Opinion Information Sheet

			

   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 
                                                               NO.  8 6 4 1 6 - 1
                      Petitioner, 

           v.                                                      EN BANC

COREY JEROME IRISH, 

                      Respondent.
                                                           Filed February 16, 2012

           PER CURIAM -- The Court of Appeals vacated Corey Irish's sentence on
multiple felonies, reasoning that previous convictions that were included in  Irish's
offender score for his current offenses may have violated double jeopardy principles. 
We grant the State's petition for review and reverse. 
           Irish and another man robbed a drug store in 2007. Police responding to a 
silent alarm captured Irish as he tried to flee. The second robber escaped. A jury 
convicted Irish of one count of first degree robbery, three counts of second degree 
assault (involving three store employees), one count of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. The trial  

No. 86416-1                                                                               Page 2

court merged one of the assaults into the robbery. Irish's offender score was partly 
based on four 1998 convictions: two for first degree robbery and two for second 
degree assault, all committed on the same day. The court in the current sentencing 
counted all four convictions separately in calculating Irish's offender score. 
           The Court of Appeals affirmed the robbery, assault, and firearm 
convictions, but it reversed the controlled substances conviction and remanded for 
resentencing. Irish had argued in his statement of additional grounds for review that 
his 1998 convictions should have been treated as "the same criminal conduct" for 
offender score purposes. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument on the basis that 
the 1998 convictions involved different victims. See RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). 
           On remand,       Irish  apparently    renewed his argument that his 1998 
convictions should not have been separately counted in his offender score. The trial 
court continued sentencing, and when it reconvened it agreed with the State that the 
Court of Appeals had rejected that argument. Asked for his view, defense counsel
stated he had no response. The State asked for a high-end standard range sentence. 
Defense counsel did not dispute the standard sentence range calculation but urged a 
low-end sentence. When invited to address the court, Irish claimed that there was no 
proof or factual basis for his guilty plea to the 1998 assaults. The trial court then asked 
Irish whether he wanted to say anything about sentencing on his current offenses. Irish 
responded that he did not. As it had before, the trial court counted the 1998 
convictions separately, and it imposed a high-end standard range sentence. 
           Irish appealed again, arguing that the trial court on remand should have 
determined whether the 1998 convictions violated double jeopardy principles because 
they arose out of the same course of conduct and thus constituted a single unit of 
prosecution. The Court of Appeals agreed with Irish and vacated his sentence,  

No. 86416-1                                                                               Page 3

remanding to the trial court to determine whether the 1998 convictions violated double 
jeopardy principles. 
           The Court of Appeals erred. It is well settled that the State is not required to 
prove the constitutional validity of prior convictions used to calculate a defendant's 
offender score on a current conviction. State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 187-88, 713 
P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (1986). And a criminal defendant generally has no right to 
contest the validity of a previous conviction in connection with a current sentencing. 
Ammons, 105 Wn.2d at 188. Requiring the State to make such a showing, or allowing 
the defendant to assert such a challenge, would turn the current sentencing proceeding 
into an appellate review of all of the defendant's prior convictions. Id. Consequently, a 
defendant seeking to challenge the validity of a prior conviction must exhaust 
established postconviction avenues of relief, such as a personal restraint petition. Id. If 
Irish wishes to challenge the validity of his 1998 convictions, he should file a personal 
restraint petition attacking those convictions. Allowing Irish to assert such a challenge 
in connection with his current sentencing is plainly contrary to Ammons.
           The Court of Appeals is reversed.