at face value. Seven Gables, 106
Wn.2d at 13. KS Tacoma has not presented factual support for its assertion that the 2009
8 Chapter 43.21C RCW.
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No. 41361-2-II
revision's elimination of residential units and the increase in the number of hotel rooms will
negatively affect future development in the area. Accordingly, KS Tacoma's alleged injury from a
change in land use is conjectural and cannot support its standing to challenge the revision.
ii. Aesthetic Enjoyment Injury
Next, KS Tacoma claims an injury-in-fact stemming from the 2009 revision's interference
with the aesthetic enjoyment of the Thea Foss Waterway. Specifically, KS Tacoma claims that
the 2009 revision does "not have any special aesthetic qualities" and will not be a "world class
architectural wonder[ ]" because the proposal calls for "walls of a fake brick façade and other
formulaic architecture with no respect for the aesthetic of the area." Br. of Appellant at 38.
Because KS Tacoma fails to demonstrate that a decision revoking the 2009 revision will redress
its alleged aesthetic injury, it fails the redress requirement of the injury-in-fact test.
Here, KS Tacoma appealed only the 2009 revision and did not timely appeal the original
2007 SSDP or the 2008 permit revision. WAC 173-27-100 governs appeals from state shoreline
development permit revisions and provides in relevant part:
A permit revision is required whenever the applicant proposes substantive changes
to the design, terms or conditions of a project from that which is approved in the
permit. Changes are substantive if they materially alter the project in a manner that
relates to its conformance to the terms and conditions of the permit, the master
program and/or the policies and provisions of chapter 90.58 RCW. Changes
which are not substantive in effect do not require approval of a revision.
When an applicant seeks to revise a permit, local government shall request
from the applicant detailed plans and text describing the proposed changes.
(1) If local government determines that the proposed changes are within
the scope and intent of the original permit, and are consistent with the applicable
master program and the act, local government may approve a revision.
(2) 'Within the scope and intent of the original permit' means all of the
following:
(a) No additional over water construction is involved except that pier,
dock, or float construction may be increased by five hundred square feet or ten
percent from the provisions of the original permit, whichever is less;
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No. 41361-2-II
(b) Ground area coverage and height may be increased a maximum of ten
percent from the provisions of the original permit;
(c) The revised permit does not authorize development to exceed height,
lot coverage, setback, or any other requirements of the applicable master program
except as authorized under a variance granted as the original permit or a part
thereof;
(d) Additional or revised landscaping is consistent with any conditions
attached to the original permit and with the applicable master program;
(e) The use authorized pursuant to the original permit is not changed; and
(f) No adverse environmental impact will be caused by the project revision.
. . . .
(8) Appeals shall be in accordance with RCW 90.58.180 and shall be filed
within twenty-one days from the date of receipt of the local government's action
by the department . . . . Appeals shall be based only upon contentions of
noncompliance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. . . . If an
appeal is successful in proving that a revision is not within the scope and intent of
the original permit, the decision shall have no bearing on the original permit.
Under WAC 173-27-100, permit revisions are not conditioned on a developer's adherence to the
original permit's aesthetic design. And WAC 173-27-100(8) provides that a successful appeal
from a permit revision has no bearing on the original permit.
Furthermore, federal constitutional standing requires that an injury must be fairly traceable
to the challenged action, and relief from the injury must be likely to follow from a favorable
decision. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-41, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 48 L. Ed. 2d
450 (1976). APA standing analysis similarly requires a party to demonstrate that "[a] judgment in
favor of that person would substantially eliminate or redress the prejudice to that person caused or
likely to be caused by the agency action." RCW 34.05.530.
Although KS Tacoma is highly critical of the proposed building design, it has not alleged
any direct and specific harm flowing from an "unattractive" building design. Br. of Appellant at
38. Instead, KS Tacoma merely concludes that it "has a concrete and personal interest in the
aesthetics of the Thea Foss Waterway that will be harmed by the City's approval of the Hollander
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No. 41361-2-II
development proposal," without providing factual support for this claim in the record. Br. of
Appellant at 36-37.
Moreover, even if the Board voided the City's issuance of a permit revision to Hollander
to construct two "limited service, branded hotel[s]" that provide less-than "high-end residential
and commercial uses," as argued by KS Tacoma, it is not likely that the decision would provide
KS Tacoma relief from the alleged aesthetic impacts of the 2009 revision because Hollander
would remain free to finish its project with its choice of aesthetic design, not one guaranteed to
please KS Tacoma. Br. of Appellant at 41. Thus, KS Tacoma has not asserted material issues of
fact relating to the aesthetics or the redressability of the alleged injury that preclude summary
judgment in favor of the City and Hollander on the 2009 revision.
iii. View Impact Injury
Finally, KS Tacoma asserts an injury from the view impact of the Hollander revision.
Similar to the alleged aesthetics injury, a favorable Board decision is unlikely to redress an alleged
injury stemming from KS Tacoma's alleged view impact of the 2009 revision. Thus, we hold that
KS Tacoma fails to allege an injury-in-fact arising from the 2009 revision with regard to the view
impact.
WAC 173-27-100(2)(b) allows a developer to increase the maximum height of a building
up to 10 percent from the building height approved under the original SSDP. Here the 2007
SSDP proposed a maximum building height of 97 feet 9 inches. CP 248. And the 2009 revision
increased the building height by only one inch, well within the 10 percent height increase WAC
173-27-100(2)(b) allows. In fact, Hollander and the City presented evidence that the view impact
from the Hotel Murano would decrease slightly under the 2009 revision because of the two tower
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No. 41361-2-II
design. Because the 2009 revision's increase in building height is within WAC 173-27-
100(2)(b)'s allowable limits and, thus, does not provide a basis for revocation of the 2009 revision
decision, a decision revoking the 2009 permit revision on any ground would not provide KS
Tacoma with relief from the view impact caused by the one-inch height change in the 2009
revision. Accordingly, KS Tacoma has not met the redress prong of the injury-in-fact test relating
to the view impact.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that demonstrating the redress element
of the injury-in-fact test is more difficult when, as here, the government action or inaction being
challenged is directed at a third party rather than the party asserting injury:
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the
nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or
proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon
whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue.
If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him
injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.
When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the
government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone
else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, causation and redressability
ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the
government action or inaction - and perhaps on the response of others as well.
The existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing "depends on the
unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose
exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to
control or to predict," ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 615[, 109 S. Ct.
2037, 104 L. Ed. 2d 696] (1989) (opinion of KENNEDY, J.); see also Simon, 426
U.S.] at 41-42[]; and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts
showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to
produce causation and permit redressability of injury. E. g., Warth[ v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490,] 505[, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975)]. Thus, when the
plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he
challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily "substantially more
difficult" to establish. Allen [v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,] 758[, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 82
L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984)]; Simon, [426 U.S.] at 44-45[], Warth, [422 U.S.] at 505.
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No. 41361-2-II
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62.
KS Tacoma has not met the admittedly difficult task of demonstrating or putting forth
material issues of fact showing that Hollander or the City would make future choices that redress
KS Tacoma's alleged aesthetics and view impact injuries if the 2009 revision were revoked. Such
choices could involve Hollander modifying a permit revision application in a way that would not
alleviate KS Tacoma's alleged injuries, or the City could issue a new permit revision with
specifications similar to those that KS Tacoma claims create an injury-in-fact to it. Here, KS
Tacoma's asserted land use injuries are conjectural and lack factual support, and the aesthetic and
view impact injuries would not be redressed by a decision in its favor. Accordingly, KS Tacoma
cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact test and we agree with the Board that KS Tacoma does not have
standing to appeal the 2009 revision, nor, on this record, could it survive the summary judgment
motion since it relied on speculation and argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues
remained and the trial court need not have considered its affidavits at face value. Seven Gables
Corp., 106 Wn.2d at 13. Thus, we affirm the Board's summary judgment order in favor of the
City and Hollander on the 2009 revisions.
III. Associational Standing
KS Tacoma alternatively asserts that if it does not have standing to appeal the 2009
revision in its own right, it could assert associational standing on behalf of its members, which KS
Tacoma claims includes its owners, employees, and Hotel Murano guests. We disagree.
Generally, a party cannot rely on injuries to third parties to establish standing. See, e.g.,
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1985);
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L.
17
No. 41361-2-II
Ed. 2d 450 (1977). The United States Supreme Court has, however,
recognized an exception to this general standing doctrine where an
association claims to represent its member's interests. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977).
An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members if it satisfies three
requirements: "([1]) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; ([2])
the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and ([3]) neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit." Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. An association generally has standing to sue as long as one of
its members has standing. E. Gig Harbor Improvement Ass'n v. Pierce County, 106 Wn.2d 707,
710, 724 P.2d 1009 (1986).
Hollander and the City contend that KS Tacoma cannot assert associational standing
because, as a for-profit corporation, it is not organized to express the collective interests of its
owners, employees, and hotel guests. Hollander and the City thus claim that KS Tacoma does not
have any members for which it can assert associational standing. But we need not answer the
question of whether a for-profit corporation such as KS Tacoma can assert associational standing
for owners, employees, and patrons because it cannot demonstrate that any of its claimed
members have standing in his or her own right. As we addressed above, KS Tacoma has failed to
raise material issues of fact relating to alleged injuries-in-fact stemming from the Hollander
revision.
Although we do not squarely reach whether a for-profit corporation such as KS Tacoma
can assert associational standing on behalf of its owners, employees, and patrons, because it has
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No. 41361-2-II
failed to raise material issues of fact as to its claimed members' injuries-in-fact, we note that it
would not likely have associational standing under existing case law.
KS Tacoma cites one federal district court case, Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc. v.
Skinner, 767 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1991), for the proposition it can assert standing on behalf of
its employees. In Overseas Shipholding, the D.C. District Court held that a corporate shipholding
company had standing to assert a National Environmental Policy Act9 claim on behalf of its
employees because of the potential risk to employees' health from air and water pollution created
by the challenged government action. 767 F. Supp. 287. The Overseas Shipholding court did not
hold that a for-profit corporation could assert standing on behalf of its customers, and KS
Tacoma has not cited any authority for the proposition that it may assert standing on behalf of its
customers. KS Tacoma has similarly not cited any authority for the proposition that a for-profit
corporation may assert standing to protect its employees' interests in land use, aesthetics, and
view impacts. Further, the Overseas Shipholding associational standing analysis has been
narrowed or rejected by later federal district court cases.
In Taubman Realty Grp. Ltd. P'ship v. Mineta, 198 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D.Va. 2002),
aff'd, 320 F.3d 475 (4th Cir.(Va.) 2003), a shopping center developer asserted that it had
associational standing based on alleged safety and health risks to its employees and patrons. The
Taubman court held that the developer could not establish associational standing "[b]ecause the
interests at stake [were] not at all 'germane' to [the developer's] organizational purposes." 198
F. Supp. 2d at 758. The Taubman court explained:
TRG owns and operates a shopping center. TRG is not a citizens group or
an association with a demonstrable interest in, or commitment to, environmental or
traffic-related causes or concerns. In fact, through the operation of Regency
9 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321.
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No. 41361-2-II
[Mall], TRG . . . precipitates some of the very environmental and traffic-related
impacts on which it seeks to fasten its standing in this action. TRG has made no
showing that environmental, traffic, or general safety interests are "germane" to its
organizational purposes in any judicially cognizable manner. It is the burden of
TRG to make that showing and its failure to satisfy that burden is fatal to its
position on standing.
198 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (footnotes omitted). In holding that the developer could not establish
associational standing, the Taubman court distinguished Overseas Shipholding:
Overseas Shipholding is inapposite here. As the Federal Defendants
properly have recognized, the business owner in Overseas Shipholding was
permitted to assert its employees' interests in safe and healthy waterways because
those waterways were the employees' direct working environment. In contrast,
the plaintiffs in this case seek to assert the interests of employees . . . in commuting
to and from work on public roads, upon which thousands of non-employee citizens
travel every day. Those circumstances are far removed from the situation before
the court in Overseas Shipholding; and . . . no court has stretched the concept of
associational standing to the point to which it must be taken to confer standing on
TRG or Taubman. To permit the plaintiffs to sue based upon the type of injuries
to employees that are alleged . . . would necessitate a substantial leap in logic, and
an unprecedented expansion in the doctrine of standing, that the Court i[s] not
prepared to make.
Taubman, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 759 (footnote omitted).
Another federal district court has rejected the Overseas Shipholding associational standing
analysis altogether. One Thousand Friends of Iowa v. Mineta, 250 F.Supp.2d 1064 (S.D.Iowa
2002). In holding that a mall limited partnership could not establish associational standing based
on an alleged injury to its employees' health, safety, and comfort, the Mineta court noted:
With due respect to the district court's opinion in Overseas Shipholding
Group, the Supreme Court's decision in Hunt makes clear that "associational
standing" is generally limited to voluntary membership organizations and/or typical
trade associations organized to represent a particular group of individuals. Hunt,
432 U.S. at 342-43 . . . . Merle Hay Mall does not fit within either of these
classifications. Accordingly, the Court declines to follow Overseas Shipholding,
and holds Merle Hay Mall does not have standing to bring the present action on
the basis of alleged injuries to its employees.
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No. 41361-2-II
250 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
As Tauban and Mineta demonstrate, even if KS Tacoma had raised a genuine issue of
material fact sufficient to demonstrate an injury-in-fact to its claimed members, it could not likely
assert associational standing on their behalf under current federal case law.
Accordingly, we affirm the Board's summary judgment order dismissing KS Tacoma's
claim for lack of standing.
Van Deren, J.
We concur:
Penoyar, C.J.
Worswick, J.
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