Opinion Information Sheet

			

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

KING COUNTY, a Washington                   )
municipal corporation, JEFFREY L.           )       No. 66432-8-I (Consolid. w/
SPENCER, a single man, and                  )       No. 66433-6-I and No. 66434-1-I)
RONALD A. SHEAR, a single man,              )
                                            ) 
                      Appellants,           )
                                            ) 
       v.                                   )       DIVISION ONE
                                            )
KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF                   )
DEVELOPMENT AND                             )       PUBLISHED OPINION
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, an                  )
executive agency,                           )
                                            ) 
                      Respondent.           )       FILED: April 2, 2012

       Spearman, J.  --  Ronald Shear and Jeffrey Spencer appealed a notice of 

violation, issued by the King County Department of Development and Environmental 

Services (DDES), for alleged unauthorized operation of a materials processing facility

within a critical area. The hearing examiner concluded that Shear and Spencer had 

established a valid nonconforming use and that the use did not occur within a critical 

area. DDES filed an appeal under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), and the superior 

court reversed the hearing examiner.  

No. 66432-8-I/2
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

       Because the record supports the hearing examiner's findings of fact, which in 

turn support the examiner's conclusions of law, we reverse the superior court. Shear 

and Spencer established a valid nonconforming use, and the use did not occur within a 

critical area.  We also hold that the conditions imposed on DDES in the hearing 

examiner's order did not exceed the examiner's jurisdiction.

       We reverse the superior court, reinstate the hearing examiner's decision, and 

remand to the hearing examiner for further proceedings.  

                                            FACTS

       Jeff Spencer owns farmland in the Green River Valley.  Ron Shear operates an 

organic materials processing business on Spencer's farm.  Other farmers and nursery 

owners bring Shear organic vegetation such as trees, stumps, brush, leaves, grass, and

organic soils that he converts into matter used in animal bedding and fuel. Dust from 

trucks driving up and down roads on Spencer's property began landing on flowers in a 

neighbor's flower farm, and the neighbor eventually contacted governmental entities.  

The King County Department of Development and Environmental Services (DDES) 

issued a notice of violation on grounds that Shear's use of the farm was an unauthorized 

"materials processing facility" in a critical area, namely a wetland and flood hazard area.  

       Spencer and Shear appealed the notice of violation to the King County hearing 

examiner.  The hearing examiner largely agreed with Spencer and Shear, concluding 

that their use was a valid nonconforming use, and that the county had failed to 

                                               2 

No. 66432-8-I/3
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

demonstrate either a wetland or a flood hazard area. DDES challenged the hearing 

examiner's ruling in superior court by filing a LUPA petition.  DDES was represented by 

the King County Prosecutor's Office.   In addition to Spencer and Shear, DDES named 

"King County" as one of the defendants in the LUPA petition.  Shortly thereafter, another 

deputy prosecutor from the King County Prosecutor's Office appeared on behalf of the 

King County hearing examiner who heard the case below.  That deputy prosecutor filed 

a brief for the limited purpose of responding to the DDES argument that the hearing 

examiner did not have jurisdiction to make parts of his ruling.  The superior court ruled 

in favor of DDES. Shear, Spencer, and the King County hearing examiner have 

appealed to this court.

                                        DISCUSSION

                                     Standard of Review 

       Judicial review of land use decisions generally proceeds under the Land Use 

Petition Act (LUPA).  RCW 36.70C.030.  Relief from a land use decision may be 

granted if the petitioner carries its burden in establishing one of six standards of relief: 

       (a)  The body or officer that made the land use decision engaged in 
            unlawful procedure or failed to follow a prescribed process, 
            unless the error was harmless; 

       (b)  The land use decision is an erroneous interpretation of the law, 
            after allowing for such deference as is due the construction of a 
            law by a local jurisdiction with expertise; 

       (c)  The land use decision is not supported by evidence that is 
            substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
            court; 

                                               3 

No. 66432-8-I/4
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

       (d)  The land use decision is a clearly erroneous application of the 
            law to the facts;  

       (e)  The land use decision is outside the authority or jurisdiction of the 
            body or officer making the decision; or 

       (f)  The land use decision violates the constitutional rights of the party 
           seeking relief. 

RCW 36.70C.130(1).

       "'When reviewing a superior court's decision on a land use petition, the 

appellate court stands in the shoes of the superior court.'"  HJS Development, Inc. v. 

Pierce County, ex rel, Department of Planning and Land Services, 148 Wn.2d 451, 

468, 61 P.3d 1141 (2003) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Pioneer Park LLC v. City of 

Mercer Island, 106 Wn. App. 461, 470, 24 P.3d 1079 (2001)).  "'An appellate court 

reviews administrative decisions on the record of the administrative tribunal, not of the 

superior court.'"  HJS, 148 Wn.2d at 468 (quoting King County v. Boundary Review Bd., 

122 Wn.2d 648, 672, 860 P.2d 1024 (1993)).  

       This court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the 

substantial evidence standard, viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party in the highest forum that exercised fact 

finding authority.  Miller v. City of Bainbridge Island, 111 Wn. App. 152, 162, 43 P.3d 

1250 (2002); Friends of Cedar Park Neighborhood v. City of Seattle, 156 Wn. App. 

633, 641, 234 P.3d 214 (2010).  Additionally, we review application of the law to the 

facts under the clearly erroneous standard, reversing only when, after considering the 

                                               4 

No. 66432-8-I/5
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

entire record, we are firmly convinced the administrative body erred.  Woodinville 

Water Dist. v. King County, 105 Wn. App. 897, 904, 21 P.3d 309 (2001); Quality Rock 

Products v. Thurston County, 139 Wn. App. 125, 133, 159 P.3d 1 (2007).

                                         Nonconforming Use  

       DDES issued a Notice of Violation to Spencer and Shear that alleged, in 

pertinent part, that the two were impermissibly operating a "materials processing 

facility" in a critical area.  DDES contends the hearing examiner's determination that 

Spencer and Shear established their use of the property was a valid nonconforming 

use is both "'an erroneous interpretation of the law'" and a "'clearly erroneous 

application of the law to the facts[.]'" For the reasons described herein, we reverse the 

superior court and reinstate the hearing examiner's determination of a nonconforming 

use. 

       "Generally, '[a] nonconforming use is a use which lawfully existed prior to the 

enactment of a zoning ordinance, and which is maintained after the effective date of the 

ordinance, although it does not comply with the [current] zoning restrictions applicable 

to the district in which it is situated.'" McMilian v. King County, 161 Wn. App. 581, 591, 

255 P.3d 739 (2011) (quoting Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 136 

Wn.2d 1, 6, 959 P.2d 1024 (1998)).  "A particular nonconforming use 'is defined in 

terms of the property's lawful use established and maintained at the time the zoning 

[causing nonconformance] was imposed.'"  McMilian, 161 Wn. App. at 591 (quoting 

                                               5 

No. 66432-8-I/6
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

Miller v. City of Bainbridge Island, 111 Wn. App. 152, 164, 43 P.3d 1250 (2002)).  "'The 

use of property must actually be established prior to the adoption of the zoning 

ordinance to qualify as a nonconforming use thereafter.'"  McMilian, 161 Wn. App. at 

591 (quoting Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wn.2d 312, 321, 501 P.2d 594 (1972)).  

"'Legal, nonconforming uses are vested legal rights.'"  McMilian, 161 Wn. App. at 591 

(quoting First Pioneer Trading Co., Inc. v. Pierce County, 146 Wn. App. 606, 614, 191 

P.3d 928 (2008)).  

       Additionally, the King County Code provides the following definition of a 

nonconforming use:

       Any use, improvement or structure established in conformance with 
       King County rules and regulations in effect at the time of 
       establishment that no longer conforms to the range of uses 
       permitted in the site's current zone or to the current development 
       standards of the code due to changes in the code or its application 
       to the subject property.

K.C.C. 21A.06.800. The nonconforming use issue before the hearing examiner in this 

case was whether Spencer and Shear's use of the property amounted to operation of a 

materials processing facility before the regulation restricting such activity in critical 

areas came into existence in September 2004.  The hearing examiner found Spencer 

and Shear established this nonconforming use.  We agree with the hearing examiner.

       The K.C.C. sets forth the following definition for a "materials processing facility":

       Materials processing facility: a site or establishment, not accessory to 
       a mineral extraction or sawmill use, that is primarily engaged in 
       crushing, grinding, pulverizing or otherwise preparing earth materials, 
       vegetation, organic waste, construction and demolition materials or 

                                               6 

No. 66432-8-I/7
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

       source separated organic materials and that is not the final disposal 
       site.

K.C.C. 21A.06.742 (2004).  DDES argues, and the superior court agreed, that because 

the hearing examiner found that Spencer and Sheer did not began crushing and 

grinding the earth materials, vegetation, and organic waste on the property until winter 

of 2004 or spring of 2005, they had not been using the property as a "materials 

processing facility" before the restriction went into effect in September 2004. But as 

Shear and Spencer point out, the code does not require crushing and grinding to be 

taking place for property to be used as a materials processing facility.  Indeed, the code 

indicates property can be used as a material processing facility where the operator is 

"otherwise preparing" the earth materials, vegetation, and organic waste.  K.C.C.

21A.06.742 (2004).  

       DDES also appears to argue that K.C.C. 21A.06.800 precludes this 

interpretation because the word "established" is in the past tense. Thus, according to 

DDES, Shear and Spencer must have completed every step involved in materials 

processing to have "established" the use. But the King County Code defines the term 

"established" and includes prospective language in the definition:

       The use of a property is defined by the activity for which the building 
       or lot is intended, designed, arranged, occupied, or maintained.  The 
       use is considered permanently established when that use will or has 
       been in continuous operation for a period exceeding sixty days.  A 
       use which will operate for less than sixty days is considered a 
       temporary use, and subject to the requirements of K.C.C. 21A.32 of 
       this title.  All applicable requirements of this code, or other 
       applicable state or federal requirements, shall govern a use located 
       in unincorporated King County. (Ord. 10870 § 328, 1993)

                                               7 

No. 66432-8-I/8
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

K.C.C. 21A.08.010 (emphasis added).  DDES responds with several dictionary 

definitions of the word "operation": "'[t]he condition of being operative or 

functioning: in operation'"; and "'[t]he state of being in action: to be in operation'"

(quoting Funk and Wagnalls' Standard Desk Dictionary, Volume 2 N-Z, Funk and 

Wagnalls' Publishing Co., 1976.  DDES thus appears to contend that every step of the 

materials processing use must have been in operation for 60 days for the use to be 

established.  We reject this argument. As is described above, the code does not 

require crushing and grinding to be taking place for property to be used as a materials 

processing facility, and moreover, the code explicitly includes the prospective word 

"will" in the definition of "established." These dictionary definitions shed no light on 

either K.C.C. 21A.06.742 or K.C.C. 21A.08.010, and as such they are of no help here. 

       DDES next cites to several out-of-state cases for the proposition that 

"prospective intent" cannot establish a legal nonconforming use.  See Response Brief 

at 16-20.  None of these cases are helpful here.  In both City of Hillsdale v. Hillsdale 

Iron & Metal Co., 100 N.W.2d 467 (Mich. 1960) and In the Matter of McDonald v. 

Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Islip, 31 A.D.3d 642 (N.Y. 2006), the issue was not 

what acts needed to occur before a nonconforming use was established, rather, it was 

whether a particular use had expanded beyond an already established, valid 

nonconforming use.  In Urban Forest Products, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals for Town 

of Haverstraw, 300 A.D.2d 498, 751 N.Y.S.2d 581) (2002), the issue was whether a use 

                                               8 

No. 66432-8-I/9
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

could be converted from a nonconforming vehicle storage lot in a residential zone to 

another use entirely -- a commercial landscaping business.  Moreover, these cases are 

of no assistance here since the plain language of K.C.C 21A.08.010, which defines 

when a use is established, specifically allows for consideration of prospective intent in 

making that determination.

       Here, the hearing examiner found that before September 2004, Shear had 

rented the site, equipment was being assembled and stored, grading had occurred, 

materials for processing organic materials were being stockpiled, and access 

driveways had been extended.  DDES does not appear to dispute these findings, but 

even if it had, the evidence when viewed in a light most favorable to Shear and

Spencer supports the finding. These findings, in turn, support the hearing examiner's 

conclusion that (1) a materials processing facility, as it would later be defined, was in 

existence on Spencer's property in April 2004, and (2) it was a legal nonconforming 

use.  As such, we reverse the superior court as to nonconforming use, and reinstate the 

decision of the hearing examiner.

                                     Flood Hazard Area

       Shear and Spencer next argue the superior court erred by concluding the King 

County Critical Areas ordinance contains an enforceable flood hazard area standard. 

The superior court concluded, "The King County Code adequately describes the 

standards applicable to defendants Shear and Spencer.  DDES has no burden to prove 

                                               9 

No. 66432-8-I/10
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

or adopt an applicable standard beyond that described in the Code." On this issue, the 

hearing examiner concluded there was no enforceable standard:

       2.  For purposes of code enforcement, however, the [Critical Areas 
           Ordinance] flood hazard provisions are incomplete.  For 
           enforcement purposes one needs also a clear and intelligible 
           standard.  KCC 21A.24.230 tells us how DDES should go about 
           formulating such a standard, but until that process is actually 
           undergone, no standard exists.

       . . . 

       4.  The relevant code provision states that "a flood hazard area 
           consists of the following components" and then lists five elements, 
           including the floodplain, the floodway, the flood fringe and channel 
           migration zones.

           . . . DDES is required to sift through and compare the multiple 
           sources of flood hazard data and evaluate their accuracy in 
           formulating a relevant standard.

       . . .

       5.  . . . Without such a formal regulatory designation, there is no easily 
           ascertainable adopted county flood hazard area standard applicable 
           to the Spencer property, and the portion of the county's notice and 
           order that cites the Appellants for conducting materials processing 
           operations and clearing, grading and filling within a flood hazard 
           area becomes a gesture without legal effect.

       DDES contends the King County Code does contain an enforceable flood 

hazard standard, but that the hearing examiner either ignored it or decided it was 

unconstitutionally vague.  From this premise, DDES argues that ruling on constitutional 

matters is outside the jurisdiction of the hearing examiner.  But the hearing examiner 

made no ruling on the constitutionality of any code provision.  Rather, the hearing 

examiner concluded the county council and DDES had not adopted standards for 

determining flood hazard areas.  The hearing examiner explains "DDES is required to 

                                              10 

No. 66432-8-I/11
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

sift through and compare the multiple sources of flood hazard data and evaluate their 

accuracy in formulating a relevant standard . . . Without such a formal regulatory 

designation, there is no easily ascertainable adopted county flood hazard area 

standard applicable to the Spencer property").  

       A related argument raised by DDES on this issue is one of law: whether the King 

County Code itself contains a flood hazard area standard.  DDES cites to the "technical 

terms and land use definitions" part of K.C.C. title 21A, which is the King County zoning 

code:

              21A.06.080  Base flood.  Base flood: a flood having a one 
       percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year, 
       often referred to as the "100-year flood."

       . . .

              21A.06.470  Flood hazard area.  Flood hazard area: any 
       area subject to inundation by the base flood or risk from channel 
       migration including, but not limited to, an aquatic area, wetland or 
       closed depression.

              21A.06.475     Flood Hazard Boundary Map.  Flood Hazard 
       Boundary Map: the initial insurance map issued by FEMA that 
       identifies, based on approximate analyses, the areas of the one 
       percent annual chance, one-hundred-year, flood hazard within a 
       community.

DDES notes that it introduced the Federal Emergency Management Act (FEMA) maps 

into evidence, and that the hearing examiner found Spencer's property was within the 

100-year flood area designated on the FEMA maps.  DDES thus argues the county 

council defined "flood hazard area" as the 100-year flood hazard designated on FEMA 

                                              11 

No. 66432-8-I/12
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

maps.

       We reject this argument.  A statute's meaning is derived "from all that the 

[legislative body] has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative 

intent about the provision in question." Department of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, 

LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).  We must not read any provision in isolation 

but look at the statute as a whole.  Id.  In its interpretation, DDES ignores other portions

of the King County zoning code that was passed in the same ordinance (King County 

Ord. 15051 (2004)) as the provisions in K.C.C. 21A.06 to which DDES cites. Indeed, in 

the very same ordinance, the council made it clear that the Department was to 

undertake a specific process in delineating flood hazard areas:

       21A.24.230 Flood hazard areas  --  components.

              A.  A flood hazard area consists of the following components:
              1. Floodplain;
              2. Zero-rise flood fringe;
              3. Zero-rise floodway;
              4. FEMA floodway; and
              5. Channel migration zones.
              B.    The department shall delineate a flood hazard area after 
       reviewing base flood elevations and flood hazard data for a flood having a 
       one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year, 
       often referred to as the "one-hundred-year flood." The department shall 
       determine the base flood for existing conditions. If a basin plan or 
       hydrologic study including projected flows under future developed 
       conditions has been completed and approved by King County, the 
       department shall use these future flow projections. Many flood hazard 
       areas are mapped by FEMA in a scientific and engineering report entitled 
       "The Flood Insurance Study for King County and Incorporated Areas." 
       When there are multiple sources of flood hazard data for flood plain 
       boundaries, regulatory floodway boundaries, base flood elevations, or 
       flood cross sections, the department may determine which data most 
       accurately classifies and delineates the flood hazard area. The 

                                              12 

No. 66432-8-I/13
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

       department may utilize the following sources of flood hazard data for 
       floodplain boundaries, regulatory floodway boundaries, base flood 
       elevations or cross sections when determining a flood hazard area:
              1. Flood Insurance Rate Maps;
              2. Flood Insurance Studies;
              3. Preliminary Flood Insurance Rate Maps;
              4. Preliminary Flood Insurance Studies;
              5. Draft flood boundary work maps and associated technical 
       reports;
              6. Critical area reports prepared in accordance with FEMA 
       standards contained in 44 C.F.R. Part 65 and consistent with the King 
       County Surface Water Design Manual provisions for floodplain analysis;
              7. Letter of map amendments;
              8. Letter of map revisions;
              9. Channel migration zone maps and studies;
              10. Historical flood hazard information;
              11. Wind and wave data provided by the United States Army Corps 
       of Engineers; and
              12. Any other available data that accurately classifies and 
       delineates the flood hazard area or base flood elevation.

K.C.C. 21A.24.230.  

       Thus, although the county council indicated in a definition section that flood 

hazard areas are those areas "subject to" the 100-year floods as set forth in FEMA 

maps, the council in the same legislation set forth an extremely detailed process by 

which DDES was to examine a wide variety of sources of information on flooding, weigh 

the data, and after that, designate specific flood hazard areas. DDES'S interpretation of 

the zoning code reads K.C.C. 21A.24.230 out of the statutory scheme entirely, and we 

decline to adopt it.  The hearing examiner's interpretation of the county code was 

correct, and we reverse the superior court on this issue.

                              Jurisdiction of Hearing Examiner

                                              13 

No. 66432-8-I/14
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

       Shear, Spencer, and the hearing examiner all argue the superior court 

incorrectly held that the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction and authority by 

imposing conditions and limitations on the Department's permit and review process.  

DDES responds that the hearing examiner's decision to impose conditions on the 

continued permitting process amounted to improperly "directing the scope of permit 

review, precluding additional critical areas review in violation of SEPA requirements, 

and limiting and directing the manner in which DDES would be allowed to exercise its 

decision-making authority . . . ."  We agree with the hearing examiner and reverse the 

superior court for the reasons described herein.

       Although the hearing examiner found in large part in favor of Shear and 

Spencer, including on the issue of the County's failure to demonstrate a wetland or 

flood hazard area, he also found that the expansion of the materials processing activity 

on the Spencer property required them to obtain a conditional use permit.  The hearing 

examiner decided to impose conditions on this permitting process, because it was 

DDES' position that Shear and Spencer's operations must cease entirely:

       DDES's position, on the other hand, as expressed in its notice and 
       order, is that wetlands and flood hazard areas exist unequivocally on 
       the Spencer property and that Mr. Shear's materials processing facility 
       use must be terminated because it impinges on such critical areas.  . . . 
       Accordingly, the conditions attached to this appeal decision will place 
       appropriate limitations on further review designed to preserve to the 
       Appellants the successful elements of their appeal and will retain 
       Hearing Examiner jurisdiction to the extent necessary to assure that 
       these limitations are observed.

The conditions imposed by the hearing examiner upon the DDES permitting process 

                                              14 

No. 66432-8-I/15
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

are, in pertinent part:

       A. The scope of the CUP review shall be limited to consideration of a 
           proposal to expand the materials processing facility to use to 
           include onsite screening and grinding of organic raw materials, the 
           impacts of increased levels of delivery and storage of raw materials 
           on the site and the transport of finished product offsite, and the 
           scope and management of onsite retail operations.  The baseline 
           legal NCU not subject to CUP review shall be defined by the uses 
           in existence on the site on September 28, 2004.  The Appellants 
           shall not be required to demonstrate during CUP review that the 
           proposed facilities are at a scale appropriate to process the 
           organic waste generated in the agricultural zone.

       B. The conditional use and grading permit review procedures shall not 
           be used to prohibit, directly or indirectly, continued operation of a 
           viable materials processing facility use at the site.

       C. DDES shall not require further studies or review of whether the 
           Spencer property is within a       flood hazard area or contains         a 
           jurisdictional wetland, except that:

              (i) a code-mandated buffer may be required to protect the 
                 offsite open-water wetland feature on the parcel adjacent 
                 to the north; and 

              (ii) requirements for the location and configuration of storage 
                 piles may take into account potential floodwater patterns.

       DDES claims K.C.C. 20.24.100 does not provide the hearing examiner with the 

authority to impose the above conditions.  DDES cites to the list of conditions set forth 

in K.C.C. 20.24.100 and notes that "none" are "relate[d] to agency decision making 

processes." DDES then argues "[i]t is a basic tenet of statutory construction that, when 

the legislature lists various items in a statute but omits others the courts should assume 

that the times omitted were left out intentionally," (citing State v. Gamble, 146 Wn. App. 

                                              15 

No. 66432-8-I/16
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

813, 817-18, 192 P.3d 399 (2008)). But DDES is selectively quoting the code provision, 

which makes it clear that the list is a nonexclusive list of conditions a hearing examiner 

may impose:

       The examiner is authorized to impose conditions, modifications and 
       restrictions, including but not limited to setbacks, screenings in the 
       form of landscaping or fencing, covenants, easements, road
       improvements and dedications of additional road right-of-way and 
       performance bonds as authorized by county ordinances.

K.C.C. 20.24.100 (emphasis added).  

       DDES also argues In re King County Hearing Examiner, 135 Wn. App. 312, 144 

P.2d 345 (2006) controls here. We disagree. In that case, although a hearing examiner 

found an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to be adequate and thereby denied an 

appeal, he nevertheless ordered a supplemental EIS to be performed.  We held "[t]he 

KCC states that the hearing examiner can grant an appeal with conditions, but does not 

give the examiner the authority to deny an appeal with conditions." In re King County 

Hearing Examiner, 135 Wn. App. at 321 (emphasis added). Here, by contrast, the 

hearing examiner did not deny the appeal with conditions, but instead, granted Shear 

and Spencer's appeal and set conditions necessary to preserve the effect of his ruling.  

       DDES finally contends that the conditions imposed by the hearing examiner in 

essence completely exempt Shear and Spencer from all applicable regulation, such as, 

for example, SEPA.  We disagree. The hearing examiner's findings regarding a lack of 

wetlands and flood hazard areas at the time Shear and Spencer began their 

nonconforming use, does not prevent application of SEPA or any other regulatory 

                                              16 

No. 66432-8-I/17
(Consolid. w/ Nos. 66433-6-I and 66434-1-I)

scheme. Likewise, nothing in the conditions indicates Shear and Spencer are exempt 

from SEPA or any other regulatory scheme. To the extent a review under SEPA or 

some other state or federal statute is implicated in the conditional use permit process, 

or at some other time in the future, this is little more than speculation that is not before 

us. We reject these arguments.  In short, the superior court erred in holding the hearing 

examiner exceeded his jurisdiction.

        We reverse the superior court, reinstate the hearing examiner's decision, and 

remand to the hearing examiner for further proceedings.

WE CONCUR:

                                              17