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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                               This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 30, 2010
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
A. John Voelker                                                                                                                                                  petition to review an adverse decision by the
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                                                                                 Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                                 and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                                 Cir. Ct. No.   2009SC3578
Appeal No.                                                                                    2010AP461
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                                                                                                 DISTRICT IV
LISA WHITING,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
V.
JEFFREY WHITING,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Dane
County:   DANIEL R. MOESER, Judge.   Affirmed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.
¶1                                                                                            LUNDSTEN, J.1    Lisa Whiting appeals the dismissal of her small
claims action against her former husband, Jeffrey Whiting.   She argues that her
1  This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(a) (2007-08).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.




No.   2010AP461
action, which sought rent from Jeffrey for their marital apartment, was properly
brought  in  small  claims  court.    She  also  contends  that  the  court  improperly
awarded Jeffrey attorney’s fees as a sanction.   I disagree and affirm the dismissal
and sanction.   In addition, I grant Jeffrey’s motion for sanctions for this appeal,
and remand for an assessment of costs, fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees.
Background
¶2                                                                                        In March 2009, Jeffrey Whiting filed for divorce from Lisa Whiting.
After this divorce filing, Lisa filed a complaint in April 2009 in small claims court
seeking rent money from Jeffrey for their marital apartment.   Lisa sought one-half
of the rent for the period of time remaining on the lease after Jeffrey moved out of
the apartment.   Citing the ongoing divorce proceedings, Jeffrey sought dismissal
of Lisa’s small claims action and moved for sanctions under WIS. STAT. § 802.05.
After  a  hearing,  the  court  commissioner  agreed  that  the  ongoing  divorce
proceedings   barred   Lisa’s   action   and,   accordingly,   dismissed   it.            The
commissioner also found grounds for sanctions under both § 802.05(2)(a) and (b)
and awarded Jeffery $660 in attorney’s fees.
¶3                                                                                        Lisa sought review of the court commissioner’s decision by filing a
small claims demand for trial.   Jeffrey again moved to dismiss.   After a hearing,
the circuit court granted Jeffrey’s motion, indicating that “[t]he case was properly
handled … in the divorce proceedings.”   The circuit court also imposed a $660
sanction against Lisa.   Lisa appeals pro se from the circuit court’s judgment and
order.
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No.   2010AP461
Discussion
¶4                                                                                         Lisa asserts that the circuit court incorrectly dismissed her small
claims action.   Lisa apparently believes that her action was properly a small claims
action because she seeks relief under WIS. STAT. § 766.70.   More specifically, she
asserts that § 766.70 “establishes Jeffrey Whiting’s responsibility to pay ½ the rent
for  the  marital  property.”    Lisa,  however,  does  not  and  could  not  provide  a
sensible argument to support that assertion.
¶5                                                                                         WISCONSIN STAT. § 766.70 is found in the code’s chapter on marital
property and provides various remedies for spouses.   For example, § 766.70(1)
provides that “[a] spouse has a claim against the other spouse for breach of the
duty of good faith imposed by s.  766.15 resulting in damage to the claimant
spouse’s property.”
¶6                                                                                         Lisa ignores the restriction found in WIS. STAT. § 767.331.   Section
767.331 expressly forbids a spouse from bringing an action under WIS. STAT.
§ 766.70 when there is a pending divorce action.   That section states:                    “No action
under s. 766.70 may be brought by a spouse against the other spouse while an
action for divorce, annulment or legal separation is pending under this chapter.”
WIS.  STAT.  § 767.331; see  also Gardner v.  Gardner,  175  Wis.  2d  420,  431,
499 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1993) (“Once an action for divorce is filed, a separate
cause of action under sec.  766.70, Stats., is barred.”).    It is undisputed that a
divorce action had been filed and was pending when Lisa brought her small claims
action premised on § 766.70.   Thus, Lisa’s assertion that § 766.70 supports her
small claims action plainly fails under § 767.331.
¶7                                                                                         Beyond  what  I  have  just  addressed,  Lisa  does  not  develop  an
alternative argument supporting her claim.    Rather, Lisa’s other assertions all
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No.   2010AP461
assume that her action premised on WIS. STAT. § 766.70 was proper.   For example,
Lisa asserts that her claim was within the dollar-amount limit for a small claims
action, and she argues that she should prevail on the merits of her small claims
action.   Neither of these assertions matter, however, because her action is barred
for the reason explained in ¶6, above.2
¶8                                                                                             Lisa also complains that the circuit court erred when sanctioning her.
Lisa does not provide any legal argument explaining why that is true.   Also fatal to
this argument is Lisa’s failure to provide this court with the transcript of the circuit
court hearing that resulted in the sanction.   In these circumstances, I “presume that
every fact essential to sustain the circuit court’s decision is supported by the
record.”   Butcher v. Ameritech Corp., 2007 WI App 5, ¶35, 298 Wis. 2d 468, 727
N.W.2d 546 (Ct. App. 2006).
¶9                                                                                             Regarding the circuit court sanction, the record contains only the
circuit court minute sheet and the circuit court’s order stating:                              “Attorney fees are
also awarded in the amount of $660.00.”   Thus, I can only conclude that the circuit
court imposed the sanction for the same two reasons as the court commissioner.
Either of these two reasons provides a basis for affirming the circuit court.
¶10    First, I would affirm a sanction under WIS. STAT.  § 802.05(2)(a),
which allows sanctions for a filing with an “improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”   Notably,
this  ground  for  sanctions  requires  factual  findings  by  the  circuit  court.    See
Wisconsin Chiropractic Ass’n v. Chiropractic Examining Bd., 2004 WI App 30,
2  Lisa also requests “attorneys fees” and “small claims court filing fees.”   Lisa does not
provide any context for these requests and, thus, I do not address them.
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No.   2010AP461
¶16, 269 Wis. 2d 837, 676 N.W.2d 580.   Here, because Lisa has not provided the
transcript, I must assume that the facts support a sanction under this provision and,
accordingly, would affirm the sanction.
¶11    Second, I would affirm a sanction under WIS. STAT. § 802.05(2)(b),
which  allows sanctions for frivolous legal contentions.    Applied  here,  I  have
already explained that Lisa’s argument on appeal is meritless.   And, as far as the
record reveals, Lisa presented the same unsupported argument to the circuit court
after receiving notice that the argument was meritless.
¶12    For the reasons stated, I affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Lisa’s
action and the imposition of sanctions.
¶13    Jeffrey moves for costs, fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees for this
appeal pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3).   Jeffrey argues that either of two
grounds for sanctions supports granting his motion:   first, that Lisa’s appeal is
“solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously injuring” Jeffrey and, second, that
Lisa knew, or should  have known, that her appeal was frivolous.    See RULE
809.25(3)                                                                               (c).   I conclude that sanctions are merited under the second ground.
¶14    I apply the following principles:
[A]n  appeal  is  frivolous  if                                                         “[t]he  party  or  the  party’s
attorney knew, or should have known, that the appeal or
cross-appeal was without any reasonable basis in law or
equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”
Sec.  809.25(3)(c)2.    Whether an appeal is frivolous is a
question  of  law.    An  appellate  court  considers  “what  a
reasonable party or attorney knew or should have known
under  the  same  or  similar  circumstances.”                                          “As  with
lawyers, a pro se litigant is required to make a reasonable
investigation  of  the  facts  and  the  law  before  filing  an
appeal.”   If an appeal is found to be frivolous, “the court
shall  award  to  the  successful  party  costs,  fees,  and
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No.   2010AP461
                                                                                                    reasonable  attorney  fees  under  this  section.”                            Sec.
809.25(3)                                                                                   (a)     (emphasis  added).                                   “To  award  costs  and
attorney fees,  an  appellate  court  must  conclude  that  the
entire appeal is frivolous.”
Larson v. Burmaster, 2006 WI App 142, ¶45, 295 Wis. 2d 333, 720 N.W.2d 134
(citations omitted).
¶15    Applying  these  principles,  I  conclude  that  the  entire  appeal  is
frivolous.   Lisa has presented an appellate argument that is largely incoherent and,
to the extent there is an actual legal argument, it is patently meritless.   The record
demonstrates that Lisa should have known her appeal was frivolous because the
same meritless argument was rejected in the previous proceedings.   To the extent
that  Lisa  raises  a  new  issue  by challenging  the  circuit  court’s  sanctions,  her
argument is undeveloped and unsupported by the record.
¶16    Thus, I conclude that Lisa’s entire appeal is frivolous because she
either knew, or should have known, that her appeal was “without any reasonable
basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an
extension,  modification  or  reversal  of  existing  law.”    See  WIS.  STAT.  RULE
809.25(3)                                                                                   (c)2.
¶17    I  also  observe  that a  sanction  here  is consistent with  the  policy
described in Riley v. Isaacson, 156 Wis. 2d 249, 456 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1990).
That is, if I do not grant Jeffrey’s request for sanctions, I would undercut the
make-whole remedy provided by WIS. STAT. § 802.05.   See Riley, 156 Wis. 2d at
262 (“The intent is to provide a ‘make-whole’ remedy to place the prevailing party
in  the  position  it  would  have  been  in  had  the  frivolous  argument  not  been
advanced in the trial court.”).
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No.   2010AP461
Conclusion
¶18    For the reasons stated, I affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Lisa’s
action and the sanction imposed.   I also remand for an assessment of costs, fees,
and reasonable attorney’s fees under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3).
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed and cause remanded
for further proceedings.
This opinion will not be published.   WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
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