Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                       DIVISION  II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                             No.  40856-2-II

                             Respondent,

       v.

ANGELINA C. MATTEUCCI,                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                             Appellant.

       Quinn-Brintnall, J.   --   On March 15, 2010, a jury entered verdicts finding Angelina C. 

Matteucci guilty of two charges of second degree theft contrary to RCW 9A.56.040(1)(c) and 

three charges of second degree identity theft contrary to RCW 9.35.020.  Matteucci appeals her 

convictions, asserting that her counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a corpus 

delicti challenge and failing to ask the court at sentencing to consider her offenses as the "same 

criminal conduct." Matteucci also argues that insufficient evidence supports her convictions, the 

court prevented her from presenting a complete defense, and the sentencing court erroneously 

denied her drug offender  sentencing alternative (DOSA), RCW 9.94A.660, request.  Because 

sufficient evidence supports both the establishment of the corpus delicti and Matteucci's 

convictions, and because her remaining contentions lack merit, we affirm.  

No. 40856-2-II

                                            FACTS

Background

       Jessica Gairns and Matteucci met in 2006 while working together at Starbucks.  The 

women became such close friends that Jessica's1 mother, Marianne Gairns, thought of Matteucci 

as "almost an extension of the family."  1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 63.  As such, Matteucci 

frequently spent time with the Gairnses and even had a spare key to their home.  Both women 

admit to borrowing money from each other and that Jessica loaned Matteucci $900 in September 

2009 to pay her rent.  Jessica also testified that she occasionally lent Matteucci a debit card 

connected to her father's account to borrow money.  

       Jessica has three other cards -- a personal credit card, a personal debit card, and a debit 

card connected to her mother's account -- which she never gave Matteucci permission to use.  

Two defense witnesses, Carol Radich and Jessica Garman, testified that they witnessed Jessica 

loaning Matteucci a debit card between two and four times.  Another defense witness, Tina 

Philbrook, estimated that Jessica and Matteucci "probably exchanged debit cards over a hundred 

times."  1 RP at 112. 

       On October 29, Jessica checked the balance of her personal debit card account and 

noticed a $200 withdrawal that she had not made.  After confirming the charge with the store, 

Jessica cancelled her card.  The next day she went to the bank to report the theft.  Shortly 

thereafter, Jessica's mother, Marianne, called to tell Jessica that someone withdrew money from 

her account as well.  Marianne discovered that her card had been used four times without her 

1 We refer to Jessica Gairns and her mother, Marianne Gairns, by their first names for clarity, with 
no disrespect intended. 

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No. 40856-2-II

knowledge on October 28.  The first transaction occurred at Mickey's Deli when someone 

withdrew $100.  The second transaction was another withdrawal request that was denied for 

insufficient funds.  In addition, someone performed a balance inquiry at a nearby location, the 

Union 76 Jackpot gas station, and then took out $20.  

       Thinking that the situation needed to be resolved, the women went to the police and 

Shelton Police Department Sergeant Virgil Pentz began an investigation into the fraudulent use of 

their cards.  During his investigation, Pentz went to Mickey's Deli and the Union 76 Jackpot gas 

station.  Mickey's Deli did not have working video but Pentz was able to view video footage at 

the Jackpot.  From prior contacts, Pentz recognized Ron Radford using the automated teller 

machine (ATM) in the video footage.  Pentz also went to Fred Meyer (where Jessica's card had

been used) but was unable to identify the ATM user from the video tape because the machine was 

too far out of camera range.  Having concluded his investigation, Pentz arrested Radford on 

November 17.  

       Matteucci came to the police station shortly after Radford's arrest and, after speaking with 

Sergeant Pentz for some time, gave a voluntary, taped statement.  Pentz informed Matteucci, of 
her Miranda2 rights at the beginning of the recording.  Matteucci acknowledged her rights and 

then proceeded to tell Pentz that she took Jessica's cards without her knowledge, called Radford, 

and asked him to use Jessica's cards.  Matteucci then told Pentz that she and Radford went to 

Mickey's Deli and, following that, they might have gone to the Union 76 Jackpot station although 

she was unsure because she had been talking on her phone.  Matteucci also told Pentz that later 

that day, Radford used Jessica's debit card to buy groceries for her and Jessica.  Finally, 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

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No. 40856-2-II

Matteucci told Pentz that, at the end of the night, she put Jessica's cards back in Jessica's purse.  

Procedure

       On December 10, the State charged Matteucci with two counts of second degree theft 

and, on March 10, 2010, amended the charges to include an additional three counts of second

degree identity theft.  Before trial, both parties agreed by stipulation to admit Matteucci's 

statements to Pentz without a hearing and to admitting the Gairnses' bank records without 

bringing in a custodian or otherwise documenting them further.  Matteucci's jury trial commenced 

on March 11 and on March 15 the jury returned a verdict, finding Matteucci guilty of all five 

counts as charged.  

       When the court reconvened for sentencing on April 5, defense counsel moved to postpone 

Matteucci's sentencing for a few weeks because "she wants to pursue the DOSA option and . . .

she has, from medical issues, become addicted to pain killers."  2 RP at 249.  Over objections 

from the State, the judge signed an order for a DOSA screening.  On April 19, the trial court 

again postponed sentencing to allow for a "full" DOSA evaluation.3       On  June 10, the court 

reconvened for sentencing a third time.  Defense counsel failed to produce an updated or more 

thorough DOSA evaluation, and the court proceeded without the full evaluation.  

       During sentencing, the prosecution asked the trial court to listen to testimony from a 

"Detective Campbell regarding actions by the defendant in between the date she was convicted 

and the date in which she testified in Ronald Radford's case."  2 RP at 266-67.  The "actions" at 

3 The initial DOSA evaluation was a two- or three-page summary.  The judge commented, "We 
used to get the full evaluation, which told us what drugs and what issues, and those kinds of 
things, which may be a real benefit at this point to the Court in deciding whether it is an 
appropriate sentence for Ms. Matteucci and appropriate for the community."  2 RP at 261.

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No. 40856-2-II

issue involved Matteucci having contact with Radford before his trial, then testifying that she had 

had no contact with him.  The prosecution reasoned that

       the State is proffering this testimony . . . because . . . when we tried to do 
       sentencing last time, it was that DOSA requires that the defendant be honest and 
       that's a critical part of the program.  And the State will, basically, demonstrate to 
       the Court that not only was the defendant dishonest, but she basically offered false 
       testimony at trial.

2 RP at 267.  Defense counsel objected, noting,

       Ms. Matteucci isn't being sentenced for something that happened, she was  --  after 
       her conviction  --  she was convicted of a crime after a jury trial.  She stands before 
       the Court to be sentenced for that crime, not for what her testimony was in some 
       later trial, or whether she had contact with some witness in a later trial.  That has 
       absolutely no bearing on what is the appropriate punishment for the crime she was 
       convicted of.
              . . . [T]he Court shouldn't be considering post-conviction behavior of Ms. 
       Matteucci when they're considering the sentence here.

2 RP at 267-68.  Despite this objection, the judge allowed brief testimony explaining,

              When the DOSA program started, we were provided with a summary, but 
       also a large packet of additional information in which answers to specific 
       questions, that helped the Court determine whether or not this was the right choice 
       for an individual [and] whether it would also benefit the community.  And that 
       information is no longer, apparently, available through the new format of the 
       report.  
              So, the Court will permit brief testimony that has been suggested today.  I 
       will make it extremely clear, however, that the real facts doctrine would preclude 
       the Court  --  and will preclude the Court  --  from using the information of something 
       that may have occurred after the events that are alleged in the Information toward 
       the sentencing.  Other than to assist the Court in deciding whether the alternate 
       that Ms. Matteucci has requested is a viable one for her in that she would be 
       successful at the program.

2 RP at 269.  

       Detective Campbell related that, at Radford's trial, Matteucci testified to having no 

contact with Radford since charges were filed against them.  Campbell further testified that, 

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No. 40856-2-II

subsequent to Radford's trial, he came into possession of a Walmart security tape showing 

Matteucci and Radford together on April 10.4   Following Campbell's testimony, the judge heard 

arguments by both sides concerning the possibility for DOSA and the calculation of Matteucci's 

offender score.  The defense did not object to the offender score calculation.  The trial court 

sentenced Matteucci to the standard range for all five counts -- two eight-month sentences on the 

second degree theft charges, and three fourteen-month sentences on the second degree identity 

theft charges, all to run concurrently plus twelve months of community custody for the three 

identity theft charges -- and, in addition, did not provide for waiver of the standard range or 

imposition of DOSA.  The trial court noted that

       the reason I do that is the number of offenses that are now before the Court, five 
       offenses at very close to the same time  --  a day or two separating those. 
              . . . .
              The Court finds in this case that there is a breach of trust.  There was so 
       much testimony about how close the two young women were. 

2 RP at 281-82. Additionally, both parties agreed to a restitution amount.  Matteucci timely 

appeals her conviction.  

                                         DISCUSSION

Bank Records

       Matteucci contends that the trial court inappropriately allowed hearsay evidence related to 

the Gairnses' bank records.5 Because Matteucci raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we 

4 The record is unclear as to when Radford's trial actually occurred.  At Matteucci's postponed 
April 5 sentencing, however, the judge amended Matteucci's prerelease conditions to preclude 
contact with Radford.  

5 Matteucci does not specifically assert error to her trial counsel failing to object to evidence 
about Marianne's and Jessica's bank records.  A number of Matteucci's assignments of error, 
however, do relate in some way to this issue.  Br. of Appellant at 20 ("Aside from Matteucci's 
statement to Pentz, the only evidence that any funds were transferred from Marianne's Bank of 
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No. 40856-2-II

do not address it.  RAP 2.5(a) ("The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error 

which was not raised in the trial court.").  Further, before trial, Matteucci stipulated to inclusion 

of the bank records and, at sentencing, agreed to a restitution award based on the bank records at 

issue.  Because Matteucci stipulated to the admission of the bank records, she cannot now 

challenge their admission.  Accordingly, all arguments related to these records, including her claim 

that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support the restitution award fail.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

       Matteucci also argues that her trial counsel's assistance was ineffective because he failed 

to raise a corpus delicti challenge and did not challenge her offender score calculation.  

Specifically, Matteucci contends that the State could not independently establish the corpus delicti 

of the charged offenses absent Matteucci's confessions to Officer Pentz and, also, that because all 

her convictions related to the same criminal intent, "it was a classic case of same criminal 

conduct."  Br. of Appellant at 31-32.  Because the State successfully established the corpus delicti 

of the alleged crimes and the trial court correctly calculated her offender score, Matteucci's 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail.  

       Under both the Washington and United States Constitutions, a criminal defendant is 

entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at critical stages in the litigation.  State v. Page, 147 

Wn. App. 849, 855, 199 P.3d 437 (2008), review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1008 (2009).  To establish 

ineffective assistance of counsel, Matteucci must show that (1) her counsel's performance was 

America account was  Marianne's unsupported statement.");  Br. of  Appellant at 23 ("The 
prosecutor also apparently decided that the strength of the State's case would not be enhanced by 
introducing bank records with the appropriate foundation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the alleged transactions in fact occurred.").

                                               7 

No. 40856-2-II

deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced her.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-

35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).  Counsel's performance is deficient when it falls below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.  State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 705, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997), cert. 

denied, 523 U.S. 1008 (1998).  Where the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on 

counsel's failure to make a motion or an objection, a defendant must show not only meritorious 

grounds for the motion but also that the verdict would have differed had the motion been granted.  

See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986).  

Here, ample evidence established the corpus delicti of the charged offenses and the trial court 

correctly treated Matteucci's convictions as separate crimes.  Accordingly, an objection related to 

either the corpus delicti or a motion to calculate her offender score using the same criminal 

conduct doctrine would not have succeeded.  As such, Matteucci suffered no prejudice from her 

trial counsel not raising either nonmeritorious argument and her counsel's performance in this 

respect was necessarily sufficient.  

       A.     Corpus Delicti

       A corpus delicti challenge does not present a question of constitutional magnitude that the 

defendant may raise for the first time on appeal.  State v. Dow, 168 Wn.2d 243, 249, 227 P.3d 

1278 (2010) ("Washington's corpus delicti rule, particularly the requirement that the State present 

independent, corroborative evidence that the offense occurred, is judicially created and not 

constitutionally mandated").  Accordingly, we would not normally consider this issue.  RAP 

2.5(a).  Matteucci does argue, however, that her counsel ineffectively represented her by failing to 

raise the corpus delicti issue below, a constitutional issue Matteucci may raise for the first time on 

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No. 40856-2-II

appeal.  As such, we address this issue solely in the context of her ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim.  Nevertheless, because the record clearly establishes that the State established the corpus 

delicti of the charged crimes, this portion of Matteucci's ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

fails.

       Establishing the corpus delicti generally requires only two elements:  (1) a specific injury 

or loss and (2) someone's criminal act as the cause of the injury or loss.  State v. DuBois, 79 Wn. 

App. 605, 609, 904 P.2d 308 (1995).  State v. Meyer, 37 Wn.2d 759, 763-64, 226 P.2d 204 

(1951) provides a traditional statement of the "corpus delicti rule":

              The confession of a person charged with the commission of a crime is not 
       sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, but if there is independent proof thereof,
       such confession may then be considered in connection therewith and the corpus 
       delicti established by a combination of the independent proof and the confession.
              The independent evidence need not be of such a character as would 
       establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance 
       of the proof.  It is sufficient if it prima facie establishes the corpus delicti.  

(Citations omitted.)  "Prima facie" in this context means there is "evidence of sufficient 

circumstances which would support a logical and reasonable inference of the facts sought to be 

proved."   State v. Vangerpen, 125 Wn.2d 782, 796, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995).  In addition to 

corroborating a defendant's incriminating statement, the independent evidence "must be 

consistent with guilt and inconsistent with [a] hypothesis of innocence."  State v. Lung, 70 Wn.2d 

365, 372, 423 P.2d 72 (1967).  The evidence must also "support not only the inference that a 

crime was committed but also the inference that a particular crime was committed."  State v. 

Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 329, 150 P.3d 59 (2006).

       Here, the independent evidence clearly provided proof of the corpus delicti.  First, the 

State established a loss specifically related to the crimes for which Matteucci was charged.  Both 

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No. 40856-2-II

Marianne and Jessica testified that an unauthorized person used their ATM cards to withdraw 

money wrongfully.  Second, the State established that the specific loss alleged was traceable to a 

criminal cause.  Both victims testified that Matteucci did not have permission to appropriate their 

debit cards or use their personal identification number (PIN).  Further, in the instance of the debit 

card associated with Marianne's account, the State submitted photographic evidence at trial 

documenting Radford's use of that card.  Finally, after learning of the unauthorized withdrawal at 

Fred Meyer, Jessica immediately cancelled her personal debit card.  It is both logical and 

reasonable to infer that a person would not cancel their debit card after learning of a withdrawal 

they themselves had not made unless they feared criminal conduct.  

       Construed in favor of the State, this evidence is sufficient to establish a reasonable and 

logical inference that someone obtained or wrongfully exerted unauthorized control over 

Marianne's and Jessica's debit cards and that someone used their PIN numbers intending to 

commit, or to aid or abet, identity theft.  As such, Matteucci's claim that her counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless corpus delicti challenge fails.  Under Strickland,

counsel's failure to raise a losing argument cannot be ineffective assistance. 

       B.     Same Criminal Conduct

       Determining whether separate offenses constitute same criminal conduct is a question of 

law that we review de novo.  State v. Torngren, 147 Wn. App. 556, 562-63, 196 P.3d 742 

(2008).  Two or more crimes constitute the "same criminal conduct" for purposes of sentencing 

when each is committed (1) with the same criminal intent, (2) at the same time and place, and (3) 

against the same victim.  RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a).  We narrowly construe the definition of "same 

criminal conduct" and require proof of all three elements to support a "same criminal conduct"

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No. 40856-2-II

determination.  State v. Vike, 125 Wn.2d 407, 410, 885 P.2d 824 (1994).  In deciding whether 

different crimes encompass the same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes, the focus is on

whether the objective criminal intent of the offenses changes from one crime to the next and 

whether one crime furthered the commission of the others.  State v. Burns, 114 Wn.2d 314, 318, 

788 P.2d 531 (1990); State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 215, 743 P.2d 1237, 749 P.2d 160 

(1987).

       Here, Matteucci's two theft convictions do not constitute same criminal conduct because 

they involve separate victims.  See In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 821, 100 

P.3d 291 (2004) ("Offenses arise from separate and distinct conduct when they involve separate 

victims.").  In addition, all three incidences of identity theft occurred at different times and places.  

The trial court appropriately treated these crimes separately for purposes of sentencing.  See State 

v. Wilson, 136 Wn. App. 596, 615, 150 P.3d 144 (2007) (where the defendant had time to 

complete the assault and form a new intent to threaten the victim, the crimes of assault and felony 

harassment had different objective intents and were not the same criminal conduct).  Thus, even if 

Matteucci's counsel had raised an objection related to same criminal conduct at sentencing, it 

would have failed.  By necessity, her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail as well. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

       Matteucci also contends that the State failed to sufficiently provide evidence proving each 

element of her charged crimes.  Specifically, she contends that she "reasonably believed she pretty 

much had free rein in using Jessica's ATM cards" (Br. of Appellant at 22) and, as a result, lacked 

the requisite criminal intent to commit identity theft pursuant to RCW 9.35.020(1) ("No person 

may knowingly obtain, possess, use, or transfer a means of identification . . . with the intent to 

                                               11 

No. 40856-2-II

commit, or to aid or abet, any crime.").  Because any rational trier of fact could conclude that 

Matteucci intended to commit a crime when taking and using the Gairnses' debit cards to obtain 

money without the cardholders' knowledge or permission, this argument lacks merit.

       Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of constitutional magnitude that the defendant 

may raise for the first time on appeal.  State v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 13, 904 P.2d 754 (1995).  

Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's 

verdict, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.  State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).  A claim of 

insufficiency admits the truth of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that a trier of fact can 

draw from that evidence.  Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.  Circumstantial evidence and direct 

evidence are equally reliable.  State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).  We 

defer to the jury to resolve issues    of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and 

persuasiveness of the evidence.  State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533, review 

denied, 119 Wn.2d 1011 (1992).   

       Here, the State presented the jurors with substantial evidence related to the theft of 

Jessica's and Marianne's debit cards.  Both victims testified, the State presented photographic 

evidence showing Radford using Marianne's card and Matteucci testified that she took and used 

the cards and then returned them without Jessica's knowledge.  In addition, the State played the 

recording of Matteucci's voluntary statement to Sergeant Pentz, made after Radford's arrest, in 

which Matteucci admitted to the thefts.  Given the overwhelming evidence presented at trial, any

rational trier of fact would infer that Matteucci intended to steal the Gairnses' identities to obtain 

money unlawfully.  

                                               12 

No. 40856-2-II

Denied the Right to a Complete Defense

       Next, Matteucci contends that the trial court denied her the right to present a complete 

defense.  Specifically she asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding testimony 

related to Matteucci's allegedly engaging in sexual activity with Jessica and her boyfriend.  

Matteucci contends that she contracted human papillomavirus from the encounter and now suffers 

from cancer as a result.  Matteucci contends that, had the jury been able to hear testimony to this 

effect, her use of Jessica's debit cards would make sense.  The State contends that because "there 

was ample other, less sensational, evidence available to Ms. Matteucci with which to establish the 

fact of this relationship," any testimony related to a sexual encounter would be needlessly 

cumulative.  Br. of Resp't at 20-21.  Because this type of evidence is irrelevant, confuses the 

issues, and is needlessly inflammatory, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying its 

admission.

       A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present relevant, admissible evidence in 

her defense.  State v. Rehak, 67 Wn. App. 157, 162, 834 P.2d 651 (1992), review denied, 120 

Wn.2d 1022, cert. denied, 508 U.S. 953 (1993).  But the right of a criminal defendant to present 

evidence is not unfettered, and the refusal to admit evidence lies largely within the sound 

discretion of the trial court.  Rehak, 67 Wn. App. at 162.  Generally, we review a trial court's 

decision to admit or refuse evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. Powell, 126 

Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995).  A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is 

manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons.  Powell, 126 Wn.2d at 258.  

       Here, the trial court  heard defense counsel's offer of proof concerning the sexual 

encounter, then concluded that "the State's request for the in limine ruling that will preclude any 

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No. 40856-2-II

testimony - or mention - of a potential reason tied to a sexual encounter and/or venereal disease 

and/or that it's allegedly led to a cancerous situation on the basis of relevance and on the basis of 

404(b) evidence."  1 RP at 44 (emphasis added).  Undoubtedly, this evidence was inadmissible 

under ER 403 on relevancy grounds as any probative value did not outweigh the substantial 

prejudice and confusion of issues addressing such a claim would entail.  ER 403 ("Although 

relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 

of . . . confusion of the issues").6 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding this issue.  

DOSA

       Last, Matteucci claims that the sentencing court violated the Sentencing Reform Act of 

1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW, and Matteucci's right to due process by ignoring statutory criteria 

in denying her request for a DOSA.  She also contends that the trial court considered 

impermissible facts in making its decision.  The State counters that whether to grant a DOSA 

rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and, in Matteucci's case, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion.  The trial court considered Matteucci's DOSA request and did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Matteucci a DOSA.

       Whether to grant a DOSA is a decision that rests within the sound discretion of the trial 

court.  State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005).  While no defendant is 

entitled to an exceptional sentence below the standard range, "every defendant is entitled to ask 

the trial court to consider such a sentence and to have the alternative actually considered."  

Grayson, 154 Wn.2d at 342.  If a trial court "refuses categorically to impose an exceptional 

sentence below the standard range under any circumstances," then it has abused the discretion 

6 Because the trial court appropriately excluded this evidence as irrelevant, we do not address 
Matteucci's arguments related to exclusion of evidence through ER 404(b).
                                               14 

No. 40856-2-II

vested to it through the SRA.  State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. 322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 

(1997), review denied, 136 Wn.2d 1002 (1998); see also Grayson, 154 Wn.2d at 342.  We review 

a trial court decision to deny a DOSA alternative under an abuse of discretion standard.  Grayson,

154 Wn.2d at 342.  

       Here, the trial  court postponed sentencing several      times to allow Matteucci the 

opportunity to obtain a DOSA screening despite the fact that her problems with drugs had not 

been presented as an issue at any time prior to sentencing.  After the sentencing hearing, the trial 

court did not consider Matteucci's failure to testify truthfully at Radford's trial and expressed a 

number of legitimate reasons for denying the DOSA alternative.     As previously discussed, the 

sentencing court based its decisions on the number of Matteucci's offenses and that stealing from 

Jessica, an extremely close friend, and her mother constituted a breach of trust.  Thus, contrary to 

Matteucci's claim, the court did not categorically oppose a DOSA or rely on impermissible 

grounds in declining to impose a DOSA.  Accordingly, we affirm Matteucci's convictions and 

sentence.  

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it 

is so ordered.

                                                 QUINN-BRINTNALL, J.
We concur:

ARMSTRONG, J.

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No. 40856-2-II

WORSWICK, A.C.J.

                                               16