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2000  WI  App  264
COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.:                                         00-0903
Complete Title
of Case:
IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST OF
CATHERINE H. BOWEN CHARITABLE TRUST:
ERIC J. WEINBERGER,
APPELLANT,
V.
JOHN F. BOWEN,
CO-TRUSTEE-RESPONDENT,
CATHERINE H. BOWEN,
RESPONDENT,
CHRISTOPHER H. BOWEN,
SUCCESSOR-TRUSTEE-RESPONDENT,
JENNIFER B. WEINBERGER, MELINDA L. BOWEN, SARAH
I. BOWEN, MICHAEL S. BOWEN AND ERIK A. BOWEN,
BENEFICIARIES-RESPONDENTS.
Opinion Filed:                                    November 8, 2000
Submitted on Briefs:                              October 2, 2000




JUDGES:                                                                 Brown, P.J., Nettesheim and Anderson, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYS:                                                              On behalf of the appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of
Gerald M. O’Brien of Anderson, Shannon, O’Brien, Rice & Bertz of
Stevens Point.
Respondent
ATTORNEYS:                                                              On behalf of the co-trustee-respondent, respondent, successor-trustee-
respondent, and beneficiaries-respondents, the cause was submitted on
the brief of William E. Duffin of Godfrey & Kahn, S.C. of Milwaukee.




COURT OF APPEALS                                  2000  WI  App  264
DECISION
                                                  DATED AND FILED           NOTICE
                                                                            This  opinion  is  subject  to  further  editing.  If
                                                  November 8, 2000          published, the official version will appear in the
                                                                            bound volume of the Official Reports.
                                                  Cornelia G. Clark
                                                                            A  party  may  file  with  the  Supreme  Court  a
                                                  Clerk, Court of Appeals
                                                                            petition  to  review  an  adverse  decision  by  the
                                                  of Wisconsin
                                                                            Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
                                                                            RULE 809.62.
No.                                               00-0903
                                                  STATE OF WISCONSIN        IN COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST OF
CATHERINE H. BOWEN CHARITABLE TRUST:
ERIC J. WEINBERGER,
APPELLANT,
V.
JOHN F. BOWEN,
CO-TRUSTEE-RESPONDENT,
CATHERINE H. BOWEN,
RESPONDENT,
CHRISTOPHER H. BOWEN,
SUCCESSOR-TRUSTEE-RESPONDENT,
JENNIFER B. WEINBERGER, MELINDA L. BOWEN, SARAH
I. BOWEN, MICHAEL S. BOWEN AND ERIK A. BOWEN,




No. 00-0903
BENEFICIARIES-RESPONDENTS.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Fond du Lac
County:   PETER L. GRIMM, Judge.   Affirmed.
Before Brown, P.J., Nettesheim and Anderson, JJ.
¶1                                                                                                NETTESHEIM, J.    Eric J. Weinberger appeals from a circuit
court order removing him as a co-trustee of the Catherine H. Bowen Charitable
Trust and appointing another in his stead.   The order was premised upon WIS.
STAT.                                                                                             § 701.12(1)                                                      (1997-98),1  which  permits  revocation,  modification  or
termination of a trust upon the written consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries.2
¶2                                                                                                On appeal, Weinberger argues that his removal under WIS. STAT.
§ 701.12(1)  violated  an  express  provision  in  the  trust  agreement  that  barred
modification  of  the  trust.    Instead,  Weinberger  argues  that  he  could  only be
removed for cause pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 701.18(2).   And since the court did
not conduct any factual inquiry as to cause for his removal, Weinberger asks that
we reverse the order.
¶3                                                                                                We agree with the circuit court that WIS. STAT. § 701.12(1),
not WIS. STAT. § 701.18(2), applies to this case.   Therefore, we affirm the order.
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 version.
2 The order also provided that in the future a co-trustee could be removed by the vote of a
majority of the legally competent descendants of the settlor.   Weinberger does not appeal this
provision of the order.
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No. 00-0903
HISTORY
¶4                                                                                                  The relevant facts are brief and undisputed.   We take them
from the petition which initiated this action.   Catherine H. Bowen established the
Catherine H. Bowen Charitable Trust under a trust agreement dated September 12,
1988.   Catherine named her son John F. Bowen as one co-trustee and Weinberger,
who was married to her granddaughter Jennifer, as the other co-trustee.   The trust
included the following provision at Article III:
Revocation or Amendment of Trust.   It is the intention of
the Grantor that any transfer to any Trust created under this
Trust Agreement shall constitute an irrevocable gift without
possibility  of  reverter.     This  Trust  is  irrevocable  and
neither the Grantor nor any other person shall have the
power  to  alter,  amend  or  modify  this  Trust  Agreement
except as specifically provided in paragraph  3.8, below.3
(Emphasis added.)
¶5                                                                                                  After the trust was created, Jennifer commenced a divorce action
against Weinberger.    As a result, Bowen, the co-trustee, asked Weinberger to
resign as a co-trustee.   Weinberger refused.  Consequently, Catherine and all of the
trust beneficiaries commenced the instant action by written petition asking the
circuit court to substitute a new co-trustee in place of Weinberger.4   The petition
was brought pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 701.12(1), which authorizes the revocation,
modification or termination of a trust upon “written consent of the settlor and all
3 Paragraph 3.8, entitled Limited Power to Amend, authorizes the co-trustees to amend
the trust agreement for purposes of assuring that the trust continued to qualify as a “charitable
lead unitrust” under relevant tax law.  This provision is not germane to the appellate issue.
4 The petition also asked the circuit court to order that any future co-trustee could be
removed by a vote of a majority of the legally competent descendants of the settlor.   See supra
note 2.
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No. 00-0903
beneficiaries.”   In the alternative, the petition sought Weinberger’s removal for
cause pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 701.18(2).5
¶6                                                                                                      The parties submitted written briefs and oral arguments to the circuit
court.   In a bench decision, the court ruled that WIS. STAT. § 701.12(1) was the
controlling statute.   Since Catherine and all of the beneficiaries had consented in
writing to the modification of the trust as required by the statute, the court ordered
Weinberger’s removal as a co-trustee.   Weinberger appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7                                                                                                      We first address our standard of review.   The trial court record in
this  case  consists  of  the  written  petition,  the  parties’  written  briefs  and  the
transcript of their oral arguments.   The parties did not seek, and the circuit court
did not conduct, a formal trial.   Thus, we have a “paper record.”   In such a setting,
we need not give any special deference to the trial court’s findings or rulings
because we are in as good a position as the trial court to address the issue.   See
Racine Educ. Ass’n v. Racine Bd. of Educ., 145 Wis. 2d 518, 521, 427 N.W.2d
414 (Ct. App. 1988); see also State ex rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266,
281  n.15,  392  N.W.2d  453  (Ct. App.  1986).    Moreover,  in this case  we  are
required to apply the statutes at issue to a particular set of facts.   That exercise
presents  a  question  of  law  which  we  decide  independently  of,  and  without
5 In support of the removal for cause, the petition alleged that Weinberger “is unsuitable
to continue in office because the pending dissolution of the marriage of                                [Weinberger and
Jennifer] has created a conflict wherein [Weinberger] no longer is able to fulfill his fiduciary duty
of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries and to administer the Trust in an objective and unbiased
manner.”
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No. 00-0903
deference to, the trial court’s ruling.   See Midwest Developers v. Goma Corp., 121
Wis. 2d 632, 651, 360 N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1984).   Thus, our review is de novo.
¶8                                                                                      Despite our de novo standard of review, we value a trial court’s
decision.   See Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 179 Wis. 2d 469, 475-76, 507
N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1993).   Here the circuit court has provided us with a well-
reasoned decision that is helpful and informative on the issue.
DISCUSSION
¶9                                                                                      We begin by setting out the two statutes at issue.   WISCONSIN STAT.
§ 701.12(1) provides:
By written consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries of a
trust or any part thereof, such trust or part thereof may be
revoked, modified or terminated, except as provided under
s. 445.125 (1) (a) 2. to 4.
WISCONSIN STAT. § 701.18(2) provides in pertinent part:
REMOVAL.   A trustee may be removed in accordance with
the terms of the creating instrument or the court may, upon
its  own  motion  or  upon  a  petition  by  a  beneficiary  or
cotrustee, and upon notice and hearing, remove a trustee
who fails to comply with the requirements of this chapter or
a court order, or who is otherwise unsuitable to continue in
office.
¶10    In this court, the parties renew their trial court arguments.    The
petitioners  contend  that  WIS.  STAT.                                                 § 701.12(1)  plainly  and  unambiguously
governs the issue because Catherine and all of the trust beneficiaries have, by their
written petition,   consented in writing to the modification substituting another in
place of Weinberger as a co-trustee.   Weinberger argues that the trust provision
prohibiting  modification  or  amendment  of  the  trust  agreement  precludes  the
application of § 701.12(1).   Instead, Weinberger contends that the petitioners’ only
recourse was to seek his removal for cause pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 701.18(2),
which he argues is the more specific statute under the circumstances of this case.
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No. 00-0903
See Gillen v. City of Neenah,  219 Wis.  2d  806,  822,  580 N.W.2d  628  (1998)
(“Where  general and  specific  statutory provisions are  in conflict,  the  specific
provisions take precedence.”).
¶11    We reject Weinberger’s argument.   We agree with the circuit court’s
holding that WIS. STAT.  § 701.12(1) clearly and unambiguously allows for the
revocation, modification or termination of a trust upon the written consent of the
settlor and all the trust beneficiaries.   That, of course, is precisely what occurred in
this case.   The circuit court also correctly observed that the statute does not limit
its application to only certain situations.    Rather, the court concluded that the
statute  applies                                                                              “to  any scenario  …  where  the  trust  may be  silent or  may be
ambiguous or has an express bar against amendments.”
¶12    Weinberger argues that the circuit court’s ruling overrides the intent
of the settlor as expressed in the trust agreement.   He cites to case law which holds
that  a  court  is  obligated  to  uphold  the  intent  of  the  settlor.    See  Upham  v.
Plankinton,  152 Wis.  275,  283-84,  140 N.W.  5  (1913), and In re Charitable
Trust, Oshkosh Found., 61 Wis. 2d 432, 442, 213 N.W.2d 54 (1973).   We, of
course, accept this fundamental principle of the law of trusts.   And we further
accept that, in most cases, the trust document will control on this question because
the settlor is deceased.   See, e.g., Upham, 152 Wis. at 277.   But here the settlor is
still  living  and  her  current  intent  as  to  who  should  serve  as  a  co-trustee  is
unequivocally expressed via her written consent to the removal of Weinberger and
her desire to substitute another in his stead.   We cannot discern any sound reason
why the settlor and all of the beneficiaries should be precluded from modifying the
terms of a trust if all are in agreement that such action is appropriate.   By its
enactment of WIS. STAT. § 701.12(1), the legislature also apparently could discern
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No. 00-0903
no such reason.   In short, the statute, and our application of it to this case, honors
the intent of the settlor.
¶13    Weinberger further argues that WIS. STAT. § 701.18(2), permitting
removal of a trustee for cause, not WIS. STAT. § 701.12(1), is the operative statute
in this situation.   We acknowledge that a plain and unambiguous statute such as
§ 701.12(1) may be rendered ambiguous by its interaction with other statutes.   See
McDonough v. DWD, 227 Wis. 2d 271, 278, 595 N.W.2d 686 (1999).   In that
situation, we read the statutes in pari materia, attempting to give meaning to both.
See id. at 279-80.   In addition, we note that a statute which is plain on its face may
also be rendered ambiguous by the context in which it is sought to be applied.   See
Roehl v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 136, 145, 585 N.W.2d 893
(Ct. App.), review denied, 222 Wis. 2d 676, 589 N.W.2d 630 (Wis. Dec. 15, 1998)
(No. 98-1207-FT).
¶14    But  we  agree  with  the  circuit  court  that  the  two  statutes  serve
different purposes.   On the one hand, WIS. STAT. § 701.12(1) allows a settlor and
all of the trust beneficiaries to revoke, modify or terminate a trust if all are in
agreement.   Such a removal need not be premised on any cause.   On the other
hand, WIS. STAT. § 701.18(2) provides a means for removing a trustee where the
conditions envisioned by § 701.12(1) do not exist.   However, in that setting, the
trustee can be removed only upon a showing of cause.   Thus, § 701.18(2) would
apply where the settlor and all of the trust beneficiaries are not in agreement that
removal is appropriate, or where the settlor is no longer living and therefore
unable to provide written consent to the removal as required by § 701.12(1).
¶15    In summary, WIS. STAT. § 701.12(1) is not rendered ambiguous by
its interaction with WIS. STAT. § 701.18(2) or by its application to the facts of this
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No. 00-0903
case.    Therefore,  we  reject  Weinberger’s  argument  that  by  allowing  for  his
removal under  § 701.12(1), we are defeating the legislative purpose served by
§ 701.18(2).   We agree with the circuit court that the two statutes serve different
purposes in different situations.
CONCLUSION
¶16    We uphold the circuit court’s ruling that WIS. STAT. § 701.12(1) was
the controlling statute in this case.    Therefore, we affirm the order removing
Weinberger as a co-trustee and substituting another in his stead.6
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
6 Because we hold that WIS. STAT. § 701.12(1) governs this case, we need not address
Weinberger’s further argument that the circuit court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing as to whether he should be removed for cause pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 701.18(2).
8

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