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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND RELEASED
NOTICE
February 18, 1997
A party may file with the Supreme Court      This opinion is subject to further editing.
a petition to review an adverse decision     If  published,  the  official  version  will
by the Court of Appeals.  See § 808.10 and   appear  in  the  bound  volume  of  the
RULE 809.62, STATS.                          Official Reports.
Nos. 95-0527
95-1966
95-3418
STATE OF WISCONSIN                           IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                             DISTRICT I
                                             95-0527
In Re the Marriage Of:
Margaret J. Schwartz, n/k/a
Margaret J. Kozlowicz,
                                             Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Jeffrey D. Schwartz,
                                             Respondent-Appellant.
95-1966
In Re the Marriage Of:
Margaret Jane Kozlowicz, f/k/a
Margaret Jane Schwartz,
                                             Petitioner-Respondent,
v.




Nos. 95-0527
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Jeffrey David Schwartz,
Respondent-Appellant.
95-3418
Margaret Jane Kozlowicz, f/k/a
Margaret Jane Schwartz,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Jeffrey David Schwartz,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from  a  judgment  and orders of the  circuit  court for
Milwaukee County:   FRANCIS T. WASIELEWSKI and DOMINIC S. AMATO,
Judges.  Affirmed.
Before Fine, Schudson and Curley, JJ.
PER CURIAM.   Jeffrey D. Schwartz appeals from the judgment of
divorce and post-judgment orders.   He brings numerous challenges to the trial
court's  factual  findings  and  to  several  of  the  trial  court's  post-judgment
determinations.  We affirm.
On October 5, 1994, following a two-day bench trial, the trial court
granted a judgment of divorce to Jeffrey and Margaret Schwartz.  The trial court
concluded,  among  other things, that Jeffrey  had  a  gross imputed  monthly
income of $4,116.00, which included the $50,000 value of stock in his father's
company where Jeffrey was employed.   Jeffrey objected to Margaret's proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and requested that the trial court make
specific factual findings.   The trial court denied Jeffrey's request and, instead,
ordered that its oral decision be incorporated in the judgment in lieu of a
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separate statement of specific findings.   Jeffrey moved for reconsideration.   The
trial court granted Jeffrey's requests relating to a saving account and an IRA
account, but denied his other requests for reconsideration.
In granting the judgment of divorce, the trial court stated, among
other things:
I am going to give [Margaret] an opportunity until May 1, 1995, to
seek to obtain financing to buy out the interest of
Jeffrey.  If she is able to do that, then the house is hers
and  Jeffrey  will  be  required  to  sign  over  the
necessary deed upon receipt of a check buying out
the value of his interest in the house.   She will be
then  solely  responsible  for  the  payment  of  the
mortgage; [t]he house will be in her name.   Failing
that, the house will be placed on the market and sold.
Margaret, in reaction to what she viewed as Jeffrey's interference with her
efforts to obtain financing, brought a motion to enforce the divorce judgment.
After taking additional testimony, the trial court concluded that Jeffrey had
interfered and, therefore, divested Jeffrey of his interest in the homestead and
awarded the entire interest to Margaret.
Subsequently, because Jeffrey refused to execute a quit claim deed
and other documents affecting ownership of the home, Margaret brought an
action to enforce the judgment.   The trial court found Jeffrey in contempt and
ordered him jailed until he would sign the quit claim deed and other documents
relating to the home.    Jeffrey then signed the necessary papers but did so
inserting, “This release is given as a purge of a contempt ordering incarceration
of the undersigned....”   Thus, in yet another action to enforce the judgment, the
trial  court  again  found  Jeffrey  in  contempt  “for  not  making  a  good  faith
compliance with the court's purge order.”   The trial court ordered Jeffrey jailed
“until he signs a Quit Claim Deed and release of lis pendens approved by this
court as a purge of his contempt.”  Ultimately, Jeffrey did so and was released.
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These consolidated appeals encompass challenges to several sets
of  orders  and  judgments:   (1) the  findings  of  fact,  conclusions  of  law,  and
judgment of divorce; (2) the post-judgment order denying Jeffrey's motion for
specific factual findings; (3) a portion of the trial court order denying certain
requests in Jeffrey's motion for reconsideration;  (4) the post-judgment order
awarding the homestead to Margaret; and (5) the two contempt orders.1
Jeffrey challenges the factual findings and legal conclusions with
respect to  (1) the ownership and value of stock he received from his father;
(2) the  gift  status  of  the  stock;                                                          (3) the  marital  debt  and  its  impact  on  the
computation  of  the  marital  estate  in  three  respects:    the  debt  against  the
corporate  stock,                                                                               $12,000  in  overdrafts  of  his  salesman's  salary  against
commissions, and a $2,489 VISA debt; (4) the award of $10,000 attorney's fees;
and (5) the child support and maintenance computations based on the alleged
erroneous findings regarding the stock value and marital debt.
We  will  uphold  a  trial  court's  factual  findings,  including  its
valuation  of  a  marital  estate,  unless  they  are  clearly  erroneous.    Section
805.17(2), STATS.; Liddle v. Liddle, 140 Wis.2d 132, 136, 410 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Ct.
App. 1987).                                                                                     “A property division rests with the sound discretion of the trial
court.”   Friebel v. Friebel, 181 Wis.2d 285, 293, 510 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Ct. App.
1993).    Most of Jeffrey's arguments quickly collapse because his contentions
regarding the stock ownership and value are undermined by his fraudulent
conduct and lack of credibility.
Jeffrey maintains that the stock was not worth $50,000 and, in any
event, should not have been included in the marital estate because it was gifted
property  from  his  father.    The  evidence  established,  however,  that  Jeffrey
deposited $20,000 from his father in a joint account with Margaret from which
she paid $10,000 to purchase the stock.   The trial court rejected Jeffrey's version,
“disregarding his testimony at trial inasmuch as it conflicts with his earlier
[deposition] testimony.”   Additionally, Margaret's expert witness, CPA David
Franklin, testified that the stock's actual value, at the time of divestiture, was
$50,000.   The trial court accepted Franklin's valuation.   Thus, the trial court's
1   The first four judgment/orders were entered by Judge Francis T. Wasielewski; the contempt
orders were entered by Judge Dominic S. Amato.
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factual findings were not clearly erroneous; they supported the inclusion of the
$50,000 stock value in the marital estate.
Moreover, the trial court found that Jeffrey and his father had
colluded to conceal Jeffrey's assets and defraud the court by back-dating a
document to make it appear that Jeffrey had rescinded his acquisition of the
stock more than one year prior to the divorce action.  As Margaret argues:
After the commencement of the divorce action the
appellant and his father colluded and lied in back-
dating  a  document  in  an  effort  to  substantially
reduce   the   divisible   marital   estate   and   thus
perpetrate a fraud upon the court.
Father and son did not just back-date the document
to before the filing of the divorce, they back-dated
the document just more than “one year prior to the
filing of the petition” so as to avoid the recovery
statute [§ 767.275, STATS.], a statute applicable only in
family law cases and seldom used by even family
law practitioners.
Who   would   think   that   two   salesmen   from
Sheboygan would be that clever?
They were caught.
Not easily ... but inescapably.
In the process they forfeited their credibility before
the trial court.
Indeed, the trial court even commented that, had this case been
tried before a jury, “the jury would be entitled to an instruction that the Court
may  disregard  all  of                                                             [Jeffrey's]  other  testimony  except  insofar  as  it's
corroborated by other evidence in this record.”   The trial court's assessment of
Jeffrey's credibility was amply supported by the evidence.   Accordingly, we
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appreciate  that  the  trial  court  viewed  Jeffrey's  allegations  through  an
appropriately-skeptical lens and resolved virtually every factual dispute against
him.
Many of Jeffrey's challenges relate to the trial court's imputation of
income based on his earning history.   Although Jeffrey offers what otherwise
might have been plausible explanations for his reduced income at the time of
the divorce, the trial court reasonably concluded that Jeffrey had been shirking.
Given Jeffrey's collusion with his father, and given that Jeffrey's income came
primarily  from  his  commissions  and  sales  in  his  father's  business,  it  was
reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Jeffrey had been manipulating his
income in an attempt to reduce his financial liability at the point of divorce.
Arguing that the trial court's “failure ... to make specific findings
of fact require[s] the reversal and remand of the judgment and all subsequent
orders predicated upon it,” Jeffrey challenges the trial court's denial of his
motion for specific factual findings.  He contends that “the trial court is silent in
its  judgment  as  to  [his]  requests  ...  for  rulings  as  to  gift  aspects  of  stock
payments, whether the stock was ever paid for in the first place, and the validity
of the outstanding promissory note for his purchase.”   Although the trial court
decision does not go into detail in all respects, and although the trial court
acknowledged that in some instances it was uncertain how one would “separate
the wheat from the chaff ... to only include those portions [of the oral decision]
which are in the nature of actual findings or orders,” we conclude that the trial
court's pronouncements and order are adequate.
A  trial  court  may  satisfy  the  requirement  for  a  statement  of
findings and conclusions through an oral decision that, in this case, filled thirty-
nine  transcribed  pages  and  was  incorporated  in  the  written  order  and
judgment.   See § 805.17(2), STATS.2   Here, the trial court articulated numerous
specific  findings  including  many  related  to  the  stock,  its  value,  Jeffrey's
collusion with his father, Jeffrey's financial arrangements with his parents, and
2                                                                                                    Section  805.17(2), STATS., states, in part:   “The court shall either file its findings and
conclusions prior to or concurrent with rendering judgment, state them orally on the record
following the close of evidence or set them forth in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by
the court.”
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Jeffrey's shirking.   Jeffrey's desire for the trial court to provide added specificity
regarding the stock and promissory note again collide with the trial court's
reasonable determination that Jeffrey and his father attempted to manipulate
Jeffrey's income and perpetrate a fraud with respect to the stock.  The trial court
did not need to ascertain every detail of their scheme or delineate its exact terms
in  order  to  determine  its  overall  character.    Further  factual  findings  were
unnecessary.3
Jeffrey also challenges the trial court's order denying his motion
for reconsideration.    He has failed, however, to separately brief this issue,
apparently  relying  on  his  arguments  addressing  the  trial  court's  primary
decision.   Accordingly, having addressed Jeffrey's challenges to that decision,
we need not further consider his assertion regarding the trial court's denial of
his  motion  for  reconsideration.    Similarly, aside  from  mentioning  the  trial
court's determinations regarding the $12,000 draw against commissions and the
$2,489.80 VISA debt, Jeffrey fails to elaborate his challenges to the trial court's
rulings on these subjects.   We will not develop Jeffrey's arguments for him.   See
Barakat v. DHSS, 191 Wis.2d 769, 786, 530 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Ct. App. 1995)
(appellate court need not consider “amorphous and insufficiently developed”
arguments).
Jeffrey next argues that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion in
awarding Margaret  $10,000.00 in attorney fees.”   He maintains that the trial
court  improperly  awarded  attorney  fees  generated  by  related  litigation  in
Sheboygan  County.    The  record  belies  his  claim.    The  trial  court  referred
specifically  to  pretrial  proceedings  in  the  Milwaukee  County  case  and
concluded:
The bottom line is that the Court hearings and court time was [sic]
necessitated   in   order   to   make   determinations.
Orders were made and there was far more litigation
here than was necessary in order to get this case in
the posture it is.   This court is satisfied that much of
3   Section 805.17(2), STATS., also provides, in part:                                                   “Findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses.”
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that—or a substantial part of the overlitigation was
caused by positions taken by [Jeffrey] here.   Under
those circumstances it's the view of the Court that a
contribution for attorney's fees is appropriate.
In a divorce action, “[t]he award of contribution to attorney fees
rests within the discretion of the trial court and will not be altered on appeal
unless an [erroneous exercise] of discretion is shown.”   Ondrasek v. Ondrasek,
126 Wis.2d 469, 483, 377 N.W.2d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 1985).   Although ordinarily
each party would pay his or her own attorney fees, a party's “overtrial” of the
matter provides a proper basis for a trial court to order one party to pay
attorney's fees of the other.   Id.   We are satisfied that the trial court exercised
reasonable discretion in ordering Jeffrey's contribution for Margaret's attorney
fees in this case.
Jeffrey  argues  that                                                                   “the  trial  court  erroneously  exercise[d]  its
discretion in setting child support and maintenance.”  His arguments, however,
are premised on his challenges to the trial court's determinations of his imputed
income and the marital estate.   Having rejected his challenges, we need not
further address his arguments on child support and maintenance.   See Gross v.
Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938) (only dispositive issue
need be addressed).
Jeffrey also argues that the “trial court abuse[d] its discretion and
violate[d]                                                                              [his]  rights  to  procedural  and  substantive  due  process  by  its
prejudgment taking of his property interest in the homestead prior to ruling
upon the merits of his defenses.”   He contends that the trial court, by awarding
the home to Margaret, improperly modified the divorce judgment.   Margaret
responds that “the trial court made a point of distinguishing between Jeffrey's
claim that it was changing a property division versus issuing of orders for the
enforcement of the original judgment.”  Margaret is correct.
Section 767.01(1), STATS., states that circuit courts “have authority
to do all acts and things necessary and proper in such actions and to carry their
orders and judgments into execution.”   Because Jeffrey had failed to comply
with its earlier directions, the trial court reasonably acted in furtherance of its
orders by awarding Margaret ownership of the homestead.
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With respect to the contempt orders, Jeffrey asserts:                                              (1) the trial
court had no basis on which to find him in contempt because neither the
divorce judgment nor the subsequent order awarding the home to Margaret
required him to sign a quit claim deed or any other document related to the
home; (2) the trial court had no authority to even consider contempt given that
he  had  already  filed  an  appeal  challenging  the  divorce  judgment  and  the
subsequent order; (3) the “order divesting him of any interest in the homestead
is in excess of  [the trial court's] jurisdiction and violates  [his] constitutional
rights ... because a party cannot be adjudged guilty of contempt for disobeying
an order ... which the court had no power or jurisdiction to make;” and (4) the
contempt  orders  were  improper  because  they                                                    “provided  for  indefinite
incarceration ... until the documents were signed,” contrary to the six month
limitation under § 785.04(1)(b), STATS.   He asks that both contempt orders be
vacated and dismissed.
We reject Jeffrey's argument.   Section 767.305, STATS., provides a
trial court with enforcement and contempt authority to assure compliance with
orders to satisfy a variety of “financial obligation[s],” including those relating to
property division under § 767.255, STATS.   Further, § 808.075(4)(d)10., STATS.,
provides that “the circuit court may act ... despite the pendency of an appeal.”
Thus, the trial court's exercise of enforcement and contempt authority was
proper.4
Therefore, to summarize, we conclude (1) the factual findings and
divorce judgment were supported by the evidence; (2) the factual findings were
sufficiently  specific;                                                                            (3) the  challenges  to  the  denial  of  the  motion  for
reconsideration,  the  draw  against  commissions,  and  the  VISA  debt  were
inadequately briefed; (4) the subsequent order awarding the home to Margaret
was  a  proper  order  in  furtherance  of  the  original  judgment;  and                          (5) the
contempt orders entered during the pendency of this appeal were appropriate
and necessary to enforce the judgment and orders.5
4                                                                                                  We need not address Jeffrey's assertion regarding the potential indefinite length of the
contempt incarceration.   Upon purging the contempt he was released, long before six months had
passed.  Thus, the issue is moot.
5   Margaret also “requests an opportunity to move this court, or upon remand, to move the trial
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By the Court.—Judgment and orders affirmed.
This opinion will not be published.  See RULE 809.23(1)(b)5, STATS.
(..continued)
court for an order directing compensation for the more than $10,000 in fees incurred in post-
judgment proceedings.”  She has not, however, offered any argument to support her request or filed
any motion pursuant to § 767.39, STATS.  Accordingly, we do not address her request.
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