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State Of Washington, Respondent V Anthony Johnson, Jr., Appellant
State: Washington
Court: Court of Appeals Division II
Docket No: 41141-5
Case Date: 03/13/2012
 
DO NOT CITE. SEE GR 14.1(a).


Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number: 41141-5
Title of Case: State Of Washington, Respondent V Anthony Johnson, Jr., Appellant
File Date: 03/13/2012

SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Pierce County Superior Court
Docket No: 09-1-04987-6
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 08/27/2010
Judge signing: Honorable Kitty-ann Van Doorninck

JUDGES
------
Authored byJ. Robin Hunt
Concurring:Jill M Johanson
David H. Armstrong

COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------

Counsel for Appellant(s)
 Lise Ellner  
 Attorney at Law
 Po Box 2711
 Vashon, WA, 98070-2711

Counsel for Respondent(s)
 Kathleen Proctor  
 Pierce County Prosecuting Atty Ofc
 930 Tacoma Ave S Rm 946
 Tacoma, WA, 98402-2171

 Thomas Charles Roberts  
 Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney
 930 Tacoma Ave S Rm 946
 Tacoma, WA, 98402-2171
			

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                       DIVISION  II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                             No.  41141-5-II

                             Respondent,

       v.

ANTHONY JOHNSON, JR.,                                      UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                             Appellant.

       Hunt, J.   --  Anthony Johnson, Jr. appeals his jury convictions and sentences for two 

counts of first degree child molestation, two counts of first degree rape of a child, and one count 

of tampering with a witness.  He argues that (1) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in 

closing argument by  commenting on his right to remain silent, commenting on witnesses'

credibility, shifting the burden of proof, and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury; 

(2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying  his motion to sever his witness tampering 

charge from his child molestation and child rape charges; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion for a mistrial after a State witness violated an order in limine by inadvertently 

mentioning a polygraph test; and (4) the trial court committed cumulative error. In his 

statement of additional grounds (SAG), Johnson asserts that (1) the trial court's granting four  

No.  41141-5-II

continuances violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment1 and CrR 3.3; (2) he 

received ineffective assistance when his trial counsel objected to the State's polygraph testimony 

but did not immediately request a limiting instruction or that the trial court strike the answer; and 

(3) the trial court sentenced him improperly. We affirm.

                                            FACTS

                                 I.  Child Molestation and Rape

       Johnson met MA2 in 2001, when her daughter, LA, was six months old.  Johnson and MA 

began a romantic relationship, and he moved into her one-bedroom apartment.  They had three 

more children together.  Although Johnson was not LA's biological father, he considered her his 

"daughter," and LA referred to him as her "dad."   3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 

198; 6 VRP at 607.  Johnson watched LA and his and MA's three other children while MA 

worked as the sole provider for the family.

       Johnson frequently brought his other girlfriends into MA's apartment while the children 

were present.  When LA once told her mother about Johnson's infidelities, Johnson threw LA 

across the room by her shirt and choked her until her mother intervened.  According to LA, 

Johnson started touching her "private" and her "behind" when she was six or seven years old.  3 

VRP at 200.  He often told her to take off her pants and to lie on the bed with her face down

while he got on top of her and touched her "down on bottom" "where he goes to the bathroom"

1 U.S. Const. amend. VI.

2 It is appropriate to provide some confidentiality in this case.  Accordingly, it is hereby ordered 
that initials will be used in the body of the opinion to identify juveniles and other parties involved.

                                               2 

No.  41141-5-II

(with his penis), occasionally putting baby gel on her bottom when he did this.  3 VRP at 201-

203.  He made LA give him oral sex until "white stuff" came out, which made LA feel "nasty" and 

"like [she] wanted to throw up."  3 VRP at 206.  Johnson also touched LA's "private" where she 

"[goes] to the bathroom" (vagina), which hurt and made her feel "bad."   3 VRP at 200-01, 208.  

Johnson may have touched LA more than ten times.

       At some point, MA began suspecting that Johnson was touching LA in a sexual manner

and asked LA, "Does your dad touch you in your private area?"    3 VRP at 258.  LA responded, 

"Yes, he does." 3 VRP at 258.  MA apologized to LA and told her it was "not going to happen 

again." Approximately one month later, in February 2008, MA and the children moved into a two-

bedroom apartment, and Johnson did not live with them for several months.  In May 2009, 

however, Johnson moved back in with the family.

       MA continued to have suspicions about Johnson touching LA.  One night, MA pretended 

to fall asleep in her bedroom while Johnson played a DVD3 in the living room.  He put the DVD 

on repeat and went into the bedroom where the children were sleeping.  Approximately twenty 

minutes later, MA checked on Johnson and she found Johnson in the children's bedroom in his 

boxer shorts, "like laying [sic] on top of [LA]" with his penis exposed.  3 VRP at 262.  Johnson 

apologized and said he did not know any better.  MA agreed to give him one more chance but 

said she would leave him if he touched LA again.

       On August 31, 2009, LA told MA that Johnson "did it again."     3 VRP at 266.  MA took 

the children to stay with her aunt, who called the police.  MA gave the police a handwritten 

3 The term "DVD" is an acronym for a digital video disc.

                                               3 

No.  41141-5-II

statement, moved with the children to a shelter, and on September 2 took LA to Saint Peter's

Hospital Sexual Assault Clinic for a trauma examination.

       Doctor Deborah Hall interviewed LA.     During the audio recorded interview, LA pointed 

to a diagram of a man's penis, told Doctor Hall that Johnson had touched her with his "peanuts,"

described the "white stuff" that had come out of Johnson's penis, and explained that he had 

touched her vagina and it hurt.  4 VRP at 387.  Doctor Hall performed two medical examinations 

of LA; she noticed that LA had an irregularly narrow hymen rim4 and less hymen tissue than 

normal for an eight-year-old girl.  Part of her vaginal tissue appeared "raw," and there were dark 

spots, suggesting bleeding under the skin.  4 VRP at 394.  Doctor Hall also found two "healed 

scars"5 in LA's vaginal area: According to Doctor Hall, the scarring in the "midline"6 area of 

LA's vagina could have been congenital; but the scarring on the "sides" of her vagina was not 

congenital and was consistent with "penetrating trauma."  4 VRP at 395.

       The police discovered fluid stains on the underwear and skirt that LA had worn on August 

31.  The skirt tested positive for semen and spermatozoa, which matched Johnson's DNA profile. 

No such test was performed on LA's underwear.  On September 16, Kimberly Brune, a child 

interviewer for the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, conducted a forensic interview 

of LA, which she video and audio recorded.  LA again discussed Johnson's sexual abuse.  On

November 4, the State charged Johnson with two counts of first degree child molestation and two 

4 Doctor Hall explained, "[T]he hymen is a thin tissue that every little girl is born with . . . and it 
partially covers the vaginal opening." 4 VRP at 392.

5 4 VRP at 394.

6 4 VRP at 395.

                                               4 

No.  41141-5-II

counts of first degree child rape.

                                     II.  Witness Tampering

       After his arrest, Johnson periodically called MA from jail, and MA began having "second 

thoughts" about proceeding with criminal charges against him.  2 VRP at 123.  MA called Grant 

Blinn of the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and asked him to dismiss the charges.  

When Blinn refused, she told him that LA had lied about the sexual abuse.  MA then contacted 

Johnson's attorney and agreed to have defense investigator Nancy Austring interview LA.  MA

instructed LA to tell Austring that she (LA) had made up the allegations about Johnson, which 

LA did.

       On June 7, 2010, Johnson again  called  MA from jail.  During this audio recorded 

conversation, Johnson told MA that she and LA needed to continue saying that the sexual abuse 

allegations were untrue or Child Protective Services would take MA's children away from her.  

Specifically, he said:

              [JOHNSON]:      You want to listen to me.  You don't want to tell nobody 
       that you, that you talked to me.
              [MA]:  I know.
              [. . .]
              [JOHNSON]:  So my attorney [sic] supposed to come interview you again.  
       You need to tell her that [the allegations against me are false].  If you do that, I 
       could turn around and sue this place, I'll give you all that, and you know what I 
       mean?
              [MA]:  Yeah.
              [JOHNSON]:  Or why don't you go to Mom's?  You know where that is.
              [MA]:  Yeah.
              [. . .]
              [JOHNSON]:  I know, but you have to stay straight with the [story] you 
       gave my attorney.  You have to or they are going to take those kids away from 
       you for life.
              [. . .]
              [JOHNSON]:  Don't trust these people -- they're -- they're -- it's a tactic 

                                               5 

No.  41141-5-II

       they use.  I know it's hard to believe me but trust me on this.  You have to stay 
       consistent on what you told my -- my peoples.  Understand?

3 VRP at 301, 303-05 (emphasis added).  Johnson then told MA that law enforcement knew 

where she was and that she needed to "shake that spot," which, according to MA, meant she 

needed to leave the shelter so she would not have to testify.  3 VRP at 316.  Johnson also told 

MA that he had seen her uncle's picture in the newspaper and that he was "one of them, too."7 3 

VRP at 311.  Before hanging up, Johnson asked MA, "Can I count on you to help me out?  . . . 

Can I count on the little one to help me out?" 3 VRP at 323.  Based on this phone call, the State 

amended its information to add one count of tampering with a witness.

                                         III.  Procedure

                                      A.  Pretrial Motions

       Johnson moved to sever the witness tampering charge from his child molestation and child 

rape charges, arguing that the offenses were not properly joined and that joinder could prejudice 

his trial by inviting the jury to draw an "adverse inference"8 from his difficult relationship with his 

trial attorney, whom he had called "that b*tch" and "[my] so-called lawyer" during his June 7 

phone conversation with MA.  1 VRP at 40.    The State responded that (1) the witness tampering 

evidence was "cross admissible" to prove the child molestation and child rape charges, and (2)

Johnson's statements during the conversation with MA to "shake that spot" (leave the shelter) 

and to "stay consistent" (testify falsely) were efforts to manipulate MA, which helped explain why 

MA had instructed LA to recant her sexual abuse allegations against Johnson.  1 VRP at 43-44.

7 According to MA, her uncle was a sex offender.

8 1 VRP at 40.

                                               6 

No.  41141-5-II

       Noting that some of the subject matter in the phone call was "incredibly prejudicial,"9 the 

trial court denied Johnson's motion to sever, but it did not allow the State to play the audio taped 

phone call for the jury.  Instead, the trial court and counsel agreed to a redacted transcript of the 

phone call, which the State and MA read in court.

       The State moved to exclude any evidence relating to a polygraph that Johnson had taken

and passed before trial.  Johnson did not object, stating, "I believe that's the status of the law." 1 

VRP at 74.  The trial court granted the State's motion and excluded the polygraph evidence.

                                            B.  Trial

                                     1. Motion for mistrial 

       At trial, MA testified that she had lied to Blinn when she said LA had made up her sexual 

abuse allegations against Johnson and then referred to a polygraph test:

              [STATE]:  Did [LA] make these things up to you?
              [MA]:  No.  I mean, she didn't say none of that.
              [STATE]: Did Mr. Blinn do anything after you put that into email and left 
       him voice messages?
              [MA]:  Actually, he said, he told me that [Johnson]  could take a lie 
       detector test or something.
              [JOHNSON]:  Your Honor -- 
              [COURT]:  I want [the State] to ask another question.
              [STATE]:  Sure.
              [STATE]:  Did he agree to dismiss the charges?
              [MA]:  No.

3 VRP at 273 (emphasis added).  Johnson argued that MA's mentioning the polygraph possibility 

(1) created an "adverse inference" that he could have taken a polygraph test but he chose not to,

or that he failed; and (2) violated his right to remain silent.  3 VRP at 278.  The trial court 

9 1 VRP at 45-46.

                                               7 

No.  41141-5-II

disagreed:

       No. What [MA] said was Mr. Blinn said something about a lie detector, and that's 
       all, then it stopped.  That's all we got.  We don't have anything else.

3 VRP at 278.

       The trial court offered to give a limiting instruction, which Johnson did not pursue.  

Johnson moved for a mistrial based on the same argument, emphasizing, "[W]e can't unring the 

bell."  3 VRP at 285.  The trial court denied Johnson's mistrial motion but again offered to give a 

limiting instruction, which Johnson did not pursue.  Later,  however,  the trial court gave the 

following instruction, which both the State and Johnson had requested:

       You heard testimony referencing a polygraph or lie detector test.  Such tests are 
       not admissible in the State of Washington because they are not reliable and you are 
       not to consider this testimony for any purpose.

CP at 108 (Jury Instruction 5) (emphasis added).

                                    2.  Johnson's testimony

       On direct examination, repeatedly using foul language, Johnson admitted (1) having 

numerous affairs with women; (2) having physically abused MA in the children's presence; (3) 

having hit LA when she told MA about his affairs; (4) having lied to the police about his birth 

date; and (5) using drugs and watching pornography in the children's presence.  But Johnson

denied having had sex with LA and trying to alter MA's testimony.  He did, however, stipulate 

that LA's skirt had tested positive for semen and spermatozoa that matched his DNA profile,

which, he claimed, had gotten onto LA's skirt when he and MA had "had sex" on top of a pile of 

dirty clothes the morning of August 31. 6 VRP at 670.

                                      3.  Closing argument

                                               8 

No.  41141-5-II

       Johnson objected several times during the State's closing argument.   The State informed 

the jury about the elements of the  crimes, summarized the  witnesses' testimony at  trial, and 

compared  Doctor Hall's and Brune's forensic interview techniques with Austring's defense

interview techniques, during which LA had falsely recanted her testimony:

       You saw the words that . . . Austring  used  and you heard her, by her own 
       admission, say a forensic interview is to find out what happened.  It's to get 
       details.  "I [Austring] didn't do a forensic interview.  I did a defense interview and 
       the purpose of a defense interview is to help the defendant."  So you might as well 
       take the truth and toss it out the window.

7 VRP at 729-30 (second  emphasis added).  Johnson objected that this argument  was  a 

"misstatement and mischaracterization" of Austring's testimony.  The trial court sustained the 

objection and struck the last sentence from the record.  7 VRP at 730.   No curative instruction 

was requested or given.

       The State then discussed LA's testimony as follows:

       The attention generated by allegations of sexual abuse is not positive, it's not fun.  
       It's negative, it's cold, it's embarrassing.  [LA] is not making this up for attention.  
       She's not making this up to get herself out of a lie.  She's telling the truth about 
       what happened to her when she was -- 

7 VRP at 732 (emphasis added).  Again Johnson objected; the trial court sustained the objection, 

struck the statement from the record, and instructed the jury to disregard the statement.

       The State then discussed Johnson's claim that his semen had gotten onto LA's skirt 

because he had "had sex"10 on top of a pile of dirty clothes:

       There is going to be an argument, well, they didn't have the panties tested and 
       there was no semen that was found on the swabs [taken from LA's inner thighs].  
       Why would you test the panties if there's already semen on the skirt?  Even if you . 
       . . test[ed] the panties . . . wouldn't he just say, "I had sex on the panties, too?"  

10 6 VRP at 670.

                                               9 

No.  41141-5-II

       He's come up with an explanation for everything else.

7 VRP at 736-37 (emphasis added).  Johnson objected that this argument "shift[ed] the burden"

of proof.  7 VRP at 737.  The trial court sustained the objection and struck the last portion of the 

argument from the record.  Again, no curative instruction was requested or given.

       The State also quoted United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo as having

said, "'Justice that is due the accused is due the accuser, as well.' Justice in this case is justice for 

[LA]."  7 VRP at 742.  Johnson objected, but the trial court overruled the objection.  7 VRP at 

742.  The State  further  argued:   "[Johnson] talks about seeing [MA's] uncle's face in the 

newspaper and says, 'He's one of them, too.' And what is [MA's] uncle?  A sex offender.  He's

identifying himself with [MA's] uncle."  7 VRP at 785 (emphasis added).  Johnson objected; the 

trial court sustained the objection and asked the State to move on.  Johnson did not request a 

curative instruction.

       The State began its rebuttal closing argument by explaining that it alone had the burden of 

proof and the "responsibility and the obligation [of proving] each and every element [of Johnson's 

crimes] beyond a reasonable doubt." 7 VRP at 767.  Then, the following colloquy ensued:

              [STATE]:  I want to start with beyond a reasonable doubt.  Do you have 
       an abiding belief in the truth of [the] charges?
              [JOHNSON]:  Objection, Your Honor.  That misstates the burden of 
       proof.
              [COURT]:  That's overruled.  The instructions are in your packet of 
       beyond a reasonable doubt.
              [STATE]:  You are given an instruction about what the burden of proof is.  
       If after such consideration you have an abiding belief in the truth of the charge, 
       you are then -- 
              [JOHNSON]:  Again, objection.  That only modifies what proof beyond a 
       reasonable doubt is.  It is not a substitute.
              [COURT]:  The objection is overruled.  I've given [this] instruction as to 
       the law.  This is argument.

                                               10 

No.  41141-5-II

              [. . .]
              [STATE]:  It would be wonderful, lovely and amazing if [LA] could be 
       100 percent consistent all [of] the time, every time she made a statement about 
       what her father did to her. [Y]ou can hold it against her that she is not an adult 
       and that she can't say, "Yes.  When I was six on May 3, 2007, it was raining . . . 
       and I was wearing a red shirt and this is exactly what my dad did to me."    You 
       can't hold [LA] to that standard.  You have to hold -- 
              [JOHNSON]:  Objection, Your Honor, misstates the law.
              [COURT]:  Overruled.
              [STATE]:  You can't hold [LA] to that standard.  You have to hold the 
       State to its burden of proof, though.  [. . .] Yes, she is not a hundred percent 
       consistent in absolutely everything, but she doesn't need to be, as long as you have 
       an abiding belief that [LA] was sexually molested and raped by her father.
              [JOHNSON]:  Again, objection, Your Honor, the standard is beyond a 
       reasonable doubt.
              [COURT]:  That's overruled.

7 VRP at 768-71 (emphasis added).

       The State also summarized Johnson's statements in his June 7 phone call to MA from jail 

and then argued:

       Then what does he say after that?  "You won't even imagine how evil [I would] be 
       if I did." Those are the words you heard.  That's the testimony you heard and 
       those are the words from the defendant.  You heard the transcripts, you heard the 
       exact words.  Not once in that entire conversation does he ever deny -- 

7 VRP at 786 (emphasis added).  Johnson objected that this argument "shift[ed] the burden" of 

proof.  7 VRP at 786.  The trial court sustained the objection, struck the statement from the 

record, and instructed the jury to disregard the statement.

                                         C.  Sentencing

       The jury found Johnson guilty of two counts of first degree child molestation, two counts 

of first degree child rape, and one count of tampering with a witness, as charged.  The trial court 

imposed standard range sentences:  198 months of confinement on each child molestation charge,

                                               11 

No.  41141-5-II

318 months on each child rape charge, and 16 months on the witness tampering charge, all to run 

concurrently.  Johnson did not object to these sentences.

       Johnson appeals his convictions and sentences.

                                          ANALYSIS

                                     I.  Speedy Trial Rights

       In his SAG, Johnson contends that the trial court violated his right to speedy trial under 

CrR 3.3 and the Sixth Amendment11 when it granted four continuances in his trial.  He is 

incorrect.

       "Trial within 60 days is not a constitutional mandate,"12 and there is "no constitutional 

basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or 

months."13 A trial court may grant a trial continuance under CrR 3.3(f)(2) when a continuance is 

"required in the administration of justice," and the "defendant will not be prejudiced" in the 

presentation of his defense.  Similarly, CrR 3.3(e)(8) allows a trial court to extend the time of trial 

for  "[u]navoidable or unforeseen circumstances."   Our courts have consistently held that the 

unavailability of counsel may constitute an unforeseen or unavoidable circumstance, warranting 

11 U.S. Const. amend. VI.

12 State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 651, 716 P.2d 295 (1986).

13 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).

                                               12 

No.  41141-5-II

a trial extension.14

       We will not disturb a trial court's grant or denial of a CrR 3.3 continuance or extension 

absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion.  State v. Williams, 104 Wn. App. 516, 520-21, 

17 P.3d 648 (2001).  The trial court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on untenable 

grounds or on untenable reasons.  Williams, 104 Wn. App. at 521.    It is not a manifest abuse of 

discretion for a trial court to grant a continuance to allow a defense counsel opportunity to 

prepare for trial, even over the defendant's express objections,  in order  to ensure effective 

representation and a fair trial.  Williams, 104 Wn. App. at 523 (citing State v. Campbell, 103 

Wn.2d 1, 15, 691 P.2d 929 (1984)).

       Here, the trial court granted the State two continuances because the prosecutor was 

scheduled in other trials.  The trial court also granted Johnson two continuances because his trial 

counsel broke her ankle, was unavailable for trial, needed to re-interview MA and LA after they 

recanted their sexual abuse allegations, and needed to prepare a defense for the State's new 

witness tampering charge.  These were permissible bases for extending the time of trial under CrR 

3.3(e)(8) and for granting a continuance under CrR 3.3(f)(2).  Furthermore, Johnson has not 

demonstrated that these continuances prejudiced him       in the presentation of his defense.  

Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting these continuances 

or deny Johnson's rights under CrR 3.3 or the Sixth Amendment.

14 State v. Carson, 128 Wn.2d 805, 814, 912 P.2d 1016 (1996); State v. Watkins, 71 Wn. App. 
164, 175, 857 P.2d 300 (1993); State v. Kelley, 64 Wn. App. 755, 767, 828 P.2d 1106 (1992); 
State v. Raper, 47 Wn. App. 530, 539, 736 P.2d 680, review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1023 (1987); 
State v. Stock, 44 Wn. App. 467, 473, 722 P.2d 1330 (1986); State v. Brown, 40 Wn. App. 91, 94-
95, 697 P.2d 583, review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1041 (1985).

                                               13 

No.  41141-5-II

                                      II.  Motion To Sever

       Johnson next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever for trial his 

witness tampering charge from his child molestation and child rape charges.  We hold that the 

charges were properly joined and the evidence for each charge was cross-admissible.  Thus, 

Johnson's argument fails.

       We review for a manifest abuse of discretion a trial court's denial of a CrR 4.4(b) motion 

to sever multiple offenses. State v. Bythrow, 114 Wn.2d 713, 717, 790 P.2d 154 (1990).  A 

defendant seeking severance has the burden of demonstrating that a trial involving all counts 

would be so manifestly prejudicial as to outweigh the concern for judicial economy.  Bythrow, 114 

Wn.2d at 718.  Joinder of offenses carries the potential for prejudice if (1) the defendant may have 

to present separate, possibly conflicting, defenses; (2) the jury may infer guilt on one charge from 

evidence of another charge; or (3) the cumulative evidence may lead to a guilty verdict on all 

charges when, if considered separately, the evidence would not support every charge.  Bythrow, 

114 Wn.2d at 718.  In determining whether the potential for prejudice requires severance, a trial 

court must consider the strength of the State's evidence on each count, the clarity of defenses as 

to each count, the court's instructions to the jury to consider each count separately, and the 

admissibility of evidence of the other charges even if not joined for trial.  State v. Russell, 125 

Wn.2d 24, 63, 882 P.2d 747 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1129 (1995); State v. Sanders, 66 

Wn. App. 878, 885, 833 P.2d 452 (1992) (such factors may "offset or neutralize the prejudicial 

effect of joinder").

       Contrary to the requirements of RAP 10.3(6), Johnson does not include argument in his 

                                               14 

No.  41141-5-II

appellate brief detailing how joining offenses for trial prejudiced him; instead, he baldly asserts the 

trial court noted that his telephone conversation from jail was "incredibly prejudicial," which 

Johnson takes out of context.15  Br. of Appellant at 26. (quoting 1 VRP at 45).  Again, Johnson 

carries the burden of proof on appeal.

       To show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance, "the defendant 

must be able to point to specific prejudice."  Bythrow, 114 Wn.2d at 720 (emphasis added).  The 

trial court's lone statement, taken out of context, is not sufficiently specific to prove that joinder 

of Johnson's offenses for trial prejudiced him.  We hold, therefore, that because Johnson has 

failed to meet his burden to show prejudice, he has also failed to show that the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying his motion for severance.16

                                     III. Denial of Mistrial 

                       A.  Passing Non-specific Reference to a Polygraph

       Johnson argues that (1) trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial 

because MA's passing reference to a polygraph test led the jury to infer that he had refused to 

15 It appears the trial court was simply noting that some of the phone call's content was 
prejudicial.  Accordingly, the trial court did not allow the State to play the entire taped phone call 
for the jury; instead, the trial court assisted the parties in creating a redacted transcript, deleting 
the prejudicial dialog during Johnson's phone call to MA from jail.  See 1 VRP at 48-49; 3 VRP 
at 300-28.  Johnson did not object when the State read these redacted portions to the jury.

16 Although we could end our inquiry here, we further note that Johnson has not demonstrated (1) 
that presenting separate defenses to the charges caused him to present conflicting defenses, (2) 
that joinder of his offenses invited the jury to cumulate evidence of guilt or to infer that he had a 
criminal disposition, or (3) that the evidence for these multiple offenses was not relevant or cross-
admissible.  See, e.g., Sanders, 66 Wn. App. at 885-86.  Moreover, the trial court properly 
instructed the jury to consider each count separately.  See CP at 109 (Jury Instruction 6).

                                               15 

No.  41141-5-II

take a polygraph test or that he had failed such test, thus undermining his presumption of 

innocence with false evidence; and (2) this taint was too great to guarantee him a fair trial.  The 

State responds that the comment was inadvertent, harmless, and did not prejudice Johnson.  We

agree with the State.

       We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's denial of a mistrial.17 The trial court 

should grant a mistrial "'only when the defendant has been so prejudiced that nothing short of a 

new trial can [e]nsure that [the] defendant will be tried fairly.'"18 To be prejudicial, the claimed 

error must have affected the outcome of the trial.19   In determining the effect of an irregular 

occurrence during trial, we examine the error's seriousness, whether it involved cumulative 

evidence, and whether the trial court properly instructed the jury to disregard it.  State v. Johnson, 

124 Wn.2d 57, 76, 873 P.2d 514 (1994).        A reviewing court will not consider whether  the

polygraph reference was deliberate or inadvertent.  State v. Weber, 99 Wn.2d 158, 164, 659 P.2d 

1102 (1983).

       In Washington, evidence of polygraph tests is generally inadmissible absent the parties'

stipulation.  State v. Rupe, 101 Wn.2d 664, 690, 683 P.2d 571 (1984).  Nevertheless, "'[t]he mere 

fact [that] a jury is apprised of a lie detector test is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to 

the result is raised or if an inference raised as to the result is not prejudicial.'"20 Thus, a witness's 

17 State v. Rodriguez, 146 Wn.2d 260, 269, 45 P.3d 541 (2002).

18 State v. Weber, 99 Wn.2d 158, 165, 659 P.2d 1102 (1983) (quoting State v. Gilcrist, 91 Wn.2d 
603, 612, 590 P.2d 809 (1979)).

19 State v. McMurray, 40 Wn App. 872, 876, 700 P.2d 1203 (1985).

20 State v. Sutherland, 94 Wn.2d 527, 529, 617 P.2d 1010 (1980) (emphasis added) (quoting 

                                               16 

No.  41141-5-II

passing reference to polygraph test, or to the mere possibility that a person could have taken a 

polygraph test, is not necessarily reversible error unless the testimony raises an inference about the 

test's result. Such was not the case here.

       Johnson compares MA's inadvertent remark that he could have taken a polygraph test to 

State v. Escalona, 49 Wn. App. 251, 742 P.2d 190 (1987), in which Division One of our court

reversed a defendant's conviction because the victim had testified that, on the day of his being 

stabbed, he was nervous because he knew that the defendant "'already ha[d] a record'" and that 

he "'had stabbed someone'" else.  Br. of Appellant at 30-32 (quoting Escalona, 49 Wn. App. at 

253).  In holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial, Division One 

emphasized that this testimony was "extremely serious" because it implied the defendant's guilt 

based on propensity evidence, which Washington's evidentiary rules specifically prohibit, and 

because the State's evidence was otherwise weak.  Escalona, 49 Wn. App. at 255.  In contrast, 

MA's passing remark that Johnson "could take a lie detector test or something"21 did not imply 

Johnson's guilt based on propensity evidence; nor did it imply that Johnson had even taken a 

polygraph test, that such test had been offered to him, or that there were any test results.

       We further note that MA's comment occurred in the context of a seven-day trial and that 

neither the trial court nor counsel drew further attention to  the  comment     or mentioned a 

polygraph.  In addition, unlike the facts in Escalona, the State's evidence against Johnson was 

State v. Descoteaux, 94 Wn.2d 31, 38, 614 P.2d 179 (1980), overruled on other grounds by State 
v. Danforth, 97 Wn.2d 255, 643 P.2d 882 (1982)).

21 3 VRP at 273.

                                               17 

No.  41141-5-II

strong; thus, it is unlikely that  MA's passing remark, which was not "extremely  serious,"22

affected the jury's verdict.  But to neutralize any possible prejudice, at both counsel's request, the 

trial court instructed the jury that polygraph evidence is not admissible in Washington and that it

should not consider the testimony "for any purpose." CP at 108 (Jury Instruction 5).  "'A jury is 

presumed to follow jury instructions and that presumption will prevail until it is overcome by a 

showing otherwise.'"  Carnation Co., Inc. v. Hill, 54 Wn. App. 806, 811, 776 P.2d 158 (1989)

(quoting Tennant v. Roys, 44 Wn. App. 305, 315, 722 P.2d 848 (1986)), aff'd, 115 Wn.2d 184, 

796 P.2d 416 (1990); see also State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 730, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997).

       Because MA's passing polygraph comment did not infer the test's results, the testimony 

was brief, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony, we hold that Johnson 

did not suffer any prejudice and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his 

mistrial motion.

                              B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       In his SAG, Johnson contends that his trial counsel's failure to ask the trial court to strike 

MA's polygraph comment from the record, or contemporaneously to instruct the jury to disregard 
the statement, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.23 This claim fails.

       We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo.  State v. White, 80 Wn. App.

22 Escalona, 49 Wn. App. at 255.

23 Johnson also asserts that counsel's failure to move to strike and to request a curative instruction
violated his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to be presumed innocent. He does 
not attempt to explain how or why this might be the case.  And based on the record before us, we 
see no evidence of any such violations.  Accordingly, we do not further consider these assertions.

                                               18 

No.  41141-5-II

406, 410, 907 P.2d 310 (1995).  To prevail on such a claim, a defendant must show (1) deficient 

representation by trial counsel and (2) resulting prejudice.  State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225, 

743 P.2d 816 (1987) (adopting the test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. 

Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).  Our scrutiny of a trial counsel's performance is highly 

deferential; it presumes that counsel provided reasonable assistance.  Thomas, 109 Wn.2d at 226.

"[T]he defendant must show in the record the absence of legitimate strategic or tactical reasons"

for the challenged conduct.  State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 336, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).  If 

counsel's conduct can be characterized as legitimate trial strategy or tactics, performance is not 

deficient.  State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011); State v. Breitung, ___ Wn.2d 

___, 267 P.3d 1012, 1015 (2011).  To show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that, but 

for his counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

trial would have been different.  Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 34.  A defendant must meet both prongs;

failure to show either prong will end our inquiry.  State v. Fredrick, 45 Wn. App. 916, 923, 729 

P.2d 56 (1986).

       Johnson does not show that his trial counsel provided deficient representation or resulting 

prejudice. The record indicates that Johnson's trial counsel did not request a limiting instruction 

immediately after MA mentioned a polygraph test because counsel did not want to draw attention 

to the evidence after the trial court ruled it inadmissible:  The trial court twice asked whether it 

should give the jury a curative instruction; both times Johnson's counsel refused, adding, "[W]e 

are in a rock and a hard place now, you know, highlighting it, you can't unring that bell." 3 VRP 

at 285.  Counsel's failure to request a contemporaneous limiting instruction was, therefore, a 

                                               19 

No.  41141-5-II

legitimate, strategic or tactical decision, which does not amount to deficient performance.  Having 

found no deficient performance, we need not address the prejudice prong; nevertheless, we note 

that the trial court's later jury instructions required the jury to disregard any evidence that they 

had heard about a polygraph test.  Because a jury is presumed to follow the trial court's 

instructions, Johnson does not demonstrate prejudice.  Carnation Co., Inc., 54 Wn. App. at 811.  

Accordingly, Johnson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

                                 IV.  Prosecutorial Misconduct

       Johnson's main argument is that the prosecutor made numerous statements in closing 

argument that amounted to prosecutorial misconduct and denied him a fair trial.  Specifically, he 

argues that the prosecutor (1) commented on his right to remain silent, (2) commented on 

witnesses' credibility, (3) shifted the burden of proof, and (4) appealed to the passions and 

prejudices of the jury.  These arguments fail.

                                    A.  Standard of Review

       We review for abuse of discretion trial court rulings based on allegations of prosecutorial 

misconduct.  State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136, 174, 892 P.2d 29 (1995).  To prove prosecutorial 

misconduct, the defendant must demonstrate that the prosecuting attorney's conduct was both 

improper and prejudicial.  State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997).  Prejudice 

exists where there is a "substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the jury's verdict."  Brown, 

132 Wn.2d at 561.  Where a defendant objected at trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, 

we give deference to the trial court's ruling because "'[t]he trial court is in the best position to 

most effectively determine if prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced [the] defendant's right to a fair 

                                               20 

No.  41141-5-II

trial.'" Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 719 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Luvene, 

127 Wn.2d 690, 701, 903 P.2d 960 (1995)).

       In addition, a prosecutor has wide latitude in closing arguments to draw reasonable 

inferences from the facts in evidence and to express such inferences to the jury.  State v. Gregory, 

158 Wn.2d 759, 860, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006); State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d 559, 577, 79 P.3d 432 

(2003).  We review any allegedly improper statements "within the context of the prosecutor's 

entire argument, the issues in the case, the evidence discussed in the argument, and the jury 

instructions."  Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d at 578.  Furthermore, an objection and an appropriate jury 

instruction may also cure any resulting prejudice.  See State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 28, 195 

P.3d 940 (2008).

                            B.  Comment on Right To Remain Silent

       Johnson argues that the prosecutor commented on his right to remain silent when she 

argued:  (1) "[W]ouldn't he [Johnson] just say, 'I had sex on the panties, too?'  He's come up 

with an explanation for everything else"24; and (2) "[n]ot once in that entire conversation [did] he 

ever deny -- ,"25 inferring that Johnson did not deny that he had abused LA in his June 7 phone call 

to MA from jail.  We disagree.

       Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to be free 

from self-incrimination, including the right to remain silent.  U.S. Const. amend. V; Wash. Const. 

art. I, § 9; see also State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 236, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996).  Although it is 

24 Br. of Appellant at 13 (quoting 7 VRP at 737).

25 7 VRP at 786 (emphasis added).

                                               21 

No.  41141-5-II

improper for a prosecutor to imply that the defendant has a duty to present evidence or to suggest 

to the jury that  the  defendant's silence  is an admission of guilt, a prosecutor may  properly 

comment on the strength of its own evidence.  State v. Cleveland, 58 Wn. App. 634, 647-48, 794

P.2d 546 (1990); State v. Lewis, 130 Wn.2d 700, 707, 927 P.2d 235 (1996).  For example, a 

prosecutor may comment that certain testimony is unrefuted as long as there is no reference to 

who could have denied it.  Brett, 126 Wn.2d at 176; see also State v. Ashby, 77 Wn.2d 33, 38, 

459 P.2d 403 (1969).  In addition, a prosecutor may comment on the absence of evidence on a 

particular issue if persons other than the accused could have testified as to that issue.  Brett, 126 

Wn.2d at 176.

       Johnson argues that the prosecutor's statements here were similar to those in State v. 

Reed,  in which Division Three of our court held that a prosecutor committed prosecutorial 

misconduct when he argued in closing, "Nobody has said, 'Yes, I was paid.' . . .  But the evidence 

in this case has to be that [the defendant] was not paid, because there is nothing to rebut that."

Br. of Appellant at 14 (quoting State v. Reed, 25 Wn. App. 46, 49, 604 P.2d 1330 (1979)).  The 

court held that these statements were a direct reference to  the defendant's failure to testify 

because he was the only person who could have testified that he had been paid.  Reed, 25 Wn. 

App. at 49.  In contrast, because Johnson did not exercise his right to remain silent but instead 

testified at trial, it is unlikely that the jury interpreted the prosecutor's statements as a comment 

on  Johnson's failure to testify or his right to remain silent.  Furthermore, Johnson  expressly 

admitted that it was his semen on LA's skirt and then went on to explain how it had come to be

there accidentally.

                                               22 

No.  41141-5-II

       When read in the context of the prosecutor's entire argument and the issues in the case, 

the prosecutor's closing argument merely anticipated Johnson's closing argument that the State 

had not proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not perform a DNA analysis on 

LA's underwear and that, unlike the semen on LA's skirt, the cotton swabs from her inner thighs 

did not reveal any of his DNA.  The prosecutor's closing argument statement, thus, reminded the 

jury that the State had presented clear evidence of Johnson's semen on LA's skirt and that, if it 

had also tested  LA's underwear, Johnson likely would have come up with an excuse for its 

presence there, too.  The record shows that the prosecutor did not comment on any failure of 

Johnson to testify or any failure to present specific rebuttal evidence.  The prosecutor merely 

argued reasonable inferences that the jury should draw from the evidence at trial, which was 

permissible closing argument.

       Even assuming, without deciding, that the prosecutor's second challenged statement -- that 

"[n]ot once . . . [did] [Johnson] ever deny"26 sexually abusing LA in his phone call to MA from 

jail -- was improper, Johnson fails to show that it prejudiced him.       The trial court sustained 

Johnson's  objections, struck this part of the prosecutor's argument from the record, and

instructed the jury that it needed to "disregard" the prosecutor's statements. 7 VRP at 786.  And, 

although, Johnson did not seek a more specific curative instruction, the trial court also instructed 

the jury that the attorney's statements were "not evidence," that it must "disregard any remark, 

statement, or argument that [was] not supported by the evidence or the law,"27 and that

       [i]f evidence was not admitted or was stricken from the record, then you are not to 

26 7 VRP at 786.

27 CP at 103 (Jury Instruction 1).

                                               23 

No.  41141-5-II

       consider it in reaching your verdict.   [I]f I have asked you to disregard any 
       evidence, then you must not discuss that evidence during your deliberations or 
       consider it in reaching your verdict.

CP at 102 (Jury Instruction 1).  Washington courts have held that virtually identical jury 

instructions "substantially mitigated" any prejudice resulting from a prosecutor's improper closing 

argument.  See e.g., State v. Papadopoulos, 34 Wn. App. 397, 401, 662 P.2d 59 (1983), 

overruled on other grounds by State v. Davis, 101 Wn.2d. 654, 658-59, 682 P.2d 883 (1984).  

Furthermore, we presume that the jury followed the trial court's instructions.  Stenson, 132 

Wn.2d at 730.  Given the strength of the State's evidence against Johnson and the trial court's 

jury instructions, we hold that Johnson has failed to prove that there was a "substantial likelihood 

the misconduct affected the jury's verdict" and his prosecutorial misconduct argument fails.  

Brown, 132 Wn.2d at 561.

                             C.  Comment on Witnesses' Credibility

       Next,  Johnson argues that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on witnesses'

credibility when she (1) mocked Austring as having testified, "'I did a defense interview and the 

purpose of a defense interview is to help the defendant.' So you might as well take the truth and 
toss it out the window"28; and (2) discussed LA's testimony, stating, "She's not making this up to 

get herself out of a lie.  She's . . . telling the truth about what happened to her when she was -- ."  

Br. of Appellant at 16 (quoting 7 VRP at 732).  This argument also fails.

       It is improper for a prosecutor to state a personal belief about the credibility of a witness

or to vouch for a witness's credibility.  Warren, 165 Wn.2d at 30; State v. Jackson, 150 Wn. App. 

28 Br. of Appellant at 16 (quoting 7 VRP at 729-30).

                                               24 

No.  41141-5-II

877, 883, 209 P.3d 553 (2009).  But a prosecutor may argue an inference from the evidence, and 

we will not find prejudicial error "unless it is 'clear and unmistakable' that  counsel  [was]

expressing a personal opinion."  Brett, 126 Wn.2d at 175 (quoting State v. Sargent, 40 Wn. App. 

340, 344, 698 P.2d 598 (1985)).

       Johnson argues that the prosecutor's statements here were similar to those in Sargent, in 

which Division One of our court reversed based on the prosecutor's having argued:  "I believe 

[the witness]. I believe him when he tells us that he talked to the defendant."  Sargent, 40 Wn. 

App. at 343, 345.  The court held that these statements were both improper and prejudicial

because they bolstered the credibility of the only witness directly linking the defendant to the 

crime, and all other evidence against the defendant was circumstantial.  Sargent, 40 Wn. App. at 

345.   Again, even  assuming, without deciding, that  the prosecutor's statements  here were 

improper, Johnson fails to show prejudice because it is not "clear and unmistakable" that the 

prosecutor was expressing a personal opinion about the witnesses' credibility.  In contrast to 

Sargent, Johnson's prosecutor did not explicitly state that she personally "believed" LA or that 

she "disbelieved" Austring.

       Arguably, the prosecutor was asking the jury to infer from the evidence that Austring's

aggressive and leading interview techniques29 and her motivations for conducting LA's interview 

may have been suspect given her admitted assertion that she did a "defense interview,"30 the 

29 The State had presented evidence that Austring's interview methods were suggestive in that she 
had used leading questions and LA's mother, who had told LA to lie, had been present for LA's
interview.

30 6 VRP at 545.

                                               25 

No.  41141-5-II

purpose of which was to gather information "beneficial to the defendant" and "to assist in the 

defense." 6 VRP at 572.   Johnson does not show that the prosecutor exceeded her wide latitude 

in closing argument to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and to express such 

inferences to jury.  Gregory, 158 Wn.2d at 860.

       Similarly,  taking the record as a whole, it is not  "clear and unmistakable" that  the 

prosecutor's  comment that LA was  "telling the truth"31 was a reference to the prosecutor's 

personal opinion about the child's testimony.  In presenting his defense, Johnson focused on LA's 

having recanted her sexual abuse allegations and having given conflicting testimony about 

Johnson's  sexual abuse.  Thus, the prosecutor's statements about LA's age, the stigma and 

embarrassment associated with sexual abuse, and her lack of motivation to lie were reasonable 

inferences from the evidence and legitimate responses to Johnson's attack on LA's credibility.32

       Moreover, Johnson has failed to show prejudice because the trial court sustained his 

objections, struck the comments from the record, and instructed  the jury to "disregard" the 

prosecutor's comment that LA was "telling the truth."   7 VRP at 732.  As we have previously 

noted, we presume that the jury followed the trial court's instructions.  Accordingly, we presume 

that the trial court's oral admonishments and its instructions to the jury cured any prejudicial 

effect that the statements may have had.

                                  D.  Shifting Burden of Proof

31 7 VRP at 732.

32 See Warren, 165 Wn.2d 24-25 (drawing a distinction between arguing that a child's memory 
should not be confused with credibility and arguing that a defendant is not entitled to the "benefit 
of the doubt").

                                               26 

No.  41141-5-II

       Johnson argues that the prosecutor "misstated the burden of proof" in rebuttal closing 

argument when she referenced the "'abiding belief'" language in the trial court's jury instructions.  

Br. of Appellant at 18 (quoting 7 VRP at 768).  This argument also fails.

       We begin by noting that (1) the prosecutor's statements mirrored the language in the 

court's jury instruction on reasonable doubt; and (2) Division Three of our court has approved a 

virtually identical jury instruction that included the "abiding belief" language, holding that, when 

read as a whole, the instruction adequately informed the jury that the State had the burden of 

proving each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Mabry, 51 Wn. App. 24, 

25, 751 P.2d 882 (1988); accord State v. Tanzymore, 54 Wn.2d 290, 291, 340 P.2d 178 (1959) 

(referring to the instruction as the "standard instruction on reasonable doubt").   We hold, 

therefore, the trial court's instruction, as given, was not an erroneous statement of the law and 

that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in restating it during closing argument.

       But  Johnson   contends  that the prosecutor "dissected"     the reasonable doubt jury 

instruction, argued that the jury did not need to consider any other language in the instruction, 

and suggested that it could infer guilt if it had an "abiding belief" in the charges.  Br. of Appellant 

at 20.  Although the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the  "abiding belief" language in the 

instruction, taken in the context of her rebuttal closing argument as a whole, we hold that the 

prosecutor did not misstate the law or invite the jury to disregard Johnson's presumption of 

innocence  or the State's burden of proving each element of the charged offenses beyond a 

reasonable doubt.33

33 The prosecutor began her rebuttal closing argument by informing the jury that the State alone 
had the burden of proof:  "The reason the State gets to go again is because it's the State's burden 

                                               27 

No.  41141-5-II

                         E.  Appealing to Jury's Passions and Prejudices

       Johnson also argues that the prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury 

when (1) she argued that Justice Benjamin Cardozo once said, "'Justice that is due the accused is 

due the accuser[,] as well'";34 and (2) she inferred that Johnson admitted he was a sex offender 

when he saw a picture of MA's uncle in the newspaper and claimed, "[H]e's one of them, too."  

Br. of Appellant at 23 (quoting 7 VRP at 785).  This argument also fails.

       Johnson argues that the prosecutor's statements in his case were similar to those in State 

v. Powell, in which a prosecutor told the jury that a not guilty verdict would "send a message"

that children who reported sexual abuse would not be believed and this would essentially declare 

"'open season on children.'"  Br. of Appellant at 24 (quoting State v. Powell, 62 Wn. App. 914, 

918, 816 P.2d 86 (1991)).  Johnson also compares the prosecutor's statements here to those in 

State v. Belgarde, in which a prosecutor appealed to jury passions and prejudices and introduced 

of proof.  We have the responsibility and the obligation to prove each and every elements[sic]
beyond a reasonable doubt."    7 VRP at 767 (emphasis added).  The prosecutor then drew the 
jury's attention to jury instruction two, which laid out the reasonable doubt standard in more 
detail; the instruction also informed the jury that (1) the State had the burden of proof, (2) 
Johnson was presumed innocent, and (3) he did not have a burden of proving that any reasonable 
doubt existed.
       The prosecutor then referred to the "abiding belief"         language while discussing 
inconsistencies in LA's testimony, in essence arguing that LA was not "100 percent consistent all 
[of] the time" but that the jury could still find Johnson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if it had 
an "abiding belief" that he had committed each of the offenses charged, 7 VRP at 769-70.  The 
prosecutor continued to remind the jury that the State carried the ultimate burden of proof when it 
argued, "You can't hold [LA] to that standard.  You have to hold the State to its burden of proof, 
though."  7 VRP at 770 (emphasis added).  The prosecutor then directed the jury to other 
evidence of Johnson's guilt, including MA's testimony, Doctor Hall's medical findings, and the 
semen on LA's skirt.

34 Br. of Appellant at 23 (quoting 7 VRP at 742).

                                               28 

No.  41141-5-II

facts not in evidence by referring to the defendant's American Indian Movement (AIM) affiliations 

and describing  AIM members as "'a deadly group of madmen'" and "'butchers[ ] that kill[ ]

indiscriminately.'"  Br. of Appellant at 25 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Belgarde, 110 

Wn.2d 504, 506-08, 510, 755 P.2d 174 (1988)).

       As we have already noted, a prosecutor has wide latitude in closing argument to draw 

reasonable inferences from the facts in evidence and to express such inferences to the jury.35  In 

contrast to Powell and Belgarde, the prosecutor's reference here to Justice Cardozo's quote was 

relatively minor in the context of her entire argument.  Nor did the prosecutor introduce facts not 

already in evidence or make inflammatory statements designed to elicit an emotional response 

from the jurors.  The trial court expressly recognized the propriety of the prosecutor's argument 

when it overruled Johnson's objection.  Again, we give a trial court's rulings on prosecutorial 

misconduct considerable deference because the trial court is  in the best position to determine 

whether such comments prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial; therefore, we reject Johnson's 

argument that the  prosecutor committed misconduct by  her isolated reference to Justice 

Cardozo's quote.  Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 719.

       Nor did the prosecutor commit misconduct when she inferred that Johnson self-identified 

as a sex offender when, in response to seeing a picture of MA's  sex offender  uncle  in the 

newspaper, Johnson said,  "He's  one of them, too."    7 VRP at 785.  The State had already 

presented evidence that Johnson had told MA in his phone call from jail, "I seen your uncle's face 

in the newspaper and you know why he was there?  He's one of them, too";36 and MA had

35 Gregory, 158 Wn.2d at 860.

                                               29 

No.  41141-5-II

testified that Johnson was referring to her uncle as a sex offender when Johnson made these 

statements.  Furthermore, Johnson did not object when the State introduced this evidence at trial.  

Given the prosecutor's wide latitude to draw inferences from the evidence and that it was 

reasonable to infer from Johnson's statements that he was self-identifying as a sex-offender or that 

his statements showed his consciousness of guilt, we hold that the prosecutor's closing argument 

comments were not improper.

                                      F.  Cumulative Error

       Johnson argues that cumulative error denied him a fair trial based on the prosecutor's 

multiple acts of misconduct in closing argument.  The cumulative error doctrine applies only when

several trial errors occurred, none of which  alone warrants reversal, but the combined errors 

effectively denied the defendant his right to a fair trial.  State v. Hodges, 118 Wn. App. 668, 673-

74, 77 P.3d 375 (2003).  But "[a]bsent prejudicial error, there can be no cumulative error that 

deprived the defendant of a fair trial." State v. Saunders, 120 Wn. App. 800, 826, 86 P.3d 232 

(2004) (emphasis added). Johnson has shown neither prosecutorial misconduct  nor prejudice. 

Therefore, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.

                                         V.  Sentencing

       Last, in his SAG, Johnson asserts that the trial court improperly sentenced him because, he 

claims, (1) although he had "no offender felony points" on his record, the trial court calculated his

sentence using "five felony points"; (2) the trial court gave him an "exceptional sentence" when it 

sentenced him to 318 months of imprisonment; and (3) the trial court improperly sentenced him 

36 3 VRP at 311, 326.

                                               30 

No.  41141-5-II

outside of the jury's presence. SAG at 1.  None of these claims have merit.

       First, Johnson misunderstands how the trial court calculated his sentence.  The trial court 

calculated Johnson's offender score as nine plus, not five.  At the time of sentencing, Johnson had 

a lengthy criminal history; but the "five felony points" to which he refers were likely his 

current felony  convictions37 -- two counts of first degree child molestation, two counts of first 

degree child rape, and one count of witness tampering.  These current convictions produced an 

offender score higher than nine after applying the tripling provisions38 for sex offenses in former 

RCW 9.94A.525(17) (Laws of Washington, ch. 231 § 3 (eff. June 12, 2008)).  With an offender 

score of nine plus, the trial court sentenced Johnson to standard-range sentences for each of his 

current convictions.39  Because the trial court ran these standard-range sentences concurrently 

37 Former RCW 9.94A.525(1) (Laws of 2008, ch. 231 § 3) was in effect at the time of Johnson's 
crimes; it provided:  "Convictions entered or sentenced on the same date as the conviction for 
which the offender score is being computed shall be deemed 'other current offenses' within the 
meaning of RCW 9.94A.589." Although the legislature has since amended other RCW 9.94.525 
provisions, it did not amend this subsection (1).  RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) provides, in relevant part:
       [W]henever a person is to be sentenced for two or more current offenses, the 
       sentence range for each current offense shall be determined by using all other 
       current and prior convictions as if they were prior convictions for the purpose of 
       the offender score.
(Emphasis added).

38 Former RCW 9.94A.525(17) provided:
       If the present conviction is for a sex offense, count priors as in subsections (7) 
       through (11) and (13) through (16) of this section; however count three points for 
       each adult and juvenile prior sex offense conviction.
(Emphasis added).  Again, although the legislature has since amended other provisions in RCW 
9.94.525, it did not amend this subsection (17).

39 The standard-range sentence for Johnson's first degree child rape convictions was "240-318 
months to life." CP at 164.  The standard-range sentence for his first degree child molestation 
convictions was "149-198 months to life."  CP at 164.  And the standard-range sentence for his 
witness tampering conviction was "12 [plus] - 16 months." CP at 164.

                                               31 

No.  41141-5-II

(instead of consecutively), Johnson  did not receive an exceptional sentence.40   A defendant 

generally cannot appeal a sentence within the standard range.  State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 

481, 139 P.3d 334 (2006).

       Last, Johnson cites no authority, nor are we aware of any such authority, requiring the 

trial court to sentence him in the jury's presence. On the contrary, the long-established practice is 

for the trial court to thank and to dismiss the jury after it has rendered its verdict.  And it would 

be cumbersome and serve no recognized purpose to try to recall the jury at some later date, 

sometimes months after the trial's conclusion, when the parties and trial court are ready to 

proceed to sentencing.  Johnson's sentencing challenges fail.

       We affirm Johnson's convictions and sentences.

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it 

is so ordered.

                                                 Hunt, J.
We concur:

Armstrong, P.J.

Johanson, J.

40 RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) (consecutive sentences may be imposed only under the exceptional 
sentence provisions of RCW 9.94A.535).

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