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Lawson v. Mercer County Commission
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
September 1996 Term
No. 23399
WALTER O. LAWSON, ET AL., Plaintiffs
v.
THE COUNTY COMMISSION OF MERCER COUNTY AND DON B. MEADOWS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF MERCER COUNTY, Defendants
Certified Question from the Circuit Court of Mercer County Honorable John R. Frazier, Judge Civil Action No. 95-CV-328-F
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED
Submitted: September 17, 1996
Filed: December 17, 1996

Dwayne E. Cyrus, Esq.  W. T. Weber, Jr., Esq.
Kathryn Reed Bayless, Esq.  W. T. Weber, III, Esq.
Bayless, McFadden & Cyrus                Weber & Weber
Princeton, West Virginia                    Weston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs                Attorneys for the Defendants

Charles D. Smith, Esq.
Prosecuting Attorney
Princeton, West Virginia

The Opinion of the Court was delivered Per Curiam.
JUDGE RECHT, sitting by temporary assignment. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
"West Virginia Code, 58-5-2 (1967), allows for certification of a question arising from a denial of a motion for summary judgment. However, such certification will not be accepted unless there is a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record on which the legal issues can be determined. Moreover, such legal issues must substantially control the case." Syllabus Point 5, Bass v. Coltelli, 192 W. Va. 516, 453 S.E.2d 350 (1994).

2.
"A statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied." Syllabus Point 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 186 W. Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992).


3. "Judicial interpretation of a statute is warranted only if the statute is ambiguous and the initial step in such interpretative inquiry is to ascertain the legislative intent." Syllabus Point 1, Ohio County Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W. Va. 552, 301 S.E.2d 183 (1983).
4. "A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith." Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W. Va. 659, 63
S.E. 385 (1908).
5.
"The repeal of a statute by implication is not favored, and where two statutes are in apparent conflict, the Court must, if reasonably possible, construe such statutes so as to give effect to each." Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. Graney v. Sims, 144 W. Va. 72, 105 S.E.2d 886 (1958).

6.
"It is the duty of a court to construe a statute according to its true intent, and give to it such construction as will uphold the law and further justice. It is as well the duty of a court to disregard a construction, though apparently warranted by the literal sense of the words in a statute, when such construction would lead to injustice and absurdity." Syllabus Point 2, Click v. Click, 98 W. Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925). Per Curiam:See footnote 1


        We are presented in this case with four questions certified by the Circuit Court of Mercer County regarding the method of calculating the annual salary increment for deputy sheriffs as provided for in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985). The circuit court certified the following four questions:
1. Is W. Va. Code 7-14-17c vague and ambiguous?
ANSWER: Yes
2.
Does the annual salary increase/increment provided deputy sheriffs in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c become a part of the deputy's base pay?

ANSWER: No

3.
Is the annual calculation of the increase/increment in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c for subsequent years of service performed by a compounding (as opposed to cumulative) approach as reflected in the attached chart?

ANSWER: No

4.
For a claim arising under W. Va. Code 7-14-17c and where deputies are employed pursuant only to written order only of County Commission, is the applicable period of limitations, under W. Va. Code 55-2-6:

a.
5 years ANSWER: Yes

b.
10 years ANSWER: No




        The certified questions are the result of the circuit court's denial of the parties' motions for partial summary judgment. "West Virginia Code, 58-5-2 (1967),See footnote 2 allows for certification of a question arising from a denial of a motion for summary judgment. However, such certification will not be accepted unless there is a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record on which the legal issues can be determined. Moreover, such legal issues must substantially control the case." Syllabus Point 5, Bass v. Coltelli, 192 W. Va. 516, 453 S.E.2d 350 (1994). Because there is a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record upon which the legal issues can be determined, and because these legal issues substantially control this case, the questions are properly certified under W. Va. Code 58-5-2 (1967). We therefore have jurisdiction to consider the questions certified by the circuit court.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        The plaintiffs in this case are active and retired deputy sheriffs of Mercer County. In their amended complaint against the County Commission of Mercer County (hereinafter "County Commission"),See footnote 3 which was filed on August 22, 1995, the deputy sheriffs allege that they are entitled to back pay because the County Commission has incorrectly interpreted and administered an annual incremental salary increase statute, W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985); therefore, the County Commission has improperly withheld wages from the deputy sheriffs in violation of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, W. Va. Code 21-5-1 to -18 (1996).
        On September 8, 1995, the deputy sheriffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment requesting the circuit court to rule as a matter of law that the County Commission has misapplied W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985) since its enactment ten years ago, and therefore, has underpaid the deputy sheriffs for the past ten years.
        Conversely, the County Commission filed its own motion for summary judgment on October 19, 1995, requesting the court to rule as a matter of law that the County Commission had in fact properly applied the incremental increase statute so that no additional compensation is due.
        The circuit court, after conducting a hearing on the parties' motions on December 20, 1995, and after reviewing all relevant papers, denied both parties' motions in its Order of January 5, 1996 and certified the questions set forth above in an order entered January 12, 1996.
II. DISCUSSION
        We review questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court under a de novo standard. Syllabus Point 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., ___ W. Va. ___, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
A.        The first question we are asked by the circuit court to address is whether the language in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985) is ambiguous. W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985) provides:
         Beginning on and after the effective date of this section [July 1, 1985], every deputy sheriff with one year or more of service shall receive an annual salary increase in the sum of five dollars per month for each year of service up to a maximum of sixteen years of service. Any incremental salary increase in effect prior to the effective date of this section that is more favorable to the deputy sheriffs entitled to such increase shall remain in full force and effect to the exclusion of the provisions of this section.
        "A statute is open to construction only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." Hereford v. Meek, 132 W. Va. 373, 386, 52 S.E.2d 740, 747 (1949). We find that W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985) is susceptible to differing constructions in that the term "receive an annual salary increase" can mean either that the increase becomes a part of the annual salary (as contended by the deputy sheriffs), or that the increase is an addition to the annual salary, as a salary supplement calculated upon years of service (as contended by the County Commission). Because the statute can be read by reasonable persons to have different meanings, we find the language of the statute to be ambiguous and accordingly answer the first certified question in the affirmative.
        "A statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied." Syllabus Point 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 186 W. Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992). We now address the remaining certified questions, applying traditional rules of statutory construction.
B.        The second question we are asked to consider is whether "the annual salary increase/increment, provided to the deputy sheriffs in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c, become[s] a part of the deputy's base pay."
        We have determined that W. Va. Code 7-14-17c is ambiguous in that it is susceptible to differing interpretations. "Judicial interpretation of a statute is warranted only if the statute is ambiguous and the initial step in such interpretative inquiry is to ascertain the legislative intent." Syllabus Point 1, Ohio County Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W. Va. 552, 301 S.E.2d 183 (1983). Our task then is to determine whether the Legislature intended this incremental increase to be made a part of the deputy sheriffs' base pay, or whether the Legislature merely intended this increase to be a supplement to the deputy sheriffs' salaries.
        In determining the intent of the Legislature at the time it enacts a law, we are mindful of the following:
         A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith. Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W. Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908). See also Syllabus Point 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975) ("[s]tatutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments.").
        The West Virginia Constitution expressly empowers the county commissions within the State of West Virginia to administer the fiscal affairs of each county. The West Virginia Constitution provides, in relevant part, that the county commissions "shall . . . under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have the superintendence and administration of the . . . fiscal affairs of their counties." W. Va. Const. art IX,

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