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State of WV v. Boxley

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
September 1997 Term
No. 23854
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee

v.
MICHAEL DeWAYNE BOXLEY,
Defendant Below, Appellant

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
Honorable A. Andrew MacQueen, Judge
Civil Action No. 94-F-275

AFFIRMED

Submitted: October 7, 1997
Filed: November 21, 1997

Jeff C. Woods
Melissa M. Robinson
Jackson & Kelly
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellant

William C. Forbes
Prosecuting Attorney In and For Kanawha County
Mary Beth Kershner
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellee

This Opinion was delivered PER CURIAM.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. "This Court is constitutionally obligated to give plenary, independent, and de novo review to the ultimate question of whether a particular confession is voluntary and whether the lower court applied the correct legal standard in making its determination. The holdings of prior West Virginia cases suggesting deference in this area continue, but
that deference is limited to factual findings as opposed to legal conclusions." Syl. pt. 2, State v. Farley, 192 W. Va. 247, 452 S.E.2d 50 (1994).
2. "Ordinarily the delay in taking an accused who is under arrest to a magistrate after a confession has been obtained from him does not vitiate the confession under our prompt presentment rule." Syl. pt. 4, State v. Humphrey,
177 W. Va. 264, 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986).
3. "The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Syl. pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).
4. "A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An appellate court must review all the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution. The evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations are for a jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set aside only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from
which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent that our prior cases are inconsistent, they are expressly overruled." Syl. pt. 3, State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).
Per Curiam:See footnote 1 1
        This case is before this Court upon an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County entered on November 20, 1995. The appellant, Michael D. Boxley, was convicted by a jury of the offense of murder in the first degree without a recommendation of mercy. On appeal, appellant contends that his statement to the police should have
been suppressed. He also claims that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence. He cites as further error the trial court's voluntary manslaughter instruction. Finally, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
        This Court has before it the petition for appeal, all matters of record, and the briefs and argument of counsel. For the reasons discussed below, appellant's conviction is affirmed. I         Appellant was arrested on May 19, 1994, and charged with the stabbing death of Deanna Tolber. The evidence at trial showed that in the early morning hours of May 19, 1994, appellant went to the apartment of Trista Anderson in Charleston. Jason
Brown was there and Deanna Tolber arrived later. All three decided to stay the rest of the night with Ms. Anderson.        While the men were sleeping, Ms. Tolber rummaged through their clothing looking for money. At approximately
8:00 a.m., Mr. Brown awoke and found his money missing. He argued with Ms. Tolber and Ms. Anderson and then woke up appellant. Mr. Brown told appellant that his money was gone and that he should "check his pockets." Appellant discovered that he was missing $200 and asked the women to return his money. When they did not respond, appellant picked up a steak knife and waved it at Ms. Tolber, again demanding his money. The argument between appellant and Ms. Tolber escalated, and according to Ms. Anderson, appellant stabbed Ms. Tolber in the chest.
        The police were called to Ms. Anderson's apartment around 8:20 a.m. by a neighbor, Sherry Napier. Ms. Napier told the police that she heard a commotion in the hallway that morning while she was getting her children ready for school. She looked out and saw two men. After returning from taking her children to school, Ms. Napier knocked on
Ms. Anderson's door. As Ms. Anderson opened the door, Ms. Napier saw Ms. Tolber lying on the floor. Although Ms.
Tolber was still alive when the police arrived, she died shortly thereafter of the stab wound to her chest. Initially, Ms.
Anderson stated that she

did not know who stabbed Ms. Tolber.See footnote 2 2 However, she later told the police that appellant was the culprit.
        That afternoon, the police went to appellant's home to arrest him. Appellant was read his Miranda rightsSee footnote 3 3 at 2:45 p.m. Upon arrival at the police station, appellant was questioned by Detective James A. Rollins. Around 3:55 p.m., appellant gave a signed statement in which he stated that he remembered being at Ms. Anderson's
apartment, that his money was missing, and that he started "swinging the knife." Appellant said that after that his mind
"went blank," and he did not remember anything else besides getting in a taxi to go home.See footnote 4 4
        After he gave the statement, appellant agreed to provide a second statement regarding another crime which he had witnessed previously. Thereafter, appellant was fingerprinted and photographed. The police walked appellant across the street to the magistrate around 6:00 p.m. During the walk, appellant was confronted by the media. His answers to some of the reporters' questions were recorded on videotape.See footnote 5 5             Prior to trial, the appellant sought to have his statements to the police and the media suppressed. The trial court denied appellant's motions, and the statements were
admitted into evidence over defendant's objections. Following a three-day trial, appellant was convicted of first degree
murder without a recommendation of mercy as reflected in the final order.
II

        As his first assignment of error, appellant contends that the statements he gave to the police should have been
suppressed. Appellant claims that after he was read his Miranda rights, he told Detective James A. Rollins and Detective Lloyd W. Brown that he did not want to talk to them. He asserts that his right to remain silent was violated when Detective Rollins continued to question him and obtained his statement at the police station.See footnote 6 6
        Traditionally, we have given deference to the trial court's decision regarding voluntariness of a confession. See syl. pt. 3, State v. Vance, 162 W. Va. 467, 250 S.E.2d 146 (1978). However, recently, we clarified our standard of review. In syllabus point 2 of State v. Farley, 192 W. Va. 247, 452 S.E.2d 50 (1994), we held:
            This Court is constitutionally obligated to give plenary, independent, and de novo review to the ultimate question of whether a particular confession is voluntary and whether the lower court applied the correct legal standard in making its determination. The holdings of prior West Virginia cases suggesting deference in this area continue, but
that deference is limited to factual findings as opposed to legal conclusions.
        When determining whether a waiver was made, there are three considerations: were the rights given in proper form and substance; did the appellant understand them; and did he waive them? State v. Rissler, 165 W. Va. 640, 646, 270 S.E.2d 778, 782 (1980). In this case, it is undisputed that appellant was properly informed of his Miranda rights.See footnote 7 7 Thus, the issue presented is whether appellant understood his rights and then waived them.             This Court has long since held, in accordance with United States Supreme Court decisions, that: "Once a person
under interrogation has exercised the right to remain silent guaranteed by W.Va. Const. art. III

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