Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                       DIVISION  II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                             No.  41583-6-II

                             Respondent,                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

       v.

JEFFREY BRANDON KNUDTSON,

                             Appellant.

       Armstrong, J.   --  Jeffrey Brandon Knudtson appeals a community custody condition 

imposed after he pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation.  More specifically, Knudtson 

challenges the condition prohibiting him from having physical contact with minors, arguing that it 

interferes with his parenting rights.  In a pro se statement of additional grounds, Knudtson raises 

additional claims of error.  We affirm. 

                                             Facts

       In April 2009, 16-year-old V.D. disclosed to a school counselor that Knudtson had raped 

her 10 years earlier when he was married to her mother.1 According to V.D., Knudtson made her 

bathe afterward and threatened her and her family with harm if she ever told anyone.  At the time 

of V.D.'s allegation, Knudtson was living in New York and, in a handwritten statement to law 

enforcement there, he admitted to having intercourse with the 6-year-old V.D.  He blamed her for 

initiating the sexual contact and commented that it had made the two closer.  

       After the State charged Knudtson with first degree child rape, he pleaded guilty to the 

1 The probable cause declaration describes V.D. as Knudtson's stepdaughter, but subsequent 
information in the record describes her as his niece.  For purposes of this appeal, we rely on the 
probable cause declaration, as do both parties in their appellate briefs. 

No. 41583-6-II

reduced charge of first degree child molestation.  Under an Alford/Newton plea,2 Knudtson denied 

committing the crime but acknowledged that the State's evidence revealed a substantial 

probability of conviction.

       The trial court accepted the plea and entered a finding of guilt.  Knudtson subsequently 

moved to withdraw his plea on the following grounds:  (1) he had recently learned that another 

man in V.D.'s life had behaved in a sexually inappropriate manner around her, and her recent 

behavior indicated that she might not be credible; (2) when he was granted a request for a new 

attorney, he should have been assigned an attorney who was not also employed by the 

Department of Assigned Counsel; (3) the police report from New York State concerning his 

confession was falsified; and (4) his trial counsel did not adequately represent his interests.

       After considering these assertions, the trial court denied Knudtson's motion to withdraw 

the  plea.  The trial court then sentenced him to a standard range sentence of 63 months of 

confinement, followed by 36 months of community custody.  The community custody conditions 

included the following:

       16.  Do not initiate, or have in any way, physical contact with children under the 
       age of 18 for any reason.
       . . . 
       19. Avoid places where children congregate.  (Fast-food outlets, libraries, theaters, 
       shopping malls, play grounds and parks.)
       . . . 
       24.  No contact with any minors without prior approval of the DCO/CCO and 
       Sexual Deviancy Treatment Provider.

Clerk's  Papers at 106-07.  When defense counsel asked whether these conditions included 

Knudtson's minor children, the trial court replied affirmatively and denied his request for a 

2 See N. Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970); State v. 
Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 552 P.2d 682 (1976).  
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No. 41583-6-II

modification.

                                            Analysis

                                 I.  Crime-Related Prohibitions

       Knudtson argues at the outset that the condition prohibiting him from physical contact 

with minors improperly infringes on his parental rights.  

       As a condition of sentence, the trial court may impose crime-related prohibitions and 

prohibit conduct that relates directly to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has 

been convicted.  State v. Berg, 147 Wn. App. 923, 942, 198 P.3d 529 (2009).  We review 

sentencing conditions for abuse of discretion, and such conditions are usually upheld if reasonably 

crime related.  State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d 940 (2008).

       Although parents have a fundamental right to raise their children without state 

interference, parental rights are not absolute and may be regulated.  State v. Corbett, 158 Wn. 

App. 576, 598, 242 P.3d 52 (2010).  In criminal cases, a sentencing court may impose limitations 

on parenting rights when reasonably necessary to further the State's compelling interest in 

protecting children.  Berg, 147 Wn. App. at 942; see also State v. Letourneau, 100 Wn. App. 

424, 438, 997 P.2d 436 (2000) (limits on fundamental rights during community custody terms 

that help prevent the defendant from committing further criminal conduct during his sentence are 

constitutional).

       Our decision in Corbett is instructive here.  Corbett was convicted of raping his six-year-

old stepdaughter, and the sentencing conditions prohibited his contact with all minors, including 

his biological children.  Corbett, 158 Wn. App. at 586.  On appeal, he argued that barring contact 

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No. 41583-6-II

with his children was not a valid crime-related prohibition because the State had failed to show he 

was a danger to his sons.  Corbett, 158 Wn. App. at 597.  We rejected that argument, noting that 

his crimes were perpetrated against a minor he had parented:  

       Corbett's crime establishes that he abuses parental trust to satisfy his own prurient 
       interests.  The trial court's no-contact order prohibiting Corbett from having 
       contact with his biological children is directly related to his crime because they fall 
       within a class of persons he victimized.

Corbett, 158 Wn. App. at 601.

       As support, we relied in part on Berg, 147 Wn. App. at 942-43, where the defendant had 

molested his stepdaughter in their home.  Consequently, an order restricting his contact with other 

female children in the home was reasonable to protect his biological daughter from the same type 

of harm.  Berg, 147 Wn. App. at 943.  Furthermore, there was no evidence that Berg was not a 

danger to his daughter.  Berg, 147 Wn. App. at 943-44.  

       Here, too, there was no evidence that Knudtson was not a danger to his biological 

children.  More significantly, however, the no-contact order was directly related to Knudtson's 

crime and included a class of persons he had victimized.  He had acted as a parent to V.D. when 

he was her stepfather and had abused the corresponding position of trust.  

       Knudtson relies on decisions that are factually distinguishable.  In Letourneau, 100 Wn. 

App. at 442, Division One struck a community custody condition barring the defendant from 

having unsupervised in-person contact with her minor children.  Her offenses had not involved 

children in her home, and her evaluators agreed that she was not a pedophile.  Letourneau, 100 

Wn. App. at 441.  Consequently, there was no evidence that she posed any danger to her children, 

and the condition restricting contact was not reasonably necessary to protect them from the harm 

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No. 41583-6-II

of sexual molestation by their mother.  Letourneau, 100 Wn. App. at 441-42.  

       Knudtson also relies on State v. Ancira, 107 Wn. App. 650, 27 P.3d 1246 (2001), where 

Division One again struck a no-contact condition barring the defendant's contact with his 

children.  Ancira had been convicted of violating a domestic violence no-contact order concerning 

his wife.  Ancira, 107 Wn. App. at 652-53.  Division One reasoned that because he was already 

barred from contacting his wife, the provision barring contact with his children was not reasonably 

necessary to prevent them from the harm of witnessing further domestic violence.  Ancira, 107 

Wn. App. at 655.    

       By contrast, the no-contact provision at issue is related to the circumstances of 

Knudtson's crime and reasonably necessary to prevent his children from the harm of sexual abuse 

by their father.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the crime-related 

prohibition barring Knudtson's physical contact with minors during his term of community 

custody.

                                        II. Pro Se Issues

       Knudtson raises several additional issues in his pro se statement of additional grounds.  

RAP 10.10.  He argues initially that his first trial attorney represented him ineffectively by failing 

to request a CrR 3.5 evidentiary hearing.3 To prove a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant 

must show that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial.  

State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 32-33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011).  Knudtson cannot show deficient 

performance based on his attorney's failure to request a CrR 3.5 hearing because he waived the 

3 The trial court apparently appointed a new attorney because of Knudtson's personal conflict 
with his initial court-appointed counsel.
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No. 41583-6-II

right to challenge the admissibility of evidence by pleading guilty.  In re Pers. Restraint of Bybee, 

142 Wn. App. 260, 267-68, 175 P.3d 589 (2007).  

       Knudtson next challenges his attorney's representation on the ground that he was kept in 

the jury room during several court appearances.  There is no support in the record for this claim, 

and we will not review it further.  See Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 29 (when ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim is raised on appeal, reviewing court may consider only facts within the record).  

       Knudtson also challenges his attorney's failure to subpoena V.D.'s medical records.  He 

claims to know their contents but does not describe them or explain how he was prejudiced by 

this alleged failure.  See State v. Martinez, 161 Wn. App. 436, 442, 253 P.2d 445 (defendant 

establishes prejudice by showing that but for counsel's alleged deficiency, he would not have 

pleaded guilty), review denied, 172 Wn.2d 1011 (2011).

       Knudtson further alleges that two weeks before trial, his attorney was not prepared, 

thereby requiring him to request a new attorney.  Because this request was granted, Knudtson 

again fails to demonstrate prejudice.  

       Finally, Knudtson complains that his former attorney failed to challenge his confession 

after Knudtson informed him that it had been altered and was not in Knudtson's handwriting.  In 

his motion to withdraw his plea, Knudtson asserted that he told both his attorneys about the 

alleged alteration before he pleaded guilty.  Knowing of that alleged alteration, he still 

acknowledged in his plea statement that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction.  

Consequently, he does not establish that the failure to challenge his confession affected his 

decision to plead guilty and was prejudicial.  

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No. 41583-6-II

       Knudtson maintains that his new trial attorney was similarly ineffective because he used 

the notes and information from his former attorney and "[r]efused the same items as previous 

council [sic]."  Statement of Additional Grounds (SAG), at 1.  This claim lacks sufficient 

specificity to support a claim of ineffective assistance.  Knudtson also argues that his new attorney 

again was unprepared two weeks before trial.  There is no support for this claim in the record, and 

it does not support a claim of prejudice given Knudtson's decision to plead guilty.

       Knudtson argues further that both his new attorney and the trial court failed to inform him 

that his plea would give him "two strikes."  See State v. Keller, 143 Wn.2d 267, 274, 19 P.3d 

1030 (2001) (defining "strikes" that may qualify defendant as persistent offender).  But Knudtson 

had no prior criminal history that would have rendered his current offense a second strike.  This 

claim has no merit.

       Knudtson also contends that "[a]ll parties involved in [his] case" overlooked the fact that 

his alleged crime occurred in 1999.  SAG, at 2.  This fact was not overlooked.  Rather, it was 

referenced in the original and amended information, his statement on plea of guilty, and his 

judgment and sentence. 

       Finally, Knudtson alleges that he pleaded guilty because the prosecutor threatened to add 

new charges if he went to trial.  Here again, there is no support for this contention in the record.  

To the contrary, the record shows that (1) Knudtson denied during the plea hearing that he was 

coerced into pleading guilty, (2) his signed plea statement declared that he had not been coerced, 

and (3) his motion to withdraw his guilty plea made no mention of coercion.  We decline to 

address this issue further.  

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No. 41583-6-II

       Affirmed.

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so 

ordered.

                                                 Armstrong, J.
We concur:

Quinn-Brintnall, J.

Penoyar, C.J.

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