Opinion Information Sheet

			

State v. Posey (Daniel Alfred, Jr.)

                                         No. 82957-8

       MADSEN, C.J. (dissenting) -- Although I agree with the majority that the superior 

court has residual jurisdiction to sentence Daniel Alfred Posey Jr., I cannot endorse the 

trial court's decision to apply the juvenile sentencing range.  Because Posey has reached 

the age of majority, the underlying goals and purpose of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 

are no longer served and he should be sentenced to the adult range. 

                                           Analysis

       Article IV, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution grants superior courts 

residual jurisdiction in "all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not 

have been by law vested exclusively in some other court."  Although the legislature may 

govern which "sessions" of the superior court may hear which types of cases, and the

juvenile court is one such session, the juvenile court is a division of the superior court.  

Const. art. IV, § 5; Laws of 1905, ch. 18, § 3; State v. Werner, 129 Wn.2d 485, 492, 918 

P.2d 916 (1996). Therefore, even though by statute only the juvenile session has the 

power to hear and determine certain juvenile matters, its ultimate authority originates in 

the superior court's article IV, section 6 jurisdiction over felony offenses.  The majority is 

No. 82957-8

correct to conclude that the superior court has residual jurisdiction in this case.

       However, because the unique purposes of the juvenile system could no longer be 

served after Posey reached the age of majority, the superior court should have imposed a 

sentence using the adult sentencing guidelines.  See In re Pers. Restraint of Smiley, 96 

Wn.2d 950, 953-54, 640 P.2d 7 (1982) (extended jurisdiction of juvenile court has the 

purpose of "'provid[ing] juvenile courts with a rehabilitative post-majority dispositional 

alternative'" (quoting State v. Binford, 90 Wn.2d 370, 374, 582 P.2d 863 (1978)).

       The Juvenile Justice Act provides for "necessary treatment, supervision, and 

custody for juvenile offenders" while still holding juveniles responsible for their actions.  

RCW 13.40.010(2)(c), (f).  The system is specifically designed to respond to the needs of 

youthful offenders and their victims.  RCW 13.40.010(2). The act ensures that 

punishment takes into consideration the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile 

offender.  RCW 13.40.010(2)(d).  Although both the juvenile and adult justice systems 

serve the purpose of punishing wrongdoers, the juvenile system alone makes 

rehabilitation an equally important goal and also seeks to keep children out of adult 

facilities.  See Smiley, 96 Wn.2d at 953-54.  There is, however, no constitutional right to 

be tried in a juvenile court.  In re Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d 772, 784 n.8, 

100 P.3d 279 (2004).

       Because Posey has reached the age of majority, he may no longer benefit from 

juvenile rehabilitation, would not be a child out of place in an adult facility, and is not of 

an age requiring any other sort of special treatment.  See id.  As Posey himself argues, 

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through operation of the extended jurisdiction statute, juvenile jurisdiction may extend 

beyond when a defendant reaches age 18 but not past age 21.  RCW 13.40.300(3).  When 

Posey was sentenced in Yakima County Superior Court, he was over the age of 21.  Once 

Posey turned 21, the juvenile court, specifically empowered to carry out the goals of the

Juvenile Justice Act, lacked jurisdiction to impose a juvenile sentence and was required to 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction without imposing sentence.  RCW 13.40.300(3) ("In no 

event may the juvenile court have authority to extend jurisdiction over any juvenile 

offender beyond the juvenile offender's twenty-first birthday except for the purpose of 

enforcing an order of restitution or penalty assessment."); see also Young v. Clark, 149 

Wn.2d 130, 133, 65 P.3d 1192 (2003). In these circumstances, the juvenile court could 

not exercise extended jurisdiction because it lacked any jurisdiction at all.

       Although the purposes of accountability and punishment are tempered by and at 

times must give way to the purposes of responding to the needs of the juvenile, the 

termination of juvenile jurisdiction marks an end to the juvenile system's emphasis on 

rehabilitation as well as its special sentencing provisions.  See State v. J.A., 105 Wn. App. 

879, 886, 20 P.3d 487 (2001); RCW 13.40.300, .0357. Accordingly, there is no basis for 

applying a juvenile sentence to serve rehabilitative purposes.

       In addition, there is no due process bar to sentencing Posey to an adult sentence.  

When an individual commits a crime as a juvenile and comes of majority age while her 

case is still making its way through the criminal justice system, that individual is 

thereafter treated as an adult, unless she can show the State violated her due process 

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rights by negligently or intentionally causing delay.  State v. Lidge, 111 Wn.2d 845, 848, 

765 P.2d 1292 (1989) (finding constitutional the decision to refer defendant to the adult 

division when insufficient time remained to bring charges in juvenile court before he 

turned 18); State v. Brewster, 75 Wn.2d 137, 449 P.2d 685 (1969) (concluding that no 

due process violation resulted when defendant was charged as a minor but subsequently 

reached the age of majority and was tried and sentenced as an adult).

       Here, Posey makes no argument that the State caused any undue delay, either 

intentionally or negligently, and accordingly has failed to show a due process violation 

that would necessitate a juvenile sentence.  Because the juvenile court lost jurisdiction 

and sentencing Posey as an adult would not pose a due process problem, Posey should 

have been sentenced as an adult.

       The majority provides no explanation for how the interests of justice would be 

furthered by sentencing an adult to a juvenile sentence or why it would make sense to 

sentence Posey under the Juvenile Justice Act after determining that the act's 

jurisdictional requirement was not satisfied.  The majority also fails to provide any 

precedent for imposing a juvenile sentence after a defendant has reached the age of 

majority.  Instead, the majority decouples a juvenile sentence from both the jurisdictional 

requirement that a defendant be a juvenile and the underlying principles that justify a 

juvenile sentence.  Because the juvenile court has lost jurisdiction, and the special 

purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act can no longer be advanced, I would sentence Posey 

according to the adult sentencing guidelines.

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No. 82957-8

AUTHOR:

        Chief Justice Barbara A. Madsen

WE CONCUR:

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