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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                          This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 30, 2010
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
A. John Voelker                                                                                                                                             petition to review an adverse decision by the
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                                                                            Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                            and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                            Cir. Ct. No.   2009CV10142
Appeal No.                                                                               2010AP208
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                          IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                                                                                            DISTRICT I
AURORA CONSOLIDATED HEALTH CARE AND SENTRY INSURANCE,
A MUTUAL COMPANY,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
V.
LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION AND JEFFREY SCHAEFER,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
MAXINE A. WHITE, Judge.   Affirmed.
Before Fine, Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1                                                                                       BRENNAN, J.      Aurora Consolidated Health Care and its insurer
Sentry Insurance, A Mutual Insurance Company (collectively “Aurora”) appeal a
circuit  court  order  that  upheld  a  decision  of  the  Labor  and  Industry Review
Commission (“LIRC”).   The LIRC decision found Jeffrey Schaefer permanently




No.   2010AP208
and totally disabled as a result of a work injury and awarded Schaefer benefits on
that basis.   Aurora argues that LIRC violated the Worker’s Compensation Act and
denied  Aurora  its  right  to  due  process  when  it  prohibited  Aurora  from
cross-examining the independent medical examiner appointed by the Department
of Workforce Development (“the Department”), and further, that LIRC’s decision
is  not  based  on  credible  and  substantial  evidence.    Because  LIRC  permitted
Aurora  to  present  evidence  rebutting  the  independent  medical  examiner  and
reasonably relied on the independent medical examiner’s reports, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2                                                                                      On February 27, 2001, Schaefer, employed as a courier by Aurora,
slipped  on  ice  and  fell  onto  concrete  while  making  a  delivery.     Schaefer
experienced lower back pain and bilateral leg pain, but finished his shift.
¶3                                                                                      On March 5, 2001, Schaefer went to Dr. James Cain, complaining of
the injuries he sustained from the February 27, 2001 fall.   Dr. Cain ordered an
MRI, which showed that Schaefer had an L5-S1 recurrent disc herniation.   As a
result, Schaefer underwent surgery.
¶4                                                                                      Because  Schaefer  had  recurrent  pain  after  his  surgery,  Dr.  Cain
referred Schaefer to Dr. Ali Sadeghi for pain management.   Dr. Sadeghi reported
that Schaefer underwent several steroid injections for pain as well as trigger point
injections.   Schaefer was also given a number of oral narcotic medications and
adjunct analgesics to control his lower back and bilateral leg pain.
¶5                                                                                      Sometime in 2005, Schaefer developed right hip pain, unrelated to
the work injury he suffered on February 27, 2001.   On August 15, 2006, Schaefer
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No.   2010AP208
underwent a total right hip replacement with positive results.   Schaefer does not
seek worker’s compensation for difficulties related to his hip problem.
¶6                                                                                     On  July                                                                               10,                                2006,  Dr.  Sadeghi  completed  a  form  entitled
“Lumbosacral Spine Impairment Medical Assistant,” setting forth Schaefer’s work
restrictions.   In a post-hearing submission, Dr. Sadeghi explicitly stated that the
limitations listed were those stemming from Schaefer’s work-related back injury
and not from his subsequent hip problem.   According to the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ”) summary of the document, Dr. Sadeghi:
imposed  restrictions  limiting  Schaefer  to  continuously
sitting  15 minutes and continuously standing  30 minutes
after which he would need to lie down.   In an eight hour
workday,  Schaefer  could  sit  less  than  two  hours  and
stand/walk less than two hours, that Schaefer would require
more  than  ten  unscheduled  breaks  during  the  average
workday, and that he could rarely lift less [than] ten pounds
and  was  never  to  twist,  stoop  or  bend.    Additionally,
Schaefer would likely be absent from work more than four
days per month because of his impairments or treatment
and would be unable to perform routine, repetitive tasks at
a  consistent  pace  or  fast  paced  tasks.    Schaefer  would
frequently  experience  symptoms  which  interfere  with
attention and concentration needed to perform even simple
work tasks during a typical workday.
¶7                                                                                     Aurora conceded liability for the February 27,  2001 fall and paid
                                                                                       Schaefer temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits,
and some associated medical expenses.
¶8                                                                                     On March  6, 2006, Schaefer filed a worker’s compensation claim
with  the  Department  for  the  February                                              27,                                                                                    2001  fall,  seeking  additional
compensation.
¶9                                                                                     Relying on Dr. Cain’s and Dr. Sadeghi’s medical opinions, the ALJ
concluded that Schaefer was permanently and totally disabled.   The ALJ further
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No.   2010AP208
concluded that Schaefer had sustained a permanent total loss of earning capacity
based on the vocational expert reports.
¶10    Aurora petitioned LIRC for review of the ALJ’s findings and order.
On review, Aurora argued that the ALJ should have disregarded Dr. Sadeghi’s
opinion because his opinion was “untruthful” and contained restrictions, not only
for  Schaefer’s  February                                                                    27,   2001  fall,  but  also  for  Schaefer’s  unrelated  hip
problem.   LIRC remanded the case to the Department with directions to the ALJ to
appoint an independent medical examiner to assess only Schaefer’s disabilities
related to the February 27, 2001 fall.
¶11    The ALJ appointed Dr. Jerome Ebert to perform the independent
medical  assessment  of  Schaefer’s  work-related  disabilities.    On  November  6,
2008,  Dr.  Ebert  conducted  the  independent  medical  examination  and  later
submitted his assessment of Schaefer’s work-related injuries to the ALJ.   Dr. Ebert
found that “100% of [Schaefer’s] disability … is due to his back.   In other words,
if  he  had  no  hip  problem  whatsoever,  his  restrictions  would  be  the  same.”
Dr. Ebert  went  on  to  conclude  that  “Schaefer  is  disabled,  and  the  following
limitations  are  due  entirely to  his  back  problem:    Sit  for  1/2-hour,  stand  for
1/2-hour, drive for 1/2-hour, walk 1/2-mile maximum.   Sedentary duty lifting 10
pounds frequently, 20 pounds maximal with change in position every 1/2-hour.”
¶12    After receiving Dr. Ebert’s written assessment, the ALJ gave notice
to both parties that each party could “submit medical records in response to the
opinions of Dr. Ebert” within ninety days.   The ALJ’s notice also provided that
once the additional medical records were received, the ALJ would send the case
back to LIRC to render a decision.
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No.   2010AP208
¶13    LIRC reviewed Dr. Ebert’s written assessment and then remanded
the case to the Department a second time.   On the second remand, LIRC instructed
the ALJ to request clarification from Dr. Ebert by asking Dr. Ebert three specific
questions:
(1)                                                                                     [H]ow many hours of work in an average
workday would  [Schaefer] be able to tolerate, given his
physical restrictions;
(2)                                                                                     [W]ould                                         [Schaefer]’s  physical  restrictions
require him to take unscheduled breaks during an average
workday, and if so, what is the estimate of how many such
breaks would be required; and
(3)                                                                                     [W]ould  Dr.  Ebert  expect  the  effects  of
[Schaefer]’s low back disability to cause him to miss work
time on a recurring basis, and if so, what is the estimate of
how often this missed work time might occur?
(Formatting added.)    Dr. Ebert promptly replied, answering as follows:                (1)  “I
would estimate  [Schaefer] would be able to work  8 hours per day given  [his]
restrictions”; (2) “I’d estimate approximately two brief 10 minute breaks per day
would be required”; and (3) “Chronic back pain of this nature does tend to flare at
times.   Sometimes the flares are so severe that work would not be possible.   I
would estimate that this would occur approximately 2 times per month.”
¶14    Following Dr. Ebert’s response to the ALJ’s three questions, both
parties submitted a third set of vocational reports from their respective vocational
experts.   The vocational experts found one of Dr. Ebert’s answers to the ALJ’s
three questions particularly relevant to their analysis of Schaefer’s loss of earning
capacity.   This prompted Aurora to send a letter to LIRC requesting that LIRC
remand  the  case  to  the  Department  for  a  third  time  to  allow  Aurora  to
cross-examine Dr. Ebert about his answers to the ALJ’s three questions.   Aurora
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No.   2010AP208
also requested, as an alternative, that three additional questions be submitted to
Dr. Ebert:
(1)                                                                                  Is your estimate that Mr. Schaefer will miss
work approximately two times per month due to his chronic
back pain an opinion which you hold to a reasonable degree
of medical probability?
(2)                                                                                  Would   it   still   be   your   estimate   that
Mr. Schaefer would miss work approximately two times
per month if he worked on a part time basis within the
restrictions you previously assigned?
(3)                                                                                  What  level  of  work  could  Mr.  Schaefer
perform that would not lead you to estimate that he would
miss approximately two days from work per month due to
the condition of his back, and what permanent functional
restrictions would be appropriate for him in that situation?
¶15    On  May  28,  2009,  LIRC  denied  both  of  Aurora’s  requests  and
affirmed  the  Department’s  decision,  finding  that  Schaefer  was  totally  and
permanently disabled and that Schaefer sustained a permanent total loss of earning
capacity.  In denying Aurora’s request for a third remand, LIRC stated that it:
is  familiar  with  Dr.  Ebert,  because  he  has  provided
tiebreaker medical opinions in numerous cases, and [LIRC]
is satisfied that his medical opinions are routinely given to
a reasonable degree of medical probability.    There is no
ambiguity in the opinions he has provided in this case, and
[LIRC] sees no reasonable basis to question whether they
were given to a reasonable degree of medical probability.
[LIRC] also fails to see any useful purpose in questioning
Dr. Ebert regarding part-time work or theoretical “levels”
of work.    Dr. Ebert’s functional restrictions are credible,
and  Vocational  Consultant  Bruce  Schuyler  has  credibly
opined that based on those restrictions, [Schaefer] falls into
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No.   2010AP208
the  “odd lot” category as described in Beecher v. LIRC,
2004 WI 88, ¶31, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29.[ ]
Aurora  appealed  to  the  circuit  court  and  the  circuit  court  affirmed  LIRC’s
decision.   Aurora now appeals to this court.
DISCUSSION
¶16    Aurora asks that we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand this
case to LIRC for rehearing because it alleges that the Worker’s Compensation Act
required LIRC to allow Aurora an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, the
independent medical examiner, and that LIRC’s decision to prohibit Aurora from
cross-examining Dr. Ebert violated Aurora’s due process rights.   Further, Aurora
argues that LIRC’s decision was not based on credible and substantial evidence.
We address each contention in turn.
I.                                                                                                The Worker’s Compensation Act
¶17    Aurora first argues that LIRC acted in excess of its powers when it
denied Aurora’s request to cross-examine Dr. Ebert.   In support of its argument,
Aurora contends that WIS. STAT. §§ 102.17(1)(g) and 102.17(1)(d)1. (2007-08)
require  LIRC  to  provide  Aurora  with  an  opportunity  to  cross-examine  an
independent medical examiner appointed by the Department.   LIRC and Schaefer
disagree, arguing that  § 102.17(1)(g) only requires that Aurora be provided an
opportunity  to                                                                                   “rebut”  the  independent  medical  examiner’s                                          “report”  and  that
1                                                                                                 “[T]he odd-lot doctrine provides that some injured workers should be characterized as
permanently, totally disabled even though they are still capable of earning occasional income.”
Beecher v. LIRC, 2004 WI 88, ¶2, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29.
2  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise
noted.
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No.   2010AP208
§ 102.17(1)(d)1. only requires that Aurora be permitted to cross-examine experts
“presented by a party.”    We agree with LIRC and Schaefer.
A.                                                                                        Standard of Review
¶18    Our scope of review is identical to that of the circuit court, and we
review LIRC’s decision, not the circuit court’s.    Target Stores v. LIRC,  217
Wis. 2d 1, 11, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998).                                            “We affirm LIRC’s findings of
fact if they are supported by substantial evidence.”   Id.                                “[T]he agency’s decision
may be set aside by a reviewing court only when, upon an examination of the
entire record, the evidence, including the inferences therefrom, is found to be such
that a reasonable person, acting reasonably, could not have reached the decision
from the evidence and its inferences.”   Id.
¶19    However, reviewing courts are not bound by LIRC’s determinations
of law.   DILHR v. LIRC, 155 Wis. 2d 256, 262, 456 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1990).
This  court  will  apply  one  of  three  levels  of  deference  applicable  to  LIRC’s
interpretations of a particular statute:   great weight, due weight, or no weight (de
novo review).    Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC,  196 Wis.  2d  650,  659-60,  539
N.W.2d 98 (1995).   Here, we need not determine exactly what level of deference
is afforded, because we conclude that under any level of deference, the result is the
same:   LIRC acted within its statutory authority when it denied Aurora’s request to
cross-examine the independent medical examiner.
¶20    Aurora’s  claim  that   LIRC  acted   contrary  to  the   Worker’s
Compensation  Act  requires  that  we  interpret  the  meaning  of  certain  statutes.
When determining the legislature’s intent,  we begin with the language of the
statute.   State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.
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No.   2010AP208
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what
a statute means in order to give the statute its full, proper,
and intended effect.   We begin with the statute’s language
because we assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed
in  the  words  it  used.    Generally,  language  is  given  its
common,  ordinary,  and  accepted  meaning.    In  addition,
statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is
used,  in  relation  to  the  language  of  surrounding  or
closely-related statutes, and interpreted to avoid absurd or
unreasonable results.
Orion Flight Servs., Inc. v. Basler Flight Serv., 2006 WI 51, ¶16, 290 Wis. 2d
421, 714 N.W.2d 130 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
B.                                                                                    WISCONSIN STAT. § 102.17(1)(g)
                                                                                      ¶21    We turn first to WIS. STAT. § 102.17(1)(g), which states, in relevant
part:
Whenever the testimony presented at any hearing
indicates a dispute or creates a doubt as to the extent or
cause of disability … the department may direct that the
injured employee be examined … by or from an impartial,
competent physician … designated by the department who
is  not  under  contract  with  or  regularly  employed  by  a
compensation insurance  carrier or self-insured employer.
… The report of the examination … shall be transmitted in
writing to the department and a copy of the report shall be
furnished by the department to each party, who shall have
an opportunity to rebut such report on further hearing.
(Emphasis added.)
¶22    Aurora  concedes  that  WIS.   STAT.                                           § 102.17(1)(g)  grants  the
Department  the  authority  to  request  the  opinion  of  an  independent  medical
examiner.   However, Aurora argues that once LIRC exercised its discretion, and
ordered  the  Department to appoint an independent  medical examiner, LIRC’s
discretion under § 102.17(1)(g) was exhausted.   Aurora contends that LIRC was
then required—by the legislature’s use of the word  “shall”—to provide Aurora
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No.   2010AP208
with “an opportunity to rebut such report.”   Without citation to any source, Aurora
then  goes  on  to  argue  that  implicit  in  the  word                                  “rebut”  is  the  right  to
cross-examine.   We are unpersuaded.
¶23    Indeed,  WIS.   STAT.                                                              § 102.17(1)(g)  provides  LIRC  with  the
discretion  to  request  an  independent  medical  examiner  when                         “the  testimony
presented at any hearing indicates a dispute or creates a doubt as to the extent or
cause  of  disability.”    And  Aurora  correctly  notes  that,  once  the  independent
medical examiner’s report is obtained, § 102.17(1)(g) requires that the parties be
permitted to “rebut such report.”   However, the right to rebut a report is not the
same as the right to cross-examine the independent medical examiner who drafted
the report.
¶24    If the legislature had intended to permit cross-examination of the
independent medical examiner, it could have done so.   Indeed, in other sections of
the Worker’s Compensation Act the legislature explicitly provides the right to
cross-examine  a  witness,  see  WIS.  STAT.                                              § 102.17(1)(d)1.                            (providing  that
physicians presented by a party shall be subject to cross-examination), as it does in
other statutes outside the Worker’s Compensation Act, see WIS. STAT. § 907.06
(providing that an expert witness appointed by the circuit court “shall be subject to
cross-examination by each party”).   The legislature did not do so here.
¶25    If  the  legislature  had  wanted  to  permit  the  independent  medical
examiner  to  be  cross-examined,  it  also  would  have  needed  to  restructure  the
appointment/rebuttal process in the statute substantially.   As drafted, Wis. Stat.
§ 102.17(1)(g) makes no provision for the independent medical examiner to give
testimony  at  a   hearing  or   a   deposition,   providing  no   opportunity  for
cross-examination to occur.  And by stating that the independent medical examiner
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No.   2010AP208
must submit a report “in writing” to LIRC and the parties, the legislature indicates
that it did not intend the examiner to attend the hearing.   Finally, by stating that the
parties shall have the “opportunity to rebut [the] report,” as opposed to providing
an opportunity to rebut the examiner, the legislature further indicates that its intent
is that the independent medical examiner not be subject to cross-examination.
(Emphasis added.)    As a matter of statutory construction, nothing in the plain
language  of  § 102.17(1)(g)  states  or  implies  that  the  legislature  intended  the
“opportunity to rebut [the] report” to include the right to cross-examination of the
examiner.
C.                                                                                          WISCONSIN STAT. § 102.17(1)(d)1.
¶26    Aurora also points to WIS. STAT. § 102.17(1)(d)1. in support of its
argument  that  the  Worker’s  Compensation  Act  requires  it  be  permitted  to
cross-examine Dr. Ebert.   Section § 102.17(1)(d)1. states, in relevant part:
The  contents  of  certified  medical  and  surgical
reports by physicians … and of certified reports by experts
concerning loss of earning capacity under [WIS. STAT. §]
102.44(2) and (3), presented by a party for compensation
constitute prima facie evidence as to the matter contained
in those reports, subject to any rules and limitations the
department prescribes.   Certified reports of physicians …
who have examined or treated the claimant, and of experts,
if the practitioner or expert consents to being subjected to
cross-examination also constitute prima facie evidence as
to the matter contained in those reports….
(Emphasis added.)
¶27    The plain  language of  WIS.  STAT.  § 102.17(1)(d)1. provides that
certain expert reports are prima facie evidence when the author of the report
consents to cross-examination.    However, the statute does not require that all
evidence submitted in a case be prima facie evidence.   Rather, § 102.17(1)(d)1.
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No.   2010AP208
merely shifts the burden of proof from the party submitting the evidence to the one
opposing it when certain conditions have been met.   See Knight v. Milwaukee
Cnty., 2002 WI App 194, ¶4, 256 Wis. 2d 1000, 651 N.W.2d 890 (providing that
once a party relying on a presumption proves the basic fact, the opposing party
must demonstrate that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable).
Consequently, we conclude that § 102.17(1)(d)1. does not require that Dr. Ebert be
subjected to cross-examination before his reports can be submitted into evidence.
II.                                                                                     Due Process
¶28    Next, Aurora argues that the right to cross-examine a witness is a
basic necessity of due process and that LIRC denied Aurora this basic right when
it  refused  to  allow  Aurora  to  cross-examine  Dr.  Ebert.    LIRC  and  Schaefer
respond that due process was satisfied by the opportunity to rebut Dr. Ebert’s
reports and that Aurora was given that opportunity.   We agree with LIRC and
Schaefer.
¶29    Whether a party has been denied due process is a question of law we
review without deference to the administrative agency.    Wright v. LIRC,  210
Wis. 2d  289,  296,  565  N.W.2d  221  (Ct.  App.  1997).                               “‘The  ultimate  test  to
determine  whether  due  process  of  law  has  been  accorded  a  party  to  an
administrative proceeding is the presence or absence of fair play.’”   Osterhues v.
Board of Adjustment for Washburn Cnty., 2005 WI 92, ¶32, 282 Wis. 2d 228,
698 N.W.2d 701 (citation omitted).   A fair hearing must include:                       “(1) [t]he right
to seasonably know the charges or claims proffered;  (2) the right to meet such
charges or claims by competent evidence; and (3) the right to be heard by counsel
upon the probative force of the evidence adduced by both sides and upon the law
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No.   2010AP208
applicable thereto.”   Theodore Fleisner, Inc. v. DILHR, 65 Wis. 2d 317, 326, 222
N.W.2d 600 (1974) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).
¶30    To begin, Aurora was timely notified of the claims against it and
does  not  contend  otherwise.    Accordingly,  the  first  factor  to  consider  when
determining whether a hearing satisfies due process was established.
¶31    We further determine that the second factor—an opportunity to meet
the  claims  by  competent  evidence—has  also  been  satisfied.    After  receiving
Dr. Ebert’s  initial  written  report,  forwarded  to  the  parties  by  a  letter  dated
November 11, 2008, Aurora was given ninety days to submit additional medical
records.    Aurora  also  asked  for  and  was  granted  the  opportunity  to  submit
additional vocational information.
¶32    After Dr. Ebert submitted his second report, answering LIRC’s three
additional  questions  regarding  Schaefer’s  work  tolerance,  that  report  was
forwarded to the parties by a letter dated March 16, 2009.   Aurora was then given
thirty days to submit additional vocational information.   Aurora did not request to
submit additional medical information and did not request to cross-examine Dr.
Ebert at that time.
¶33    The day its additional vocational reports were due, Aurora asked for
additional time to respond to Dr. Ebert’s latest report.   The ALJ granted Aurora’s
request  and  allowed  it  until  May  1,                                                   2009,  to  submit  additional  evidence  in
response to the second report.    On May  1,  2009, five-and-a-half months after
receiving Dr. Ebert’s first report, Aurora requested to cross-examine Dr. Ebert for
the first time.
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No.   2010AP208
¶34    In short, Aurora was given ample opportunity to present competent
evidence—vocational   and   medical   reports—challenging   the   findings   in
Dr. Ebert’s reports and that is all that due process affords it.   There is no per se
right to cross-examine a court-appointed author of a report, especially when the
request to do so comes late in the game, after LIRC had already granted the parties
an extension of time within which to collect and submit evidence.
¶35    Likewise, the third factor is also satisfied because Aurora was given
“the right to be heard by counsel upon the probative force of the evidence adduced
by both sides and upon the law applicable thereto.”   As set forth above, LIRC gave
Aurora considerable time to submit evidence challenging Dr. Ebert’s reports.
¶36    Finally, in a last-ditch effort to convince us that its due process rights
were violated, Aurora cites to Theodore Fleisner, Inc. for the proposition that
LIRC cannot deny Aurora an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Ebert.   According
to Aurora, in Theodore Fleisner, Inc.:
a  case  in  which  the  plaintiffs-appellants  had  asked  the
Department to adjourn a hearing so they could obtain and
present new medical evidence to contradict the testimony
of  the  applicant’s  treating  doctors[,]                                              [t]he  Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed the Department’s denial of that
request.                                                                                The  court  held  that  because  the  plaintiffs-
appellants had had the opportunity to cross-examine the
applicant’s medical expert fully, it could not conclude that
the plaintiffs’-appellants’ due process right to a fair hearing
had been infringed.   [See id., 65 Wis. 2d at 327.]
¶37    Even if we accept Aurora’s recitation of Theodore Fleisner, Inc.’s
facts and  holding  at  face-value,  they do not support  Aurora’s  claim because:
(1) they apply to the “applicant’s” medical expert, as opposed to an independent
medical examiner appointed by the Department; and (2) cross-examination is not
the only way to ensure that due process has been satisfied, as we previously noted.
14




No.   2010AP208
III.                                                                                               Credible and Substantial Evidence
¶38    Finally,  although  the  majority  of  its  brief  is  dedicated  to  the
arguments set forth above, Aurora also appears to argue that LIRC’s conclusion
that  Schaefer  suffered  permanent  total  disability  because  of  his  work-related
injuries is not based on credible and substantial evidence.   See Target Stores, 217
Wis.  2d  at  11  (“We  affirm LIRC’s findings of  fact if  they are  supported by
substantial evidence.”).    The main thrust of Aurora’s argument is that LIRC’s
decision to appoint Dr. Ebert showed a lack of confidence in Schaefer’s expert,
Dr. Sadeghi, such that Dr. Sadeghi’s opinion was insufficient to meet Schaefer’s
burden of proof.    Additionally, Aurora disputes the degree of certainty of Dr.
Ebert’s opinion.
¶39    Whether a party has satisfied its burden of proof presents a question
of law.   Currie v. DIHLR,  210 Wis.  2d  380,  387,  565 N.W.2d  253  (Ct. App.
1997).   Here, because the law LIRC relied on, the odd-lot doctrine, “is a common
law  adjunct  to  worker’s  compensation  law,”  LIRC’s  determination  that  the
evidence  satisfied  that  law  is  entitled  to  no  deference.     See  Cargill  Feed
Div./Cargill Malt and AIG Cas. Co. v. LIRC, 2010 WI App 115, ¶17, ___ Wis. 2d
___, 789 N.W.2d 326.
¶40    In order to establish a qualifying injury under the odd-lot doctrine:
[a]n injured claimant … must make a prima facie case of
permanent and total disability.   The claimant may do so by
3  We note that although Aurora raises three issues in its appellate brief it sets forth only
two issues in its “statement of issues.”   See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19.   Instead, Aurora’s third
argument, that LIRC’s decision was not based on credible and substantial evidence, is raised
haphazardly throughout its appellate brief, and as such, was difficult to follow and poorly
explained.  We caution counsel to be more careful in the future.
15




No.   2010AP208
producing certain basic facts—such as his or her injury,
age,  education,  capacity,  and  training—which  constitute
prima facie evidence of a presumed fact: that the injured
claimant is permanently and totally incapable of earning a
living.
Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case,
the  presumption  that  the  claimant  is  permanently  and
totally disabled is triggered, and the burden shifts to the
employer  to  prove                                                                   “that  it  is  more  probable  that  the
claimant  is  not  permanently  and  totally  incapable  of
earning a living.”   To meet its burden, the employer must
“show  that  there  exists  suitable  employment  for  the
claimant.    The  employer  does  this  by  bringing  forward
evidence of actual job availability, making it more probable
than not that the claimant is able to earn a living.”
Id., ¶¶20-21 (citations omitted).
¶41    To begin, we disagree with Aurora that LIRC’s decision to order the
ALJ to appoint an independent medical examiner “is evidence that [LIRC] did not
find Dr. Sadeghi’s opinion credible enough to stand on its own.”    WISCONSIN
STAT. § 102.17(1)(g) permits the appointment of an independent medical examiner
“[w]henever the testimony presented at any hearing indicates a dispute or creates a
doubt as to the extent or cause of disability.”    In other words,  § 102.17(1)(g)
permitted LIRC to order the appointment of an independent medical examiner if
Aurora’s experts and Schaefer’s experts, including Dr. Cain and Dr. Sadeghi,
disagreed on the cause of Schaefer’s disability.   That LIRC was required to find a
dispute  existed  before  ordering  the  appointment  of  an  independent  medical
examiner, does not mean that LIRC was required to find the experts were not
credible.   Consequently, once LIRC received Dr. Ebert’s report, LIRC was free to
reach a decision based on both Dr. Sadeghi’s and Dr. Ebert’s opinions.   Nor was
LIRC’s decision left unsupported simply because Aurora’s expert presented an
alternate opinion.   We defer to LIRC’s assessment of witness credibility.   WIS.
16




No.   2010AP208
STAT.  § 102.23(6); Princess House, Inc. v. DILHR,  111 Wis.  2d  46,  54,  330
N.W.2d 169 (1983).
¶42    Second, Aurora cursorily argues that LIRC erroneously relied on
Dr. Ebert’s medical opinion because it was not expressly given to the appropriate
degree of medical certainty.    Indeed, a medical opinion is inadmissible if it is
based on speculation or conjecture.    Drexler v. All Am. Life & Cas. Co.,  72
Wis. 2d 420, 432, 241 N.W.2d 401 (1976).   Rather, a medical opinion must be
given to a reasonable degree of medical probability.   Pucci v. Rausch, 51 Wis. 2d
513, 518-19, 187 N.W.2d 138 (1971).   However, “[n]o particular words of art are
necessary to express the degree of medical certainty required to remove an expert
opinion from the realm of mere possibility or conjecture.”   Drexler, 72 Wis. 2d at
432.    The test is whether the expert’s words may be reasonably interpreted as
demonstrating he or she was expressing an expert medical opinion.    Id.    The
Wisconsin  Supreme  Court  has  held  “expressions  such  as  ‘I  felt,’  ‘I  feel,’  ‘I
believe,’ ‘liable,’ ‘likely,’ and ‘probably’ to be sufficient.”   Id. at 432-33.
¶43    However,  Aurora  forfeited  its  right  to  claim  that  Dr.  Ebert’s
testimony was inadmissible when Aurora failed to raise the issue before LIRC.
See generally State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶29-30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d
612 (defining forfeiture as the failure to make a timely assertion of a right).   While
Aurora requested that LIRC remand the case to the Department so that Aurora
could ask Dr. Ebert whether his opinions were given to a reasonable degree of
medical probability,  Aurora did not object to the admissibility of  Dr. Ebert’s
reports  when  LIRC  denied  its  request.    And  “[i]t  is  clear  that  once  opinion
evidence                                                                                   …  is  admitted  without  objection,  it  may  be  considered  by  the
[factfinder].”   Drexler, 72 Wis. 2d at 432.
17




No.   2010AP208
¶44    In any event, it is clear that Dr. Ebert’s reports satisfy the certainty
requirements.    Here,  Dr.  Ebert’s  written  reports were  created pursuant to the
Department’s request and Dr. Ebert knew they would be utilized in administrative
proceedings as he had prepared many such reports in the past.   Further, LIRC was
familiar with Dr. Ebert’s past reports and knew Dr. Ebert to be familiar with the
requirement that medical opinions be given to a reasonable degree of medical
probability.   Given these facts, we conclude that LIRC reasonably concluded that
the opinions in the reports were given to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
and properly relied on the reports as credible and substantial evidence.
¶45    Having  reviewed  the  record,  we  agree  with  LIRC  that  given
Schaefer’s   age                                                                       (forty-seven-years-old),   education   (high-school-equivalency
degree), various physical restrictions (as set forth by Dr. Sadeghi and Dr. Ebert),
and the effects of his daily prescribed narcotic-based pain medication (straining
his ability to think and concentrate), Schaefer has made a prima facie case that he
is properly categorized as an odd-lot worker.   See Cargill, 789 N.W.2d 326, ¶17.
And in its appellate brief, Aurora does not even attempt to set forth evidence that
demonstrates “‘that there exists suitable employment for’” Schaefer.   See id., ¶21
(citation omitted).   Because Aurora has not sufficiently rebutted the presumption
that Schaefer is permanently and totally incapable of earning a living, we conclude
that Schaefer is indeed permanently and totally disabled.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
Recommended for publication in the official reports.
18




No.                                                                                       2010AP208(D)
¶46    FINE,  J.                                                                          (dissenting).    As  we  have  recognized,   “John  Henry
Wigmore has characterized cross-examination as ‘beyond any doubt the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’                                   5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1367  (Chadbourn  rev.  1974).”    State  v.  Yang,  2006  WI  App  48,  ¶11,  290
Wis. 2d 235, 245, 712 N.W.2d 400, 405.   Indeed, the right of cross-examination is
the cornerstone of our judicial systems—both criminal and civil.   See Struckman
v. Burns, 534 A.2d 888, 892 (Conn. 1987) (recognizing common-law right in civil
cases;  not  deciding  whether  recognition  of  the  same  right  in  civil  cases  is
compelled by due process).    This right applies even when the witness is one
selected by the trial court because he or she is deemed to be impartial.   See WIS.
STAT. RULES 906.14(1) (“The judge may, on the judge’s own motion or at the
suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine
witnesses thus called.”); 907.06(1) (“The judge … may appoint [expert] witnesses
of the judge’s own selection. … The witness shall be subject to cross-examination
by each party.”).
¶47    The legislature recognized the significance  of  the right to cross-
examine when it authorized cross-examination of expert witnesses called by the
parties.                                                                                  See  WIS.   STAT.                            § 102.17(1)(d)1.   Consistent  with  WIS.   STAT.
RULE 907.06,  the  legislature  also  permitted  the  tribunal  here  to  appoint         “an
impartial,  competent  physician”  to  report  on  the  physician’s  analysis  of  the
contested medical issues.   WIS. STAT. § 102.17(1)(g).   But rather than expressly
permitting  the  parties  to  cross-examine  the  tribunal’s  witness,  as  do  RULES
906.14(1) and 907.06(1), the legislature declared that the parties “shall have an




No.   2010AP208(D)
opportunity to rebut such report on further hearing.” § 102.17(1)(g).   The Majority
construes “rebut” restrictively; I would not.   Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶48    I agree that the word “rebut” does not say, in haec verba, “cross-
examine.”    But the right to  “rebut” what a witness  (either expert or lay) says
(either by admissible hearsay, the case here, or by actual testimony) is hollow
without  the  right  to  cross-examine,  if  that  is  possible.    Thus  in  Struckman,
although reports of out-of-state medical experts could be received even though the
experts could not be subpoenaed for trial because they were outside the court’s
territorial jurisdiction,  the  party against whom the  reports were  offered could
cross-examine at an out-of-state deposition.   Struckman, 534 A.2d at 889-894.   In
my view, this is an irreducible minimum of “fair play.”   See Majority, ¶30.
¶49    Although, as the Majority notes, Aurora Consolidated Health Care
and Sentry Insurance could submit additional materials, the essence of “fair play”
is not only the right to introduce written materials but, crucially, the right to
explore the “impartial” physician’s methodology and analysis in order to discern
flaws in his or her conclusions, which will, in reality, be dispositive.   Without that
right, to paraphrase a conundrum that was current as I was growing up-“Yes, you
may go swimming, but don’t go near the water.”-although Aurora and Sentry may
participate in the proceeding, they cannot do so meaningfully.
¶50    In my view,  “rebut” must encompass the right to cross-examine,
whether at a hearing or by deposition.  Thus, I respectfully dissent.

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