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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                  This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 23, 2013
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Diane M. Fremgen                                                                                    petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                           Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                    and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                    Cir. Ct. No.   2006CV8092
Appeal No.                                       2008AP1830
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                  IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I
MBS-CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, LLC
AND THOMAS H. SCHMITT, CPA,
D/B/A METROPOLITAN BUSINESS SERVICES,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS,
V.
WISCONSIN BELL INC., D/B/A AT&T WISCONSIN,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT,
ILD TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
D/B/A ILD TELESERVICES,
AMERICATEL CORPORATION AND
LOCAL BIZ USA, INC.,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS-CROSS-APPELLANTS,
US CONNECT, LLC,
DEFENDANT.




No. 2008AP1830
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from an order of the circuit court
for Milwaukee County:   RICHARD J. SANKOVITZ, Judge.   Affirmed in part;
reversed in part.
Before Curley, P.J., Brennan and Lundsten, JJ.
¶1                                                                                        CURLEY, P.J.      This appeal is before us on remand from the
                                                                                          supreme court.   MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC and Thomas H. Schmitt,
CPA,   d/b/a   Metropolitan   Business   Services                                                                                                                         (unless   otherwise   specified,
collectively  referred  to  as                                                            “MBS,”  using  the  singular  pronoun                                           “it”)  initially
appealed the trial court’s order dismissing a number of claims—including claims
made pursuant to the anti-“cramming” statute, WIS. STAT. § 100.207 (2009-10)1—
against Wisconsin Bell Inc., ILD Communications, Inc., Americatel Corp., and
Local  Biz  USA,  Inc.,  (unless  otherwise  specified,  collectively  referred  to  as
“defendants”) and ILD cross-appealed.   On appeal, we concluded, as did the trial
court below, that the voluntary payment doctrine precluded MBS’s claims.   See
MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 2010 WI App
135, ¶1, 329 Wis. 2d 709, 790 N.W.2d 542   (unpublished) (“MBS I”).   We further
concluded that, because the voluntary payment doctrine precluded MBS’s claims,
we did not need to address ILD’s cross-appeal, nor did we need to address the
parties’ additional arguments regarding the efficacy of the trial court’s order.   See
id., ¶¶1, 21.   The supreme court, concluding that the voluntary payment doctrine
did not preclude MBS’s  §  100.207 claims because application of the doctrine
would undermine the manifest purposes of the statute, reversed our decision.   See
1  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise
noted.
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No. 2008AP1830
MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 2012 WI 15,
¶¶4-5, 338 Wis. 2d 647, 809 N.W.2d 857 (“MBS II”).   The supreme court also
remanded the matter back to us so that we could consider issues initially briefed,
but not considered in our original decision.   See id., ¶¶5, 75, 78-80, 83.   Those
issues are:                                                                                           (1) the viability of ILD’s cross-appeal; (2) MBS’s WIS. STAT. § 100.18
claim; and (3) MBS’s claim under the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act,
see  WIS.  STAT.  §§  946.80-946.88  (2007-08)  (“WOCCA”).    See  MBS II,  338
Wis. 2d 647, ¶¶5, 75, 78-80, 83.
¶2                                                                                                    On  remand,  we  conclude,  for  the  reasons  set  forth  below,  that:
(1) MBS’s WIS. STAT.  § 100.207(2) and  (3)(a) claims against ILD;  (2) MBS’s
WIS. STAT. § 100.18 claim against all defendants; and (3) MBS’s WOCCA claim
against all defendants should have survived defendants’ motion to dismiss.   In so
concluding, we also herein address any arguments defendants brought in support
of their motion to dismiss that were not addressed the first time the case was
before us.2   We affirm the part of the trial court’s order denying ILD’s motion to
dismiss  MBS’s  § 100.207(2)  claim; reverse  the  part  of  the  trial  court’s  order
granting ILD’s motion to dismiss MBS’s § 100.207(3)(a) claim; reverse the part of
the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss MBS’s  § 100.18
claim; and reverse the part of the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss MBS’s WOCCA claim.3
2  To the extent the parties argue issues not addressed by this opinion, we conclude that
our decision resolves all dispositive issues.  See Patrick Fur Farm, Inc. v. United Vaccines, Inc.,
2005 WI App  190,  ¶8 n.1,  286 Wis.  2d  774,  703 N.W.2d  707  (“[W]e decide cases on the
narrowest possible grounds.”).
3  As will be discussed herein, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss
MBS’s WOCCA claim on grounds that it was precluded by the voluntary payment doctrine.   It
did not otherwise discuss whether MBS’s WOCCA claim was properly pled.
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No. 2008AP1830
BACKGROUND AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3                                                                                      The facts of this case and standard of review are set forth in detail in
MBS II, 338 Wis. 2d 647, ¶¶6-25.   We will therefore provide only such additional
facts as are required by the issues raised in the analysis section below.
ANALYSIS
A.   The part of the trial court’s order denying ILD’s motion to dismiss MBS’s
claim under WIS.  STAT.  §  100.207(2) is affirmed, and the part of the trial
court’s order granting ILD’s motion to dismiss MBS’s claims under WIS. STAT.
§ 100.207(3)(a) is reversed.
¶4                                                                                      In its cross-appeal, ILD challenges the trial court’s rulings as to
MBS’s WIS. STAT. § 100.207 claims.   The complaint alleges that ILD and other
defendants  violated                                                                    §  100.207(2)  by  billing  MBS  in  a  false,  misleading,  or
deceptive manner, and by omitting information necessary to ensure that statements
in the phone bills were not false, deceptive or misleading.   The complaint alleges
that defendants violated § 100.207(3)(a) by billing MBS for services that it did not
affirmatively order, and that were not required by federal law, the FCC, or any
local utilities commission.   According to ILD, the trial court erroneously held that
MBS stated a claim against it for violating § 100.207(2); and “erroneously held
that … MBS had standing to bring a claim under § 100.207(3).”
¶5                                                                                      We  turn  first  to  MBS’s  claim  against  ILD  under  WIS.  STAT.
                                                                                        § 100.207(2).   Section 100.207(2), titled “Advertising and sales representations,”
provides:
A person may not make in any manner any statement or
representation    with    regard    to    the   provision    of
telecommunications service, including the rates, terms or
conditions for telecommunications service, which is false,
misleading or deceptive, or which omits to state material
information    with    respect    to    the    provision    of
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No. 2008AP1830
telecommunications service that is necessary to make the
statement not false, misleading or deceptive.
(Bolding omitted from title.)
¶6                                                                             Regarding  MBS’s  WIS.  STAT.  § 100.207(2)  claim,  the  trial court
determined that MBS did state a claim against all defendants, including ILD:
Stating on a phone bill that a customer owes money
for services the customer did not authorize is false.   Taking
the  allegations  of  the  complaint  as  true,  each  of  the
defendants  made  false  statements                                            “with  regard  to  the
provision of telecommunications service.”
And that seems to be the only element that must be
shown  to  demonstrate  a  violation  of                                       [WIS.  STAT.                                                            §]
100.207(2).   Subsection (2) does not specify to whom the
statement must be made, and because it states no limits, it
does not appear limited in any way to telecommunications
providers who deal directly with customers, and it may be
construed  to  mean  that  if  such  a  statement  is  made  to
anyone on the planet, it is unlawful….
Whatever  potential  ambiguity  might  exist  in  a
statute which doesn’t identify the victim of the conduct the
statute purports to outlaw is clarified in … [WIS. STAT. §
100.207](6)(e), [which] authorizes “any person or class of
persons  adversely affected  by the  failure  to  comply”  to
bring a suit….
Even though ILD may not have made any statements to the
plaintiffs directly, the complaint makes allegations which
suggest[] that ILD[’s] statements to Wisconsin Bell were
false  and  it  adversely  affects  the  plaintiffs,  and  I  must
conclude that ILD’s conduct is subject to the dictates of
[WIS. STAT. § 100.207](2).
I  understand  the  defendants’  contention  that  the
complaint  fails  to  state  a  claim  under                                   [WIS.   STAT.
§ 100.207](2)    because    telephone    bills    are    not
“advertisements” or “sales representations.”   The heading
of [WIS. STAT. § 100.207](2) suggests that it relates only to
advertising and sales representations.
However, the text of the statute is what counts, and
the heading comes into play only if the Legislature’s intent
is not expressed clearly enough in the text.   The text is clear
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No. 2008AP1830
and straightforward and not limited by any language about
advertising or sales, and I don’t see any need to refer to the
title to understand its meaning.
¶7                                                                                         We agree with the trial court that the statute does not limit prohibited
representations to those made directly to the party alleging the violation.   See WIS.
STAT. § 100.207(2).   Therefore, we agree that the § 100.207(2) claim against ILD
may go forward even though the complaint does not allege that ILD forwarded
billing information directly to MBS.
¶8                                                                                         We also agree with the trial court that the statutory text does not
limit the prohibited representations to “advertisements” or “sales representations.”
The text of WIS. STAT. § 100.207(2) very clearly prohibits false, misleading, or
deceptive statements or representations made “in any manner.”   See id. (emphasis
added).   Moreover, as the trial court correctly explained, we discern meaning from
the statute’s heading only if there is ambiguity in the text, and given that the text is
clear and unambiguous, no such recourse to the heading is required.   See WIS.
STAT. § 990.001(6) (“The titles to subchapters, sections, subsections, paragraphs
and subdivisions of the statutes and history notes are not part of the statutes.”); see
also Continental Cas. Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 175 Wis. 2d 527,
532, 499 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 1993) (Titles to statutes “may not be considered to
create ambiguities relating to statutes being challenged.”).   We therefore conclude
that, regardless of whether the telephone bill constituted an  “advertisement,” a
“sales representation,”  or some  other sort of  representation,  MBS has alleged
violations  against  ILD  within  the  purview  of  WIS.   STAT.                           § 100.207(2).
Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s order denying ILD’s motion to dismiss
MBS’s claim under § 100.207(2).
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No. 2008AP1830
¶9                                                                                     We  turn  next  to  MBS’s  claim  against  ILD  under  WIS.  STAT.
§ 100.207(3)(a).  Section 100.207(3)(a) provides:
A  person  may not  engage  in  negative  option  billing  or
negative   enrollment   of   telecommunications   services,
including  unbundled  telecommunications  services.     A
person may not bill a customer for any telecommunications
service that the customer did not affirmatively order unless
that service is required to be provided by law, the federal
communications   commission   or   the   public   service
commission.    A  customer’s  failure  to  refuse  a  person’s
proposal to provide a telecommunications service is not an
affirmative request for that telecommunications service.
¶10    Regarding MBS’s WIS. STAT. § 100.207(3)(a) claim against ILD, the
trial court determined that MBS stated a claim against all defendants, with the
exception of ILD:
I am satisfied that ILD did not bill the plaintiffs.    ILD
collected, packaged, and communicated billing information
to  Wisconsin  Bell,  but  that  conduct  cannot  fairly  be
described as  “billing” as in billing the plaintiffs, not any
more than the post office or an internet service provider
bills  a  homeowner  by  virtue  of  delivering  a  bill  to  the
homeowner’s attention.
ILD may have played some aider or abettor role in this
case, but the claim does not assert aider or abettor liability
against ILD.
¶11    We disagree with the trial court’s reasoning that the complaint does
not allege that ILD violated WIS.  STAT.  § 100.207(3)(a) because ILD did not
describe “billing” by ILD.   The statute expressly prohibits “engag[ing] in negative
option billing,” which is precisely what ILD is alleged to have done by collecting,
packaging, and communicating billing information to Wisconsin Bell.    See id.
Indeed, we conclude that the complaint adequately alleges that all defendants, in
their  various  roles  in  the  cramming  scheme,                                      “engage[d]  in  negative  option
billing.”    See id.   Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the complaint adequately
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No. 2008AP1830
explains each defendant’s role in the cramming scheme.    As described in the
complaint, ILD’s role is more significant than that of an internet provider or the
post-office, which have no role in putting together the bills they deliver.    We
therefore conclude that the complaint pleads a  §  100.207(3)(a) claim with the
requisite particularity.
¶12    Moreover, we disagree with defendants’ contention that the WIS.
STAT. § 100.207(3) claim must be dismissed because MBS is not a “consumer” as
defined  by  the  Department  of  Agriculture,  Trade,  and  Consumer  Protection
(“DATCP”).   As an initial matter, we note that the statute does not use the word
“consumer;” rather, it prohibits negative billing and enrollment to  “customers.”
We also agree with the trial court that the defendants’ arguments relying on the
DATCP definition of “consumer” are unavailing:
The defendants reason that the word  “customers”
cannot be understood without reference to related statutes
and regulation[s] and the related statute[s] and regulations
apply only to [“]consumers.[”]
However,  I  see  no  need  to  resort  to  the  other
statutes and regulations to understand the meaning of [WIS.
STAT.  §]  100.207(3)(a) because the meaning of the word
[“]customer[”]  is  plain,  and  its  plain  meaning  does  not
distinguish                                                                          between             customers       who   buy
telecommunications service for their homes as opposed to
their businesses….   First, it is not mandatory for a court to
consult related regulations in order to discern the meaning
of the statute.   A court is permitted to do so if it needs to do
so, to ferret out legislative intent, but when the Legislature
uses plan language, there may not be a reason to do so….
The second flaw in defendants’ argument is the assumption
that [§] 100.207 has no force apart from the regulations….
I  have  to  disagree.                                                               The  language  of   [WIS.   STAT.
§ 100.207](6)(e)  directs  the  Department  to  promulgate
rules, but the statute does not state that the rules are the
exclusive means of enforcing the statute.   To the contrary,
the statute explicitly provides for class action relief for a
failure to comply with the statute.   And that portion of the
statute  makes  no  precondition  of  a  rule  violation  for
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No. 2008AP1830
liability  under   the   statute.                                                         The   third   flaw   under
[defendants’] argument is that even if I was persuaded that
I need to consult the regulation to better understand the
meaning of the term [“]customer,[”] the regulations are of
limited  help.                                                                            Wisconsin  Administrative  Code  ATCP
123.01 does not define the term [“]customer.[”]
(Some formatting altered.)
¶13    Similarly,  defendants  point  to  no  controlling  authority  for  the
contention  that  MBS,  because  it  is  a  limited  liability  company,  cannot  be  a
“customer”  under  WIS.  STAT.  § 100.207(3)(a).    Cf.  WIS.  STAT.  § 180.0302(1)
(“[A] corporation  … has the same powers as a natural person to do all things
necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including but not
limited to power to … [s]ue and be sued, complain and defend in its corporate
name.”).    Given  the  dearth  of  controlling  precedent  to  the  contrary  and  the
supreme court’s mandate that the statute is to be construed broadly to effectuate its
anti-cramming purpose, see MBS II, 338 Wis. 2d 647, ¶¶43-44, 55, we conclude
that MBS does have standing to sue defendants under § 100.207(3)(a).   Therefore,
we reverse the part of the trial court’s order that grants ILD’s motion to dismiss
MBS’s § 100.207(3)(a) claim.
¶14    In sum, construing the statute broadly with an eye toward advancing
its legislative purpose, see MBS II, 338 Wis. 2d 647, ¶¶43-44, 55 (“The plain text
of WIS. STAT. § 100.207 sets forth a broad remedy available to persons who are
adversely  affected  by  cramming.”),  we  conclude  that  MBS’s  WIS.  STAT.
§ 100.207(2)  &                                                                           (3)(a)  claims  against  all  defendants  were  properly  pled.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision as to the  § 100.207(2) claim
against  ILD,  and  we  reverse  the  circuit  court’s  decision  regarding  the
100.207(3)                                                                                (a) claim against ILD.
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No. 2008AP1830
B.   The part of the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss
MBS’s WIS. STAT. § 100.18 claim is reversed.
¶15    As noted by the first two MBS opinions, the trial court dismissed
MBS’s  WIS.  STAT.  § 100.18  claim  on  grounds  not  related  to  the  voluntary
payment doctrine.   See MBS II, 338 Wis. 2d 647, ¶¶20-21.   Specifically, the trial
court determined that the misleading bills were not  “advertisements” or  “sales
promotions”:
[T]he claims alleged under [WIS. STAT. §] 100.18 should be
dismissed because the complaint fails to alleged the receipt
of  any  untrue,  deceptive,  or  misleading  advertising  and
sales promotions from the defendants.
The  telephone  bills  themselves  do  not  constitute
advertisements or sales promotions, it’s just a demand for
payment, and therefore, I don’t believe they fit within [§]
100.18.
In other words, the trial court was persuaded that § 100.18 applies only to claims
involving  “false advertising” and  “sales promotions,” and that bills do not fit
either category.
¶16    We disagree with the trial court on this issue.   The language of WIS.
STAT. § 100.18 is extremely broad.   Section 100.18(1) provides:
No person, firm, corporation or association, or agent or
employee thereof, with intent to sell, distribute, increase
the consumption of or in any wise dispose of any real
estate,  merchandise,  securities,  employment,  service,  or
anything  offered  by  such  person,  firm,  corporation  or
association,  or  agent  or  employee  thereof,  directly  or
indirectly,  to  the  public  for  sale,  hire,  use  or  other
distribution, or with intent to induce the public in any
manner to enter into any contract or obligation relating
to the purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of any real estate,
merchandise,  securities,  employment  or  service,  shall
make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the
public,  or  cause,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  be  made,
published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the
public, in this state, in a newspaper, magazine or other
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No. 2008AP1830
publication,  or  in  the  form  of  a  book,  notice,  handbill,
poster, bill, circular, pamphlet, letter, sign, placard, card,
label, or over any radio or television station, or in any
other  way  similar  or  dissimilar  to  the  foregoing,  an
advertisement,                                                                              announcement,                                statement   or
representation of any kind to the public relating to such
purchase,  sale,  hire,  use  or  lease  of  such  real  estate,
merchandise, securities, service or employment or to the
terms   or   conditions   thereof,   which   advertisement,
announcement, statement or representation contains any
assertion, representation or statement of fact which is
untrue, deceptive or misleading.
(Emphasis added.)
¶17    We conclude the plain language of the statute shows that statements
or  representations  may  be  actionable  even  when  contained  in  bills  or  other
documents  not  traditionally  considered                                                   “advertisements.”    Indeed,  the  statute
includes  “bill” as an example of a document that may contain a deceptive or
misleading representation, and even goes so far as to include documents “similar
or  dissimilar”  to  the  enumerated  items,  so  long  as  that  document  contains
misrepresentations.   See id. (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Novell v. Migliaccio,
2008 WI 44, ¶26, 309 Wis. 2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544                                            (“Novell I”) (noting that
WIS. STAT. § 100.18 “prohibits making false representations with the intent to sell
real estate”).    We  therefore  conclude  that the  phone  bills and representations
therein that induced MBS to pay for services it did not authorize are among the
kind of misleading representations that WIS. STAT. § 100.18 prohibits.
¶18    Our   conclusion   is   supported   by   other   cases   in   which
“representations”  with  respect  to  a  WIS.  STAT.                                        § 100.18  claim  were  not
“advertisements” as that word is commonly understood.   For example, in Novell I,
supra,  the  representations  at  issue  included  a  real  estate  seller’s  painting  a
basement wall in order to represent to the buyer that there had been no water
damage there.   See id., 309 Wis. 2d 132, ¶¶14, 18-20, 59, 62; see also Novell v.
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No. 2008AP1830
Migliaccio,                                                                                 2010  WI  App  67,  ¶¶10-13,  325  Wis.  2d  230,  783  N.W.2d  897
(“Novell II”).   Similarly, in Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 228 Wis. 2d 425, 597
N.W.2d  462  (1999),  we  held  that  a  “hold  harmless”  provision  of  a  provider
agreement—which advised plaintiffs that they would be held harmless for hospital
costs when in reality the hospital attempted to collect for its services via a lien on
plaintiffs’ property—constituted a “representation made to the public within the
meaning of [§ 100.18],” see Dorr, 228 Wis. 2d at 445-46.   Indeed, in Dorr, we
concluded  that                                                                             “[s]ection                                                                  100.18  prohibits  deceptive,  misleading,  or  untrue
statements of any kind to the public made in a commercial setting, no matter how
made.”    See Dorr,  228  Wis.  2d at  445  (emphasis added).    While defendants
attempt to distinguish Dorr by arguing that the alleged misrepresentation was
made in the context of promoting a service—which defendants liken to what they
describe  as                                                                                “false  advertising”—it  is  clear  that  in  the  case  before  us,  the
misrepresentations were made to “induce … an obligation” to pay for services not
ordered, which is directly covered by the statute.   See § 100.18(1).
¶19    We also conclude—contrary to defendants’ assertions—that MBS
has properly alleged a WIS. STAT.  § 100.18 misrepresentation claim against all
defendants.                                                                                 “[T]here are three elements in a § 100.18 cause of action:                  (1) the
defendant  made  a  representation  to  the  public  with  the  intent  to  induce  an
obligation,                                                                                 (2)  the  representation  was                                               ‘untrue,  deceptive  or  misleading,’  and
(3) the  representation  materially  induced                                                (caused)  a  pecuniary  loss  to  the
plaintiff.”   Novell I, 309 Wis. 2d 132, ¶49 (citation omitted).   In the case before us,
the complaint alleges that defendants, by acting in concert to submit bills for
services that MBS did not authorize, made representations to the public with the
intent  to  induce  an  obligation  to  pay  for  unauthorized  services,  which  was
misleading  and  deceptive,  and  which  caused  pecuniary  loss  to  MBS.    See
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No. 2008AP1830
§ 100.18(1).    While  the  defendants  argue  that  MBS  does  not  constitute  the
“public” because MBS had a contractual relationship with Wisconsin Bell, there
was no contract in place with any of the defendants for the billed services at issue;
indeed that is crux of this suit—that MBS and others were billed for services for
which they never contracted.   In this case, charges were billed to a party who had
never agreed to pay for them in the hope of tricking that party into assuming a
payment obligation.   We agree with MBS that, “[t]his is the very type of false or
misleading representation that § 100.18 addresses.”
¶20    Moreover, we conclude that the voluntary payment doctrine does not
bar MBS’s WIS. STAT. § 100.18 claim.   Because MBS has properly stated a claim
under the statute, we must now analyze whether the voluntary payment rule is at
odds with the manifest purpose of the statute.   See MBS II, 338 Wis. 2d 647, ¶¶78,
80 (“If the court of appeals concludes that MBS has stated a claim under WIS.
STAT.  § 100.18(1), then it will need to address whether the voluntary payment
doctrine is a viable defense to a claim under that statute.”).   As noted above, it is
evident from the language of § 100.18, as well as relevant case law, that the statute
applies to a broad range of false statements and misrepresentations.   See Novell I,
309 Wis. 2d 132, ¶¶ 14, 18-20, 59, 62; Novell II, 325 Wis. 2d 230, ¶¶10-13; Dorr,
228 Wis. 2d at 445-46.   It is also evident from the statutory language that the
purpose of the statute is to prohibit certain activities—in this case, representations
made  in  a  commercial  setting—without  placing  the  heightened  pleading
requirements that fraud requires.   Cf. Butcher v. Ameritech Corp., 2007 WI App
5,                                                                                       ¶15,  298 Wis.  2d  468,  727 N.W.2d  546  (fraud a defense to the voluntary
payment doctrine).   If a party violating § 100.18 can defend its actions using the
voluntary payment rule, then the broad, remedial purpose of § 100.18 would be
undermined.   See MBS II, 338 Wis. 2d 647, ¶¶54-55 (voluntary payment doctrine
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No. 2008AP1830
did not apply to WIS. STAT. § 100.207 claim because legislative purpose would be
severely undermined).    Consequently, we conclude that the voluntary payment
doctrine does not apply to claims under § 100.18, and consequently does not bar
MBS’s  §  100.18  claim against defendants.    Thus by alleging that defendants
represented to MBS that it owed money for services that it did not authorize—
whether  directly  or  indirectly—the  complaint  properly  alleges  a  claim  under
§ 100.18.
C.   The part of the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss
MBS’s WOCCA claim is reversed.
¶21    As noted, the defendants moved to dismiss MBS’s claim under the
WOCCA, arguing that MBS failed to properly plead acts of racketeering activity
as  required  by  WIS.  STAT.  § 946.82(4).    The  trial  court,  concluding  that  the
voluntary  payment  doctrine  precluded  the  WOCCA  claim,  did  not  determine
whether the WOCCA claim was properly pled.
¶22    We conclude that the complaint does state a claim under WOCCA.
WISCONSIN STAT. § 946.83(3) provides:                                                       “No person employed by, or associated
with,  any  enterprise  may  conduct  or  participate,  directly or  indirectly,  in  the
enterprise  through  a  pattern  of  racketeering  activity.”                               WISCONSIN  STAT.
§ 946.82(3) defines “pattern of racketeering activity” as “engaging in at least 3
incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results,
accomplices, victims or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing   characteristics...                                                         .”   WISCONSIN    STAT.                 § 946.82(4)   defines
“racketeering activity” as “the attempt, conspiracy to commit, or commission of”
specified   predicate   felonies,   including   felony   theft   under   WIS.   STAT.
§ 943.20(3)(bf)-(e).    The complaint alleges that defendants engaged in at least
three separate acts of felony theft, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 943.20, as well as mail
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No. 2008AP1830
fraud.   While various defendants argue that the complaint lacks specificity as to
the common “enterprise” the defendants engaged in with respect to the WOCCA
claim, the complaint in fact explains defendants’ ongoing roles in the common
scheme in painstaking detail, describing the process of generating false billing
information, sending that information to the service providers, and mailing it to
MBS  and  others  with  the  expectation  that  they  would  unwittingly  pay  for
telecommunications services they did not authorize.   See Jennings v. Emry, 910
F.2d                                                                                   1434,   1440   (7th  Cir.   1990)   (In  a  Racketeer  Influenced  and  Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) case, “[w]hether legal or extra-legal, each enterprise
is an ongoing ‘structure’ of persons associated through time, joined in purpose,
and  organized  in  a  manner  amenable  to  hierarchial  or  consensual  decision-
making.”) (citation omitted).   See also State v. O’Connell, 179 Wis. 2d 598, 606,
508  N.W.2d  23  (Ct.  App.  1993)  (case  law  interpreting  RICO  is  persuasive
authority when we interpret WOCCA); State v. Evers, 163 Wis. 2d 725, 732, 472
N.W.2d  828  (Ct.  App.  1991)  (same).    Indeed,  the  portion  of  the  complaint
explaining how defendants violated the WOCCA is over four pages long.   The
complaint more than adequately lays out each defendant’s role in the cramming
scheme, and more than adequately puts defendants on notice of WOCCA liability.
¶23    In reaching our conclusion, we determine the complaint properly
alleges a pattern of racketeering activity with respect to the WIS. STAT. § 943.20
felony theft allegation.   Defendants argue that because the discrete charges issued
to MBS and  others  were  less than  $2500,  they fail to  constitute  felony theft
pursuant to § 943.20(bf).   In support, they cite to State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App
45, 261 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 12, in which we held that fifteen convictions of
felony theft under § 943.20 were not multiplicitous.   See Swinson, 261 Wis. 2d
633,  ¶¶27,  47.    However,  Swinson  does  not  support  defendants’  contentions
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No. 2008AP1830
because it is not analogous to the claim before us.   In Swinson, the defendant was
convicted of fifteen counts of theft by fraudulent misrepresentation.   Id., ¶3.   The
State’s theory of the case was that the defendant submitted false invoices to his
employer for work that was never actually completed, and that each false invoice
for  services  submitted  was  a  false  representation  because  the  defendant  “had
sufficient time between preparing each separate invoice to reflect on his actions
and to recommit to the criminal conduct.”   Id., ¶¶31-32, 35.   To put it another
way, the defendant’s conduct in Swinson was similar to a person who buys a
magazine at a newsstand each morning with cash.    In the case before us, in
contrast, the conduct alleged by the complaint is more similar to that of a family
who signs up for a magazine subscription; the acts of theft and fraud are alleged as
part of an ongoing pattern of racketeering activity among numerous defendants
that affected an entire class of plaintiffs.   In the circumstances before us, it is not
inappropriate to aggregate the discrete charges to constitute acts of theft of $2500
or more.
¶24    Our position is supported by State v. Copening, 103 Wis. 2d 564,
572-73, 309 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1981), in which we held that multiple acts of
check kiting could be considered to be one criminal offense because they were all
part of the same scheme.   In Copening, we concluded that a single count of theft
by fraud could be brought even though the check kiting took place over a period of
time and even though it involved multiple victims.   See id.   As we explained in
that case:
[W]hen  a  defendant  is  operating  an  ongoing  fraudulent
scheme, it may be necessary to allege several individual
transactions   which,   considered   together,   reflect   the
fraudulent operation.   We can conceive of no other manner
in which a check kiting operation, such as involved here,
can be alleged.   Although each check passed represents a
distinct taking, it is within the state’s discretion to charge
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No. 2008AP1830
the entire scheme as a single offense.   The single criminal
design to commit theft is inferable from the complaint.
Id. at 573 (footnote omitted).
¶25    Similarly, in this case, the defendants are alleged to have engaged in
a  scheme  to  steal  money  over  a  period  of  time  from  multiple  victims.    We
therefore conclude that the individual acts of theft can be considered as a single
offense involving more than $2500 for purposes of establishing felony theft.
¶26    Because we conclude that the complaint properly alleges a WOCCA
claim with respect to felony theft, we need not decide whether the complaint
adequately alleges acts of mail fraud, even though the parties dispute the issue.
See Patrick Fur Farm, Inc. v. United Vaccines, Inc., 2005 WI App 190, ¶8 n.1,
286 Wis. 2d 774, 703 N.W.2d 707 (“[W]e decide cases on the narrowest possible
grounds.”).
¶27    We further conclude that the voluntary payment doctrine does not
apply to preclude MBS’s WOCCA claim.   Similar to WIS. STAT. §§ 100.207 and
100.18,  the  purpose  of  the  WOCCA  is to compensate  parties that have  been
injured by racketeering and to deter such behavior.    See WIS.  STAT.  § 946.81
(“The legislature finds that a severe problem is posed in this state by the increasing
organization among certain criminal elements and the increasing extent to which
criminal activities and funds acquired as a result of criminal activity are being
directed  to  and  against  the  legitimate  economy  of  the  state.  The  legislature
declares  that  the  intent  of  the  Wisconsin  Organized  Crime  Control  Act  is  to
impose sanctions against this subversion of the economy by organized criminal
elements and to provide compensation to private persons injured thereby.”).   Also,
as we recently held in S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Morris, 2010 WI App 6, ¶33,
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No. 2008AP1830
322 Wis. 2d 766, 799 N.W.2d 19, the remedial provisions of the WOCCA are to
be given “liberal construction.”   Given the statutory purpose and the mandate that
the  statute  is  to  be  construed  broadly  to  effectuate  its  manifest  purpose,  we
conclude that applying the voluntary payment doctrine would frustrate the purpose
of the WOCCA.   Cf. MBS II, 338 Wis. 2d 647, ¶82 (“[T]he conflict between the
statute’s purpose and the common law defense leaves no doubt that the legislature
intended that the common law defense should not be applied to bar claims under
the statute.”).   Consequently, we hold that the voluntary payment doctrine does
not, in fact, bar MBS’s WOCCA claims.   Therefore, because MBS has stated a
valid WOCCA claim, and because the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply,
we deny defendants’ motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
¶28    In light of the foregoing, we affirm the part of the trial court’s order
denying ILD’s motion to dismiss MBS’s § 100.207(2) claim; reverse the part of
the trial court’s order granting ILD’s motion to dismiss MBS’s § 100.207(3)(a)
claim; reverse the part of the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss MBS’s  § 100.18 claim; and reverse the part of the trial court’s order
granting defendants’ motion to dismiss MBS’s WOCCA claim.
By the Court.— Order affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Recommended for publication in the official reports.
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