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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
This  opinion  is  subject  to  further  editing.  If
published, the official version will appear in the
bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 14, 1999
A  party  may  file  with  the  Supreme  Court  a
petition  to  review  an  adverse  decision  by  the
Marilyn L. Graves
Court of Appeals.   See § 808.10 and RULE 809.62,
Clerk, Court of Appeals
STATS.
of Wisconsin
Nos.  99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                      IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III
NO.   99-2019
IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
TO ZACHARY H., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:
BROWN COUNTY,
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
V.
WADE H.,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
NO.   99-2020
IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
TO DEREK D., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:
BROWN COUNTY,
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
V.




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
WADE H.,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
NO.   99-2021
IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
TO LUKE D., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:
BROWN COUNTY,
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
V.
WADE H.,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
APPEALS  from  orders  of  the  circuit  court  for  Brown  County:
WILLIAM C. GRIESBACH, Judge.   Affirmed.
¶1                                                                                            PETERSON, J.    Wade H. appeals a circuit court’s orders granting
the  petitions  for  the  termination  of  his  parental  rights  to  his  three  children,
Zachary H., Derek and Luke D.   Wade raises six claims of error: (1) He did not
receive adequate notice of the grounds for the possible termination of his parental
rights, in violation of due process; (2) he did not receive adequate notice of the
grounds  for  the  possible  termination  of  his  parental  rights,  in  violation  of
§ 48.356(2), STATS.; (3) he was not represented by counsel during the underlying
CHIPS1  proceedings  which  violated  his  rights  to  due  process  and  effective
representation in the TPR action; (4) the circuit court’s determination that Brown
1 CHIPS is an acronym for “children in need of protection or services.”   A CHIPS order
is issued pursuant to § 48.13, STATS.
2




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
County Human Services made reasonable efforts to provide the  court-ordered
services was not supported by sufficient evidence; (5) the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion in terminating his parental rights; and (6) the circuit court
lost its competency to terminate his parental rights because it failed to enter its
written  orders  within  ten  days  of  disposition.    Because  Wade’s  claims  are
unpersuasive, the circuit court’s orders are affirmed.
BACKGROUND
¶2                                                                                       Brown  County  Department  of  Human  Services  (County)  filed  a
petition for the termination of Wade’s parental rights grounded on the continuing
need for protection or services.    See  §  48.415(2), STATS.    The children were
originally removed from their mother’s home in 1992 based on a CHIPS action
arising out of neglect.   They were returned to their mother in 1994, but in October
1997, the children were again found unattended and the house was in complete
disarray and unsanitary.   Wade was unable or unwilling to provide care for the
children and did not object to their foster placement.
¶3                                                                                       The children remained in County care without either parent taking
the necessary steps to re-enter the children’s lives.    The County filed a TPR
petition in November 1998.   Denise failed to appear at the initial hearing on the
TPR action and the court found her in default.   Wade waived his right to a jury
trial and, after a hearing in February 1999, the court found that the County had met
its burden as to each of the necessary elements.    The court held a disposition
hearing  on  March  26,  1999,  where  it found that termination was in  the  best
interests of the children.    The court filed its written order terminating Wade’s
parental rights for each child on April 16, 1999.
3




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS FOR NOTICE
¶4                                                                                          Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in matters of family life.
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).   In In re Jason P.S., 195
Wis.2d 855, 863, 537 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Ct. App. 1995), this court explained that
fundamental  fairness  requires  that  parents  be  given  fair  notice  of  the  actual
conduct that could lead to the termination of their parental rights.
¶5                                                                                          Wade claims that the County did not give him adequate notice of the
possible grounds for terminating his parental rights.   The facts surrounding the
notice Wade received are basically undisputed.    The application of the United
States Constitution to undisputed facts presents a question of law that this court
reviews de novo.   See id. at 862, 537 N.W.2d at 49-50.
¶6                                                                                          Written  warnings  of  the  type  of  conduct  that  could  lead  to  the
termination of his parental rights were attached to the November  1997, CHIPS
order. “Abandonment,” the specific reason the children were removed from their
home at that time, was the only ground checked as being most applicable to Wade
for the future possibility of terminating his parental rights.   There is no dispute that
Wade  received  a  copy of  the  written warnings.    However,  the  eventual TPR
petition was based on the “continuing need for protection or services.”   Based on
this difference, Wade argues that the County substantially changed the grounds for
terminating his parental rights without advance notice.
¶7                                                                                          Wade relies on Jason P.S., where this court examined the amended
version  of                                                                                 § 48.415(2)(c),  STATS.    This  court  concluded  that  the  amendment
substantially changed the type of conduct that could lead to the termination of a
person’s parental rights.   The petitioner had not provided the parent notice of the
new, broader grounds.   Therefore, this court held that the parent’s rights had been
4




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
terminated under a fundamentally unfair procedure because the lack of notice
prevented  the  parent  from  having  the  opportunity  to  address  her  family
circumstances accordingly.   See id. at 863-64, 537 N.W.2d at 50.
¶8                                                                                                    Here, Wade was on notice of the possible grounds for terminating
his parental rights.   Attached to the underlying CHIPS order was an information
sheet entitled “Notice Concerning Grounds to Terminate Parental Rights.”   Wade
does not dispute that he received this document.   The first paragraph read:
Your parental rights can be terminated against your will
under certain circumstances.   A list of the potential grounds
to terminate a parent’s rights is given below.   Those that are
check-marked  are  most  applicable  to  you,  although  you
should also be aware that if any of the others also exist now
or in the future, your parental rights can be taken from you.
Although not check-marked, one of the listed grounds was continuing need of
protection or services, the grounds alleged in the TPR petition.   The information
sheet therefore placed Wade on notice of the grounds that ultimately formed the
basis of terminating his parental rights.2   See In re Jamie L., 172 Wis.2d 218, 227-
28, 493 N.W.2d 56, 61 (1992).
2 Wade also received several other forms of warnings that further assure this court he had
actual notice of the eventual grounds for terminating his parental rights.   The social worker sent
Wade numerous letters trying to establish meetings and attempting to give him help toward
completing the court-ordered conditions.   Some of the letters she sent him also contained written
warnings that specifically highlighted the possibility of terminating his parental rights on the
grounds of continuing need of protection or services, among others.   Wade also concedes in his
brief to this court that “all parties were aware early in the CHIPS proceeding that a termination
proceeding was seriously threatened.”
5




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
NOTICE UNDER § 48.356(2), STATS.
¶9                                                                                         Similarly, Wade argues that the County failed to meet its burden of
proving that the children were “placed, or continued in a placement, outside his or
her home pursuant to one or more court orders … containing the notice required
by  s. 48.356(2),                                                                          [STATS].  Section                                                     48.415 (2)   (a)1,  STATS.     In  relevant  part,
§ 48.356(2), requires that “any written order which places a child … outside the
home … shall notify the parent” of any grounds for termination of parental rights
under  §  48.415, STATS., which may be applicable.    Wade again seizes on the
information sheet that was attached to the November 1997, CHIPS order claiming
it does not satisfy the required notice because the eventual grounds for termination
of his parental rights were not highlighted as being “most applicable” to him.
¶10    The supreme court has previously decided that written orders under
§ 48.356(2),  STATS.,  may  contain  more  warnings  than  the  particular  one
eventually relied on in the TPR proceeding.   See id.   To comply with § 48.356(2),
the written orders need only have contained the same information as the oral
notice given by the court under subsec. (1).   See id. at 228, 493 N.W.2d at 61.
Under subsec. (1), the court was required to orally warn Wade of any grounds that
may  have  been  applicable  for  the  termination  of  his  parental  rights.    Wade
concedes that the circuit court orally warned him that his parental rights could be
terminated  for  the  continuing  need  of  protection  or  services.   This  court  has
already concluded that the information sheet, by its express terms, also provided
Wade actual notice of the eventual grounds for terminating his parental rights.
Therefore, Wade received adequate notice under § 48.356(2).
6




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
REPRESENTATION IN UNDERLYING CHIPS PROCEEDINGS
¶11    Wade argues that the circuit court’s failure to appoint counsel in the
underlying CHIPS proceedings constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion and
denied him due process.
¶12    Wade bases his arguments on Joni B. v. State, 202 Wis.2d 1, 549
N.W.2d 411 (1996).   In Joni B., the court considered a challenge to an amendment
to § 48.23(3), STATS., which prohibited a circuit court from appointing counsel for
any adult in  a  CHIPS action.    See  id.  at  5,  549 N.W.2d at  412.    The  court
concluded that the statute violated due process because it precluded a case-by-case
determination of the necessity for appointment of counsel.   See id.
¶13    Wade  argues  that  the  circuit  court  erroneously  exercised  its
discretion because it failed to address the issue of appointing counsel in his CHIPS
proceeding.   However, the Joni B. court clearly explained that a circuit court need
not undertake such an inquiry in every case:
We   emphasize   that   the   key   to   an   individualized
determination is that the need to appoint counsel will differ
from case to case.   In other words, a circuit court should
only  appoint  counsel  after  concluding  that  either  the
efficient administration of justice warrants it or that due
process considerations  outweigh the presumption against
such  an  appointment.    If  the  parent  does  not  request
appointment  of  counsel  and  the  court  perceives  no
particularized need for counsel in the case before it, the
court need not address the issue.
Id. at 18, 549 N.W.2d at 417-18 (emphasis added).
¶14    Wade makes a completely unsupported claim in his brief that he
“may have” raised the issue of the need for counsel at the CHIPS hearing because
when he arrived at the hearing he noted that he did not have a lawyer.   Wade has
7




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
failed to provide the transcripts of the CHIPS proceedings.   When an appellate
record is incomplete in connection with an issue raised by the appellant, this court
must assume that the missing material supports the circuit court’s discretionary
ruling.   See Duhame v. Duhame, 154 Wis.2d 258, 269, 453 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Ct.
App. 1989). 3
¶15    Acknowledging that there is no right to appointment of counsel at a
CHIPS proceeding, he claims he required counsel because the court ordered him
to decide within thirty days whether he wanted to be a parent to his children.   He
also  makes  an  amorphous  argument  that  he  did  not  understand  the  legal
procedures or significance of the CHIPS proceedings.
¶16    As the court in Joni B. noted, the interests of the parents affected by
any CHIPS order are significant.    Although there is no constitutional right to
appointment of counsel, in cases demonstrating a particularized need, the circuit
court must have discretion to do so.   In assessing the need for counsel, the court
suggested that the circuit court balance the following factors, among others:
- the  personal  characteristics  of  the  parent,  such  as  age,
mental  capacity,  education,  and  former  contact  with  the
court;
- the  parent's  demonstrated  level   of  interest   in  the
proceedings and desire to participate;
- whether the petition alleges incidents of abuse or neglect
which could lead to criminal prosecution;
- the complexity of the case, including the likelihood of the
introduction of medical or psychological evidence;
- the probability of out-of-home placement and  potential
duration  of  separation,  based  on  the  allegations  in  the
petition and the social worker's recommendation.
3  There is absolutely no evidence that Wade ever raised the issue of the need for
appointment of counsel with the circuit court.
8




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
Id. at 19, 549 N.W.2d at 418.
¶17    Wade has not specifically addressed any of these factors, and his
vague claims do not illustrate the type of concerns that are extraordinary or could
raise doubt as to the validity of the proceedings.4   Legal counsel was not necessary
for Wade to realize that he needed to make his children a higher priority.   This
court concludes that the  CHIPS proceedings in this case  did not  present any
special circumstances that overcame the presumption against appointing counsel
or risked  either  the efficient administration of  justice or  Wade’s right to due
process.5
4  The Joni B. court used a hypothetical example to illustrate the kinds of special
circumstances that might require the appointment of counsel to ensure the fundamental fairness of
the CHIPS proceedings:
A  woman  is  severely  developmentally  disabled,  with  a
borderline  IQ,  but  manages  to  live  independently,  gainfully
employed as a waitress. She gives birth to twins and lovingly
raises them, providing for all of their necessities. But as the boys
grow older they mentally outstrip their mother; she does not have
the capacity to help them with their homework, and they soon
find ways they can "outfox" her. There has been no abuse or
neglect but the county decides that it is too expensive to continue
to provide in-home services to assist the family, so they file a
CHIPS action requesting that the boys be placed in foster care.
The mother desperately wants to keep her two children whom
she intensely loves, so she contests the CHIPS petition. Under
amended  § 48.23(3),  the  court  is  prohibited  from appointing
counsel to assist the mother, and a date for a jury trial is set
where the mother must appear alone to argue that she should be
allowed to keep her family intact.
Joni B. v. State, 202 Wis.2d 1, 17, 549 N.W.2d 411, 417 (1996).
5 Wade also argues that the circuit court’s failure to appoint counsel in the underlying
CHIPS  proceedings  rendered  his  trial  counsel’s  representation  in  the  TPR  proceedings
ineffective.    Wade’s argument is insufficiently developed and he has failed to provide the
transcripts of the underlying CHIPS proceedings.   We will not consider inadequate argument or
appeals that otherwise do not comply with § 809.19, STATS.   Nor will we abandon our neutrality
by developing Wade’s argument for him.   See Barakat v. DHSS, 191 Wis.2d 769, 786, 530
N.W.2d 392, 398 (Ct. App. 1995).
9




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
“REASONABLE EFFORT” TO PROVIDE SERVICES
¶18    Wade argues that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to
support the circuit court’s decision.   In particular, he claims that the County failed
to make a “reasonable effort” to provide the court-ordered services, as required by
§ 48.415(2)(a)2, STATS.   Subparagraph (2)(a)2a requires the County to prove that
it made an earnest and conscientious effort to take good-faith steps to provide the
court-ordered services.   This court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence necessary to support a trial court’s decision de novo.   See In re Lily
R.A.P., 210 Wis.2d 132, 140, 565 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Ct. App. 1997).
¶19    Whether the County made a diligent effort to provide court-ordered
services is a fact-sensitive inquiry where this court must consider the totality of
circumstances as they exist in each case.   See In re Torrance P., 187 Wis.2d 10,
15, 522 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Ct. App. 1994).   The factfinder’s determination and
judgment will not be disturbed if more than one inference can be drawn from the
evidence.   See In re Dejmal, 95 Wis.2d 141, 151, 289 N.W.2d 813, 818 (1980).
Furthermore,  this court applies a  highly deferential standard of  review  to the
circuit court’s findings of fact, giving due regard to the court’s opportunity to
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and will not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous.   See § 805.17(2), STATS.
¶20    Here,  the  circuit  court’s  determination  that  the  County  made  a
reasonable effort to provide the court-ordered services was supported by sufficient
evidence.   The social worker told Wade that she would assist him with the court-
ordered services, but that he needed to take steps toward completing an alcohol
and other drug abuse assessment and completing any necessary treatment ordered
by the court.   Wade claims that the social worker denied him visitation until he
10




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
completed an assessment.   But there is absolutely no evidence in the record that
Wade ever specifically requested visitation or that the County denied him that
opportunity.   In fact, the social worker testified that whenever she asked Wade
why he had not taken the initiative to be involved with the kids, he “repeatedly
explained that he’s had some things going on in his life  … that he had some
personal problems to deal with.”   This testimony contradicts Wade’s claim that the
social worker prevented him from visiting his children.
¶21    Wade claims he could not afford an assessment and was unaware
that financial assistance was available.   However, the social worker testified that
she could not recall Wade ever raising financial concerns with her.
¶22    Wade contends that the social worker’s efforts to provide him the
court-ordered services were less than diligent because she insisted that he take
some initial steps to help himself.   However, the social worker made numerous
phone calls and sent Wade thirteen letters, several of which contained explicit
warnings that his children’s continuing need for protection and services could be
grounds  for  the  termination  of  his  parental  rights.    The  social  worker  also
scheduled ten meetings, only two of which Wade actually attended.   This evidence
contradicts Wade’s claim that the social worker did not make an earnest and
conscientious effort to provide him the court-ordered services.   The circuit court
found the social worker’s testimony credible and its determination that the County
made  a  “reasonable  effort”  to  provide  Wade  the  court-ordered  services  was
therefore supported by sufficient evidence.   See  §  805.17(2), STATS; Plesko v.
Figgie Int’l, 190 Wis.2d 764, 775, 528 N.W.2d 446, 450 (Ct. App. 1994)                        (When
the circuit court acts as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility
of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to each witness’s testimony.).
11




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
¶23    According  to  Wade,  the  circuit  court  erroneously  exercised  its
discretion in terminating his parental rights because it failed to consider the steps
he had taken between the fact-finding hearing and the dispositional hearing.   Once
grounds were established to terminate  Wade’s parental rights, the decision of
whether to actually terminate his rights is vested with the circuit court’s sound
discretion.   See In re Brandon S.S., 179 Wis.2d 114, 150, 507 N.W.2d 94, 107
(1993).   If the circuit court rationally applies the correct law to the relevant facts,
an  appellate  court  will  not  disturb  its  discretionary  decision.  See  Loy  v.
Bunderson, 107 Wis.2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175, 184 (1982).
¶24    At  the  disposition,  the  court  was  required  to  consider  the  best
interests of the child, including the specific factors enumerated under § 48.426(3),
STATS.6    Wade does not specifically challenge the court’s consideration of the
appropriate factors, but argues that it erroneously exercised its discretion because
it  did  not  give  more  weight  to  the  steps  he  had  taken  toward  assuming
6 Section 48.426(3), STATS., requires the court to consider the following non-exhaustive
list of factors:
(a)  The likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination.
(b)  The age and health of the child, both at the time of the
disposition and, if applicable, at the time the child was removed
from the home.
(c)  Whether  the  child  has  substantial  relationships  with  the
parent  or  other  family  members,  and  whether  it  would  be
harmful to the child to sever these relationships.
(d)  The wishes of the child.
(e)  The duration of the separation of the parent from the child.
(f)  Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and
permanent family relationship as a result of the termination,
taking  into  account  the  conditions  of  the  child's  current
placement, the likelihood of future placements and the results of
prior placements.
12




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
responsibility in the approximate month between the fact-finding hearing and the
dispositional hearing.
¶25    At the dispositional hearing, Wade testified that he had completed
the assessment, found a better apartment and intended to follow through with the
other court-ordered services.   The circuit court listened to the evidence, but found
it insufficient to alter the complete picture, which was most heavily painted by
Wade’s  past  actions.    The  court  stated  that  Wade  had  never  exhibited  the
commitment  necessary  to  retaining  his  children,  but  that  he  had  only  made
excuses.   The court also noted that Wade’s latest efforts were not timely.    As
Wade acknowledges, this was a “judgment call” that the circuit court was entitled
to make in its discretion.
¶26    Wade  also  argued  at  the  dispositional  hearing  that  the  County
effectively  denied  him  visitation  with  his  children  by requiring  him  to  make
progress on the court-ordered services before setting up any supervised visitation.
Unconvinced, the circuit court found that Wade failed to demonstrate any attempts
to establish a substantial relationship with his children.   It took his social worker
over three months of sustained effort before Wade would even meet with her.
Only  when  they  finally  met  did  she  explain  to  him  that  she  wanted  him  to
complete the assessment and establish a reliable schedule before unfairly raising
the children’s hopes and expectations with sporadic or unreliable visitation.   Wade
then  proceeded  to  miss  the  next  four  scheduled  meetings  and  a  scheduled
assessment.   He went to Texas for four months and before leaving he rejected the
social worker’s emphatic plea to sign releases that would allow his children to
participate in their activities.   Then Wade was in jail from September 1998, to
January 1999.   The circuit court reminded Wade that it had asked him nearly a
year and a half earlier to make a commitment to his children and that Wade had
13




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
simply failed to do so.   The court properly exercised its discretion in determining
that termination was in the best interests of the children.7
LOSS OF COMPETENCY
¶27    Finally, Wade claims that the circuit court lost its competency to
terminate his parental rights because it failed to enter a written order within the
statutory period.   Section 48.427(1), STATS., requires a circuit court to enter its
disposition terminating parental rights within ten days after receiving evidence at
the dispositional hearing.8   Wade does not dispute that the court unambiguously
pronounced  oral  judgment  on  the  same  day  as  the  dispositional  hearing.
Nevertheless, he argues that the court lost its competency because it failed to enter
its written order within ten days of the hearing.
¶28    The application of undisputed facts to a statute presents a question of
law this court reviews de novo.   See Ball v. District No. 4, Area Bd., 117 Wis.2d
529, 537, 345 N.W.2d 389, 394 (1984).   The cardinal rule in interpreting statutes
is  that  the  purpose  of  the  whole  act  is  to  be  sought  and  is  favored  over  a
construction that will defeat the manifest object of the act.    See Ynocencio v.
Fesko, 114 Wis.2d 391, 398, 338 N.W.2d 461, 464 (1983).
7 Wade also argues that it was fundamentally unfair to rely on his failure to visit his
children when the County was effectively prohibiting him from doing so.   Wade raises this
constitutional issue for the first time on appeal, and therefore this court does not consider it.   See
Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis.2d 433, 443, 287 N.W.2d 140, 145 (1980).
8 Section 48.427(1), STATS., provides:
(1) Any party may present evidence relevant to the issue of
disposition,   including   expert   testimony,   and   may   make
alternative  dispositional  recommendations  to  the  court.  After
receiving any evidence related to the disposition, the court shall
enter one of the dispositions specified under subs.  (2) to  (4)
within 10 days.
14




No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
¶29    Section                                                                                   §  48.427(1),  STATS.,  states  that  the  court   “shall”  enter
disposition within ten days.   The use of the term “shall” presumptively renders the
statute  mandatory  in  nature.    See  Karow  v.  Milwaukee  County  Civil  Serv.
Comm’n, 82 Wis.2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214, 217 (1978).   However, it is well
established that “the mandatory nature of [a] statute does not necessarily mean that
noncompliance  requires  the  loss  of  competence.”    State  v.  Kywanda  F.,  200
Wis.2d  26,  32,  546  N.W.2d  440,  444  (1996).    Indeed,  this court has serious
reservations whether the ten-day requirement under § 48.427(1) is mandatory.   See
State v. Industrial Comm’n, 233 Wis. 461, 466, 289 N.W. 769, 771 (1940) (“a
statute prescribing the time within which public officers are required to perform an
official act is merely directory, unless it denies the exercise of power after such
time, or the nature of the act, or the statutory language, shows that the time was
intended to be a limitation.”).9    Nevertheless, even assuming that the ten-day
requirement  is  mandatory,  this  court  concludes  that  failure  to  enter  a  written
judgment does not affect the circuit court’s competency to proceed.
¶30    Courts  that  have  held  that  some  of  ch.  48,  STATS.,  time  limits
involve the circuit court’s competency to proceed have relied on legislative history
to reach their result.   See Kywanda F., 200 Wis.2d at 34, 546 N.W.2d at 445.   The
9 In In re R.H., this court also differentiated between mandatory and directory time
period stating:
The language … that the court shall set a hearing date which “is
no more than” a specified number of days from the previous
event, implies that the time is intended to be a limitation.   Where
a time limit has been held to be directory, the statute simply
provided that the act "shall" be done within a specified time.
In re R.H., 147 Wis.2d 22, 26, 433 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Ct. App. 1988), (citing Galewski v. Noe, 266
Wis. 7, 16, 62 N.W.2d 703, 708 (1954) (decision of trial court “shall be … filed” within sixty
days after submission)).
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No.s.   99-2019, 99-2020, 99-2021
legislative history and expressed policy here suggests that failure to satisfy the ten-
day time requirement under § 48.427(1), STATS., should not result in the loss of
competency.   Wade is not harmed in any conceivable way by the court’s failure to
file a written order memorializing its oral judgment within ten days.
¶31    Moreover, an opposite conclusion would be directly contrary to the
express  purposes  and  policies  behind  ch.                                               48,  STATS.    Section   48.01(1)   (gg),
STATS., states that it is the purpose of the chapter “[t]o promote the adoption of
children into safe and stable families rather than allowing children to remain in the
impermanence of foster or treatment foster care.”   Here, the circuit court found
that adoption was likely.   It stated, that “[i]t’s clear that the foster parents now are
willing to adopt these children.”   If the circuit court lost competency to file its
written order, the adoption it found likely would be on hold, contrary to the
express intent of ch. 48.
By the Court.—Orders affirmed.
This opinion will not be published.  See RULE 809.23(1)(b)4, STATS.
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