Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
41138-5 |
Title of Case: |
William And Mary Mason, Dept. Of L & I, Appellants. V. Georgia-pacific Corp., Respondent |
File Date: |
02/29/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Clark Superior Court |
Docket No: | 09-2-04379-9 |
Judgment or order under review |
Date filed: | 07/29/2010 |
Judge signing: | Honorable Robert a Lewis |
JUDGES
------
Authored by | Jill M Johanson |
Concurring: | J. Robin Hunt |
| Marywave Van Deren |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| Jill Amanda Karmy |
| Parham, Hall & Karmy |
| Po Box 757 |
| Longview, WA, 98632-7490 |
|
| Natalee Ruth Fillinger |
| WA St Attorney Generals Office |
| Po Box 40121 |
| Olympia, WA, 98504-0121 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| James L Gress |
| The Law Office of Gress & Clark |
| 9020 Sw Washington Square Rd Ste 560 |
| Portland, OR, 97223-4436 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
WILLIAM MASON, DECEASED, and No. 41138-5-II
MARY MASON,
Appellants,
v.
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION, PUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent,
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR & INDUSTRIES,
Appellant.
Johanson, J. -- Mary Mason and the Department of Labor and Industries appeal the
superior court's calculation of her surviving spouse pension under the Industrial Insurance Act.
Mary1 and the Department primarily argue that (1) the legislature intended to provide wage based
death benefits to survivors of voluntarily-retired workers who die from occupational diseases and
(2) because former RCW 51.32.050 (1986) conflicts with RCW 51.32.180, the conflict should be
1 For clarity, we refer to the Masons by their first names. We intend no disrespect.
No. 41138-5-II
resolved in favor of the survivor. We reverse the superior court and hold that Mary's survivor
benefits should be based on her deceased husband's wages at the time he retired.
FACTS
William D. Mason worked for Georgia-Pacific Corporation for more than 35 years until
his voluntary retirement on April 30, 1986. Working mostly as a millwright, William was
extensively exposed to caustic chemicals, including asbestos and chlorine dioxide. In June 1988,
William filed a claim for industrial insurance benefits based on a bilateral lung condition related to
chemical exposure during his employment. The Department accepted the claim.
William died in December 2006. Mary, his wife of many years, survived him. His claim
for industrial insurance benefits was still open at the time of his death. In April 2007, the
Department found that an occupationally-related condition caused Mason's death and approved
surviving spouse benefits. In July, the Department determined that the appropriate date for the
manifestation of William's occupationally-related condition was the last day he worked (April 30,
1986), and established a surviving spouse pension based on his last day of work wages.
Georgia-Pacific protested the Department's manifestation date for William's
occupationally-related condition, but the Department affirmed the order. Georgia-Pacific
appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, which affirmed the order.
Both Mary and Georgia-Pacific appealed to superior court, which consolidated their
appeals.2 At trial, Georgia-Pacific argued that Mary was entitled to benefits calculated using the
statutory minimum survivor pension rate because William had voluntarily retired before his lung
2 The issues Mary appealed to superior court are not appealed here.
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No. 41138-5-II
condition manifested.
Based on the jury's finding that William's condition did not manifest until after his
voluntary retirement, the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that RCW 51.32.180 required
Mary's survivor benefits to be set at the statutory minimum. The trial court reversed and
remanded, directing the Department to grant a spousal pension to Mary using the statutory
minimum rate to calculate the pension amount and to close the claim. Both the Department and
Mary appeal.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Unlike our review of other administrative decisions, we review workers' compensation
cases appealed from superior court in the same way we review nonadministrative civil cases.
RCW 51.52.140; Rogers v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 151 Wn. App. 174, 180, 210 P.3d 355,
review denied, 167 Wn.2d 1015 (2009).3 The superior court's construction of a statute is a
question of law, which we review de novo. Jacobsen v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 127 Wn. App.
384, 389, 110 P.3d 253 (2005), review denied, 156 Wn.2d 1024 (2006). Here, the parties do not
dispute the facts, and the only question is one of statutory construction, a question of law.
If a statute's meaning is plain on its face, then we give effect to that plain meaning as an
expression of legislative intent. State ex rel. Citizens Against Tolls (CAT) v. Murphy, 151 Wn.2d
226, 242, 88 P.3d 375 (2004). We discern plain meaning not only from the provision in question
3 Under RCW 34.05.030(2)(a), the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, chapter 34.05 RCW, do not apply "[t]o adjudicative proceedings of the board of industrial
insurance appeals except as provided in RCW 7.68.110 and 51.48.131."
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No. 41138-5-II
but also from closely related statutes and the underlying legislative purposes. Murphy, 151
Wn.2d at 242. In contrast, when a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, it is ambiguous and we use canons of statutory construction or legislative history.
Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We consider
and harmonize statutory provisions in relation to each other and interpret a statute to give effect
to all statutory language. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142
Wn.2d 543, 560, 14 P.3d 133 (2000). We avoid construing a statute in a manner that results in
"unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences." Glaubach v. Regence BlueShield, 149 Wn.2d 827,
833, 74 P.3d 115 (2003).
Washington's Industrial Insurance Act "is remedial in nature and is to be liberally
construed in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees
injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker." Dennis v. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987). Regarding statutory interpretation,
our fundamental objective is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Campbell & Gwinn, 146
Wn.2d at 9-10.
II. Legislative Intent of Survivor Benefits
A. Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius -- where a statute specifically
designates the things or classes of things on which it operates -- an inference arises in law that the
legislature intentionally omitted all things or classes of things omitted from it. Wash. Natural Gas
Co. v. Pub. Utils. Dist. No. 1, 77 Wn.2d 94, 98, 459 P.2d 633 (1969).
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No. 41138-5-II
The 1986 Act provided to workers and their families four types of wage-based,
periodically-paid monetary benefits. These benefits included permanent total disability pension
benefits,4 temporary total disability time loss compensation,5 loss of earning power benefits (also
known as partial time loss compensation),6 and death benefits.7 In 1986, the legislature amended
three of the four wage-based, periodically paid monetary benefits. The amendments provided that
if the worker voluntarily retires then "benefits shall not be paid." Former RCW 51.32.060,
former RCW 51.32.090(1), (3). But the legislature did not amend the fourth provision, which
provided death benefits to the worker's survivors.
Georgia-Pacific argues that we should not assume that the legislature "knew what it was
doing" because there is no legislative history that expressly articulates a purposeful omission of a
similar provision to the death benefit. Br. of Resp't at 20. However, one rule of statutory
construction is that the court presumes the legislature to be familiar with its own law, including
prior subjects of legislation, the rules, and court decisions construing the former legislation. In re
Wissink, 118 Wn. App. 870, 875, 81 P.3d 865 (2003). Additionally, no legal authority supports
4 Former RCW 51.32.060 (1986).
5 Former RCW 51.32.090(1) (1986).
6 Former RCW 51.32.090(3) (1986).
7 Former RCW 51.32.050 (1982) provides:
(2)(a) Where death results from the injury, a surviving spouse of a deceased
worker eligible for benefits under this title shall receive monthly for life or until
remarriage payments according to the following schedule:
(i) If there are no children of the deceased worker, sixty percent of the wages of
the deceased worker but not less than one hundred eighty-five dollars.
5
No. 41138-5-II
Georgia-Pacific's argument requiring express evidence of legislative intent.
Georgia-Pacific also argues that RCW 51.32.050, the provision that restricts the benefits
of a worker who voluntarily retires is not an example of "classes of things" referred to by the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Br. of Resp't at 22. Georgia-Pacific seeks to
narrow the application of the maxim to parallel "classes of things" identified in previous case law.
Br. of Resp't at 22. This argument misunderstands the maxim. Instead, the various types of
benefits available to retired workers under the Act are types or classes of a thing to which we
apply the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is "the law in Washington, barring a
clearly contrary legislative intent." City of Algona v. Sharp, 30 Wn. App. 837, 842, 638 P.2d 627
(1982). Applying it here, we infer that by amending the language regarding three out of four
wage-based, periodically-paid monetary benefits, the legislature intentionally omitted a similar
limitation to survivors' death benefits.
B. Unique Character of Death Benefit
Mary and the Department argue that a surviving spouse's lifetime pension is different in
character from the worker's wage replacement benefits. Specifically, they argue that a worker
can choose to resume work, thereby reversing his or her voluntary retirement; but a surviving
spouse does not have the ability to reverse the voluntary retirement of his or her deceased spouse.
Second, a worker cannot waive the survivor's rights to benefits. Georgia-Pacific argues that
death benefits merely extend the worker's wage replacement benefits to the spouse and the
legislative purpose of the survivor's death benefit is the same as the worker's wage replacement
6
No. 41138-5-II
benefit. We agree with Mary and the Department.
Although the legislature made no express statement, it is reasonable to conclude that the
legislature intended to provide different benefits for workers and survivors. The Department's
regulations provide a means for a worker to reverse voluntary retirement; however, no means
exist for a survivor to reverse his or her deceased spouse's retirement. WAC 296-14-100(1)(b)
(voluntary retirement is negated by evidence showing the worker's "bona[ ]fide attempt to return
to work after retirement"). In addition, our Supreme Court has held that "the worker cannot
waive the survivor's rights to benefits." Kilpatrick v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 222,
228, 883 P.2d 1370, 915 P.2d 519 (1994). Kilpatrick supports the argument that the survivor's
death benefit has a separate character and is not merely an extension of the worker's wage
replacement benefit.
Although Georgia-Pacific correctly argues that the Act does not entitle voluntarily-retired
workers who subsequently become disabled (either temporarily or permanently) to receive wage
replacement benefits, it asserts without explanation that the survivor's death benefit is merely an
extension of the worker's wage replacement benefit. Regarding worker's benefits, Division Three
of this court established that temporary disability benefits are not available to a voluntarily-retired
worker. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Overdorff, 57 Wn. App. 291, 297, 788 P.2d 8
(1990). Similarly, Division One of this court concluded that permanent total disability benefits are
not available to a voluntarily-retired worker. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Farr, 70 Wn. App. 759, 763-
64, 855 P.2d 711 (1993), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1017 (1994). Both cases determined that the
voluntarily-retired person no longer earns wages, thus cannot suffer wage loss, and the legislature
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No. 41138-5-II
intended the benefit to protect the worker from wage loss. Farr, 70 Wn. App. at 763; Overdorff,
57 Wn. App. at 296-97. Georgia-Pacific neither addresses nor explains why the survivor's death
benefit should have the same purpose and limitations as the worker's wage replacement benefits.
Georgia-Pacific's argument overlooks the fact that a worker's benefit benefits the worker and a
survivor's benefit benefits the survivor.
We agree with Mary and the Department that the legislature intended to treat death
benefits differently than wage replacement benefits.
III. Conflict of Statutes
Mary and the Department argue that former RCW 51.32.0508 (which bases death benefits
on the deceased worker's wages) conflicts with RCW 51.32.180(b)9 (which commences
8 Former RCW 51.32.050 provides:
(2)(a) Where death results from the injury, a surviving spouse of a deceased
worker eligible for benefits under this title shall receive monthly for life or until
remarriage payments according to the following schedule:
(i) If there are no children of the deceased worker, sixty percent of the wages of
the deceased worker but not less than one hundred eighty-five dollars.
9 RCW 51.32.180 provides:
Every worker who suffers disability from an occupational disease in the course of
employment under the mandatory or elective adoption provisions of this title, or
his or her family and dependents in case of death of the worker from such disease
or infection, shall receive the same compensation benefits and medical, surgical and
hospital care and treatment as would be paid and provided for a worker injured or
killed in employment under this title, except as follows: (a) [(1)] This section and
RCW 51.16.040 shall not apply where the last exposure to the hazards of the
disease or infection occurred prior to January 1, 1937; and (b) [(2)] for claims filed
on or after July 1, 1988, the rate of compensation for occupational diseases shall
be established as of the date the disease requires medical treatment or becomes
totally or partially disabling, whichever occurs first, and without regard to the date
of the contraction of the disease or the date of filing the claim.
8
No. 41138-5-II
compensation for occupational diseases at time of manifestation). The conflict exists when a
worker's occupational disease manifests during voluntary retirement, and the worker has no
current wages on which to base death benefits. Mary and the Department argue that when
statutes conflict, specific statutes control over general ones, and we construe the conflict in the
worker's favor. Georgia-Pacific responds that the statutes do not conflict, and are unambiguous,
mandating a plain meaning approach to statutory construction. We agree with Mary and the
Department.
As an initial matter, we reject Georgia-Pacific's assertion that no conflict exists between
former RCW 51.32.050 and RCW 51.32.180(b). Georgia-Pacific argues that based on a plain
language reading, the statutes are not in conflict because a retired person, who does not actively
earn wages, has a wage rate of zero.
Former RCW 51.32.050 bases a death benefit on the worker's wages.10 See supra note 9.
But RCW 51.32.180(b) establishes that compensation for occupational diseases commences at the
time the disease became manifest. See supra note 10. If a worker's occupational disease
manifests during voluntary retirement when the worker does not actively earn wages, the statutes
conflict.
Additional conflict between these statutes involves the legislature's general intent that the
Act treats workers who have an occupational disease the same as workers who have an
10 In 2007, the legislature amended RCW 51.32.050 by striking the minimum rate of $185 and
linking the minimum benefit amount to a percentage of the state's average monthly wage.
Although industrial insurance benefits are paid based on the schedule in effect on the date of
worker's injury, subsequent legislative history supports Mary's argument that the legislature
intended the death benefit to be linked to the worker's wages.
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employment injury. Specifically, RCW 51.32.180 provides that "[e]very worker who suffers
disability from an occupational disease in the course of employment . . . shall receive the same
compensation benefits . . . as would be paid and provided for a worker injured or killed in
employment . . . except . . . the rate of compensation for occupational diseases shall be established
as of the date the disease requires medical treatment." Similarly RCW 51.16.040 requires that
workers who have an occupational disease be compensated and paid "in the same manner" as
workers with employment injuries.11
Under Georgia-Pacific's interpretation, the occupationally-injured worker who voluntarily
retires12 and then dies, leaves a survivor who will receive wage-based death benefits. But the
occupationally-diseased worker who voluntarily retires and then dies, leaves a survivor who will
receive only the minimum death benefit (non-wage-based death benefit).
We consider and harmonize statutory provisions in relation to each other and interpret a
statute to give effect to all statutory language. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.,
142 Wn.2d at 560. We avoid construing a statute in a manner that results in "unlikely, absurd, or
strained consequences." Glaubach, 149 Wn.2d at 833. When statutes conflict, specific statutes
control over general ones. Hallauer v. Spectrum Props., Inc., 143 Wn.2d 126, 146-47, 18 P.3d
540 (2001).
11 RCW 51.16.040 (Occupational diseases) provides:
The compensation and benefits provided for occupational diseases shall be paid
and in the same manner as compensation and benefits for injuries under this title.
12 An occupationally-injured worker "voluntarily retire[s]" if the injured worker is capable of
obtaining and performing some form of gainful employment other than the job that injured the
worker, but the injured worker chooses to retire instead of pursuing these options. See WAC 296-
14-100 (defining a voluntarily retired worker).
10
No. 41138-5-II
In this case, the statutes conflict. Comparing these statutes, former RCW 51.32.050
applies specifically to death benefits and in contrast, RCW 51.32.180(b) is more general because it
applies to all benefits based on claims for occupational diseases. Because the statutes conflict, the
more specific "death benefit" provision controls the more general "occupational diseases" statute.
Hallauer, 143 Wn.2d at 146. Under this interpretation, both the employment-injured worker's
survivors and the occupationally-diseased worker's survivors receive wage-based death benefits.
This interpretation harmonizes the statutory provisions to give effect to all statutory language.
Finally, the Act "is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve its
purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with
doubts resolved in favor of the worker." Dennis, 109 Wn.2d at 470. Therefore, when
"'reasonable minds can differ over what Title 51 RCW provisions mean . . ., the benefit of the
doubt belongs to the injured worker.'" Harry v. Buse Timber & Sales, Inc., 166 Wn.2d 1, 8, 201
P.3d 1011 (2009) (quoting Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 811, 16 P.3d 583
(2001)). Here, neither party contests the Department's finding that employment conditions
caused William's death. A core purpose of the Act is to motivate employers to make workplaces
safer by allocating the cost of workplace injuries to the industry that produces them. Harry, 166
Wn.2d at 19.
We conclude that because the statutes conflict, specific statutes control over general ones,
and ambiguous statutes are construed in favor of the worker, Mary's survivor benefits should be
based on William's wages at the time of his retirement.
IV. Attorney Fees
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No. 41138-5-II
Mary and the Department request an award of attorney fees and costs under RCW
51.52.130 and RCW 4.84.010, which authorize assessed attorneys fees and costs when a party
prevails on appeal.13 Because we reverse the superior court's decision, both Mary and the
Department are entitled to attorney fees and costs. RAP 18.1.
We reverse.
Johanson, J.
We concur:
Hunt, P.J.
Van Deren, J.
13 In their reply brief Mason and the Department abandon their request for superior court attorney
fees and costs.
12
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