Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                    No. 66015-2-I
                       Respondent,
                                                    DIVISION ONE
        v.
                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SADIE A. HUNTOON,
                                                    FILED:  March 5, 2012
                       Appellant.

        Leach, J.  --  Sadie Huntoon appeals her residential burglary conviction.  She 

 claims that the court erred by refusing to allow her to cross-examine her accomplice 

 about the sentence he received after pleading guilty to a lesser offense.        She contends 

 this violated her right to confront an adverse witness and present a defense because 

 she could not develop evidence of the witness's bias and potential motive to testify 

 against her.  Because the court acted within its discretion in limiting Huntoon's cross-

 examination, we affirm.

                                          Background

        Sadie Huntoon, along with Phillip Flynn, burglarized an apartment temporarily 

 abandoned by its occupant due to flooding.  Officer Joshua Hong saw them leaving the 

 area.  He recognized them both, knew they did not live in the complex, and that Flynn 

 was someone who "like[d]        to do burglaries."     He stopped Flynn, who         eventually 

 admitted to burglarizing the apartment and turned over his spoils to the police.  Flynn  

No. 66015-2-I / 2

confirmed that Huntoon also entered and stole items from the apartment.  

       The State charged Huntoon and Flynn with residential burglary.  Flynn pleaded

guilty to attempted residential burglary.  By the time Flynn testified against Huntoon at 

her trial, he had already been sentenced.  At the start of the trial, the court granted, 

without objection, the State's motion to exclude any evidence or argument concerning 

any penalty Huntoon might face if convicted.  

       At trial, on direct examination, Flynn testified that he did not receive any special 

treatment or any kind of benefit at sentencing so that he would testify against Huntoon.  

During cross-examination, the State objected when defense counsel asked Flynn about 

the consequences of pleading guilty to a lesser offense.  The State contended that the 

question improperly sought to place before the jury, in violation of the court's pretrial 

order, the punishment that might follow Huntoon's conviction.  The State also 

contended that with the question defense counsel sought to elicit sympathy for his 

client by showing that she was being prosecuted for a more serious offense for conduct 

similar to or less culpable than Flynn's.  Defense counsel asserted that ER 609 allowed 

the question to demonstrate Flynn's bias or motivation to testify.   The trial court 

sustained the State's objection.  

       The jury convicted Huntoon of residential burglary.  She now appeals.

                                     Standard of Review

       We review alleged violations of the state and federal confrontation clauses de 

novo.1  We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of 

       1 State v. Medina, 112 Wn. App. 40, 48, 48 P.3d 1005 (2002).

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discretion.2  Abuse occurs when the trial court's exercise of discretion is manifestly 

unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons.3            We may affirm the lower 

court's ruling on any grounds adequately supported by the record.4

                                           Analysis

       At trial, Huntoon claimed ER 609 authorized the disputed inquiry.  For the first 

time on appeal, Huntoon claims that the court's exclusion of this evidence denied her 

constitutional right to present a defense.5          A violation of the Sixth Amendment

confrontation clause is a manifest error affecting a constitutional right and may be 

raised directly on appeal.6   Therefore, Huntoon may raise this issue for the first time on 

appeal.  

       The confrontation clause guarantees a criminal defendant              the right "to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him."7       This includes the right to cross-examine 

those  witnesses.8   But the right to cross-examine witnesses is not absolute.9                A 

defendant does not have a constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence.10  

Generally, evidence of bias is relevant to a witness's credibility.11  A trial court properly 

       2 State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 619, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002).
       3 Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 619.
       4 State v. Costich, 152 Wn.2d 463, 477, 98 P.3d 795 (2004).
       5 The State argues that Huntoon has not preserved a sufficient record for appeal 
because she did not make an offer of proof after the trial court sustained the State's 
objection.  However, ER 103(a)(2) does not require an offer of proof when, as here, the 
substance of the evidence was apparent from the context within which the questions 
were asked.  Therefore, we find the record sufficient for review.
       6 RAP 2.5(a); State v. Clark, 139 Wn.2d 152, 156, 985 P.2d 377 (1999).
       7 U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. art. 1, § 22.
       8 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 23, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 
(1967).
       9 Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 620-21.
       10 State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 15, 659 P.2d 514 (1983).

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limits cross-examination where the offered evidence only remotely tends                       to 

show bias or prejudice of the witness.12       However, while the scope of confronting a 

witness is within the trial court's discretion, 

       "[t]he exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and 
       important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
       examination. . . .     [A] criminal defendant states a violation of the 
       Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in 
       otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical 
       form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury 
       the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences 
       relating to the reliability of the witness."[13]

       Huntoon relies heavily on United States v. Mayans.14  She correctly notes that 

the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is "'especially important with respect to 

accomplices or other witnesses who may have substantial reason to cooperate with the 

government.'"15    Therefore, the details of a plea agreement are "highly relevant" in 

assessing the credibility of an accomplice who has pleaded guilty, and inquiry into such 

details is "essential"   for effective cross-examination.16        If  Flynn  had received a

favorable sentencing recommendation from the State in exchange for his testimony, 

evidence of that would have been relevant because it would show potential bias or 

motivation for his testimony.  

       11 State v. Lubers, 81 Wn. App. 614, 623, 915 P.2d 1157 (1996).
       12 State v. Knapp, 14 Wn. App. 101, 108, 540 P.2d 898 (1975).
       13 State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 883, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (some 
alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olden v. Kentucky, 
488 U.S. 227, 231, 109 S. Ct. 480, 102 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1988)).
       14 17 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994).
       15 Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1184 (quoting United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938, 945 
(5th Cir. 1976)).
       16 Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1184 (citing United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 
443-44 (8th Cir. 1989)).

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No. 66015-2-I / 5

       Flynn testified that he received no benefit from his testimony.  Huntoon had no 

evidence to the contrary.  Huntoon ignores Mayans's observation that "'what tells . . . is 

not the actual existence of a deal but the witness' belief or disbelief that such a deal 

exists.'"17 After Flynn unequivocally stated that he received no benefit in exchange for 

his plea, the defense had no legitimate reason to pursue the issue further.  The trial 

court agreed with the State that defense counsel's inquiry either was a back door 

attempt to introduce evidence about the possible sentence Huntoon might receive if 

convicted or an effort to elicit sympathy and not relevant to demonstrate bias.  The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination to prevent the jury 

from hearing this improper evidence.  

                                          Conclusion

       Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Huntoon's cross-

examination of Flynn, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

       17 Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1184 (alteration in original) (quoting Onori, 535 F.2d at 
945).

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