DO NOT CITE. SEE GR 14.1(a).
Court of Appeals Division III
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
29736-5 |
Title of Case: |
State of Washington V. Erwin W. Hull |
File Date: |
03/01/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Grant Superior Court |
Docket No: | 10-1-00024-3 |
Judgment or order under review |
Date filed: | 12/14/2010 |
Judge signing: | Honorable John D Knodell |
JUDGES
------
Authored by | Teresa C. Kulik |
Concurring: | Kevin M. Korsmo |
| Stephen M. Brown |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| Andrea Burkhart |
| Burkhart & Burkhart PLLC |
| 6 1/2 N 2nd Ave Ste 200 |
| Walla Walla, WA, 99362-1855 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| D Angus Lee |
| Grant County Prosecuting Attorney |
| Po Box 37 Law And Justice Center |
| Ephrata, WA, 98823-0037 |
|
| Carole Louise Highland |
| Attorney at Law |
| Grant Cnty Pros Atny Offc |
| Po Box 37 |
| Ephrata, WA, 98823-0037 |
FILED
MARCH 1, 2012
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 29736-5-III
)
Respondent, )
) Division Three
v. )
)
ERWIN W. HULL, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
)
Kulik, C.J. -- The Grant County Sheriff's Office and the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) received tips that Erwin Hull was growing marijuana in a dug out room
below his house. The sheriff obtained a search warrant for Mr. Hull's home and found a
grow operation as described by the informants. When questioned by police, Mr. Hull did
not have documentation designating him as a marijuana provider. On stipulated facts, the
court found Mr. Hull guilty of one count of manufacture of marijuana. Mr. Hull appeals.
He contends that the magistrate did not have probable cause to issue the search warrant,
that the trial court should have allowed him to assert an affirmative defense as a
designated provider, and that he did not knowingly manufacture marijuana contrary to
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
law. We conclude that Mr. Hull's assertions of error are unpersuasive and, therefore,
affirm the conviction.
FACTS
In April 2009, the Grant County Sheriff's Office Interagency Narcotics
Enforcement Team (INET) received two anonymous tips from the Washington State
Patrol Marijuana Hotline. The tipsters reported an underground marijuana grow
operation at Mr. Hull's home. The tipsters stated that the grow was accessible through a
trapdoor in a bedroom of the residence. Detective Jeff Wentworth of INET determined
that Erwin and Jacqueline Hull owned the property at 550 South Grand Drive in Moses
Lake, Washington.
As part of the investigation, in June 2009, Detective Wentworth checked the
power records of the Hull residence and compared the power usage with neighboring
homes of comparable size and age. Detective Wentworth determined that the Hull
residence used more kilowatt hours than the comparable households; one comparison
established a difference of approximately 6,751 kilowatt hours. Admittedly, some of the
comparable households had upgrades to insulation and windows where the Hull residence
did not.
In July 2009, Detective Wentworth received a report from an agent in the Spokane
2
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
division of the DEA. The report indicated that a confidential source, who had done
work for the DEA in the past, claimed that "'Jackie and Buster'"1 who lived 550 South
Grand Drive in Moses Lake, Washington, were growing marijuana in their home.
According to the report, the confidential source was at 550 South Grand Drive during the
first week in July. While at the residence, the confidential source was shown a trapdoor
in the closet of a bedroom that led to an underground facility where approximately 50
marijuana plants were being grown under bright lights.
Later in July, the confidential source called the hotline and stated that he or she
had again observed the room under the house, and the grow operation was still active as
of July 30, 2009.
On August 4, Detective Wentworth received a search warrant to use a thermal
imaging device on the Hull residence. Detective Wentworth did not observe any heat
change differences between the Hull residence and other comparable homes. Detective
Wentworth noted that this finding would be logical if the grow operation was
underground.
Five months later, on January 12, 2010, Detective Wentworth spoke with a citizen
informant (CI) who wanted to give information on the marijuana grow operation at 550
1 Clerk's Papers at 34.
3
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
South Grand Drive. The CI stated that Jackie and Erwin Hull lived at the
residence. The CI said that he or she had known Jackie for more than 20 years and
that Jackie struggled with drug addiction. The CI further advised that in the late spring to
early summer of 2009, he or she visited the Hull house and Jackie revealed the marijuana
grow operation under the house. The CI was shown a trapdoor in the closet floor of a
bedroom and was invited to go under the house. The CI saw that the entire foundation
had been dug out. The CI observed numerous marijuana plants in different stages of
growth.
The CI's past history with the drug culture helped the CI recognize the plants as
marijuana plants. The CI also provided other correct, verifiable information to Detective
Wentworth, such as the date that the Hulls moved into the residence, Mr. Hull's place of
employment, and specific information regarding the transfer of Ms. Hull's vehicle. The
CI agreed to disclose his or her identity to the magistrate issuing the warrant.
Detective Wentworth and a colleague conducted another comparative investigation
of the Hulls' power usage, using different homes from the previously-listed comparables.
The officers discovered that in 2008, the Hulls used approximately 12,900 more kilowatt
hours and spent approximately $130 more for power consumption than their neighbors.
In 2009, the difference increased to approximately 16,500 kilowatt hours and $550.
4
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
Detective Wentworth requested and received a search warrant to enter the Hull
residence and search for evidence of marijuana manufacturing, consumption, use, and/or
distribution. An affidavit accompanied his request.
Upon execution of the warrant, Mr. Hull voluntarily responded to the officer's
knock and complied with all orders. In the southwest bedroom closet, Detective
Wentworth observed a trapdoor in the floor, which opened into an underground room
where 11 marijuana plants were growing. Detective Wentworth heard Mr. Hull state that
he was growing marijuana plants for his father and that his father passed away in
December. Mr. Hull also stated that he did not have any paperwork authorizing him to
grow marijuana. On that same day, Mr. Hull was arrested and charged in Grant County
with manufacture of marijuana.
Procedural Facts. Mr. Hull filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained under
the search warrant, contending the warrant was not supported by probable cause. The
court held an evidentiary hearing and entered formal findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The court ultimately denied Mr. Hull's motion to suppress.
On the first day of trial on January 5, 2011, the State brought a motion in limine to
preclude Mr. Hull from asserting the affirmative defense of providing marijuana as a
designated provider for an authorized patient. Mr. Hull sought to admit evidence that
5
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
established Mr. Hull as Noel Callahan's designated provider of medical marijuana. Mr.
Hull also sought to admit documentation that authorized Mr. Callahan to use marijuana
for medical purposes. Mr. Callahan's authorization was issued on December 7, 2008,
and expired on December 7, 2009, one month before the search of Mr. Hull's residence.
Mr. Hull did not provide this documentation to law enforcement; the first presentation
occurred in March or April 2010 when Mr. Hull's counsel furnished it to the State. The
trial court adjourned without a decision on the State's motion.
On the second day of trial, Mr. Hull presented new, additional documentation
relating to Mr. Callahan's authorized use of medical marijuana. This subsequent
authorization was issued on January 27, 2010, two weeks after the search of Mr. Hull's
residence.
The trial court granted the State's motion to prohibit Mr. Hull from raising an
affirmative medical marijuana defense. The trial court determined that Mr. Hull's
qualifying patient did not have valid authorization that would allow Mr. Hull to grow
marijuana and that Mr. Hull failed to provide documentation to law enforcement at the
time of inquiry, as required by statute. The parties proceeded to a stipulated facts trial.
The trial court found Mr. Hull guilty of manufacture of marijuana. The trial court
sentenced Mr. Hull to 30 days in jail, with credit for one day served and the balance of 29
6
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
days converted into community service.
ANALYSIS
Motion to Suppress. A magistrate's determination that probable cause exists is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Vasquez, 109 Wn. App. 310, 317-18, 34
P.3d 1255 (2001) (conceding that the standard of review of a police officer's probable
cause determination is not as deferential), aff'd, 148 Wn.2d 303, 59 P.3d 648 (2002). A
reviewing court should give great deference to a judge's decision. State v. Seagull, 95
Wn.2d 898, 907, 632 P.2d 44 (1981). Any doubts are to be resolved in favor of the
warrant. State v. O'Connor, 39 Wn. App. 113, 123-24, 692 P.2d 208 (1984). A judicial
determination of probable cause will be sustained so long as a substantial basis exists for
the decision. State v. Lyons, 160 Wn. App. 100, 105, 247 P.3d 797 (quoting Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), abrogated by Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), but adhered to by State
v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984)), review granted, 172 Wn.2d 1013
(2011).
"The burden of proof is on the defendant moving for suppression to establish the
lack of probable cause." State v. Anderson, 105 Wn. App. 223, 229, 19 P.3d 1094
(2001). The reviewing court looks to the information available to the magistrate at the
7
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
time the warrant was issued. Id.
"The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution require that a search warrant be
issued upon a determination of probable cause based upon 'facts and circumstances
sufficient to establish a reasonable inference' that criminal activity is occurring or that
contraband exists at a certain location." State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 108, 59 P.3d 58
(2002) (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 140, 977 P.2d 582
(1999)).
"Probable cause is established when an affidavit supporting a search warrant
provides sufficient facts for a reasonable person to conclude there is a probability the
defendant is involved in the criminal activity." Id. The magistrate is entitled to draw
commonsense inferences from the stated facts in the affidavit. State v. Kennedy, 72 Wn.
App. 244, 248, 864 P.2d 410 (1993). Facts that do not establish probable cause when
considered singularly can establish probable cause when viewed together. State v. Cole,
128 Wn.2d 262, 286, 906 P.2d 925 (1995).
When an informant's tip supplies information used in the affidavit, Washington
uses the test found in Aguilar and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584,
21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, but adhered to by
8
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432) to evaluate whether probable cause exists in relation to the
informant's tip. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 443. Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, a
determination of probable cause requires that the affidavit establishes both (1) the
informant's basis for knowledge and (2) the informant's credibility. Id.
For the basis for knowledge prong, the affidavit must reveal facts that permit the
magistrate to determine whether the informant had a basis for his allegation that a certain
person committed a crime. Id. at 437. This prong is satisfied by showing that the
informant obtained the information through firsthand observations. Id.
For the "veracity" or credibility prong, the affidavit must contain facts that allow
the magistrate to determine the credibility of the informant. Id. "The credibility of a
confidential informant depends on whether the informant is a private citizen or a
professional informant and, if a citizen informant, whether his or her identity is known to
the police." State v. Atchley, 142 Wn. App. 147, 162, 173 P.3d 323 (2007).
When the police and the magistrate know the identity of the informant, the
necessary showing of reliability is relaxed. Id. In a situation where the police know the
identity of the informant but the magistrate does not, the burden of showing reliability is
raised and the affidavit must contain "'background facts to support a reasonable inference
that the information is credible and without motive to falsify.'" Id. (quoting Cole, 128
9
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
Wn.2d at 287-88). The credibility prong can be satisfied by showing that the informant
has a record of providing accurate information to the police. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 437.
If either or both of the prongs are not met, probable cause may still be established
if an independent police investigation corroborates the informant's tip to such an extent
that it supports the missing elements of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Id. at 438. The police
investigation should point to suspicious acts that indicate criminal activity as suggested
by the informant. Id. "Merely verifying 'innocuous details,' commonly known facts or
easily predictable events should not suffice to remedy a deficiency in either the basis of
knowledge or veracity prong." Id.
While increased power usage alone is not enough to establish probable cause to
support a warrant, it does provide additional evidence that supports the probable cause
determination of the magistrate. State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d 110
(1994).
Here, the affidavit listed several sources of information to support a finding of
probable cause. The information provided by the DEA confidential source is of primary
importance. First, the DEA confidential source had a basis of knowledge through his
firsthand observations of the marijuana grow. The DEA confidential source saw the
underground marijuana grow operation and gave a detailed description of Mr. Hull's
10
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
sophisticated operation. This description included the location of the trapdoor in the
bedroom closet, the number and size of plants, and how Mr. Hull propagated and grew
the plants.
Second, the DEA confidential source was credible due to his past history with the
DEA. The DEA confidential source previously provided information which led to arrests
for narcotics violations. Because the affidavit established the credibility of the DEA
confidential source and his firsthand knowledge of the facts, the information provided by
the DEA confidential source satisfies both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test and
supports a finding of probable cause.
Furthermore, the affidavit contained additional information that supported a
finding of probable cause. Another informant, the CI, also met the requirements of the
Aguilar-Spinelli test. The CI personally observed the underground marijuana grow
operation and provided Detective Wentworth with specific details that matched the
information given by the DEA confidential source. The CI identified the plants as
marijuana based on his history with the drug culture and marijuana magazines. The CI
had personal observations sufficient to support a basis of knowledge.
As to credibility, the CI was willing to have his or her identity disclosed to the
magistrate. However, the record does not support the conclusion that the magistrate knew
11
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
the identity of the CI, thereby relaxing the credibility requirement. In any case, the CI
provided noninnocuous facts that established his or her credibility, such as Ms. Hull's
past history with drug use, the details surrounding the transfer of Ms. Hull's car, Mr.
Hull's employer, and the length of time the Hulls lived in their home. Detective
Wentworth verified the information through an independent investigation. The
information provided by the CI passes both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
Detective Wentworth also provided corroborating evidence through an
investigation into the Hulls' power usage. Two investigations using four comparable
homes showed that the Hull residence consumed more power than its neighbors. Also,
thermal imaging of the Hull residence did not show any heat differences between the Hull
residence and other comparable homes, despite the increased energy usage. Detective
Wentworth determined that it was not unusual for underground grow operations to fail to
show thermal heat changes. The increased energy usage and thermal imaging
corroborates the information that the Hulls maintained an underground grow operation.
Admittedly, the anonymous tips gathered from the marijuana hotline have little
credibility and importance when standing alone. However, when considered with the
other facts in the case, these tips provide additional evidence to support a finding of
probable cause.
12
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
The court did not abuse its discretion by determining probable cause existed based
on the information from the DEA confidential source, the information from the CI, the
increased power usage, and the anonymous tips.
The trial court did not err by denying Mr. Hull's motion to suppress the evidence
discovered through the search warrant because the search warrant was supported by
probable cause.
Affirmative Defense -- Provider of Medical Marijuana. Whether the trial court
erred by disallowing a defendant to assert an affirmative defense is a question of law that
is reviewed de novo. State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1, 11, 228 P.3d 1 (2010).
Under former RCW 69.51A.040(3) (2007), an individual may establish an
affirmative defense as a medical marijuana designated provider, if the person
(a) Meet[s] all criteria for status as a . . . designated provider;
(b) Possess[es] no more marijuana than is necessary for the patient's
personal, medical use, not exceeding the amount necessary for a sixty-day
supply; and
(c) Present[s] his or her valid documentation to any law
enforcement official who questions the . . . provider regarding his or her
medical use of marijuana.
To be a designated provider, a person must be 18 years or older, be designated in
writing by a patient to serve as a designated provider, cannot consume marijuana obtained
for the personal medical use of the patient, and serve as the designated provider for one
13
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
patient at a time. RCW 69.51A.010(1).
Valid documentation requires a statement signed by a qualifying patient's
physician or a copy of the qualifying patient's medical records that, in the physician's
professional opinion, the patient may benefit from the medical use of marijuana. Former
RCW 69.51A.010(5)(a) (2007).
Generally, a trial court must allow a defendant to present his or her theory of a
case if the law and evidence support the theory. State v. Ginn, 128 Wn. App. 872, 878,
117 P.3d 1155 (2005). "A defendant raising an affirmative defense must offer sufficient
admissible evidence to justify using the defense." State v. McCarty, 152 Wn. App. 351,
358, 215 P.3d 1036 (2009). The defendant may not use irrelevant or inadmissible
evidence. Ginn, 128 Wn. App. at 879. Any relevant and admissible evidence must be
interpreted in favor of the defendant. State v. Otis, 151 Wn. App. 572, 578, 213 P.3d 613
(2009). If the law and evidence support a defendant's theory of the case, the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury on the theory results in a reversible error. Id.
Under the requirements of the Medical Use of Marijuana Act, chapter 69.51A
RCW, a defendant must obtain the required documentation in advance of questioning by
law enforcement. State v. Butler, 126 Wn. App. 741, 750-51, 109 P.3d 493 (2005). A
defendant who fails to present the necessary documentation lacks the proof required to
14
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
assert the affirmative defense of medical marijuana. Id. at 744 n.2.
Mr. Hull failed to present the evidence needed to qualify for the affirmative
defense. Specifically, he failed to present valid documentation to the police. According
to the testimony of Detective Wentworth, when officers involved in the search questioned
Mr. Hull and asked for his documentation, Mr. Hull responded that he did not have
documentation. Mr. Hull failed to abide by the terms of the statute by not presenting
documentation to police during questioning. He lacks the proof required to assert the
affirmative defense according to RCW 69.51A.040.
Admittedly, Mr. Hull contends that the officers never asked for documentation and
he never admitted to the officers that he did not have documentation. But the first time
Mr. Hull presented evidence was in March or April 2010, several months after his arrest.
Mr. Hull failed to produce the information even when charged with the offense.
Moreover, the documentation presented by Mr. Hull was not valid. According to
former RCW 69.51A.010(5), valid documentation included a physician's statement by the
qualifying patient's doctor authorizing the patient to use marijuana. The authorization
presented by Mr. Hull expired on December 7, 2009. The additional physician's
statement that Mr. Hull provided did not take effect until after Mr. Hull's arrest. Because
the qualifying patient did not have authorization to use marijuana at the time of Mr.
15
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
Hull's arrest, Mr. Hull did not have valid documentation as required by the statute. He
fails to provide the evidence needed to qualify for the affirmative defense.
The trial court properly granted the State's motion in limine that prohibited Mr.
Hull from presenting the designated provider affirmative defense.
Knowingly Manufacturing Marijuana. Appellate courts review challenged
findings of fact for substantial evidence. Vasquez, 109 Wn. App. at 318.
RCW 69.50.401(1) states that it is unlawful for any person to manufacture,
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance.
Marijuana is a controlled substance. Former RCW 69.50.204(c)(14) (1993).
Although the statutory offense of manufacturing a controlled substance does not
have a knowledge element, case law suggests that guilty knowledge is considered a
nonstatutory element of the crime. State v. Warnick, 121 Wn. App. 737, 742-43, 90 P.3d
1105 (2004). For a defendant to be found guilty of manufacturing a controlled substance,
the defendant must know that the substance being manufactured is a controlled substance.
Id. at 743-45.
Mr. Hull contends that he lacked the nonstatutory knowledge requirement because
he did not know he was manufacturing marijuana contrary to law. However, the guilty
knowledge requirement relates to the actual offense of growing marijuana. It does not
16
No. 29736-5-III
State v. Hull
incorporate the medical marijuana affirmative defense. Mr. Hull admitted that the plants
in his possession were marijuana. Mr. Hull knowingly grew an illegal substance. He met
the guilty knowledge requirement.
We affirm the conviction.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________
Kulik, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ _________________________________
Brown, J. Korsmo, J.
17
|