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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                         This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 21, 2001
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
                                                                                        Cornelia G. Clark                                                  petition to review an adverse decision by the
                                                                                        Clerk of Court of Appeals                                          Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                           and RULE 809.62.
No.                                                                                     00-2554
                                                                                        STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                 IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III
DONIVAN MOLITOR AND KAREN MOLITOR,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
V.
RUSK COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, JODI OMAN,
VERLYN FISER, DENNIS LELM AND RUSK COUNTY, A
WISCONSIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Rusk County:
EUGENE D. HARRINGTON, Judge.  Affirmed.
Before Hoover, P.J., Peterson and Vergeront, JJ.
¶1                                                                                      HOOVER, P.J.    Donivan and Karen Molitor appeal a judgment that
affirmed the Rusk County Board of Adjustment’s decision to deny their request
for a side yard setback variance.   They argue that the board failed to follow proper




No.   00-2554
procedure,  its decision  was not supported by the  evidence  and it erroneously
applied the law.   We disagree and affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶2                                                                                                 The Molitors own a parcel of land sixty-feet wide located on the
Lake Holcombe Flowage.    The County concedes that the ordinance governing
setbacks and permissible lot widths was amended after the Molitors’ property was
created.1   The ordinance now requires the side yards to be a minimum of fifteen
feet each, and the combined side yards must equal thirty-five feet.   RUSK COUNTY,
WIS., REV. ORDINANCES 17.57 SW-1 § 4.02 (1998).   The minimum lot width is
now 100 feet.   Id. at § 4.01.   The County does not dispute that these amendments
made  the  entire  subdivision,  of  which  the  Molitor  property  was  a  part,
nonconforming.
¶3                                                                                                 On August 6, 1998, the Molitors applied for and were issued a land
use  permit  to  build  an  addition  to  their  home  and  a  garage.    Because  the
structure/house was a prior nonconforming use, the zoning technician, Yvonne
Johnson, issued the permit under § 10.15, which provides:
No structural alteration, addition or repair to any building
or   structure   with   a   nonconforming   use   or   any
nonconforming building or structure, over the life of the
building or structure, shall exceed 50 percent of its current
real estate tax equalized fair market value for that year to
1   The Molitors refer to significant legislative history of the ordinance, the proof of which
is not in the record.   However, we address only what is in the record.   See WIS. STAT. RULE
§ 809.15(2); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 571, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).   Moreover, the
legislative history would only be relevant if the current ordinances were ambiguous.   Landis v.
Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶15, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 628 N.W.2d 893; State v. Ozaukee Cty.
Board of Adj., 152 Wis. 2d 552, 559, 449 N.W.2d 47 (Ct. App. 1989).   We are satisfied that the
setback ordinance is not ambiguous.
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No.   00-2554
be  applied  to  all  future  improvements,  unless  it  is
permanently changed to conform to the requirements of this
ordinance.
Johnson reasoned:
According to my calculations, your fair market value on the
home is  $52,395.    This makes your  50% dollar amount
26,197.   Using the estimates that you have provided me, I
have   calculated   that   the   amount   of   the   proposed
improvement will be $4,039.   This amount will be applied
to the 50% that you are allowed to spend which will leave
you                                                                                    $22,158  to  use  for  future  additions  or  structural
improvements.
If there are changes to the project which will affect the 50%
amount, please contact the zoning office so I can make the
necessary changes to the permit on file.
¶4                                                                                     On September 14, 1998, the Molitors sought to modify their permit
because they decided to enlarge the addition to their house.    The new zoning
administrator, CeCe Teske, reviewed the request.   She discovered that a previous
addition had been added to the nonconforming structure in 1995 and concluded
that the base line for the 50% value should have been established in 1995 instead
of 1998.   She found that the 1995 permit erroneously listed the addition and house
as meeting the fifteen-foot setbacks.   Teske testified that the Molitors, and not a
survey,  provided  the  previous  zoning  administrator  with  the  property  line
landmarks.   The board found the same fact.   Teske visited the site and measured
the distances.   She determined that the actual distance from the lot line to the
house was at or less than thirteen feet.    The survey that was later completed
confirmed that the building was 12.2 feet from the property line.   She also found
that the 1995 addition was twice as large as permitted.
¶5                                                                                     After discussing the situation with Donivan, Teske reported that he
suggested removing the additions from the house and adding them to the garage he
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No.   00-2554
planned to build on the property.   Teske approved this solution on October 26,
1998.
¶6                                                                                        The Molitors later decided that they were  not satisfied with this
solution and applied for a variance.    After a public hearing, the Rusk County
Board of Adjustment denied the request.   The board applied the standards found
§ 11.5 of the ordinance:
The  board  of  adjustment  may  grant  upon  application  a
variance from the dimensional standards of this ordinance
where an applicant convincingly demonstrates that:
1.   Literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance
will result in unnecessary hardship on the applicant;
2.   The hardship is due to special conditions unique to the
property;
3.   Such variance is not contrary to the public interest ….
The board unanimously concluded that enforcement of the ordinance would not
result in unnecessary hardship and that the hardship claimed was not due to unique
conditions of the property.2
¶7                                                                                        The Molitors appealed the decision to the circuit court and requested
that the court take evidence or appoint a referee to take evidence.    The court
remanded the case to the board for it to hold a public hearing and take evidence in
response to certain specific questions.   The board issued findings of fact for circuit
court review.
2  The majority of the board also determined that a variance would be contrary to the
public interest.
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No.   00-2554
¶8                                                                                                       The circuit court affirmed the variance denial.   The Molitors now
appeal.
                                                                                                         STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9                                                                                                       Our  scope  of  review  of  the  board’s  decision  is  limited  to  four
questions:                                                                                               (1) whether the board stayed within its jurisdiction;  (2) whether it
proceeded  on  a  correct  theory  of  law;                                                              (3)  whether  its  action  was  arbitrary,
oppressive  or  unreasonable,  representing  its  will  instead  of  its  judgment;  and
(4) whether the evidence was such that the board might reasonably have made the
determination under review.   State v. Kenosha County Board of Adj., 218 Wis. 2d
396, 410-11, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998).3
¶10    Because  the  circuit  court  considered  additional  evidence  as
permitted under WIS. STAT. § 59.694(10),4 we review the record as augmented by
the  second  board  hearing.    See  Lakeshore  Dev.  Corp.  v.  Plan  Comm’n,  12
Wis. 2d 560, 565, 107 N.W.2d 590 (1961).   The board’s findings of fact will be
upheld if substantial evidence supports its decision, even if substantial evidence
also supports the opposite conclusion.   See CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 564,
568 n.4, 579 N.W.2d 668 (1998).   Substantial evidence means relevant, credible
and  probative  evidence  upon  which  reasonable  persons could rely to reach  a
3  The court remanded the case to the board for additional fact finding, see WIS. STAT.
§ 59.694(10) (1997-98), and then applied those facts to its own conclusions of law.   Both parties
present their arguments as if we are reviewing both the board and the circuit court.    In an appeal
of a trial court order affirming an agency decision, however, we review the agency’s decision, not the
trial court’s.   See Sterlingworth Condo. Ass’n v. DNR, 205 Wis. 2d 710, 720, 556 N.W.2d 791 (Ct.
App. 1996).  Neither party has demonstrated why the trial court’s remand to the board for additional
fact finding would change this axiom.
4  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise
noted.
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No.   00-2554
conclusion.   See Princess House, Inc. v. DILHR, 111 Wis. 2d 46, 54, 330 N.W.2d
169 (1983).   The board, and not the reviewing courts, determine the weight and
credibility of  the  evidence.    Delta Biological Resources v.  Board of  Zoning
Appeals, 160 Wis. 2d 905, 915, 467 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1991).    Reviewing
courts are hesitant to interfere with administrative decisions and accord to the
board’s  decision  a  presumption  of  correctness  and  validity.    See  Snyder  v.
Waukesha County Zoning Board of Adj., 74 Wis. 2d 468, 476, 247 N.W.2d 98
(1976).
DISCUSSION
¶11    The Molitors raise five arguments relating to errors the board and
circuit court made.   It is necessary to resolve the questions of law regarding the
proper standards before we address the arguments related to the sufficiency of the
evidence.
I.   STANDARD FOR REVIEWING VARIANCES
¶12    The  heart  of  the  Molitors’  appeal  is  whether  the  standard  as
enunciated in Kenosha County,  218 Wis.  2d at  411, applies to this case.5    In
Kenosha County, a property owner was denied a variance to build a deck on a
lake house.   Id. at 401.   The proposed deck violated the seventy-five-foot setback
5  Members of our supreme court disagree on whether its recent decision in State v.
Outagamie County Board of Adj., 2001 WI 78, ___Wis. 2d ___, 628 N.W.2d 376, modified the
standard in Kenosha County.   Justices Sykes, Prosser, Crooks and Wilcox agreed that an owner
must only show unnecessary hardship in light of the purpose of the applicable zoning regulations.
Justices Sykes and Prosser perceived that Kenosha County should be overruled to arrive at this
standard.   Justices Crooks and Wilcox, however, viewed Kenosha County as already applying
this same “purpose” standard.   See Outagamie Cty., 2001 WI 78 at ¶¶68, 69, 73, 81 and 83.   It is
unnecessary to resolve this conflict for the purpose of this decision.
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No.   00-2554
requirement.   Id.   Upon review, the supreme court reasoned that an applicant has
the burden to prove that a variance is required to avoid an unnecessary hardship.6
Id. at 410.   It determined that unnecessary hardship could only be proved where
the property owner has no reasonable use of the property without the variance.   Id.
at 411.
¶13    The  Molitors  contend  that  the  board  should  have  applied  the
standard found in Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 474.   The Molitors read Snyder to require
proof  of  a  “practical  difficulty”  rather  than  an                                  “unnecessary  hardship.”    The
Molitors appear to interpret “practical difficulty” as a less onerous burden than
“unnecessary hardship.”   We disagree.   Snyder explained:                               “[A]lthough the terms
‘unnecessary  hardship’  and                                                             ‘practical  difficulty’  are  insusceptible  to  precise
definition and are often stated disjunctively in zoning enactments, the authorities
generally recognize that there is no practical difference between them.”   Id. at 472.
¶14    The Molitors further contend that Kenosha County does not apply to
their case because Kenosha County resolved the standard for shoreline setbacks,
not side lot setbacks.   Kenosha County answers the Molitors’ argument when it
6  The court interpreted WIS. STAT. § 59.694(7)(c), which provides:
POWERS OF BOARD. The board of adjustment shall have all of the
following powers:
.…
(c) To authorize upon appeal in specific cases variances from
the terms of the ordinance that will not be contrary to the public
interest, where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement
of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary
hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed
and substantial justice done.
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No.   00-2554
quoted a previous case to demonstrate that “unnecessary hardship” should apply to
all aspects of an area variance, not just a setback from the waterfront.
In  a  previous  application  of  the  zoning  statute,  we
described an unnecessary hardship as where  “compliance
with the strict letter of the restrictions governing area, set
backs, frontage … would unreasonably prevent the owner
from using the property for a permitted purpose or would
render  conformity  with  such  restrictions  unnecessarily
burdensome.”
Id. at 412 (quoting Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 475, citing 2 RATHKOPF, The Law of
Zoning & Planning, 45-28 (3d ed. 1972)).   The court did not differentiate between
side setbacks and waterfront setbacks.
¶15    Once  an  appellate  court  interprets  legislation,  its  interpretation
becomes a part of the enactment as much as if it appeared expressly therein, unless
the legislative body subsequently amends the legislation.   See Salerno v. John
Oster Mfg. Co., 37 Wis. 2d 433, 441, 155 N.W.2d 66 (1967).   There has been no
amendment to  WIS. STAT.  § 59.694  (7)(c)  since Kenosha County.    Thus, we
conclude that the proper standard to be applied to this case is whether the Molitors
have no reasonable use of the property without the variance.
II.   SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
¶16    The Molitors first contend that the board failed to make findings of
fact to support its decision and that the board failed to make a sufficient record of
the proceedings.
¶17    Under WIS. STAT. § 59.694(3), the board is required only to keep
minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each member upon each question,
or, if absent or failing to vote, indicating that fact.   The statute further mandates
that the minutes be filed immediately in the office of the board of adjustment and
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No.   00-2554
shall be a public record.   The board followed this procedure and filed a signed
decision articulating the reasons for the variance denial.
¶18    The circuit court had further questions and remanded the case to the
board to make findings relevant to those questions.   The board held a hearing and
recorded the proceedings in a transcript.   The Molitors concede that nothing in the
case law commands that the board prepare written findings of fact, conclusions of
law and judgment.   We conclude that the board satisfied the statutory requirements
for recording the proceedings.7
¶19    Next, the Molitors argue that substantial evidence does not support
the decision. They contend that they suffered an unnecessary hardship and that
their property was unique, qualifying them for a variance.
¶20    The  Molitors  carry a  dual  burden  on  this  appeal  in  order  to  be
granted a variance.   See Arndorfer v. Sauk Cty. Board of Adj., 162 Wis. 2d 246,
253,  469 N.W.2d  831  (1991).    First, they must overcome the presumption of
correctness accorded to the board’s decision.   Id.   Second, they must show that
they will suffer unnecessary hardship if a variance is not granted.   Id.
[T]he question of whether unnecessary hardship … exists is
best  explained  as                                                                                 “[w]hether  compliance  with  the  strict
letter of the  [zoning] restrictions  … would unreasonably
prevent the owner from using the property for a permitted
purpose or would render conformity with such restrictions
unnecessarily burdensome.”
7  The Molitors also argue that because the record is so inadequate, it is “impossible to
determine if the Court of Appeals kept within its jurisdiction.”   Because we conclude that the
record has been sufficiently memorialized, we dismiss this argument without resolving whether
the Molitors mean the circuit court, the board or, although quite unlikely, the court of appeals.
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No.   00-2554
Id. at 255 (quoting 2 RATHKOPF, supra, at 45-28, as cited in Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at
474-75).   To be an unnecessary hardship, it must be related to a unique condition
affecting the subject property.   Id.   If the hardship applies to the neighboring lands
as  well  as  the  subject  property,  it  is  not  unique,  and  the  owner  should  seek
legislative relief, rather than administrative relief.   Id. at 256.   To grant variances
in these cases would  “be unfair to owners who remain subject to the general
restrictions of the zoning ordinance, and it would endanger the community plan by
piecemeal exemption.”   Id. (quoting 3 ANDERSON, American Law of Zoning, 474-
76 (3d ed. 1986)).   In addition, to be an unnecessary hardship, the variance must
not be contrary to the public interest.   Id.
¶21    A zoning authority has the power to enact ordinances that limit the
change or extension of nonconforming uses.   Schroeder v. Dane County Board of
Adj., 228 Wis. 2d 324, 339, 596 N.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1999).   Thus, Rusk County
had the authority to adopt an ordinance that established side yard setbacks and,
given pre-existing nonconforming lots, prohibit further building beyond setbacks
without a variance.   The County also had the authority to establish a rule that a
building permit will only be issued for additions on nonconforming structure up to
50% of the assessed building value.   Variances are granted sparingly.   Kenosha
County, 218 Wis. 2d at 421 (citing 3 ZIEGLER, Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning &
Planning,  §  37.06 at  37-81  (4th ed.  1993).    As described above, the ordinance
requires the board to examine three criteria to determine whether a variance is
appropriate.    Here,  the  first  two,  unnecessary  hardship  and  uniqueness,  are
dispositive.   We therefore do not address the public interest standard.   See Norwest
Bank Wisconsin Eau Claire, N.A., v. Plourde,  185 Wis.  2d  377,  383 n.1,  518
N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1994).
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No.   00-2554
¶22    A property’s “uniqueness” in the case law is interpreted as a means
for proving unnecessary hardship.    See Kenosha County,  218 Wis.  2d at  409
(citing Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 254).   Arndorfer noted:
Hardship  is  not  peculiar  to  the  applicant’s  land  if  it  is
shared  by  a  neighborhood  or  an  entire  area;  a  shared
hardship will not support the granting of a use variance to
relieve  it.                                                                             …  Where  the  hardship  imposed  upon  an
applicant’s  property  is  no  greater  than  that  suffered  by
nearby  lands,  the  board  of  adjustment  may  not  grant  a
variance to relieve it.
Id. at 255-56 (quoting 3 ANDERSON, supra, at 474-76).
¶23    To  the  extent  the  shoreland  regulations  have  been  amended  to
impose limitations on lot sizes and side yard setbacks, they apply to all lots on
Lake Holcombe and all other navigable bodies of water in Rusk County.   The
Molitors  concede  that  other  lots  in  their  subdivision  are  nonconforming.    A
condition  that applies  to  multiple  properties does not  make  a  single  property
unique.   Their remedy is with the legislature, not the board of adjustment.   As we
stated above, the Molitors have the burden on this issue and they have not shown
that their property is unique.
¶24    Nowhere in the record is there any testimony or other evidence that
the Molitors’ home is unlivable, unsafe, that it has been damaged or destroyed or
that they can make no reasonable use of the property.   The Molitors are charged
with full knowledge of zoning ordinances.    Willow Creek Ranch v. Town of
Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶162, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 482, 611 N.W.2d 693.   They chose
not to have a survey completed before beginning construction on the addition to
their house.   They built an addition twice as large as that approved.   The record
supports the conclusion that they created a self-imposed hardship.   Their hardship
is therefore not unnecessarily burdensome.
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No.   00-2554
¶25    The board has discretion to deny a variance for an addition that does
not  satisfy  the  ordinance’s  purpose.    The  evidence  shows  that  the  Molitors’
proposed addition would violate the setback limit in 1998 and also in 1995.   The
applicant bears the burden to demonstrate that the variance should have been
granted.    The  Molitors  did  not  meet  that  burden.    The  board  was  within  its
discretion to conclude  that the  1998 proposed construction exceeded both the
setback requirements and the rule allowing only 50% of the value to be invested in
remodeling the nonconforming house.8
¶26    The board had substantial evidence before it to determine that the
Molitors’ request did not meet two of the three standards required by ordinance for
approval  of  a  variance.    The  board  applied  the  proper  standards  of  law  and
properly denied the variance.   We affirm the trial court’s decision to affirm the
board.
8  The Molitors contend that the zoning administrator was without authority to revoke the
building permit.   Although this case is before us on a review of the variance denial, we note that
even where a permit was issued, if based upon an erroneous reading of an ordinance by the
official  charged  with  its  enforcement,  this  would  not  prevent  the  municipality  from  later
enforcing the ordinance as written.  See Village of Wind Point v. Halverson, 38 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 155
N.W.2d 654 (1967); Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 477 (a building permit cannot confer the right to
violate the ordinance).   We dismiss their laches, estoppel and unclean hands arguments on the
same grounds.
The Molitors also make reference to “political infighting, pettiness, and outright fraud”
being the cause of the variance denial.   The only evidence they cite is that the new zoning
administrator disagreed with the previous zoning administrator whether a building permit should
have been granted.   The new administrator explained that after a site visit and discovery that the
previous administrator had based the permit on boundaries supplied by the Molitors, the permit
was not properly issued.    The Molitors provide no other support for this claim of political
infighting.  We do not address the issue further.
To the extent we have not addressed other arguments the Molitors have raised, the
arguments are deemed rejected.  See State v. Waste Mgmt., 81 Wis. 2d 555, 564, 261 N.W.2d 147
(1977).
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No.   00-2554
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
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