Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                        )
                                            )       DIVISION ONE
                      Respondent,           )
                                            )       No. 66118-3-I
                      v.                    )
                                            )       UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JASON LILLY VRIEZEMA                        )
                                            )
                      Appellant.            )       FILED: April 16, 2012
________________________________)

       Dwyer, J.  --  Jason Vriezema challenges the trial court's denial of his 

request to "discharge" his court-appointed counsel.  The substitution of 

appointed counsel is warranted only where the defendant shows good cause for 

such substitution.  Because Vriezema did not do so, the trial court did not err by 

denying his request.  

                                            I

       By information filed on July 8, 2010, the State charged Vriezema with one 

count of robbery in the second degree.  The information was later amended to 

include one count of assault in the third degree and one count of escape in the 

second degree.  Trial was scheduled to begin on September 7.  

       At an August 3 hearing, Vriezema sought to "discharge" his appointed 

counsel.  He told the trial court:  "I don't think she has my best interests in mind.   

No. 66118-3-I/2

She has not come and seen me, not once; and, two, she is already making me 

plead out to a Rob II."  The trial judge replied, "Nobody makes you plead . . . you 

choose whether you're going to plead."  Vriezema then continued:

       I mean, she haven't even went over -- she haven't even heard my 
       side of the story, you know what I mean, so -- and I don't have no 
       trust in her, you know, for one.  She's already telling me to plead 
       out.  Come on, I mean, you don't even -- you haven't even came 
       and seen me yet.  You haven't even heard my side of the story, 
       you know what I mean?  And I just don't feel that I feel comfortable 
       going to trial with . . .

       The trial court asked Vriezema's counsel, "[Y]ou got the case within the 

last two weeks, right?"  Counsel replied in the affirmative.  Counsel then

informed the trial court that there had been "numerous contacts" between her 

and Vriezema and that she was representing him in two different matters then

pending before the court.  Counsel further informed the trial court that she 

believed that she had "had sufficient contact" with Vriezema.  She told the court, 

"[I]t's also not my practice to advise my clients to plead guilty."    

       The trial court denied Vriezema's request.  
       Ultimately, a jury found Vriezema guilty of theft in the third degree1 and 

assault in the third degree.  The jury additionally found by special verdict that 

Vriezema had committed the assault shortly after being released from 

incarceration.  Vriezema pleaded guilty to the charge of escape in the second 

degree, which had been severed for trial.  He was sentenced to 60 months of 

       1 Theft in the third degree is a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree, 
the crime with which Vriezema was charged.  

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incarceration.  

       He appeals.

                                           II

       Vriezema contends that his right to counsel, afforded by the Sixth 

Amendment and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution, was 

violated when the trial court denied his request to "discharge" his court-

appointed counsel.  We disagree.

       The "essential aim" of the Sixth Amendment "is to guarantee an effective 

advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will 

inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers."  Wheat v. United 

States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988).  However, 

"if the relationship between lawyer and client completely collapses, the refusal to 

substitute new counsel violates [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to 

effective assistance of counsel."  United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1158 

(9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).

       "A criminal defendant who is dissatisfied with appointed counsel must 

show good cause to warrant substitution of counsel, such as a conflict of 

interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication 

between the attorney and the defendant."  State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 

734, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997).  A conflict between the attorney and the defendant 

warrants the substitution of counsel "only when counsel and [the] defendant are 

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so at odds as to prevent presentation of an adequate defense."  Stenson, 132 

Wn.2d at 734.  An irreconcilable conflict justifying the substitution of counsel 

"occurs when the breakdown of the relationship results in the complete denial of 

counsel."  State v. Schaller, 143 Wn. App. 258, 268, 177 P.3d 1139 (2007).  

Moreover, the substitution of counsel is not justified due solely to a "general loss 

of confidence or trust" by the defendant in his or her attorney.  Stenson, 132 

Wn.2d at 734.  Nor is a defendant's "general dissatisfaction and distrust" with 

counsel's performance sufficient to warrant the substitution of counsel.  State v. 

Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 200-01, 86 P.3d 139 (2004).

       "Whether an indigent defendant's dissatisfaction with his court-appointed 

counsel is meritorious and justifies the appointment of new counsel is a matter 

within the discretion of the trial court."  Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 733.  In 

determining whether the trial court erred by denying a request for substitution of 

counsel, we consider "(1) the extent of the conflict; (2) the adequacy of the [trial 

court's] inquiry; and (3) the timeliness of the motion."  Moore, 159 F.3d at 1158-

59; accord In re Pers. Restraint of Stenson, 142 Wn.2d 710, 724, 16 P.3d 1 

(2001).

       Here, the extent of the purported conflict between Vriezema and his 

appointed counsel was clearly insufficient to warrant the substitution of counsel.  

Vriezema told the trial court that he did not feel "comfortable" going to trial while 

represented by his appointed counsel.  He stated that this was both because she 

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had not yet "come and seen [him]" or "heard [his] side of the story" and because 

she nevertheless suggested that he plead guilty to one of the charges.  Neither 

of these professed reasons indicates that Vriezema's Sixth Amendment 

"guarantee [to] an effective advocate" was in jeopardy.  See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 

159.  

       "'[G]eneral discomfort with [counsel's] representation'" is not sufficient to 

warrant the substitution of appointed counsel.  State v. Staten, 60 Wn. App. 163,

169, 802 P.2d 1384 (1991) (quoting State v. Sinclair, 46 Wn. App. 433, 436, 730 

P.2d 742 (1986)).  Moreover, although counsel's "inaccessibility" is a "legitimate 

grievance, it is not one that requires a trial judge to grant a motion to 
substitute."2  Staten, 60 Wn. App. at 170 n.7 (holding that the defendant was not 

entitled to substituted counsel where his stated grievance was that he "[had] yet 

to see [his] attorney anywhere but in court").  Vriezema did not provide the trial 

court with legitimate and sufficient grounds for substituting appointed counsel.

       Vriezema additionally asserts that the trial court engaged in an 

inadequate inquiry of the purported conflict between him and his counsel, thus 

preventing the trial court from fully understanding the nature of that conflict.  He 

contends that, "[f]or an inquiry regarding substitution of counsel to be sufficient, 

       2 We do not intend to suggest that there are no circumstances in which appointed 
counsel's inaccessibility might justify the substitution of counsel.  However, such a grievance, 
because it does not necessarily indicate a "complete breakdown" of communication between the 
attorney and the defendant, does not inevitably entitle a defendant to new counsel.  The inquiry 
is not simply, "how many times has counsel visited the defendant?"  Although such may be 
considered, the true inquiry is whether the result of the matter about which the defendant is 
dissatisfied prevents the defendant from being afforded his or her Sixth Amendment right to an 
effective advocate.

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No. 66118-3-I/6

the trial court should question the attorney or defendant 'privately and in depth.'"  

United States v. Nguyen, 262 F.3d 998, 1004 (quoting Moore, 159 F.3d at 1160).  

In Nguyen, however, "the District Judge concluded that he would not continue 

the trial at a pretrial meeting that Nguyen did not attend or even know about, and 

then refused to grant Nguyen a full hearing on the issue."  262 F.3d at 1003.  

Moreover, there, the trial judge gave improper reasons for denying Nguyen's 

request -- stating "'I didn't travel halfway around the world to continue this 

trial'" -- and "improperly emphasized his own schedule at the expense of 

Nguyen's Sixth Amendment rights."  Nguyen, 262 F.3d at 1003.  Such are not 

the facts of this case.

       Rather, here, the trial judge perceptively inquired of counsel how long it 

had been since she was assigned to Vriezema's case.  Counsel affirmed the trial 

judge's belief that counsel had been assigned to the case for only two weeks.  

Counsel additionally informed the court that she had "had numerous contacts" 

with Vriezema and assured the court that it was "not [her] practice to advise [her] 

clients to plead guilty."  

       Based upon this inquiry, it was clear to the trial judge, as it is to us, that 

the purported conflict between Vriezema and his appointed counsel was not 

sufficient to justify the substitution of counsel.  The fact that the inquiry was brief 

is not decisive, given that it provided the requisite information for the trial judge 

to accurately determine whether substitution of counsel was required in order to 

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No. 66118-3-I/7

afford to Vriezema his constitutional right to an effective advocate.  "Formal 

inquiry is not always essential where the defendant otherwise states his reasons 

for dissatisfaction on the record."  Schaller, 143 Wn. App. at 271; accord Varga, 

151 Wn.2d at 200-01 (sufficient that trial judge afforded defendant opportunity to 

explain his reason for dissatisfaction and questioned counsel about the merits of 

the complaint); In re Stenson, 142 Wn.2d at 731 (trial court's inquiry "appear[ed] 

to have been sufficiently searching" where the defendant and counsel were 

permitted to express their concerns).

                                          - 7 - 

No. 66118-3-I/8

       The trial court's denial of Vriezema's request to "discharge" his court-

appointed counsel did not violate Vriezema's constitutional right to counsel.

       Affirmed.

We concur:

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