Preview:

2002  WI  21
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:                                                                  00-0420
COMPLETE TITLE:
Manitowoc  Western  Company,  Inc.,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant,
v.
Allan  Montonen,
Defendant-Third-Party  Plaintiff-Appellant-
Cross-Respondent-Petitioner,
v.
Manitex,  Inc.,  The  Manitowoc  Company,  Inc.,  Fred
Butler,  Robert  R.  Friedl,  and  Does  1  through  20,
inclusive,
Third-Party  Defendants-Respondents-
Cross-Appellants.
REVIEW  OF  A  DECISION  OF  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS
Reported  at:                                                              244  Wis.  2d  285,  628  N.W.2d  438
(Ct.  App.  2001-Unpublished)
OPINION FILED:                                                             February  27,  2002
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:                                                             January  10,  2002
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:                                                                     Circuit
COUNTY:                                                                    Manitowoc
JUDGE:                                                                     Darryl  W.  Deets
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For    the                                                                 defendant-third-party    plaintiff-appellant-cross
respondent-petitioner  there  were  briefs  by  John  J.  Prentice,
Andrew  T.  Phillips  and  Prentice  &  Phillips,  Milwaukee,  and  oral
argument  by  Andrew  T.  Phillips.
For   plaintiff-respondent-cross-appellant   and   third-party
defendants-respondents-cross-appellants   there   was   a   brief   by
Richard  C.  Ninneman,  Brian  D.  Winters  and  Quarles  &  Brady  LLP,
Milwaukee,  and  oral  argument  by  Richard  C.  Ninneman.




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2002  WI  21
NOTICE
This  opinion  is  subject  to  further
editing  and  modification.    The  final
version   will   appear   in   the   bound
volume of the official reports.
No.                                                                         00-0420
(L.C.  No.                                                                  96  CV  117)
STATE  OF  WISCONSIN                                                        :                IN  SUPREME  COURT
Manitowoc  Western  Company,  Inc.,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-
Appellant,
v.
Allan  Montonen,
FILED
Defendant-Third-Party  Plaintiff-
Appellant-Cross-Respondent-                                                 FEB  27,  2002
Petitioner,
Cornelia G. Clark
Clerk of Supreme Court
v.
Manitex,  Inc.,  The  Manitowoc  Company,
Inc.,  Fred  Butler,  Robert  R.  Friedl,  and
Does  1  through  20,  inclusive,
Third-Party  Defendants-
Respondents-Cross-Appellants.
REVIEW  of  a  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.    Affirmed.
¶1    ANN    WALSH    BRADLEY,    J.      The    petitioner,    Allan
Montonen,   seeks   review   of   an   unpublished   court   of   appeals
decision  affirming  a  circuit  court  grant  of  summary  judgment  in




No.                                                                           00-0420
favor  of  the  respondent,  Manitowoc  Western  Company.1     Montonen
asserts  that  this  court  should  extend  the  fraud  exception  to  the
transient  rule  of  personal  jurisdiction  in  order  to  prohibit
service  of  a  lawsuit  on  a  person  who  comes  to  Wisconsin  for
settlement  negotiations.     Because  we  conclude  that  the  public
policies  at  stake  are  best  served  by  the  fraud  exception  as  it
presently  stands,  we  decline  to  extend  the  exception  as  Montonen
asks.    Accordingly,  we  affirm  the  court  of  appeals.
I
¶2    The  pleadings  and  affidavits  set  forth  the  following
facts.     Manitowoc  Western  Company  is  a  Wisconsin  corporation
that  employed  Montonen,  a  California  resident,  in  its  Benicia,
California  facility.    In  October  1994,  Manitowoc  Western  sent  a
letter   to   Montonen   outlining   proposed   terms   for   Manitowoc
Western's  sale  of  its  Benicia  Boom  Truck  Crane  Dealership  to
Montonen.     Manitowoc  Western  believed  the  letter  to  be  a  non-
binding  general  expression  of  intent,  but  Montonen  maintained
that  the  letter  was  a  binding  and  enforceable  agreement.
¶3    Although   the   parties   dispute   many   of   the   details
surrounding   events   subsequent   to   the   signing   of   the   October
letter,   the   following   three   facts   are   undisputed.                 First,
Montonen  came  to  Wisconsin  with  his  attorney  on  April  30,  1996,
to  meet  with  representatives  of  Manitowoc  Western  to  discuss
1  See   Manitowoc   Western   Co.   v.   Montonen,   No.                     00-0420,
unpublished  slip  op.  (Wis.  Ct.  App.  April  25,  2001)  (affirming  a
judgment  of  the  circuit  court  for  Manitowoc  County,  Darryl  W.
Deets,  Judge).
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No.                                                                           00-0420
their  disagreement  over  the  letter.     Second,  Manitowoc  Western
filed  this  lawsuit  against  Montonen  in  Wisconsin  earlier  that
day.     Third,  Manitowoc  Western  served  Montonen  with  process  at
the  end  of  the  meeting.
¶4    Montonen  moved  to  set  aside  the  service  of  process  and
asked  the  circuit  court  to  declare  that  it  lacked  jurisdiction
over  his  person.     He  argued  that  Manitowoc  Western  engaged  in
fraud   and   deceit   by   tricking   or   enticing   him   to   come   to
Wisconsin  for  settlement  negotiations,  then  subsequently  serving
him  with  process.     The  circuit  court  denied  Montonen's  motion
and  eventually  granted  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Manitowoc
Western.
¶5    In   the   court   of   appeals,   Montonen   argued   that   the
court  should  adopt  a  rule  forbidding  service  of  process  on  a
person  who  comes  to  Wisconsin  for  settlement  discussions.     The
court  of  appeals  acknowledged  that  some  jurisdictions  follow  the
rule  Montonen  proposed.     However,  the  court  explained,  such  a
rule  would  represent  a  "wholesale  change  in  the  law  of  personal
jurisdiction"   in   Wisconsin.                                               Whether   such   a   change   was
warranted,  the  court  concluded,  was  for  this  court  to  decide.
Accordingly,  the  court  of  appeals  declined  to  adopt  Montonen's
rule  and  affirmed  the  circuit  court.
II
¶6    Montonen  renews  his  request  in  this  court.     He  asks
that  we  expand  or  interpret  broadly  the  fraud  exception  to  the
transient  rule  of  personal  jurisdiction  to  prohibit  service  of  a
lawsuit   on   a   person   who   comes   to   Wisconsin   for   settlement
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No.                                                                            00-0420
negotiations.      Whether  to  expand  the  fraud  exception  to  the
transient  rule  of  personal  jurisdiction  presents  a  question  of
law  subject  to  independent  appellate  review.    See  P.C.  v.  C.C.,
161  Wis.  2d  277,  299,  468  N.W.2d  190  (1991).
¶7    In   addressing   the   question   before   us,   we   briefly
summarize   the   law   of   personal   jurisdiction   relevant   to   this
case,  then  turn  to  examine  the  expanded  versions  of  the  fraud
exception  that  Montonen  advances.     After  examining  these  rules
in   light   of   the   public   policies   at   stake,   we   reject   the
proffered  rules  as  unnecessary  to  effectuate  these  policies  and
conclude   that   Montonen   has   provided   no   compelling   reason   to
extend  the  fraud  exception  as  he  requests.    Instead,  we  reaffirm
the  fraud  exception  in  its  current  form.
III
¶8    We  begin  with  a  brief  recitation  of  the  relevant  law
of  personal  jurisdiction.    Under  Wisconsin's  long-arm  statute,  a
court   has   jurisdiction   over   an   individual   who   is   a   natural
person  served  with  process  while  voluntarily  present  within  this
state.     Wis.  Stat.  §  801.05(1)(a)                                        (1995-96)2;  see  also  Oxmans'
2  Wisconsin  Stat.  §  801.05(1)(a)  provides:
A  court  of  this  state  having  jurisdiction  of  the
subject  matter  has  jurisdiction  over  a  person  served
in  an  action  pursuant  to  s.                                               801.11  under  any  of  the
following  circumstances:
(1)                                                                            LOCAL  PRESENCE  OR  STATUS.      In  an  action
whether  arising  within  or  without  this  state,  against
a  defendant  who  when  the  action  is  commenced:
(a)      Is   a   natural   person   present   within   this
state  when  served
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      No.                                                    00-0420
                                                                                                                                           Erwin  Meat  Co.  v.  Blacketer,  86  Wis.  2d  683,  687,  273  N.W.2d  285
                                                                                                                                           (1979)  (discussing  the  statute).3    Physical  presence  is,  in  fact,
                                                                               the   traditional   basis   of   personal   jurisdiction.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Burnham   v.
Superior  Court,                                                               495  U.S.                                                   604,                                                                           612                                                                         (1990);  Oxmans'  Erwin,                               86
Wis.  2d  at                                                                   687.                                                                                                                                       Personal  jurisdiction  based  only  on  physical
                                                                                                                                           presence  within  a  state  at  the  time  of  service  has  been  referred
                                                                                                                                           to  alternatively  as  "transient  jurisdiction"  or  the  "transient
                                                                               rule"  of  personal  jurisdiction.     Burnham,                                                                                                                                                                        495  U.S.  at                                          629  n.1
                                                                               (Brennan,   J.,   concurring);   Oxmans'   Erwin,                                                                                                                                                                      86   Wis.  2d   at                                     687
nn.2-3.
¶9    Of  course,  courts  may  achieve  personal  jurisdiction
over   an   individual   on   a   basis   other   than   physical   presence
within  the  state  at  the  time  of  service.     See,  e.g.,  Schlosser
v.  Allis-Chalmers  Corp.,                                                     86  Wis.  2d                                                226,                                                                           241,                                                                        271  N.W.2d                                            879
(1978)                                                                         (citing  International  Shoe  Co.  v.  Washington,                                                                                                                                                                                                                            326  U.S.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          All  subsequent  references  to  the  Wisconsin  Statutes  are  to  the
                                                                                                                                           1995-96  version  unless  otherwise  indicated.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          3  This  court  in  Oxmans'  Erwin  Meat  Co.  v.  Blacketer,                                                                                                                     86
Wis.  2d                                                                       683,                                                        688  n.4,                                                                      273  N.W.2d                                                                 285                                                    (1979),  did  not  need  to
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          decide    whether    Wis.  Stat.  §  801.05(1)(a)'s    provision    for
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          transient  jurisdiction  was  constitutional  because  it  resolved
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          the  case  under  the  due  process  "minimum  contacts"  framework  of
                                                                                                                                           International  Shoe  Co.  v.  Washington,                                                                                                                  326  U.S.                                              310                           (1945).     At
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          the  time  of  Oxmans'  Erwin,  the  question  of  whether  the  "minimum
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          contacts"   limitation   on   the   constitutionality   of   personal
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          jurisdiction  also  applied  to  a  transient  defendant  through  a
                                                                               long-arm   statute   such   as                                                                                                                                                                                         §  801.05   was   unresolved.                                                        See              86
Wis.  2d   at                                                                  688.                                                                                                                                                                                                                   However,   the   Supreme   Court   in   Burnham   v.
Superior  Court,  495  U.S.  604  (1990),  decided  that  question.    The
Court  concluded  that  voluntary  physical  presence  at  the  time  of
service  is  sufficient  to  satisfy  due  process  for  purposes  of
personal  jurisdiction.    Id.  at  619,  628-29.
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                                                                                                                             No.                                                       00-0420
310                                                                            (1945)).                                      In   this   case,   however,   we   address   personal
jurisdiction  and  service  only  under  the  transient  rule.
¶10   The  transient  rule  is  not  without  exception.    Where  an
individual   is   brought   within   a   jurisdiction   by   fraud   or
trickery,  service  will  be  set  aside  upon  the  proper  showing.
If  a  person  is  induced  by  false  representations
to  come  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  for  the
purpose    of    obtaining    service    of    process    upon
him  .  .  .  it  is  an  abuse  of  legal  process,  and,  the
fraud   being   shown,   the   court   will,   on   motion,   set
aside  the  service.
Townsend  v.  Smith,  47  Wis.  623,  626,  3  N.W.  439  (1879);  see  also
Saveland  v.  Connors,  121  Wis.  28,  31,  98  N.W.  933  (1904).
¶11   Montonen                                                                 has                                           consistently                                              and       forthrightly
acknowledged  that  his  position  represents  an  expansion  of  the
fraud  exception  to  the  transient  rule.     He  concedes  that  he  is
unable  to  show  actual  fraudulent  intent  and  thus  does  not  fall
within   the   fraud   exception   as   it   stands   under   Townsend   and
Saveland.     Rather,  he  emphasizes  the  vintage  of  the  two  cases
and  asserts  that  it  is  time  for  the  exception  to  expand  and
evolve.
¶12   Citing  cases  from  other  jurisdictions,  Montonen  asks
that   we   extend   the   fraud   exception   by   adopting   a   flat
prohibition    on    service    under    the    transient    rule    during
settlement   negotiations.                                                     In   support   of   this   rule,   Montonen
relies  primarily  on  E/M  Lubricants,  Inc.  v.  Microfral,  91  F.R.D.
235                                                                            (N.D.  Ill.                                   1981),  and  K  Mart  Corp.  v.  Gen-Star  Indus.  Co.,
110  F.R.D.  310  (E.D.  Mich.  1986).
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No.                                                                           00-0420
¶13   The   federal   district   court   in   E/M   Lubricants,               91
F.R.D.  at                                                                    238,  determined  that  the  fraud  exception  should  be
extended  to  cover  cases  where  a  defendant  "reasonably  relies  on
plaintiff's  agreement  to  discuss  settlement  and  where,  later,
plaintiff,  without  notice  to  defendant,  decides  to  sue."     In
such  cases,  the  court  explained,  the  duty  is  on  the  plaintiff  to
either                                                                        (1)  communicate  to  the  defendant  before  the  defendant
enters  the  jurisdiction  that  pre-suit  negotiations  are  no  longer
feasible  or  that  the  plaintiff  has  chosen  a  legal  remedy,  or  (2)
forego  service  on  the  defendant  if  the  defendant  is  in  the
jurisdiction  for  the  exclusive  purpose  of  discussing  settlement.
Id.
¶14   Likewise,  in  K  Mart,                                                 110  F.R.D.  at                                                313,  the  district
court  concluded  that  service  was  prohibited  during  settlement
talks  unless  the  plaintiff  either  (1)  warns  the  defendant  before
entering  the  jurisdiction  that  it  may  be  subject  to  service,  or
(2)  gives  the  defendant  an  opportunity  to  leave  the  jurisdiction
after  settlement  talks  fail.    The  court  in  K  Mart  characterized
its  standard  as  a  "bright-line"  rule  that  would  eliminate  "a
determination   of   whether   the   plaintiff   intended   to   file   a
complaint  at  the  time  the  parties  were  arranging  the  settlement
meeting."    Id.
¶15  As  an  alternative,  Montonen  asserts  that  this  court
could  expand  the  fraud  exception  to  require  the  quashing  of
service  when  a  plaintiff  invites  a  defendant  into  Wisconsin  for
purposes  of  settlement  talks  and  fails  to  inform  the  defendant
of  the  possibility  of  service.     Among  other  cases,  he  cites  to
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  No.          00-0420
                                                                              Coyne  v.  Grupo  Indus.  Trieme,  105  F.R.D.  627  (D.D.C.  1985),  and
Henkel  Corp.  v.  Degremont,                                                                                                                             136  F.R.D.                                           88   (E.D.  Pa.   1991),  in
support  of  this  rule.
¶16   In   Coyne,   the   district   court   applied   the   fraud
exception  and  recognized  a  presumption  of  fraud,  given  certain
facts.    In  essence,  the  court  adopted  an  "invitation  rule"  that
establishes  an  evidentiary  presumption  of  fraud  when  a  plaintiff
invites  a  defendant  into  the  plaintiff's  jurisdiction  to  discuss
settlement  and  then  effects  service.    Coyne,  105  F.R.D.  at  630.
¶17   Similarly,  the  district  court  in  Henkel,  relying  on
Coyne,   concluded   that   service   should   be   quashed   "whenever   a
defendant   enters   a   jurisdiction   for   settlement   talks   at   the
plaintiff's  suggestion  and  the  plaintiff  has  not  clearly  and
unequivocally   informed   the   defendant   of   the   possibility   of
service  should  the  settlement  negotiations  fail."     Henkel,            136
F.R.D.  at                                                                    96.                                                                         Thus,  the  focus  of  the  test  under  Coyne  and
Henkel   is   the   plaintiff's   role   in   initiating   the   settlement
meeting  in  the  plaintiff's  jurisdiction  and  subsequently  serving
the  defendant  without  forewarning.
¶18   Although  the  standards  set  forth  under  either  approach
have  much  in  common,  it  is  apparent  that  they  are  not  the  same.
As  we  read  the  cases,  the  essential  difference  between  the  two
is   that   under   Coyne   and   Henkel,   the   plaintiff   must   have
initiated  the  settlement  meeting  while  E/M  Lubricants  and  K  Mart
purport  to  apply  a  "bright-line"  rule  that  makes  irrelevant  the
inquiry  into  which  party  initiated  the  meeting.
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                               No.                           00-0420
                                                                                                                                   ¶19   Other    cases    Montonen    cites    illustrate    further
                                                                                                                                   variations  on  the  theme.    See  TMF  Tool  Co.  v.  H.M.  Financiere  &
Holding,                                                                       689  F.  Supp.                                820   (N.D.  Ill.                                                                                 1988);  Commercial  Bank  &
                                                                                                                                   Trust  Co.  v.  District  Court,  605  P.2d  1323  (Okla.  1980);  Western
                                                                               States  Refining  Co.  v.  Berry,                   313  P.2d                                                                     480   (Utah   1957).                        In
Western  States,  for  example,  the  Utah  Supreme  Court  determined
that  a  showing  of  actual  fraudulent  intent  was  unnecessary  where
the  following  conditions  were  met:                                         (1)  the  plaintiff  "extends
an  invitation"  to  the  defendant  to  enter  the  jurisdiction  for
purposes    of    settlement;                                                  (2)    the    defendant    was    in    the
jurisdiction  for  the  "sole  purpose"  of  discussing  settlement;
(3)  service  was  effected  either  during  settlement  negotiations
or   during   a   "reasonable   period"   involved   in   coming   to   the
negotiations  and  returning  therefrom;  and  (4)  the  plaintiff  did
not  advise  the  defendant  at  the  time  of  the  invitation  that  the
defendant  would  be  served  if  settlement  negotiations  failed.
313  P.2d  at  481-82.
¶20   In  TMF  Tool,  the  district  court  adopted  a  rule  similar
to  that  in  E/M  Lubricants  and  K  Mart,  but  framed  it  as  a  three-
prong  test.     The  court  in  TMF  Tool  determined  that  service  may
be  quashed  on  a  transient  defendant  when  (1)  the  parties  agreed
to  have  a  settlement  discussion;                                           (2)  the  defendant  entered  the
jurisdiction   "only   for   that   purpose;"   and                            (3)   the   plaintiff
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No.                                                                            00-0420
failed  to  notify  the  defendant,  before  the  defendant  arrived,
that  it  might  be  served.                                                   689  F.  Supp.  at  823.4
¶21   The   courts   in   the   cases   cited   gave   a   variety   of
reasons  for  adopting  their  respective  rules.      Most  of  these
reasons,  however,  may  be  distilled  into  two  important  public
policy  considerations.
¶22   First,  the  courts  relied  on  the  public  policy  of  the
promotion  and  encouragement  of  settlement  negotiations.      See
Henkel,  136  F.R.D.  at  95;  K  Mart,  110  F.R.D.  at  313;  Coyne,  105
F.R.D.  at                                                                                                    630;  E/M  Lubricants,                                                                                    91  F.R.D.  at                            238;  Commercial
Bank,                                                                          605  P.2d  at                  1325.                                                                                                     Second,  the  courts  sought  to  avoid
                                                                                                                                              thorny   factual   inquiries,   particularly   where   such   inquiries
                                                                                                                                              amount  to  nothing  more  than  "swearing  matches  about  who  said
                                                                               what  to  whom."     Henkel,                                   136  F.R.D.  at                                                           94                                        (quoting  Coyne,              105
F.R.D.   at                                                                                                   630);   see   also   K  Mart,                                                                             110   F.R.D.   at                                                       313;   E/M
Lubricants,                                                                                                   91    F.R.D.    at              238.                                                                                                                Montonen    echoes    these
considerations  in  his  assertions,  arguing  that  an  extension  of
the   fraud   exception   is   necessary   to   promote   these   important
public  policies  in  Wisconsin.
¶23   We  agree  that  encouraging  the  efficient  resolution  of
disputes  through  settlement  negotiations  and  avoiding  factual
inquiries  that  are  certain  to  devolve  into  swearing  matches  are
important  public  policy  considerations.      These  public  policy
4  On  appeal  in  the  TMF  Tool  litigation,  the  Seventh  Circuit
Court  of  Appeals  noted  that  there  was  no  controlling  law  of  the
circuit  on  the  fraud  exception.    See  TMF  Tool  Co.  v.  Muller,  913
F.2d  1185,  1191  (7th  Cir.  1990).
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No.                                                                           00-0420
goals  may,  upon  initial  examination,  appear  to  justify  rules
like  the  ones  Montonen  advances.     Ultimately,  however,  we  are
not  convinced  that  they  are  best  achieved  by  an  expansion  of
Wisconsin's  fraud  exception  to  the  transient  rule.
¶24   The  rules  as  advanced  by  Montonen  create  at  least  as
many  factual  inquiries  as  they  eliminate.    This  is  true  even  of
the   rule   that   Montonen,   citing   K  Mart,   characterizes   as   a
bright-line   rule.                                                           That   rule   leaves   questions   such   as   the
following  ripe  for  contention:     What  constitutes  a  settlement
negotiation?     Was  the  served  party  in  the  jurisdiction  for  the
sole  purpose  of  those  negotiations?     What  happens  if  it  is  the
primary  purpose  but  not  the  sole  purpose?    When  does  one  purpose
end  and  another  begin?
¶25   Under  other  variations  of  the  rules,  such  as  those
adopted   in   Coyne   or   Western   States,   still   further   factual
inquiries  are  added  to  the  mix:     Did  the  plaintiff  "invite"  or
"suggest"  the  settlement  negotiations?    In  any  given  case,  what
is  a  "reasonable  period"  of  time  before  and  after  a  settlement
negotiation  in  which  a  person  may  expect  to  remain  immune  from
service?
¶26   Indeed,  the  disputes  that  would  arise  from  these  types
of  questions  are  foreshadowed  by  the  facts  in  this  case.     For
example,  Montonen  asserts  that  Manitowoc  Western  "invited"  him
to   Wisconsin   although   Manitowoc   Western   argues   that   it   was
Montonen   who   requested   the   meeting.                                   Manitowoc   Western   also
argues  that  the  meeting  in  Wisconsin  may  not  have  constituted  a
"settlement   discussion,"   yet   Montonen   maintains   that   it   is
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No.                                                                         00-0420
beyond  dispute  that  the  purpose  of  the  meeting  was  to  "discuss
settlement."     Both  parties  submitted  affidavits  in  support  of
their  positions,  each  with  competing  versions  of  the  facts.
¶27   In  addition,  we  note  that  although  Montonen  helpfully
has  attempted  to  categorize  cases  expanding  the  fraud  exception
into  essentially  two  rules,  there  is  substantial  variation  among
the  cases  cited  as  to  the  exact  bounds  of  the  rules.     This
further  illustrates  that  an  expanded  fraud  exception  provides  no
more  of  a  bright-line  standard  than  does  the  fraud  exception  as
it  now  exists.
¶28   We  do  not  agree  with  Montonen  that  the  fraud  exception
in   its   present   form   significantly   discourages   settlement
negotiations,   thus   undermining   the   efficient   resolution   of
disputes  through  settlement  negotiations.     Parties  who  wish  to
engage  in  face-to-face  settlement  negotiations  without  risking
service  are  not  without  alternatives.     As  technologies  such  as
internet  video  conferencing  become  increasingly  commonplace,  the
benefits  of  face-to-face  settlement  negotiations  may  be  realized
without  an  in-person  meeting.
¶29   Perhaps  more  significantly,  parties  may  agree  ahead  of
time  that  they  will  not  attempt  service  during  the  settlement
negotiations.     Thus,  a  party  who  is  fearful  of  service  can  be
protected  by  simply  insisting  on  a  clear  statement  from  the
other   party   that   service   will   not   be   attempted.               At   oral
argument,  Manitowoc  Western  conceded  that  service  in  violation
of   such   a   safe   harbor   agreement   would   fall   within   the
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No.                                                                           00-0420
traditional  fraud  exception  as  it  is  presently  formulated  under
Saveland  and  Townsend.
¶30   The  rules  that  Montonen  advances  also  fail  to  account
for  another  important  public  policy  that  provides  a  compelling
reason  to  retain  the  present  fraud  exception's  relatively  narrow
formulation.     Wisconsin  has  a  definite  interest  in  providing  a
forum  where  its  citizens  may  seek  legal  redress.     Clement  v.
United  Cerebral  Palsy  of  S.E.  Wisconsin,  Inc.,                          87  Wis.  2d  327,
338,                                                                          274   N.W.2d  688                                                     (1979);   Nagel   v.   Crain   Cutter   Co.,   50
Wis.  2d  638,                                                                649,                                              184  N.W.2d   876   (1971).                                        Expanding  immunity
from   service   of   process   to   cover   parties   in   settlement
negotiations   may   limit   and   obfuscate   the   availability   of   a
Wisconsin   forum   for   Wisconsin   litigants.                              As   the   dissenting
justice  in  Western  States  noted  in  criticizing  Utah's  version  of
the  rule:
This                                                                          [rule]  opens  the  door  to  the  unscrupulous
nonresident  present  in  the  state,  who,  on  being  served
by  a  resident,  need  only  conveniently  to  state  that  he
is   present   in   the   state   at   the   invitation   of   the
plaintiff  for  the  purpose  of  settling  a  claim,  thus
inoculating   himself  .  .  .                                                Before   such   immunity
should  be  granted,  there  should  be  a  finding  of  an
allurement,   enticement,   trickery,   fraud,   legal   or
otherwise,  or  some  other  kind  of  bad  faith  on  the  part
of  him,  who  did  the  inviting  to  negotiate,  as  the
great  weight  of  authority  requires.
313  P.2d  at  482-83  (Henriod,  J.,  dissenting).
¶31   We  agree  with  the  dissent  in  Western  States  that  the
better  rule  is  to  continue  to  require  a  showing  of  actual  fraud
when   a   party   seeks   to   set   aside   service   under   the   fraud
exception  to  the  transient  rule.    Montonen  has  failed  to  provide
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No.                                                                            00-0420
a  compelling  reason  why  this  court  should  depart  from  the  rule
of  Saveland  and  Townsend.
¶32   In  sum,  Montonen  asks  that  this  court  extend  the  fraud
exception   to   the   transient   rule   of   personal   jurisdiction   in
order  to  prohibit  service  of  a  lawsuit  on  a  person  who  comes  to
Wisconsin  to  engage  in  settlement  negotiations.     We  decline  to
do  so.    The  public  policies  at  stake  do  not  warrant  an  expansion
of  that  exception.    Rather,  the  public  policies  are  best  served
by  the  fraud  exception  as  it  presently  stands.    Accordingly,  we
affirm  the  court  of  appeals.
By   the   Court.—The   decision   of   the   court   of   appeals   is
affirmed.
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No.   00-0420
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