Opinion Information Sheet

			

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                       DIVISION  II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                             No.  41539-9-II

                             Respondent,

       v.

ALLEN K. DUPUIS,                                            PUBLISHED OPINION

                             Appellant.

       Quinn-Brintnall, J.   --   Allen K. Dupuis appeals the trial court's finding that his driver's 

license must be revoked under RCW 46.20.285(4) because he used a motor vehicle while 

committing the offense of second degree taking or riding in a motor vehicle without the owner's 

permission.  Because Dupuis used a motor vehicle to commit his underlying offense, and because 

the legislature requires the revocation of driving privileges of those who have been convicted of 

offenses even when driving is an essential element of the crime, we affirm.

                                            FACTS

       Dupuis lived with Kelli Armfield and her mother, Marilea Armfield.  Marilea Armfield was 

the protected person in a guardianship proceeding.  Following a hearing, the guardianship court 

ordered Dupuis to transfer possession of the car he had been driving to Marilea Armfield's 

guardian.  Dupuis gave two keys to the guardian's attorney and left the courtroom.  When family  

No. 41539-9-II

members went outside and tried to use the keys, they did not work.  Dupuis then went to the 

vehicle, used the touch pad to unlock it, and drove away.  Police recovered the vehicle five days 

later in Snohomish County at an impound lot.  

       The State charged Dupuis with second degree taking or riding in a motor vehicle without 

the owner's permission and he entered an Alford plea.1   At sentencing, defense counsel argued 

that the Department of Licensing was not authorized to revoke Dupuis's driver's license because 

a motor vehicle was not used in the offense, but the trial court disagreed.  The court ordered the 

clerk "to immediately forward an Abstract of Court Record to the Department of Licensing, 

which must revoke [Dupuis's] driver's license."  Clerk's Papers at 25.  

       Dupuis now appeals the finding that he was using the motor vehicle when he took it 

without permission and the corresponding license revocation.

                                          ANALYSIS

Applicability of License Revocation Statute, RCW 46.20.285

       RCW 46.20.285(4) requires revocation of the driver's license of any person who uses a 

motor vehicle in the commission of a felony.  Because this case concerns the application of the 

statute to a specific set of facts, our review is de novo.  State v. Hearn, 131 Wn. App. 601, 609, 

128 P.3d 139 (2006).2  

       RCW 46.20.285 does not define "use," but we have cited the plain and ordinary meaning 

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970); State v. 
Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 552 P.2d 682 (1976).  

2 This issue is not moot because the license revocation period is not triggered until the underlying 
conviction becomes final.  RCW 46.20.285; see also City of Redmond v. Bagby, 155 Wn.2d 59, 
64, 117 P.3d 1126 (2005) (under RCW 46.20.285, license suspension is stayed until conviction 
becomes final).

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of the word in finding that, in order for RCW 46.20.285(4) to apply, a vehicle must have been 

employed in accomplishing the crime.  State v. Batten, 95 Wn. App. 127, 129-30, 974 P.2d 879 

(1999), aff'd, 140 Wn.2d 362, 997 P.2d 350 (2000).  The relevant test is whether the felony had 

some reasonable relationship to the operation of a motor vehicle, or whether use of a motor 

vehicle contributed in some reasonable degree to the commission of the felony.  State v. B.E.K., 

141 Wn. App. 742, 746, 172 P.3d 365 (2007) (citing Batten, 140 Wn.2d at 365).  

       Dupuis argues that a motor vehicle is incidental to and not used to commit a crime if it 

serves simply as a means of transportation from the scene.  As support, he cites two cases where 

the defendants' possession of drugs had no relationship to the cars they were driving when they 

were arrested and did not require license revocation under RCW 46.20.285(4).  See State v. 

Wayne, 134 Wn. App. 873, 875, 142 P.3d 1125 (2006) (use of car is merely incidental if 

possession is with the person rather than the car); Hearn, 131 Wn. App. at 610-11 (drugs found 

in defendant's effects did not have reasonable relation to operation of vehicle such that use of 

vehicle contributed to commission of offense).  Dupuis contrasts these holdings to a case where 

the defendant obtained cocaine in exchange for giving someone a ride in his car.  State v. Griffin, 

126 Wn. App. 700, 708, 109 P.3d 870 (2005).  The use of the car was not incidental but 

contributed directly to the crime of cocaine possession and was sufficient to trigger RCW 

46.20.285(4).  Griffin, 126 Wn. App. at 708.

       Dupuis also cites California cases concerning an almost identical license revocation 

statute.  Cal. Veh. Code § 13350(a)(2);  see Batten, 140 Wn.2d at 366 (citing as support 

California case dealing with that state's license revocation statute).  The California Court of 

Appeals found the statute triggered when the defendant used a car to travel to and from the 

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No. 41539-9-II

burglary scene and to conceal the fruits of his crime.  In re Gasper D., 22 Cal. App. 4th 166, 170, 

27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152 (1994); see also People v. Gimenez, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1237, 42 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d 681 (1995) ("use" found under similar facts even though theft was not completed).  

Dupuis contends that because he used the motor vehicle only to leave the scene, he did not use it 

in a manner that implicated Washington's license revocation statute.  

       Dupuis also argues that where the car is merely the object of the crime, RCW 

46.20.285(4) does not apply.   As support, he cites this court's decision in B.E.K., where the 

juvenile defendant was convicted of second degree malicious mischief for spray painting a police 

vehicle.  141 Wn. App. at 744.  License revocation under RCW 46.20.285(4) was not required 

because the defendant did not employ the patrol car to commit his act of mischief; rather, he 

simply made the car the object of his crime.  B.E.K., 141 Wn. App. at 748.  The nexus between 

the crime and the vehicle was based not on a manner of use but on a relationship similar to that 

between an offender and his victim.  B.E.K., 141 Wn. App. at 748.  

       Where a vehicle was both the object and the instrumentality of the offense, however, 

RCW 46.20.285(4) applied.  State v. Dykstra, 127 Wn. App. 1, 12, 110 P.3d 758 (2005), review 

denied, 156 Wn.2d 1004 (2006).  As part of his participation in an auto theft ring, Dykstra used 

cars to drive around looking for others to steal, and he also took possession of the stolen cars by 

driving them away from the scene.  Dykstra, 127 Wn. App. at 12.  Division Three of this court 

held that the record supported the trial court's finding that Dykstra used a motor vehicle in 

committing first degree theft.  Dykstra, 127 Wn.2d at 12.  

       Division Three recently applied similar reasoning when the defendant argued that his 

possession of a stolen vehicle did not involve use of a vehicle in the manner contemplated by 

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No. 41539-9-II

RCW 46.20.285(4).  State v. Contreras, 162 Wn. App. 540, 254 P.3d 214, review denied, 172 

Wn.2d 1026 (2011).  In rejecting this argument, the court first referred to B.E.K., where the 

police vehicle was only the object of the crime.  Contreras, 162 Wn. App. at 547 (citing B.E.K.,

141 Wn. App. at 748).  Division Three then found the facts in Contreras distinguishable:

              Here, Mr. Contreras used this car.  He tried to relicense it.  He possessed 
       it.  It was not something he did to the car.  It was his use and his possession and 
       assertion of ownership that satisfied the elements of the [crime].
              He drove the car to the state patrol office and attempted to relicense it with 
       the false VIN tags from his previous car.  The car was not simply the object upon 
       which he visited his crime.  The court, then, did not err by finding that Mr. 
       Contreras used a motor vehicle in the commission of a felony.

162 Wn. App. at 547 (citations omitted).  

       Dupuis argues that both Dykstra and Contreras are distinguishable because he used the 

car only as a means to transport himself from the scene.  The felony to which he pleaded guilty 

did not occur, however, while the car was parked outside the courthouse.  Rather, it occurred 

when Dupuis drove the vehicle away without permission.  Although it is possible to take a car 

without using it (as when, for example, a tow truck is employed), Dupuis used the car to 

accomplish the crime of taking or riding in a motor vehicle without the owner's permission.  See 

B.E.K., 141 Wn. App. at 748 (offender must operate or use vehicle in some fashion to carry out 

the crime).  

       Dupuis also argues, however, that the reference to "use" in RCW 46.20.285(4) is 

ambiguous because his underlying offense already punishes him for using a motor vehicle.  He 

asserts that under the rule of lenity, the license revocation provision should not apply in this 

instance.  See B.E.K., 141 Wn. App. at 745 (under the rule of lenity, if two possible statutory 

constructions are permissible, the court construes the statute strictly against the State in favor of a 

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criminal defendant).  But when read in context, the fact that operating a motor vehicle is already 

an essential element of taking a motor vehicle without the owner's permission does not render the 

license revocation statute either ambiguous or inapplicable to Dupuis.  See State v. Jacobs, 154 

Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (plain meaning of statute is discerned in part from context 

of statute in which provision is found).  With one exception, the other subsections of RCW 

46.20.285 also require revocation of the privilege to drive despite the fact that operating a motor 

vehicle is an essential element of the underlying offense.  See  RCW 46.20.285(1) (vehicular 

homicide), .285(2) (vehicular assault), .285(3) (driving under the influence), .285(5) (hit and run), 

and .285(7) (reckless driving); but see RCW 46.20.285(6) (perjury or false statement or affidavit 

under Title 46 RCW or other law relating to ownership or operation of motor vehicle).  

       In particular, subsections (3) and (7) of RCW 46.20.285 require revocation where the 

defendant has already been punished solely for driving a motor vehicle, albeit in a compromised 

manner.  These subsections and subsection (4) were passed simultaneously so are in pari materia

and should be construed together in determining their meaning.3  In re Arbitration of Mooberry, 

108 Wn. App. 654, 658, 32 P.3d 302 (2001); see also State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 547, 617 

P.2d 1012 (1980) (purpose of reading statutory provisions in pari materia with related provisions 

is to determine legislative intent underlying entire statutory scheme and to read the provisions as a 

unified whole).  When viewed as a whole, RCW 46.20.285 clearly contemplates revocation of a 

driver's license following a crime involving the operation of a motor vehicle.  We see no 

3 Enacted in 1965, the subsections in RCW 46.20.285 were renumbered in 1983.  Laws of 1965, 
Ex. Sess. ch. 121, § 24; Laws of 1983, ch. 165, § 15.
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ambiguity sufficient to trigger the rule of lenity and hold that, as a matter of law, the trial court 

did not err in applying RCW 46.20.285(4) to Dupuis.

       Affirmed.  

                                                 QUINN-BRINTNALL, J.
We concur:

HUNT, J.

WORSWICK, C.J.

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