Opinion Information Sheet

			

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,

                Respondent,                                    No. 82957-8

        v.                                                       En Banc

 DANIEL ALFRED POSEY, JR.,                                Filed March 22, 2012

                Petitioner.

       J.M. JOHNSON, J. -- The question in this case is whether legislation 

relating to juvenile courts        can deprive the superior courts of their 

constitutional jurisdiction.  Article IV, section 6 of the constitution vests in 

the  superior  courts'    jurisdiction    "in all criminal cases amounting to 

felony. . . ."  We hold the legislature does not have the power to alter this 

constitutional grant of felony jurisdiction.  We  thus affirm the sentence 

imposed in this case.

       At 16 years of age, Daniel A. Posey Jr. committed two counts of rape  

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

in the second degree.  A jury convicted Posey, and the superior court 

sentenced him as an adult.  On direct review, we remanded Posey's case with 

instructions that a juvenile court sentence him.  Prior to the mandate of our 

decision, Posey turned 21 years old.

       On remand, Posey challenged the juvenile court's authority to sentence 

him.  The presiding judge agreed.  Subsequently, acting in her role as a 

superior court judge, the trial court sentenced Posey as an adult but imposed a 

sentence consistent with the standard juvenile range.  Posey appeals his 

sentence arguing that, by operation of statute, neither the juvenile court nor 

the superior court had jurisdiction to sentence him for his crimes.  We 

disagree and affirm the Court of Appeals' decision upholding the sentence 

imposed upon Posey.

                            Facts and Procedural History

       In 2003, 16-year-old Posey was charged in Yakima County Juvenile 

Court with three counts of second degree rape and one count of first degree 

assault while armed with a firearm.  Because the first degree assault charge 

was classified as a "'[s]erious violent offense'" under former RCW 

9.94A.030(37)(a)(v) (2002), the juvenile court automatically declined 

                                           -2- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

jurisdiction over Posey pursuant to RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A)                        and 

transferred the case to the Yakima County Superior Court.

       The matter proceeded to trial in the Yakima County Superior Court.  

The jury found Posey guilty of two counts of second degree rape.  The jury 

acquitted Posey on the count of first degree assault and one count of second 

degree rape.  The trial judge sentenced Posey under the adult sentencing 

guidelines to two concurrent terms of life in prison with a minimum term of 

119 months of confinement.

       Posey appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the superior 

court did not have jurisdiction to sentence him as an adult after his acquittal 

on first degree assault, the charge that led the juvenile court to automatically 

decline jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and 

affirmed Posey's judgment and sentence.  State v. Posey, 130 Wn. App. 262, 

122 P.3d 914 (2005).

       Posey thereafter obtained review in this court.  We affirmed Posey's 

convictions but reversed the Court of Appeals.  State v. Posey, 161 Wn.2d 

638, 647, 167 P.3d 560 (2007) (Posey  I).  We remanded the matter "to 

juvenile court for further proceedings."  Id. at 649.  The mandate for our 

                                           -3- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

opinion issued on October 16, 2007, less than a month after Posey turned 21 

years of age. 

       A few months later, the Yakima County Juvenile Court conducted a 

sentencing hearing on remand.  Yakima Superior Court Judge Susan Hahn 

presided over the hearing in her capacity as a judge of the Yakima County 

Juvenile Court.  Posey's counsel moved to dismiss "the matter" arguing that 

the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to sentence him because Posey 

was now 21 years old.  Clerk's Papers at 15.  Judge Hahn agreed that the 

juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction over Posey due to his age but 

indicated that she would "forget, for a moment," that she was sitting in 

juvenile court and would "transform the room and the judge into a [s]uperior 

[c]ourt . . . and sentence [Posey], right now, to a standard range sentence, 

according to the Juvenile Justice Act."  Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 

30.  Judge Hahn then imposed a juvenile standard range disposition of 60 to 

80 weeks.  The judge also entered a protection order and sex offender notice 

of registration requirements.

       Posey appealed this sentence to the Court of Appeals.  In response, the 

State filed a motion on the merits.  A commissioner at that court granted the 

                                           -4- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

motion and a panel of that court denied Posey's motion to modify.  We 

granted Posey's petition for review.

                                       Analysis

       We affirm the Court of Appeals.  We hold that the legislature cannot 

deprive the superior courts of their constitutional jurisdiction over felony 

offenses.  The legislature may designate special sessions of the superior court 

to adjudicate juvenile cases.  However, where a statute prohibits the juvenile 

session from adjudicating the case, the superior court retains its constitutional 

jurisdiction over felony offenses.

A.     The Constitutional Framework

       In adopting Washington Constitution article IV, section 6 the people of 

this state granted the superior courts original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases 

amounting to felony" and in several other enumerated types of cases and 

proceedings.  In these enumerated categories where the constitution 

specifically grants jurisdiction to the superior courts, the legislature cannot 

restrict the jurisdiction of the superior courts.  See Blanchard v. Golden Age 

Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 418, 63 P.2d 397 (1936).  Even though the 

legislature cannot restrict the enumerated jurisdiction of the superior courts, it 

                                           -5- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

can promulgate laws that govern procedures as to which "sessions" of the 

superior court will hear certain types of cases.  See Wash. Const. art. IV, § 5 

("In any county where there shall be more than one superior court judge, 

there may be as many sessions of the superior court at the same time as there 

are judges thereof . . . the business of the court shall be so distributed and 

assigned by law . . . ."); see also State ex rel. Campbell v. Superior Court, 34 

Wn.2d 771, 775, 210 P.2d 123 (1949).

       Article IV, section 6 also grants the superior courts residual

jurisdiction over nonenumerated cases and proceedings, providing that

superior courts "shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all 

proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested 

exclusively in some other court . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  It is with respect to 

cases and proceedings that fall within the residual jurisdiction of the superior 

courts that the legislature can vest exclusive jurisdiction in an alternative 

forum.  For example, by limiting  the common law tort claims of injured 

workers and creating administrative procedures and enhanced remedies under 

the Industrial Insurance Act, Title 51 RCW, the legislature effectively 

modified the role of the superior courts over such claims.  See Laws of 1911, 

                                           -6- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

ch. 74; see also Lidke v. Brandt, 21 Wn.2d 137, 139, 150 P.2d 399 (1944); 

Dougherty v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 150 Wn.2d 310, 314, 76 P.3d 1183 

(2003).

B.     Juvenile Court Jurisdiction

       The State of Washington's earliest juvenile legislation recognized that 

the superior courts possessed original jurisdiction over juvenile cases.  See

Laws of 1905, ch. 18, § 2.  However, the "sessions" of the superior court 

handling juvenile cases were designated as the "'Juvenile Court.'"  Id., § 3.  

This same assignment of juvenile cases held true throughout subsequent 

revisions of the legislation governing juvenile courts and cases.  See, e.g., 

Laws of 1913, ch. 160, § 2; Laws of 1937, ch. 65, § 1.  Likewise, our case 

law interpreted the juvenile court legislation as a special "session" of the 

superior court that  the legislature directed to preside over juvenile cases 

pursuant to article IV, section 5 of the state constitution.  See Campbell, 34 

Wn.2d at 775; Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wn.2d 331, 352, 413 P.2d 940, 

422 P.2d 783 (1966).

       In 1977, the legislature added the language in RCW 13.04.030, which 

grants the juvenile courts "exclusive original jurisdiction" over all juvenile 

                                           -7- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

proceedings.  Laws of 1977, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 291, § 4.  We interpreted the 

effect of these changes in State v. Werner, 129 Wn.2d 485, 496, 918 P.2d 

916 (1996).     We held that "under Article IV, § 6, the Legislature has not 

vested jurisdiction exclusively in some court other than the superior court by 

enacting RCW 13.04.030 because the juvenile court is a division of the 

superior court, not a separate court."  Id. at 493 (emphasis added).

       Further, we explained that the legislature could not divest the superior 

courts of their criminal jurisdiction over juveniles.  Id. at 496.  We stated:

       The only remaining argument . . . is that the creation of juvenile courts 
       by statute somehow constrained the power of a superior court . . . .  
       That argument fails.  This Court has resolutely resisted legislative 
       attempts to restrict its constitutional authority . . . "[T]he courts are not 
       required to recognize a legislative restriction which has the effect of 
       depriving them of a constitutional grant or of one of their inherent 
       powers.  What the legislature has not given, it cannot take away."

Id.  (last  alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Blanchard, 188 

Wash. at 418).

       Admittedly, our prior jurisprudence discussing juvenile court 

jurisdiction is not a model of clarity.  See Dillenburg, 70 Wn.2d at 353 (

"When, then, we spoke of 'surrender of jurisdiction' and 'jurisdiction' in 

reference to juvenile and superior court proceedings in our original opinion in 

                                           -8- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

this case, we were not accurately using the word 'jurisdiction' in its true 

juridical and traditional sense.").  Werner's own discussion of the "'three 

jurisdictional elements in every valid judgment'" further confused the issue.  

Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 493 (quoting In re Marriage of Little, 96 Wn.2d 183, 

197, 634 P.2d 498 (1981)). 1

       Werner distinguished between "'three jurisdictional elements in every 

valid judgment, namely, jurisdiction of the subject matter, jurisdiction of the 

person, and the power or authority to render the particular judgment.'"  Id. 

(quoting Little, 96 Wn.2d at 197 (citing 1 A.C. Freeman, A Treatise of the 

Law of Judgments § 226 (5th ed. rev. 1925)).  The opinion's distinction 

between "jurisdiction of the subject matter" and "the power or authority to 

render the particular judgment" rests on an antiquated understanding of 

subject matter jurisdiction.  Compare            1  Freeman,  supra,       § 226,   with
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 (1982).2 It is not even clear that the 

1 In dicta, the Werner opinion stated that "[t]he issue, then, is not whether the adult 
division of the [superior court] had the power to hear and determine the charges against 
[the juvenile].  It did not."  Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 494.  However, Werner also affirmed 
that the superior court maintained constitutional subject matter jurisdiction over juvenile 
criminal cases.  Id. at 493.  Werner's distinction between a court's subject matter 
jurisdiction and its "power to hear and determine" a criminal case is not entirely clear and 
thus provides limited value as precedent.

2 Werner relied on Little for the assertion that every valid judgment contains three 
jurisdictional elements.  Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 493 (quoting Little, 96 Wn.2d at 197).  

                                           -9- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

precedents relied on by Werner recognized such a distinction.  See Little, 96 

Wn.2d at 197 ("We have found no case holding that trial procedural 

requirements, such as the time for deciding issues, are jurisdictional.").  

Unfortunately,  Werner is not our only opinion embracing this antiquated 

distinction.  See In re Per. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d 772, 283, 100 

Little relied on a legal treatise from the early 20th century to establish this proposition.  
Little, 96 Wn.2d at 197 (citing 1 Freeman,  supra, § 226).  The legal treatise gives 
illustrative examples of cases invalidating judgments that fail to satisfy all three of the 
jurisdictional elements.  1 Freeman, supra, § 226 n.17.

       One example the treatise cites is Grannis v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. 245, 79 P. 
891 (1905).  In Grannis, a California statute prohibited courts from entering a final 
divorce decree until one year after the entry of an interlocutory decree.  Id. at 247.  The 
California Supreme Court held that a divorce decree that failed to comply with these 
statutory prerequisites was void.  Id. at 252.  The court reached this conclusion even 
though the court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction.  Id. at 247.  As Grannis
illustrates, the third jurisdictional element contemplated by Freeman refers to procedural 
requirements that a court must follow before entering a valid judgment.

       Freeman's   jurisdictional analysis is inadequate.  Modern treatises do not 
distinguish three jurisdictional elements.  Rather, modern commentators distinguish 
between mere legal errors and errors affecting a court's subject matter jurisdiction.  See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11.

       Failure to comply with Title 13 RCW's procedural provisions does not impact the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the superior courts.  The subject matter jurisdiction of the 
superior courts over juvenile offenders derives from article IV of the state constitution.  
Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 493; In re Per. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d 772, 283, 100 
P.3d 279 (2004).  The legislature cannot restrict a superior court's constitutional 
jurisdiction.  Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 496.  Additionally, Little itself expressly rejects the 
view that mere procedural errors strip a superior court of jurisdiction.  See Little, 96 
Wn.2d at 197 ("We have found no case holding that trial procedural requirements, such as 
the time for deciding issues, are jurisdictional.").  For these reasons, we do not adopt the 
inadequate jurisdictional analysis announced by Freeman.

                                          -10- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

P.3d 279 (2004).

       Our prior opinion discussing Posey's own case also involved an 

idiosyncratic use of the term "jurisdiction."  See generally Posey  I, 161 

Wn.2d 638.  Two reasons suggest that Posey I used the term "jurisdiction" in 

an uncharacteristic way.  First, a court's jurisdiction cannot hinge on the 

result it reaches.  "'Jurisdiction means the power to hear and determine.'"  

Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 493 (quoting State ex rel. McGlothern v. Superior 

Court, 112 Wash. 501, 505, 192 P. 937 (1920)).  It is conceptually incoherent 

to suppose that a court's power to determine a case depends on its 
determination in the case.3     Second, we affirmed Posey's conviction.  Posey 

I, 161 Wn.2d at 649.  If the superior court truly lacked jurisdiction to decide 

Posey's case, his conviction too would have been a nullity.  However, we 
upheld Posey's conviction and remanded for resentencing.  Id.4

       The juvenile courts are properly understood, jurisdictionally, as a 

separate division of the superior courts.  See Campbell, 34 Wn.2d at 775; 

Dillenburg, 70 Wn.2d at 352-53; Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 492; In re Boot, 130 

3 We do not however question the unproblematic assertion that a court is competent to 
determine its own jurisdiction.  See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11.

4 Our remand for resentencing in the juvenile court was based on the assumption that 
Posey remained a juvenile.  Posey I, 161 Wn.2d at 641.

                                          -11- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

Wn.2d 553, 561 n.4, 925 P.2d 964 (1996).  By adopting RCW 13.04.050, the 

legislature did not deprive the superior courts of their original jurisdiction 

over crimes committed by juveniles.  Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 493.  The 

legislature  cannot deprive the superior courts of constitutional jurisdiction 

over crimes committed by juveniles.  Id. at 496.  Where our precedents 

contain language at odds with the constitutional powers of the superior courts, 

the constitution prevails.

C.     The Superior Court Retained Jurisdiction To Sentence Posey  

       A jury convicted Posey of two counts of rape in the second degree.  

Posey I, 161 Wn.2d at 641.  Second degree rape is a felony offense.  RCW 

9A.44.050(2).  The Yakima County Superior Court has jurisdiction over 

felony offenses.  Wash. Const. art. IV, § 6.         Therefore, the Yakima County 

Superior Court possessed jurisdiction to sentence Posey.

       Posey argues that no court had jurisdiction to sentence him.  He 

contends that because the jury found him not guilty of the first degree assault 

charge, the superior court lacked jurisdiction.  As authority for this point, he 

cites this court's previous opinion in this case.  See Posey I, 161 Wn.2d at 

647.  Posey further contends that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over 

                                          -12- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

him due to RCW 13.40.300(3), which states that "[i]n no event may the 

juvenile court have authority to extend jurisdiction over any juvenile offender 

beyond the juvenile offender's twenty-first birthday."

       This argument fails.  The superior court always retains its jurisdiction 

over felony offenses.  This jurisdiction derives directly from the constitution.  

See Wash. Const. art. IV, § 6.  The legislature by statute cannot alter the 

constitutional jurisdiction of the superior courts.  Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 496.

       Posey's argument wrongly assumes that the juvenile court and the 

superior court are different courts with different jurisdictional requirements.  

Juvenile courts are not separate and distinct from superior courts.  Properly 

understood, "the superior court, sitting in juvenile court 'session,' grants to 

prosecuting officials the 'authority to proceed,' in an appropriate case, with 

the criminal prosecution of a child under 18 years of age."  Dillenburg, 70

Wn.2d at 353.  If a particular judge receives the designation of "'juvenile 

court judge,'" "the other departments of the superior court in that county do 

not lose jurisdiction in . . . juvenile court matters."  Campbell, 34 Wn.2d at 

775.  "[U]nder Article IV, § 6, the Legislature has not vested jurisdiction 

exclusively in some court other than the superior court by enacting RCW 

                                          -13- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

13.04.030 because the juvenile court is a division of the superior court, not a 

separate court."  Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 493.

       Long established precedents from this court recognize that juvenile 

courts are simply departments (or divisions) of the superior courts.  See

Campbell, 34 Wn.2d at 775; Dillenburg, 70 Wn.2d at 352-53; Werner, 129 

Wn.2d at 492; Boot, 130 Wn.2d at 561 n.4.  The legislature has 

acknowledged this.  See RCW 13.04.021(1) ("The juvenile court shall be a 

division of the superior court.").

       The constitution grants the superior courts original jurisdiction "in all 

criminal cases amounting to felony . . . ."  Wash. Const. art. IV, § 6.  The 

legislature cannot rescind this constitutional jurisdiction or vest it exclusively 

in another court.  Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 496.           Because the superior court's 

jurisdiction derives from the constitution, and the juvenile session lacked 

statutory authority to act in Posey's case, the superior court retained 

jurisdiction to sentence him for his crimes.

                                         Conclusion

       The constitution grants jurisdiction to the superior courts "in all cases 

amounting to felony. . . ."     Wash. Const. art. IV, § 6.  By later legislation, a

                                          -14- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

separate division of the superior courts adjudicates cases involving juveniles.  

Title 13 RCW does not alter the constitutional felony jurisdiction of a 

superior court.  Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 493.  Moreover, the legislature does 

not have the power to alter the constitutional jurisdiction of a superior court

under article IV.  Id. at 496.  Where a person is no longer subject to the 

procedures governing juvenile adjudications, the superior court retains such

constitutional jurisdiction.       We affirm the Court of Appeals decision 

upholding the sentence imposed against Posey by the Yakima County 

Superior Court.

       AUTHOR:

                Justice James M. Johnson

       WE CONCUR:

                Justice Charles W. Johnson                      Justice Debra L. Stephens

                Justice Tom Chambers                            Justice Charles K. Wiggins

                Justice Susan Owens

                Justice Mary E. Fairhurst

                                          -15- 

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8

                                          -16-