Opinion Information Sheet

			

                                                                               FILED

                                                                           JAN 31, 2012

                                                                    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                                  WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                           )       No. 29592-3-III
                                               )
                             Appellant,        )
                                               )
                      v.                       )       Division Three
                                               )
ELISEO C. SANCHEZ,                             )
                                               )
                             Respondent.       )       PUBLISHED OPINION

       Korsmo, J.  --  The trial court dismissed this residential burglary prosecution on the 

basis that Eliseo Sanchez's ex-wife permitted him to be in her home despite a court's 

exclusion order.  We conclude that only a judge can alter a court order and that Mr. 

Sanchez could not reasonably rely on his ex-wife's decision to countermand the court.  

The order of dismissal is reversed.

                                            FACTS

       As part of a felony conviction, the Chelan County Superior Court entered a 

domestic violence no-contact order against Mr. Sanchez on February 9, 2009.  Mr.  

No. 29592-3-III
State v. Sanchez

Sanchez signed the order.  It prevented him from being within 300 feet of his former 

wife, Maria Vera-Rodriguez, for a four year period.  It also excluded him from her 

residence and place of work.  Mr. Sanchez reportedly moved to Mexico after the order 

entered, allegedly in response to other pending charges.

       He returned to the Wenatchee area in late August 2010.  Despite her protests that 

he could not stay with her, Mr. Sanchez insisted on living with Ms. Vera-Rodriguez and 

two of their children.  She relented and he stayed in her residence about one week.  The 

couple engaged in consensual sexual relations during that time.

       On the afternoon of August 28, Mr. Sanchez returned to the house and insisted on 

sexual relations despite Ms. Vera-Rodriguez's refusal.  He pulled her into the bedroom 

and ripped off her shirt.  Over the next three and one-half hours he forced himself on her 

sexually and prevented her from leaving.  The children eventually called 911 to report 

that their parents were fighting.  Three members of the sheriff's office arrived.

       They found the couple in bed; Mr. Sanchez was naked.  The deputies ultimately 

arrested him on outstanding warrants and on suspicion of first degree rape, first degree 

burglary, unlawful imprisonment, and felony violation of a no-contact order.  The 

prosecutor ultimately filed just two charges: residential burglary with sexual motivation 

and felony violation of a no-contact order.

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No. 29592-3-III
State v. Sanchez

       The defense moved to dismiss the burglary count before trial in accordance with 

State v. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986).  Defense counsel argued that Ms. 

Vera-Rodriguez's consent to Mr. Sanchez's presence in her home precluded the State 

from establishing the "enters or remains unlawfully" element of the burglary statute.  The 

State argued that the court order prevented Ms. Vera-Rodriguez from consenting to Mr. 

Sanchez's presence in her home.

       The trial court agreed with Mr. Sanchez and ruled that the case was controlled by 

the decision in State v. Wilson, 136 Wn. App. 596, 150 P.3d 144 (2007).  The residential 

burglary charge was dismissed.  The State then timely appealed to this court.

                                         ANALYSIS

       The parties agree that this case turns on Ms. Vera-Rodriguez's ability to consent to 

Mr. Sanchez staying at her home, but disagree over whether the Wilson decision applies.  

We find Wilson easily distinguishable and conclude that it would be against public policy 

to allow a victim to consent in the face of a contrary court order.

       Appellate courts review Knapstad rulings de novo.  State v. Conte, 159 Wn.2d 

797, 803, 154 P.3d 194, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 992 (2007).  Knapstad created a pretrial 

process, akin to summary judgment motions in civil cases, that allows the trial court to 

dismiss a criminal case when the agreed upon facts show the prosecution's case is 

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No. 29592-3-III
State v. Sanchez

missing an element necessary to prove the charged offense.  Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 356-

357.  Because the trial court does not find facts, it does not enter findings of fact.  Id. at 

357.  This, too, is the practice in summary judgment motions.  Duckworth v. City of 
Bonney Lake, 91 Wn.2d 19, 21-22, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).1

       A person commits residential burglary when "with intent to commit a crime 

against a person or property therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling 

other than a vehicle." RCW 9A.52.025(1).  In turn, the legislature has defined the 

unlawful entry element:

       A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when he is not 
       then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to enter or remain.

RCW 9A.52.010(3) (partial).

       Washington has a strong public policy against domestic violence and has enacted 

chapter 26.50 RCW to protect and empower victims against their abusers.  Laws of 1992, 

ch. 111, § 1; State v. Dejarlais, 136 Wn.2d 939, 944, 969 P.2d 90 (1998). To that end, 

our courts have recognized that a protected party cannot waive the provisions of a 

domestic violence protection order or otherwise consent to contact in the face of a 

contrary court order.  Dejarlais, 136 Wn.2d at 943-946. Modifications of a protection 

       1 The trial court entered findings in support of its ruling here.  Because the 
findings were not required, we will not consider them.  Humbert/Birch Creek Constr. v. 
Walla Walla County, 145 Wn. App. 185, 192 n.3, 185 P.3d 660 (2008).
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No. 29592-3-III
State v. Sanchez

order are a matter for the trial court; modifications of the public policy are for the 

legislature.  Id. at 945-946.

       Burglary statutes have been applied to prosecute people who burglarize their own 

property.  State v. Kilponen, 47 Wn. App. 912, 737 P.2d 1024, review denied, 109 Wn.2d 

1019 (1987) (husband prosecuted for entering family home in violation of no-contact 

order); State v. Schneider, 36 Wn. App. 237, 673 P.2d 200 (1983) (estranged wife 

charged in burglary of property she co-owned with her husband who occupied the 

property).  The burglary statutes also have been applied to cases where the accused 

entered a property in violation of a domestic violence order prohibiting contact with the 

property's occupier.  E.g., State v. Spencer, 128 Wn. App. 132, 114 P.3d 1222 (2005); 

State v. Stinton, 121 Wn. App. 569, 89 P.3d 717 (2004); Kilponen, 47 Wn. App. 912.

       In Stinton, the defendant was charged with residential burglary after he entered his 

girl friend's residence in violation of a protection order that excluded him from the 

property.  The trial court dismissed the action on a Knapstad motion, reasoning that 

violating the protection order while inside the residence did not constitute a crime against 

persons or property.  121 Wn. App. at 571-572.  Division Two of this court reversed, 

holding that violating a protection order could serve as a predicate crime for residential

burglary.  Id. at 571, 576-578.

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No. 29592-3-III
State v. Sanchez

       It was against this backdrop that Division Two subsequently decided Wilson.  

There the defendant had been subject to a no-contact order that prohibited him from 

contacting his longtime girl friend, but did not expressly prohibit him from being at her 

residence. Despite the existence of the order, the two subsequently signed a lease for the 

girl friend's residence and jointly lived there.  136 Wn. App. at 600.  A few months later, 

Wilson found himself locked out of the house after an argument.  He returned in the 

middle of the night and splintered the kitchen door while forcing entry.  He assaulted his 

girl friend and subsequently threatened to kill her with the splintered wood.  The police 

arrived and Wilson was subsequently charged with first degree burglary, assault in 

violation of a protection order, and harassment.  Id. at 601.  The jury found him guilty on 

all three counts, but the trial judge set aside the burglary verdict on the basis that Wilson 

had not unlawfully entered the property.  Id. at 602.  The State appealed.

       In a thoughtful opinion, Division Two affirmed the dismissal of the burglary 

count.  The court started its analysis by stating the "legal issue of first impression" that it 

was addressing: "whether entry or remaining in a jointly shared residence, from which 

neither party has been lawfully excluded, is unlawful for purposes of establishing this 

essential element of burglary."  Id. at 603-604.  The court then reviewed various potential 

bases for allowing a burglary prosecution under the facts of the case. Throughout its 

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No. 29592-3-III
State v. Sanchez

analysis, the court repeatedly2 noted that the no-contact order had not excluded Wilson 

from his girl friend's residence, even though the order could have done so.  Id. at 611.  

The court distinguished the cases in which a property owner had been prosecuted for 

burglarizing his or her own property on the basis that the defendants did not then occupy 

the premises; the court found no support for charging burglary when the defendant 

occupied the premises.  Id. at 606-607.  The court also reasoned that merely because the 

girl friend could not waive or modify the no-contact provision, that fact did not make his 

presence in their home unlawful.  Id. at 608.  

       The court also reviewed its earlier decision in Stinton.  Because the defendant in 

Stinton had conceded his presence was unlawful and he had been prohibited from being 

in the residence, the Wilson court concluded that Stinton did not apply.  Reviewing the

special laws governing domestic violence, the court also reasoned that there was no clear 

legislative intent to apply the burglary statute to that fact pattern.  Id. at 611-612. In sum, 

because Wilson fell outside the factual circumstances of the earlier cases that had 

permitted burglary prosecutions, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to set aside 

the verdict.

       The facts of this case are not those of Wilson.  The critical factor here, as 

       2 Wilson, 136 Wn. App. at 600, 602-605, 611-612.
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No. 29592-3-III
State v. Sanchez

recognized throughout Wilson, is that the no-contact order prohibited Mr. Sanchez from 

being in his ex-wife's residence.  He also had no ownership or possessory right to that 

property.  His only basis for claiming a right to be present stems from his ex-wife's 

consent to his presence.  That simply is not a basis for overriding a court order.

Dejarlais, 136 Wn.2d at 943-946.  We hold that the consent of a protected person cannot 

override a court order excluding a person from the residence.  Accord, People v. Lewis, 

13 A.D. 3d 208, 786 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497-498 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004), aff'd, 5 N.Y. 3d 

546, 840 N.E.2d 1014 (2005).

       This holding is entirely consistent with Wilson, an opinion with which we are in 

agreement.  We simply read Wilson to mean that a general no-contact order is insufficient 

to exclude a person from his own residence merely because the protected person is 

present, even if the protected person also resides there.  If a protection order is to exclude 

a person from the victim's residence, it must so state.  That was not done in Wilson, but it 

was done here.

       Our holding is also consistent with the purposes of our domestic violence 

protection laws.  It removes any incentive an abuser may have to pressure the protected 

person to consent to his presence in violation of the order.  See Lewis, 786 N.Y.S.2d at 

498.  The power to modify a no-contact order remains with the court that issued it.

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No. 29592-3-III
State v. Sanchez

       Mr. Sanchez on appeal, as he did in the trial court, places great stock in language 

from the Wilson court's discussion of the different purposes of the burglary and no-

contact order statutes:

       Although the purpose of a no-contact order is to prevent the victim from 
       having to face her batterer, the burglary statute's intent is to allow an 
       occupant to prevent all those who are unwelcome from entering the 
       premises.  It is the consent, or lack of consent, of the residence possessor, 
       not the State's or court's consent or lack of consent, that drives the 
       burglary statute's definition of a person who "is not then licensed, invited, 
       or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain" in a building.

Wilson, 136 Wn. App. at 608-609 (emphasis added). This observation, contrary to Mr. 

Sanchez's argument, does not control this case.  The Wilson court was not addressing the 

situation where a court's exclusion order was at issue, nor was it even addressing the 

situation where a court's authority conflicted with a property owner's authority.  It was 

simply stating the obvious -- in the typical situation, whether one is lawfully on the 

property is dependent upon the will of the person who possesses the property.  Nothing in 

this passage supports the theory that the property possessor can trump an order of the 

court or that a court has no say in who can lawfully be on property. Indeed, Wilson

acknowledged that the no-contact order could have excluded Mr. Wilson from the 

premises.  Id. at 611.  The Wilson court also recognized that the girl friend had no 

authority to consent to Mr. Wilson being in their home.  Id. at 608.  To accept Mr. 

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No. 29592-3-III
State v. Sanchez

Sanchez's construction of Wilson would create internal conflicts within that opinion.

       Wilson did not involve a conflict between a court order and the right of a property 

possessor to control who may visit the premises.  Its discussion of consent authority does 

not control this case, just as it did not control the result there.  Wilson provides no support 

for Mr. Sanchez.

       The superior court in 2009 had authority to exclude Mr. Sanchez from the 

residence of his former wife.  It did so.  Mr. Sanchez knew that he had been excluded.  

The fact that he pressured Ms. Vera-Rodriguez to allow him to stay on the premises did 

not make his presence there lawful.  Her consent did not change the court's order.

       The order of dismissal is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to 

reinstate the charge of residential burglary with sexual motivation.

                                            _________________________________
                                                           Korsmo, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________              _________________________________
       Kulik, C.J.                                         Sweeney, J.

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