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2000  WI  98
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
Case No.:                                                              98-2955
Complete Title
of Case:
Ame  Aicher,  minor,  by  her  Guardian  ad  Litem,
Gerald  LaBarge,  Esq.  and  Kathy  Goelz,  mother  of
Ame  Aicher,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
Wisconsin  Patients  Compensation  Fund  and
Wisconsin  Health  Care  Liability  Insurance  Plan,
Defendants-Appellants,
Primecare  Health  Plan,  Inc.  and  Waukesha  County
Department  of  Health  and  Social  Services,
Defendants.
ON  CERTIFICATION  FROM  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS
Opinion Filed:                                                         July  12,  2000
Submitted on Briefs:
Oral Argument:                                                         May  25,  2000
Source of APPEAL
COURT:                                                                 Circuit  Court
COUNTY:                                                                Waukesha
JUDGE:                                                                 James R.  Kieffer
JUSTICES:
Concurred:
Dissented:                                                             CROOKS,  J., dissents  (opinion  filed).
BABLITCH, J.,  joins dissent.
Not Participating:
ATTORNEYS:                                                             For defendants-appellants  there were briefs by
Michael  P. Russart and Hinshaw  & Culbertson, Milwaukee, and  oral
argument  by Michael P. Russart.
For plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief  (in
the court of  appeals) by  Timothy J. Aiken,  James C.  Gallanis and




Aiken &  Scoptur,  S.C., Milwaukee,  and oral  argument  by Timothy J.
Aiken.
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2000  WI  98
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing and
modification.  The final version will appear
in the bound volume of the official reports.
No.                                                                         98-2955
                                                                            STATE  OF  WISCONSIN                 :   IN  SUPREME  COURT
Ame  Aicher,  minor,  by  her  Guardian  ad
Litem,  Gerald  LaBarge,  Esq.  and  Kathy
Goelz,  mother  of  Ame  Aicher,
FILED
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
JUL 12, 2000
v.
Cornelia G. Clark
Wisconsin  Patients  Compensation  Fund  and
Clerk of Supreme Court
Wisconsin  Health  Care  Liability  Insurance                               Madison, WI
Plan,
Defendants-Appellants,
Primecare  Health  Plan,  Inc.  and  Waukesha
County  Department  of  Health  and  Social
Services,
Defendants.
APPEAL  from  an  order  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  Waukesha
County,  James  R.  Kieffer,  Circuit  Court  Judge.    Reversed.
¶1    DAVID  T.  PROSSER,  J.                                               This  case  is  before  the  court
on  certification  by  the  court  of  appeals  pursuant  to  Wis.  Stat.
§  (Rule)  809.61  (1993-94).1    Wisconsin  Patients  Compensation  Fund
1  All  references  to  the  Wisconsin  Statutes  are  to  the  1993-
94  volumes  unless  indicated  otherwise.




No.                                                                           98-2955
and  Wisconsin  Health  Care  Liability  Insurance  Plan                      (Insurers)
seek  review  of  a  decision  of  the  Waukesha  County  Circuit  Court,
James  R.  Kieffer,  Judge.    The  circuit  court  denied  the  Insurers'
motion   for   summary   judgment   in   a   medical   malpractice   action
filed  on  behalf  of  Ame  Aicher  by  her  Guardian  ad  Litem  (Aicher).
¶2    Aicher  alleged  that  she  became  blind  in  her  right  eye
as  a  result  of  medical  malpractice  committed  during  her  newborn
examination  on  December  10,  1982.    Aicher  maintains  that  she  did
                                                                              not  discover  the  condition  until  September                                                                                        10,                       1993,  after  she
                                                                                                                                            reached  her  tenth  birthday.     Aicher  initiated  this  action  in
1996,  when  she  was  13  years  old.
                                                                                                                                            ¶3    The  Insurers  filed  a  motion  to  dismiss  and  then  sought
                                                                              summary   judgment,   invoking   Wis.   Stat.                                                                                          §§  893.55(1)(b)2   and
2  Wisconsin  Stat.  §                                                        893.55(1)  provides:
                                                                              Medical  malpractice;  limitation  of  actions;  limitation
                                                                              of  damages;  itemization  of  damages.                       (1)                                                                      Except  as
provided  by  subs.                                                           (2)  and                                                      (3),  an  action  to  recover
damages   for   injury   arising   from   any   treatment   or
operation  performed  by,  or  from  any  omission  by,  a
person  who  is  a  health  care  provider,  regardless  of
the  theory  on  which  the  action  is  based,  shall  be
commenced  within  the  later  of:
(a)  Three  years  from  the  date  of  the  injury,  or
(b)  One  year  from  the  date  the  injury  was  discovered
or,  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence  should
have  been  discovered,  except  that  an  action  may  not  be
commenced  under  this  paragraph  more  than                                 5  years  from
the  date  of  the  act  or  omission.
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              No.       98-2955
893.56.3                                                                       Section                                                      893.55 (1)                                                 (b)   establishes   a   statute   of
limitations  for  medical  malpractice  actions  of  one  year  from  the
date  of  discovery  of  the  injury.    The  provision  also  operates  as
a  statute  of  repose,  tolling  at  five  years  from  the  date  of  the
act  or  omission.     Section                                                 893.56,  another  statute  of  repose,
extends   the   time   for   minors   to   initiate   medical   malpractice
claims  to  the  tenth  birthday.
¶4    The  circuit  court  denied  the  summary  judgment  motion,
holding  that  the  statutes  of  repose  were  unconstitutional  as
applied  to  the  factual  circumstances  of  Aicher's  case.      The
court  relied  on  Estate  of  Makos  v.  Wisconsin  Health  Care  Fund,
211  Wis.  2d  41,  564  N.W.2d  662  (1997),  in  which  the  court's  lead
Section                                                                        893.55(1)                                                    (a)   is   not   at   issue   in   this   case.
Wisconsin   Stat.                                                                                                                           §  893.55(1)   provides   that   a   person   may   file
                                                                               within  the  later  time  period  of  either  subsection                                                                                                       (a)  or   (b).
The   Insurers   did   not   allege   that                                                                                                                                                             §  893.55(1)(a)   precluded
Aicher's  claim.     As  explained  below,  Aicher's  injury  accrued
when  she  was  six  months  old,  and                                         §  893.55(1)(a),  read  alone,
would  have  tolled  when  she  was  three  years  and  six  months  old.
Sections  893.55(2)  and  (3)  are  not  at  issue  in  this  case.
3                                                                              Wisconsin  Stat.  §  893.56  states:
Health  care  providers;  minors  actions.      Any  person
under  the  age  of                                                            18,  who  is  not  under  disability  by
reason    of    insanity,    developmental    disability    or
imprisonment,  shall  bring  an  action  to  recover  damages
for  injuries  to  the  person  arising  from  any  treatment
or  operation  performed  by,  or  for  any  omission  by  a
health  care  provider  within  the  time  limitation  under
s.                                                                             893.55  or  by  the  time  that  person  reaches  the  age
of  10  years,  whichever  is  later.    That  action  shall  be
brought  by  the  parent,  guardian  or  other  person  having
custody  of  the  minor  within  the  time  limit  set  forth
in  this  section.
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No.                                                                            98-2955
opinion  found  Wis.  Stat.                                                    §  893.55(1)(b)  unconstitutional.     The
circuit   court   held   that                                                  §§  893.55(1)(b)   and                           893.56   violate
procedural   due   process   and   the   right   to   remedy   because   the
statutes  foreclose  some  claims  before  a  plaintiff  even  has  the
opportunity  to  know  that  an  injury  occurred.    The  court  observed
that  the  statutes  gave  Aicher  zero  days  to  file  her  action  and
thereby  denied  her  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  in  court.
¶5    The  Insurers  appealed.    The  court  of  appeals  certified
two  issues  to  this  court:                                                  (1)  Does  the  Makos  plurality  opinion
represent  a  consensus  of  the  majority  of  the  justices  that  is
binding   on   the   courts   of   this   state?                               (2)   If   Wis.   Stat.
§  893.55(1)(b)  is  considered  unconstitutional  under  Makos,  can
the  time  limitation  for  the  discovery  of  a  medical  malpractice
injury  be  severed  from  the  repose  portion  of  the  statute?
¶6    We  do  not  answer  the  first  question  certified  by  the
court  of  appeals  because  our  decision  today  expressly  overrules
Makos.     We  hold  that  Wis.  Stat.                                         §§  893.55(1)(b)  and                            893.56  are
constitutional  for  three  reasons.     First,  the  statutes  do  not
violate    the    right-to-remedy    provision    of    the    Wisconsin
Constitution.    Second,                                                       §§  893.55(1)(b)  and  893.56  do  not  offend
equal  protection  because  the  classification  of  minor  medical
malpractice  claimants  is  related  rationally  to  the  legitimate
legislative  objectives  of  reducing  health  care  costs.     Third,
the  statutes  do  not  violate  Aicher's  right  to  procedural  due
process  because  an  unaccrued  cause  of  action  is  not  a  property
interest.      Because   we   sustain   the   constitutionality   of   Wis.
Stat.                                                                          §§  893.55(1)(b)  and                            893.56,  we  do  not  reach  the  second
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No.                                                                            98-2955
certified  question.     Accordingly,  we  hold  that                          §§  893.55(1)(b)
and  893.56  preclude  Aicher's  cause  of  action,  and  we  reverse  the
decision  of  the  circuit  court.
FACTS
¶7    Most  of  the  relevant  facts  are  not  in  dispute.     On
September                                                                      10,                1993,  when  Aicher  was  three  months  shy  of  her
eleventh  birthday,  she  underwent  a  routine  eye  examination  in
anticipation  of  her  transfer  to  a  new  school.     The  examination
revealed  that  she  had  an  untreatable  cataract  in  her  right  eye
that  caused  permanent  blindness.    The  cataract  appeared  because
a  muscle  in  her  right  eye  failed  to  develop  properly  as  a  result
of  a  condition  known  as  "poor  red  reflex."     A  physician  told
Aicher's  mother  that  if  the  condition  had  been  treated  within
six  months  after  Aicher's  birth,  the  problem  would  have  been
correctable.      The  parties  do  not  dispute  that  the  condition
resulted  in  an  injury  during  the  first  six  months  of  Aicher's
life.    Aicher  is  now  blind  in  her  right  eye.
¶8    Aicher   was   born   on   December                                      10,                1982.                                                   Dr.   Beryl
Harris,   who   performed   Aicher's   newborn   examination,   made   a
notation  in  her  medical  record  that  she  had  "poor  red  reflex  on
the  right  eye."     Aicher  contends  that  Dr.  Harris  conducted  no
follow-up  treatment  for  the  eye  condition,  and  he  never  spoke
with   Aicher's   mother   about   further   testing   or   treatment.
Aicher's  mother  testified  at  her  deposition  that  Aicher  had  a
red  spot  in  her  eye  since  birth.      Aicher  displayed  several
instances  of  unexplained  clumsiness  in  her  childhood.    She  fell
a   few   times   and   split   her   chin   open   twice.                     After   these
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No.                                                                           98-2955
incidents,  neither  the  treating  doctors  nor  hospitals  suggested
to  Aicher's  mother  that  anything  was  wrong  with  Aicher's  vision.
There   is   no   evidence   that   Aicher's   mother   sought   medical
attention  to  uncover  the  cause  of  these  episodes.    In  addition,
Aicher   testified   that   she   cheated   during   some   of   her   eye
examinations  in  school  by  looking  at  the  eye  chart  with  her  good
eye  when  her  right  eye  was  being  tested.     Dr.  Harris  died  on
April  26,  1986,  ten  years  before  Aicher  sought  recovery  in  this
action.
PROCEDURAL  HISTORY
¶9    Aicher   initiated   this   claim   on   April                          30,                                                             1996,
alleging  that  Dr.  Harris  committed  malpractice  when  he  performed
her  newborn  examination.    The  Insurers  initially  filed  a  motion
                                                                              to  dismiss,  arguing  that  Wis.  Stat.                                                §§  893.55  and   893.56  bar
Aicher's  action.
                                                                              ¶10   Wisconsin  Stat.                                          §§  893.55(1)(b)  and                     893.56  set  forth
                                                                              the   statutes   of   repose   at   issue   in   this   case.                                             Section
893.55(1)                                                                     (b)  provides  that  a  medical  malpractice  claim  must  be
filed  within  one  year  of  the  date  of  discovery  of  the  injury
(the  one-year-after-discovery  statute  of  limitations),  provided
that  five  years  have  not  passed  since  the  act  or  omission           (the
five-year  statute  of  repose).4    Section  893.56  extends  the  filing
4  Two  types  of  medical  malpractice  claims  are  exempted  from
these  limitations.    Wisconsin  Stat.  §  893.55(2)  provides:
If  a  health  care  provider  conceals  from  a  patient  a
prior   act   or   omission   of   the   provider   which   has
resulted  in  injury  to  the  patient,  an  action  shall  be
commenced  within  one  year  from  the  date  the  patient
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No.                                                                         98-2955
time  for  minors  pursuing  medical  malpractice  claims,  allowing
recovery  if  the  minor  initiates  the  lawsuit  before  reaching  the
age  of  10  (the  10-year  statute  of  repose  for  minors).
¶11   The  interplay  between  both  statutes  of  repose  operated
to  preclude  this  suit.     Under  the  broader  provisions  of  Wis.
Stat.                                                                       §  893.56,  Aicher  would  have  had  to  file  the  malpractice
claim  by  her  tenth  birthday,  roughly  nine  months  before  she
claims  to  have  discovered  her  condition.    When  governed  only  by
Wis.  Stat.                                                                 §  893.55(1)(b),  Aicher's  action  tolled  when  she  was
five  years  old,  or  just  under  six  years  before  the  discovery.
This  time  line  illustrates  the  critical  dates  in  this  action:
December  10,  1982:                                                        Aicher  born.
December  10,  1982:   Dr.   Harris   performed   the   newborn
examination.
June  10,  1982:  End   of   six-month   period   during   which
Aicher's  injury  accrued.
June  9,  1985:   Tolling                                                   date                                                               for   Wis.   Stat.
§  893.55(1)(a),   under   which
plaintiffs  file  no  later  than
discovers   the   concealment   or,   in   the   exercise   of
reasonable   diligence,   should   have   discovered   the
concealment  or  within  the  time  limitation  provided  by
sub.  (1),  whichever  is  later.
Wisconsin  Stat.  §  893.55(3)  states:
When   a   foreign   object   which   has   no   therapeutic   or
diagnostic   purpose   or   effect   has   been   left   in   a
patient's  body,  an  action  shall  be  commenced  within
one   year   after   the   patient   is   aware   or,   in   the
exercise  of  reasonable  care,  should  have  been  aware  of
the   presence   of   the   object   or   within   the   time
limitation  provided  by  sub.  (1),  whichever  is  later.
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No.                                                                         98-2955
three  years  from  the  date  of
injury.
December  9,  1987:    Tolling    date    for    Wis.    Stat.
§  893.55(1)(b),  the  five-year
statute     of     repose,     that
                                                                            precludes     actions                                                     brought
                                                                            "more  than                          5  years  from  the
                                                                            date  of  the  act  or  omission."
December  10,  1992:   Aicher   turns                                                                            10   and   Wis.   Stat.
                                                                            §  893.56,                           the                                  ten-year
statute  of  repose  for  minors,
bars  her  claim.
September  10,  1993:  Aicher  discovers  the  injury.
September  9,  1994:   If    the    one-year-after-discovery
statute    of    limitation    set
forth                                                                       in                                   Wis.                                 Stat.
§  893.55(1)(b)  were  severable
from  the                                                                   §  893.55(1)(b)  five-
year  statute  of  repose,  this
is   tolling   date   for   filing
suit.
April  30,  1996:                                                           Aicher  files  this  action.
¶12   After  the  Insurers  filed  the  motion  to  dismiss,  this
court  decided  Makos,                                                      211  Wis.  2d                        41,  a  case  that  addressed  the
constitutionality  of  Wis.  Stat.                                          §  893.55(1)(b).     The  Insurers
sought   summary   judgment,   maintaining   that   "the   fractured
majority"  of  Makos  found  §  893.55(1)(b)  unconstitutional  only  as
to  the  particular  facts  of  that  case.
¶13   The   circuit   court,   relying   on   the   lead   opinion   in
Makos,  denied  the  summary  judgment  motion.    The  court  held  that
§§  893.55(1)(b)  and  893.56  were  unconstitutional  when  applied  to
the  unique  factual  circumstances  of  Aicher's  case.     The  court
reasoned  that  the  statutes  violated  procedural  due  process  by
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No.                                                                            98-2955
denying  Aicher  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  "because  the  doors  of
the  courtroom  were  closed  before  she  even  discovered  she  was
injured."     The  court  likened  Aicher  to  the  claimant  in  Makos,
concluding  that  it  was  fundamentally  unfair  to  allow  the  statute
to  toll  on  a  claim  before  the  plaintiff  knew  or  could  have  known
about  the  injury.    The  circuit  court  found  that  granting  summary
judgment  was  inappropriate  because  the  case  presented  a  question
of   fact   for   the   jury,   namely   whether   Aicher   should   have
discovered  her  injury  before  her  tenth  birthday.5
¶14   The    circuit    court    also    held    that    Wis.    Stat.
§§  893.55(1)(b)  and                                                          893.56  were  unconstitutional  because  they
violated  the  "right  to  remedy"  clause  of  art.  I,                       §  9  of  the
Wisconsin  Constitution,  a  provision  that  "guarantees  that  every
person  shall  be  afforded  a  remedy  for  wrongs  committed  against
his  or  her  person,  property  or  character."     Noting  that  the
right-to-remedy  provision  "entitles  Wisconsin  residents  to  their
day  in  court,"  the  court  concluded  that  the  statutes  deprived
Aicher  of  a  remedy  for  a  wrong  that  she  did  not  and  could  not
discover.
¶15   The   circuit   court   declined   to   address   Aicher's
argument  that  the  two  statutes  violated  her  equal  protection  and
substantive   due   process   rights,   because   it   had   found   the
5  As  we  explain  below  in                                                                                                                          ¶¶  29-30,  a  minor  has  an  absolute
                                                                               right  to  file  a  medical  malpractice  claim  before  the  age  of                                                10
years.                                                                         Wisconsin   Stat.                                                       §  893.56,   read   alone,   contains   no
discovery  provision.
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No.                                                                           98-2955
statutes   unconstitutional   on   the   grounds   of   procedural   due
process  and  the  right-to-remedy  clause.
¶16   The  court  of  appeals  certified  the  Insurers'  appeal  to
this  court,  highlighting  the  disputed  interpretations  generated
by   Makos.                                                                   The   court   suggested   that   "[t]his   appeal   is   the
appropriate   case   for   the   Wisconsin   Supreme   Court   to   fashion
guidelines"  about  the  precedential  value  of  plurality  opinions.
In  addition,  the  court  of  appeals  asked  this  court  to  address
whether   the   five-year   statute   of   repose   in   Wis.   Stat.
§  893.55(1)(b),  if  unconstitutional,  can  be  severed  from  the
one-year-after-discovery   statute   of   limitations   for   filing   a
medical  malpractice  claim.
STANDARD  OF  REVIEW
¶17   Although   this   case   comes   before   the   court   as   the
result  of  a  summary  judgment  decision,  the  issue  we  address
requires  us  to  determine  the  constitutionality  of  two  statutes.
¶18   The  constitutionality  of  a  statute  is  a  question  of
law  that  we  review  de  novo.     Riccitelli  v.  Broekhuizen,             227
Wis.  2d                                                                      100,                                                           119,   595   N.W.2d   392   (1999).   Statutes   are
presumptively  constitutional.     Id.     The  court  indulges  every
presumption  to  sustain  the  law  if  at  all  possible,  and  if  any
doubt   exists   about   a   statute's   constitutionality,   we   must
resolve  that  doubt  in  favor  of  constitutionality.    State  ex  rel.
Hammermill  Paper  Co.  v.  La  Plante,                                       58  Wis.  2d                                                   32,    46-47,         205
N.W.2d  784  (1973).
¶19   To   overcome   this   strong   presumption,   the   party
challenging  a  statute's  constitutionality  must  demonstrate  that
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No.                                                                             98-2955
the   statute   is   unconstitutional   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt.
State  v.  Hezzie  R.,  219  Wis.  2d  848,  863,  580  N.W.2d  660  (1998).
It   is   not   sufficient   for   the   challenging   party   merely   to
establish  doubt  about  a  statute's  constitutionality,  and  it  is
not    enough    to    establish    that    a    statute    probably    is
unconstitutional.    Hammermill  Paper  Co.,  58  Wis.  2d  at  46-47.
¶20   The  presumption  of  statutory  constitutionality  is  the
product  of  our  recognition  that  the  judiciary  is  not  positioned
to  make  the  economic,  social,  and  political  decisions  that  fall
within  the  province  of  the  legislature.      See  State  ex  rel.
Carnation  Milk  Prods.  Co.  v.  Emery,  178  Wis.  147,  160,  189  N.W.
564  (1922).    The  duty  of  the  court  is  only  to  determine  if  the
legislation  clearly  and  beyond  doubt  offends  a  provision  of  the
state  constitution  that  specifically  circumscribes  legislative
action.     Hammermill  Paper  Co.,                                             58  Wis.  2d  at   46-47;  Chicago  &
N.W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  La  Follette,  27  Wis.  2d  505,  521,  135  N.W.2d  269
(1965).
¶21   Under   this   standard   of   review,   we   recognize   that
statutes  of  limitation  are  policy  considerations  best  suited  to
the  legislative  branch  of  government.     See  Tomczak  v.  Bailey,
218   Wis.  2d                                                                  245,               253-54,              578   N.W.2d   166   (1998).   We   also
acknowledge  that  the  legislature  was  aware  of  the  policy  issues
underpinning  medical  malpractice  actions  when  it  enacted  these
statutes.    Miller  v.  Kretz,  191  Wis.  2d  573,  580,  531  N.W.2d  93
(Ct.  App.  1995)  (citation  omitted).
BACKGROUND
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No.                                                                          98-2955
¶22   In  1975  the  Wisconsin  Legislature  enacted  a  series  of
statutes    governing    the    procedures    for    bringing    medical
malpractice  actions.     Ch.                                                37,  Laws  of                                                        1975.                                                            These  statutes
targeted:
[A]   sudden   increase   in   the   number   of   malpractice
suits,   in   the   size   of   awards,   and   in   malpractice
insurance  premiums,  and  identified  several  impending
                                                                             dangers:                                                             increased    health    care    costs,    the
                                                                             prescription     of                                                  elaborate     "defensive"                                                          medical
                                                                                                                                                  procedures,   the   unavailability   of   certain   hazardous
                                                                                                                                                  services   and   the   possibility   that   physicians   would
                                                                             curtail  their  practices.
                                                                             State  ex  rel.  Strykowski  v.  Wilkie,                             81  Wis.  2d                                                     491,              508,      261
N.W.2d                                                                       434                                                                  (1978).     Two  years  later,  the  legislature  addressed
medical  malpractice  actions  brought  by  minors.    Ch.  390,  Laws  of
1977.                                                                        The   legislature   found   that   the   number   of   suits   and
damages  arising  from  medical  malpractice  actions  commenced  by
minor  claimants  had  "increased  tremendously."     Id.  at                §  1(a).
These  increases  led  to  higher  insurance  premiums  for  health  care
providers  and  resulted  in  higher  charges  to  consumers  for  health
care  services  and  facilities.     Id.  at                                 §  1(c).     The  legislature
concluded   that   the   interests   of   minor   children   could   be
protected  adequately  by  requiring  children  to  initiate  medical
malpractice  suits  in  the  same  time  limitation  as  adults,  "except
in  the  case  of  very  young  children."     Id.  at                       §  1(d).     To  that
end,  the  legislature  decided  that  the  interests  of  very  young
children  could  be  "fully  protected  by  extending  the  time  limits
in  which  actions  may  be  brought  to  age                                10."     Id.  at                                                     §  1(e).
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No.                                                                            98-2955
These  legislative  findings  supported  the  passage  of  what  is  now
Wis.  Stat.  §  893.56:6
Health  care  providers;  minors  actions.      Any  person
under  the  age  of                                                            18,  who  is  not  under  disability  by
reason    of    insanity,    developmental    disability    or
imprisonment,  shall  bring  an  action  to  recover  damages
for  injuries  to  the  person  arising  from  any  treatment
or  operation  performed  by,  or  for  any  omission  by  a
health  care  provider  within  the  time  limitation  under
s.                                                                             893.55  or  by  the  time  that  person  reaches  the  age
of  10  years,  whichever  is  later.    That  action  shall  be
brought  by  the  parent,  guardian  or  other  person  having
custody  of  the  minor  within  the  time  limit  set  forth
in  this  section.
¶23   In                                                                       1979  the  legislature  undertook  a  general  revision
of  the  statutes  of  limitations.    Ch.                                     323,  Laws  of                                               1979.     These
revisions  were  in  part  a  response  to  this  court's  admonitions  to
the  legislature  that  the  existing  time  limitation  periods  for
medical  malpractice  actions  were  too  short.    Claypool  v.  Levin,
209  Wis.  2d  284,  292-93,  562  N.W.2d  584  (1997).
¶24   Before   the   law   took   effect,   medical   malpractice
claimants  were  required  to  file  suit  within  three  years  of  the
injury.    Id.    At  that  time  the  legislature  did  not  recognize  a
"discovery  rule"  that  otherwise  establishes  the  time  limitation
period  for  commencing  an  action  based  on  the  date  on  which  a
claimant   discovered   the   injury.                                          After   encountering   several
cases  in  which  the  three-year  rule  precluded  relief  before  a
plaintiff    discovered    the    injury,    this    court    urged    the
6  Wisconsin  Stat.                                                            §  893.56  originally  was  enacted  as  Wis.
Stat.  §  893.235  as  a  result  of  1977  Assembly  Bill  705.    See  Ch.
390,  Laws  of  1977.    Effective  July  1,  1980,  it  was  renumbered  as
Wis.  Stat.  §  893.56.    See  Ch.  323,  Laws  of  1979.
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No.                                                                             98-2955
legislature   to   amend   the   medical   malpractice   statute   of
limitations:
We   conclude   that   this   is   a   matter   peculiarly   for
legislative  determination.      Because  of  the  numerous
cases  in  which  the  present  three-year  requirement  for
commencing  an  action  by  a  party  who  is  the  victim  of
medical    malpractice    is    too    short,    we    strongly
recommend  to  the  legislature  that  the  basic  three-year
statute    for    negligence    actions    due    to    medical
malpractice  be  amended.
Id.  at  292  n.2  (quoting  Peterson  v.  Roloff,  57  Wis.  2d  1,  6,  203
N.W.2d                                                                          699             (1973),   rev'd   on   other   grounds,   Hansen   v.   A.H.
Robbins,  Inc.,  113  Wis.  2d  550,  335  N.W.2d  578  (1983)).
¶25   The    legislature    followed    our    recommendation    and
created  Wis.  Stat.  §  893.55,7  which  states,  in  part:
7  As  we  noted  in  Claypool  v.  Levin,                                      209  Wis.  2d   284,                                                             293
n.3,  562  N.W.2d  584  (1997):
The   drafting   record   for   this   law   reveals   that   the
medical  malpractice  section  was  designed  to  address
the  outcome  of  "Olson  v.  St.  Croix."     See  Olson,                      55
Wis.  2d  628,  201  N.W.2d  63  (1972).
In  Olson,  the  plaintiff  alleged  that  she  was  given  the
wrong  type  of  blood  in  a  blood  transfusion  that  she
received  in                                                                    1962.           Olson,                                                           55   Wis.  2d  at               630.   On
                                                                                                December  1,  1966,  the  plaintiff  gave  birth  to  a  child
                                                                                                that  died  seven  hours  later.     Id.     On  December                                               9,
                                                                                                1969,   she   delivered   a   stillborn   child.                                                 Id.    The
plaintiff  alleged  that  the  deaths  of  the  children  were
the  result  of  negligence  by  the  hospital  and  that  she
did  not  discover  that  the  wrong  type  of  blood  had  been
given   to   her   until   the   still   birth   of   the   second
child.                                                                          Id.   at        630-31.                                                          The   relevant   statute   of
limitations  provided  that  the  action  must  be  brought
within  three  years  of  the  injury.     Id.  at                              631.     This
court  first  concluded  that  the  alleged  injury  occurred
at  the  time  of  the  blood  transfusion.    Id.  at  632-33.
The  court  then  declined  to  adopt  the  discovery  and
14




No.                                                                           98-2955
                                                                                                                                Medical  malpractice;  limitation  of  actions;  limitation
                                                                              of  damages;  itemization  of  damages.                                                                                                         (1)   Except  as
provided  by  subs.                                                                                                             (2)  and                                                      (3),  an  action  to  recover
damages   for   injury   arising   from   any   treatment   or
operation  performed  by,  or  from  any  omission  by,  a
person  who  is  a  health  care  provider,  regardless  of
the  theory  on  which  the  action  is  based,  shall  be
commenced  within  the  later  of:
(a)  Three  years  from  the  date  of  the  injury,  or
(b)  One  year  from  the  date  the  injury  was  discovered
or,  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence  should
have  been  discovered,  except  that  an  action  may  not  be
commenced  under  this  paragraph  more  than                                 5  years  from
the  date  of  the  act  or  omission.
¶26   Wisconsin  Stat.  §§  893.55(1)  and  893.56  both  set  forth
statutes   of   repose.                                                       Statutes   of   repose   are   different   from
statutes   of   limitations.                                                  A   statute   of   limitations   usually
establishes   the   time   frame   within   which   a   claim   must   be
initiated  after  a  cause  of  action  actually  accrues.     A  statute
of  repose,  by  contrast,  limits  the  time  period  within  which  an
action  may  be  brought  based  on  the  date  of  the  act  or  omission.
Statutes  of  repose  thus  bear  no  relation  to  the  accrual  of  a
thus   held   that   suit   was   barred   by   the   statute   of
limitations.    Id.  at  633-34.
In   so   holding   this   court   stated:                                    "While,   as   we
pointed  out  in  McCluskey,  there  may  be  merit  to  the
discovery   rule,   the   state   of   the   facts   presented
herein  is  not  conducive  to  modification  of  the  present
holdings  of  this  court."    Id.  at  633.
The  McCluskey  case  referred  to  in  Olson  is  McCluskey  v.  Thranow,
31  Wis.                                                                      2d                                                245,                                                          142  N.W.2d                     787   (1966),  another  situation  in
which  the  court  ruled  that  an  action  for  malpractice  must  be
started  within  three  years  of  the  negligent  act.
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No.                                                                            98-2955
cause  of  action  and  can  toll  before  an  injury  is  discovered  or
even  before  an  injury  has  occurred.8
¶27   Statutes    of    limitation    and    statutes    of    repose
represent  legislative  policy  decisions  that  dictate  when  the
courthouse  doors  close  for  particular  litigants.     See  Tomczak,
218  Wis.  2d  at  253-54.    Statutes  of  limitation,  which  "are  found
and   approved   in   all   systems   of   enlightened   jurisprudence,"
articulate   the   principle   that   it   is   more   just   to   put   the
adversary  on  notice  to  defend  a  claim  within  a  specified  period
of  time  than  to  permit  unlimited  prosecution  of  stale  claims.
United  States  v.  Kubrick,  444  U.S.  111,  117  (1979).    Statutes  of
limitation   promote   fair   and   prompt   litigation   and   protect
defendants   from   stale   or   fraudulent   claims   "brought   after
memories  have  faded  or  evidence  has  been  lost."      Korkow  v.
General  Cas.  Co.  of  Wisconsin,  117  Wis.  2d  187,  198,  344  N.W.2d
108                                                                            (1984)                         (citation   omitted).                                                                                                                                 As   our   courts   recognize,
                                                                                                              "Defendants  have  a  constitutional  right  to  rely  upon  statutes  of
                                                                                                              limitations  to  limit  the  claim  against  them."    Westphal  v.  E.I.
                                                                               DuPont  de  Nemours  &  Co.,   192  Wis.  2d                                                                 347,                                                                    373,                             531  N.W.2d   386
                                                                                                              (Ct.  App.  1995)  (citing  Haas  v.  Sawicki,  20  Wis.  2d  308,  311-12,
                                                                                                              121  N.W.2d  876  (1963)).    Statutes  of  repose  operate  similarly  to
8                                                                                                                                                                                           See  Scott  A.  DeVries,  Note,  Medical  Malpractice  Acts'
                                                                                                              Statutes   of   Limitation   as   They   Apply   to   Minors:                                                                                         Are   They
Proper?,                                                                       28  Ind.  L.  Rev.             413,                                                                          414-15                                                                  (1995);  Christopher  J.
                                                                                                                                                                                            Trombetta,  Note,  The  Unconstitutionality  of  Medical  Malpractice
                                                                               Statutes   of   Repose:                                                                                      Judicial   Conscience   Versus   Legislative
Will,                                                                          34  Vill.  L.  Rev.            397,                                                                          400-01                                                                  (1989);  Susan  C.  Randall,
                                                                                                              Comment,  Due  Process  Challenges  to  Statutes  of  Repose,                                                                                         40  Sw.
                                                                               L.J.  997,  1002-03  (1986).
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No.                                                                            98-2955
protect  both  plaintiffs  and  defendants  from  litigating  claims  in
which  the  truth  may  be  obfuscated  by  death  or  disappearance  of
key  witnesses,  loss  of  evidence,  and  faded  memories.     Kubrick,
444  U.S.  at  117;  Tomczak,  218  Wis.  2d    at  272.
¶28   In  the  medical  malpractice  arena,  the  interplay  among
the  statutes  of  limitations  and  statutes  of  repose  established
by  Wis.  Stat.  §§  893.55(1)  and  893.56,  and  the  special  discovery
provisions  of                                                                 §  893.55(2)  and  (3),  can  be  perplexing,  resulting
in  different  tolling  times  depending  upon  the  date  of  injury,
the  nature  of  the  injury,  and  the  age  of  the  child.     Examined
alone,                                                                         §  893.55(1)    presents    two    alternative    points    for
determining  when  a  medical  malpractice  action  must  be  initiated.
The  prospective  plaintiff  must  choose  the  later  of  these  two
alternative  points  as  the  marker  for  when  to  file  suit.    Section
893.55(1)                                                                      (a)  provides  that  a  medical  malpractice  claim  must  be
filed   within   three   years   of   the   date   of   injury.                Section
893.55(1)                                                                      (b)  extends  the  deadline  for  filing  to  within  one  year
following  the  discovery  of  injury.     This  subsection,  however,
requires   plaintiffs   who   seek   to   file   within   one   year   of
discovery  to  initiate  their  claims  no  later  than  five  years
after  the  date  of  the  act  or  omission.     Under  this  statute,
someone   injured   at   birth   would   be   required   to   commence   the
action  either:                                                                (1)  by  the  age  of  three,  or  (2)  within  one  year
after  the  date  of  discovery  of  the  injury,  but  before  the  age  of
five.
¶29   Wisconsin   Stat.                                                        §  893.56   overlaps   with   Wis.   Stat.
§  893.55(1)  to  give  minors  additional  time  in  which  to  initiate
17




                                                                                                                No.                       98-2955
medical   malpractice   actions.                                                Like   Wis.   Stat.             §  893.55(1),
§  893.56  provides  the  claimant  with  the  benefit  of  the  latest
tolling   date   available   under   the   statutory   scheme.                  Section
893.56   allows   minors   to   commence   medical   malpractice   claims
within  the  period  before  the  child  reaches  the  age  of  10  years.
When   read   together   with                                                   §  893.55(1),                   §  893.56   creates   a
situation  in  which  a  child  injured  at  birth  must  file  at  the
latest  of  the  following  dates:                                              (1)  by  the  age  of  three;   (2)
within  one  year  after  the  date  of  discovery  of  the  injury,  but
before  the  age  of  five;  or  (3)  before  the  child  reaches  the  age
of  10  years.    Thus,  a  minor  pursuing  a  medical  malpractice  cause
of  action  always  has  until  the  age  of  10  to  file  suit,  no  matter
when  the  act  or  omission  occurred.    After  the  child  reaches  age
10,  the  action  must  be  initiated  either  within  three  years  of
the  date  of  injury  or  within  one  year  of  discovery,  provided
that  not  more  than  five  years  have  passed  since  the  act  or
omission.
¶30   The  medical  malpractice  statutes  do  not  automatically
extinguish  a  minor's  claim  when  the  minor  reaches  the  age  of  10.
Whether  a  cause  of  action  survives  that  age  depends  upon  the
date  of  the  act,  omission,  or  injury.    A  child  injured  at  age  9,
for  instance,  must  file  within  the  later  of  three  years                (age
12),  one  year  from  the  date  of  discovery  but  not  more  than  five
years  after  the  date  of  the  act  or  omission  (age  14),  or  before
the  child's  tenth  birthday.
¶31   All   these   limitations   are   overridden   when   the   two
special  situations  outlined  in  Wis.  Stat.                                  §  893.55(2)  and               (3)
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No.                                                                           98-2955
come  into  play.    These  subsections  constitute  nearly  open-ended
discovery  rules  for  situations  in  which  a  health  care  provider
conceals  a  prior  act  or  omission  that  has  resulted  in  injury  to
the  patient  and  when  a  non-therapeutic  foreign  object  has  been
left  in  a  patient's  body.9
¶32   Because,   by   their   nature,   statutes   of   repose   can
sometimes  arbitrarily  extinguish  a  prospective  plaintiff's  cause
of  action,  they  often  are  the  subject  of  constitutional  debate.10
Although  this  court  has  never  addressed  the  constitutionality
of  Wis.  Stat.                                                               §  893.56,  we  last  examined  the  constitutionality
of  Wis.  Stat.  §  893.55(1)(b)  in  Makos.
¶33   In   Makos,   a   patient   filed   a   medical   malpractice
action,    alleging    that    a    physician    had    misdiagnosed    her
metastatic  malignant  melanoma.    The  physician  examined  a  growth
on  the  patient's  leg  and  declared  that  it  was  not  malignant.
Makos,  211  Wis.  2d  at  45.    Nine  years  later,  doctors  reexamined
the  growth  and  found  that  it  was  malignant.     Id.     The  patient
filed  a  claim  approximately                                                11  months  and  one  week  after  she
received  the  melanoma  diagnosis.
9  Our   brief   discussion   of   these   statutory   implications
illustrates  how  complicated  the  interrelation  between  Wis.  Stat.
§§  893.55  and                                                               893.56  is.     Practitioners  should  take  cautious
note  of  the  potential  impact  of  these  tolling  deadlines  for
their  clients.
10  See   generally,   Josephine   Herring   Hicks,   Note,   The
Constitutionality  of  Statutes  of  Repose:    Federalism  Reigns,           38
Vand.  L.  Rev.  627  (1985).
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No.                                                                           98-2955
¶34   The  combination  of  these  facts  meant  that  when  the
patient  initiated  her  action,  the  Wis.  Stat.  §  893.55(1)(b)  one-
year-after-discovery  statute  of  limitations  did  not  preclude  the
action,  but  the  five-year  statute  of  repose  acted  as  a  bar
because  she  sought  recovery  "more  than  5  years  from  the  date  of
the   act   or   omission,"   namely   nine   years   after   the   initial
misdiagnosis.
¶35   The   decision   in   Makos   resulted   in   four   opinions.
Justice  Donald  W.  Steinmetz,  author  of  the  lead  opinion,  held
that  Wis.  Stat.                                                             §  893.55(1)(b),  as  applied  to  the  particular
facts  at  hand,  violated  the  plaintiff's  constitutional  right  to
procedural  due  process  and  violated  the  right-to-remedy  clause
of  art.  I,                                                                  §  9  of  the  Wisconsin  Constitution.                     211  Wis.  2d  at
44.
¶36   Justice  William  A.  Bablitch,  joined  by  Justice  Jon  P.
Wilcox,  concurred  only  in  the  judgment  and  did  not  join  in  the
lead  opinion's  rationale.     Justice  Bablitch  found  that  it  was
not  necessary  to  reach  the  constitutional  issues  because  the
case   could   be   decided   by   means   of   statutory   interpretation:
Wis.  Stat.                                                                   §  893.55(1)(b)  did  not  cover  the  plaintiff's  claim
because  the  statute  addresses  only  "treatment,"  not  "diagnosis."
Id.  at  55-57.
¶37   Justice   N.   Patrick   Crooks   concurred   separately   and
agreed    with    the    lead    opinion    insofar    as    Wis.    Stat.
§  893.55(1)(b)  offended  the  right-to-remedy  clause  under  art.  I,
§  9   of   the   Wisconsin   Constitution.                                   Justice   Crooks   did   not
address  the  procedural  due  process  issue.    Id.  at  59-60.
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No.                                                                           98-2955
¶38   Justice  Ann  Walsh  Bradley,  joined  by  Chief  Justice
Shirley  S.  Abrahamson,  dissented.      Justice  Bradley  concluded
that  Wis.  Stat.                                                             §  893.55(1)(b)  properly  barred  the  plaintiff's
action  and  found  that  the  statute  was  not  unconstitutional  on
any  grounds  raised  by  the  defendants.    Id.  at  68.
¶39   Justice  Janine  P.  Geske  did  not  participate  in  Makos.
¶40   We   recognize   that   this   court   has   not   spoken   with
clarity  about  the  constitutionality  of  statutes  of  repose  and
the  right-to-remedy  provision  of  the  Wisconsin  Constitution.    We
also  acknowledge  that  there  has  been  considerable  discussion
about   the   precedential   effect   of   Makos.                             Upon   careful
consideration,  we  have  examined  Makos  sufficiently  to  determine
that  it  carries  no  precedential  weight,  and  we  have  decided  to
overrule   it.                                                                Our   decision   today   adopts   much   of   Justice
Bradley's  dissent  in  Makos.
RIGHT  TO  REMEDY
¶41   Aicher  contends  that  Wis.  Stat.                                     §§  893.55(1)(b)  and
                                                                              893.56  are  constitutionally  infirm  because  they  precluded  her
right   to   seek   remedy   for   a   wrong.                                 Article   I,                                                           §  9   of   the
Wisconsin  Constitution  provides:
Every  person  is  entitled  to  a  certain  remedy  in  the
laws  for  all  injuries,  or  wrongs  which  he  may  receive
in  his  person,  property,  or  character;  he  ought  to
obtain  justice  freely,  and  without  being  obligated  to
purchase  it,  completely  and  without  denial,  promptly
and  without  delay,  conformably  to  the  laws.
¶42   Article   I,                                                            §  9   is   something   of   a   constitutional
enigma.     Our  decisions  trace  its  origin  to  Paragraph                 40  of  the
Magna  Carta,  which  states:    "To  none  will  we  sell,  to  none  will
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No.                                                                              98-2955
we  deny,  or  delay,  right  or  justice."    Vol.  I  Wisconsin  Statutes
1898,  Sanborn  and  Berryman's  Annotations  at                                 9.     The  purpose  of
the  clause  was  explained  by  Justice  Marshall  in  Christianson  v.
Pioneer  Furniture  Co.,                                                         101  Wis.                 343,   347-48,   77  N.W.   174,   77
N.W.  917  (1898).11    "[E]very  subject  .  .  .  may  take  his  remedy  by
11  As  Justice  Marshall  explained:
That  provision  is  very  old.    Its  history  dates  back  to
the  days  of  Magna  Carta.    It  was  designed  to  prevent  a
species  of  official  exactions  made  as  the  price  of
delaying   or   expediting   justice.                                            From   the   lowest
officer   to   the   king   himself,   in   the   olden   times,
bribes  were  freely  demanded  and  taken  to  procure  the
benefits  of  the  laws.    They  bore  no  relation  whatever
to  our  system  of  exactions  for  expenses  of  litigation,
called  costs,  or  the  charge  as  a  tax  on  suits,  imposed
under  laws  which  bear  equally  upon  all;  but  they  were
arbitrary  exactions  sanctioned  by  the  manners  of  the
times,   that   went   to   the   personal   benefit   of   the
judicial  head  or  body  controlling  the  execution  of  the
law,  or  to  servants  or  officers  connected  therewith.
It  was  such  abuse,  among  others,  that  the  barons  of
England  forced  King  John  to  abolish  by  granting  the
Magna  Carta.    It  contained  the  following  as  one  of  the
guaranteed  limitations  upon  kingly  prerogatives:     "We
will  not  sell  the  right  and  justice  to  anyone,  nor
will  we  refuse  it,  or  put  it  off."     Says  Sir  Edward
Coke,  "The  king,  in  the  judgment  of  the  law,  is  ever
present   and   repeating   in   all   his   courts,   'Nulli
vendemus,  nulli  negabimus,  aut  differemus  rectum  vel
justitiam,'  and  therefore  every  subject,  for  injury
done  him  'in  bonis,  in  terris,  vel  persona,'  by  any
other   subject,   be   he   ecclesiastical   or   temporal,
without  any  exceptions,  may  take  his  remedy  by  the
course  of  the  law  and  have  justice  and  right  for  the
injury  done  to  him,  freely  without  sale,  fully  without
any  denial,  and  speedily  without  delay."    So  the  right
thus  obtained  as  a  concession  from  sovereign  power  has
come   down   to   us   through   the   centuries   that   have
passed,  and  been  preserved  in  all  its  integrity  in
substantially  all  state  constitutions.     They  do  not
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No.                                                                            98-2955
the  course  of  the  law  and  have  justice  and  right  for  the  injury
done  to  him,  freely  without  sale,  fully  without  any  denial,  and
speedily  without  delay."     Id.  at                                         348.                                               Marshall  asserted  that
state  constitutional  provisions  incorporating  this  principle  "do
not  grant  the  right"  of  remedy  but  rather  preserve  remedies  that
existed  at  common  law.12    Id.
¶43   It  is  possible  to  mine  the  pronouncements  of  Wisconsin
courts  for  evidence  that  art.  I,  §  9  creates  rights,  or  that  it
                                                                               authorizes    courts    to    fashion    rights.                                                                                In    its    recent
                                                                                                                                  interpretation  of  the  provision,  however,  this  court  has  stated
that  art.  I,                                                                                                                    §  9  confers  no  legal  rights.     Roberta  Jo  W.  v.
                                                                                                                                  Leroy  W.,  218  Wis.  2d  225,  238,  578  N.W.2d  185  (1998);  Tomczak,
218  Wis.  2d  at                                                              262;     Makos,                                    211  Wis.  2d  at                                                            79                    (Bradley,  J.,
                                                                               dissenting);  Mulder  v.  Acme-Cleveland  Corp.,                                                                                95   Wis.  2d         173,
189-90,  290  N.W.2d  276  (1980).    Rather,  art.  I,  §  9  applies  only
when   a   prospective   litigant   seeks   a   remedy   for   an   already
existing  right.    In  Makos,  Justice  Bradley  described  this  right
as   a   "legislatively   recognized   right:"                                 "The   Mulder   court
emphasized  that  its  prior  Wis.  Const.  art.  I,                           §  9  analysis  in
Kallas  stood  for  no  more  than  the  proposition  that  the  'remedy
for  wrongs'  section  might  have  'possible  application  .  .  .  where
grant  the  right,  but  guarantee  the  preservation  of  one
that  existed  under  the  constitution  of  England.
Christianson  v.  Pioneer  Furniture  Co.,  101  Wis.  343,  347-48,  77
N.W.  174,  77  N.W.  917  (1898).
12  Article   XIV,                                                             §  13   explicitly   recognizes   legislative
authority  to  alter  or  suspend  common  law.
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     No.        98-2955
                                                                                                                      a   remedy   is   sought   for   a   'legislatively   recognized   right.'"
Makos,                                                                         211   Wis.  2d   at                    79                                                                            (Bradley,   J.,   dissenting)                    (quoting
Mulder,                                                                        95  Wis.  2d  at                                                                                                     189-90  n.3).     The  right-to-remedy  clause
thus  preserves  the  right  "to  obtain  justice  on  the  basis  of  the
law  as  it  in  fact  exists."    Mulder,  95  Wis.  2d  at  189.
¶44   What  is  the  "law  as  it  in  fact  exists?"     One  of  the
common-law  rights  recognized  by  the  legislature  is  the  right  to
bring  a  medical  malpractice  claim.      Martin  v.  Richards,              192
Wis.  2d                                                                       156,                                   206-09,                                                                       531  N.W.2d                                      70         (1995).   Between   1975  and
1979,  the  legislature  modified  the  terms  under  which  persons  can
initiate  medical  malpractice  actions.    Among  these  changes  were
statutes  of  limitations  that  were  more  restrictive  than  those
laid  out  for  other  tort  actions,  as  well  as  the  statutes  of
repose   at   issue   here.                                                    These   legislative   determinations
circumscribed   the   remedy   for   medical   malpractice.                    These
legislative  actions  defined  how  the  law  in  fact  exists.
¶45   From  time  to  time,  this  court  has  suggested  that  art.
I,  §  9  is  inconsistent  with  legislation  barring  a  suit  before  an
injury   actually   occurs.                                                    Makos,                                 211   Wis.  2d   at                                                           52-54                                            (lead
opinion);  Kallas  Millwork  Corp.  v.  Square  D  Co.,  66  Wis.  2d  382,
393,  225  N.W.2d  454  (1975);  Rosenthal  v.  Kurtz,  62  Wis.  2d  1,  8,
213  N.W.2d  741  (1974).    On  occasion,  this  court  has  argued  that
such  legislation  is  unconstitutional.     But  we  find  no  decision
from  this  court,  not  even  Rosenthal,  squarely  invalidating  a
statute  on  this  ground.     Courts  may  shudder  at  the  unfairness
visited  by  statutes  of  repose,  but  we  generally  acknowledge  the
policies  underlying  these  limiting  statutes.     For  instance,  in
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No.                                                                            98-2955
Rosenthal,  a  case  in  which  this  court  struck  down  a  statute  of
repose   because   of   suspect   classification,   the   court   raised
serious  questions  about  art.  I,                                            §  9,  but  we  admitted:     "Some
statute  of  repose  is  obviously  desirable  as  a  matter  of  public
policy."                                                                       62  Wis.  2d  at  11.
¶46   The  question  of  what  the  statute  of  limitations  or  the
statute   of   repose   for   a   particular   action   should   be   is   a
fundamental   question   of   public   policy.                                 The   legislature   has
recognized  the  importance  of  prompt  litigation  of  claims  and  a
need   to   protect   defendants   from   fraudulent   or   stale   claims.
Statutes  of  limitations  and  statutes  of  repose  bring  finality  to
disputes,   at   least   in   the   respect   that   they   close   judicial
tribunals  to  the  prosecution  of  claims.    Pritchard  vs.  Howell,  1
Wis.  131,  [118],  [123]  (1853).    A  statute  of  limitations  "takes
the  action  away  altogether.  .  .                                           .  [I]t  annihilates  the  remedy."
Id.
¶47   Although  art.  I,  §  9  "guarantees  a  suitor  a  day  in  [  ]
court,"   a   statute   of   limitations   may   preclude   a   p

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