Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
66614-2 |
Title of Case: |
State Of Washington, Appellant V. Robert Stuart Willhoite, Respondent |
File Date: |
01/17/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Snohomish Superior Court |
Docket No: | 10-1-00947-1 |
Judgment or order under review |
Date filed: | 01/14/2011 |
Judge signing: | Honorable Kenneth L Cowsert |
JUDGES
------
Authored by | C. Kenneth Grosse |
Concurring: | Marlin Appelwick |
| Stephen J. Dwyer |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| Seth Aaron Fine |
| Attorney at Law |
| Snohomish Co Pros Ofc |
| 3000 Rockefeller Ave |
| Everett, WA, 98201-4060 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| Washington Appellate Project |
| Attorney at Law |
| 1511 Third Avenue |
| Suite 701 |
| Seattle, WA, 98101 |
|
| Gregory Charles Link |
| Washington Appellate Project |
| 1511 3rd Ave Ste 701 |
| Seattle, WA, 98101-3635 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 66614-2-I
)
Appellant, ) DIVISION ONE
)
v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
ROBERT STUART WILLHOITE, )
)
Respondent. ) FILED: January 17, 2012
Grosse, J. -- When, as here, the facts are undisputed that the defendant did not
have a relationship with any of the victims involved in the crime, the defendant is not
eligible for a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) under the plain
language of the statute that requires as a condition of eligibility the existence of a
relationship with the victim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
Robert Willhoite pleaded guilty to one count of possession of depictions of a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct and one count of dealing in such depictions.
According to the affidavit of probable cause, federal agents identified Willhoite as a
user of a website that was used to distribute child pornography. Willhoite uploaded
three images to the site depicting children aged two through seven years old engaged
in sexual acts with adult males. Police seized his computer pursuant to a search
warrant and a search of the computer revealed several depictions of young children
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Following the seizure of his computer, Willhoite
met with a detective at the Sheriff's office and admitted that he had downloaded
No. 66614-2-I / 2
hundreds of images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
The State charged Willhoite with one count of possession of depictions of a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct and one count of dealing in such depictions.
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend 31 months' confinement
on each count, the bottom of the standard ranged for the dealing charge. Willhoite
agreed that the court could consider at sentencing facts contained in the affidavit of
probable cause.
Before sentencing, Willhoite obtained a sexual deviancy evaluation. During this
evaluation, he admitted that he viewed child pornography an average of four times
weekly, concentrating mostly on females aged five through ten years old, and denied
that he knew any of the children in the pictures he viewed. The evaluator concluded
that he was a reasonable candidate for community-based sexual deviancy treatment.
At sentencing, Willhoite asked the court to sentence him under the special sex
offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) that allows the court to impose a suspended
sentence subject to a number of conditions, including completion of appropriate
treatment.1 The State opposed a SSOSA, contending that Willhoite was ineligible
under the statute because he did not meet the requirement that he had a relationship
with the victims. The court noted that the Department of Corrections recommended a
SSOSA and concluded that this statutory requirement did not apply in this case
because there was no victim, as that term is defined in the statute, because there was
no evidence in the record about the particular harm suffered by these victims.2 The
1 RCW 9.94A.670(4), (5).
2 The statute defines "victim" as "any person who has sustained emotional,
psychological, physical or financial injury to person or property as a result of the crime
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No. 66614-2-I / 3
court then imposed a SSOSA sentence of 34 months for the possession charge and 41 months for
the dealing charged, both of which were suspended on condition of 9 months' confinement and
36 months' outpatient treatment. The State appeals the sentence.
ANALYSIS
Willhoite contends that the State is barred from appealing his sentence because
it was within the standard range and the State fails to allege any legal error that the trial
court committed in its imposition. Willhoite is correct that a standard range sentence is
generally not appealable.3 But as he also acknowledges, appellate review of a
sentence is available to the State to correct legal errors or abuses of discretion in
determining which sentence applies.4 Additionally, a party may challenge the
underlying facts and legal conclusions by which a court applies a particular sentencing
provision.5 RAP 2.2(b)(6) also permits the State to appeal a criminal sentence that
"includes provisions that are unauthorized by law," or "omits a provision that is required
by law."
In State v. Williams, the court held that the State could appeal the trial court's
determination of the defendant's eligibility for special sentencing under the drug
offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) provisions of RCW 9.94A.660 because the
grounds for appeal were not challenges to a standard range sentence, but "challenges
to claimed legal errors in determining which sentencing provision applies."6 Likewise
charged." RCW 9.94A.670(1)(c).
3 RCW 9.94A.585; RAP 2.2(b)(6).
4 State v. Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d 272, 283, 119 P.3d 350 (2005).
5 Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d at 283; State v. Wood, 117 Wn. App. 207, 210, 70 P.3d 151
(2003).
6 149 Wn.2d 143, 144, 147, 65 P.3d 1214 (2003).
-3-
No. 66614-2-I / 4
here, the State does not challenge the length of the standard range sentence, but
challenges the court's determination that the SSOSA sentencing provision applies,
contending that the statutory criteria for eligibility for that sentence were not met. Thus,
the State's appeal of the SSOSA is properly before this court.
The eligibility requirements for a SSOSA are set forth in RCW 9.94A.670(2),
which provides:
(2) An offender is eligible for the special sex offender sentencing alternative if:
(a) The offender has been convicted of a sex offense other than a violation of
RCW 9A.44.050 or a sex offense that is also a serious violent offense. If the
conviction results from a guilty plea, the offender must, as part of his or her plea
of guilty, voluntarily and affirmatively admit he or she committed all of the
elements of the crime to which the offender is pleading guilty. This alternative is
not available to offenders who plead guilty to the offense charged under North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1972) and State
v. Newton, 87 [Wn.2d] 363, 552 P.2d 682 (1976);
(b) The offender has no prior convictions for a sex offense as defined in RCW
9.94A.030 or any other felony sex offenses in this or any other state;
(c) The offender has no prior adult convictions for a violent offense that was
committed within five years of the date the current offense was committed;
(d) The offense did not result in substantial bodily harm to the victim;
(e) The offender had an established relationship with, or connection to, the victim
such that the sole connection with the victim was not the commission of the
crime; and
(f) The offender's standard sentence range for the offense includes the
possibility of confinement for less than eleven years.[7]
Thus, under the plain language of the statute, to be eligible for a SSOSA, the
defendant must have had an established relationship with the victim. Here, it is
undisputed that Willhoite did not have a relationship with any of the victims. He was
7 (Emphasis added.)
-4-
No. 66614-2-I / 5
therefore ineligible for a SSOSA.
Willhoite's argument that there was no evidence establishing a victim here does
not change this result. As set forth above, the statute is clear that eligibility depends on
the listed conditions, including the existence of a victim who has a relationship with the
offender.8 Thus, even if there were no victim as Willhoite contends, he would still fail to
meet this condition and would remain ineligible under the plain language of the statute.
We reverse and remand for resentencing.
WE CONCUR:
8 "An offender is eligible for the special sex offender sentencing alternative if . . . ."
RCW 9.94A.670(2) (emphasis added).
-5-
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