Preview:

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
                                                                   DATED AND RELEASED
                                                                                                                          NOTICE
                                                                   July 31, 1997
                                                                   A  party  may  file  with  the  Supreme  Court  a      This opinion is subject to further editing. If
                                                                   petition  to  review  an  adverse  decision  by  the   published, the official version will appear in
                                                                   Court of Appeals.   See § 808.10 and RULE 809.62,      the bound volume of the Official Reports.
STATS.
No.                                                                97-0381
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                 IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III
MICHELLE MCCANN, BY HER
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, ARDELL W. SKOW,
CYNTHIA MCCANN AND BRYAN MCCANN,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
V.
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY &
CASUALTY INS. CO.,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT,
WISCONSIN MUTUAL INS. CO.,
DEFENDANT.
APPEAL  from a judgment and  an order  of  the circuit court for
Pierce County:  ROBERT W. WING, Judge.   Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J., LaRocque and Myse, JJ.




NO.   97-0381
LaROCQUE, J.                                                                             Michelle McCann appeals a summary judgment
finding that an automobile policy issued by Metropolitan Property & Casualty
Insurance  Co.  provides  no  underinsured  motorist                                     (UIM)  coverage.    McCann
argues  that  Wisconsin  case  law  establishes  that  the  policy  is  ambiguous  and
therefore should be construed in favor of coverage.   Because we conclude that the
policy language unambiguously denies coverage, we affirm.
The relevant facts are undisputed.   McCann, a minor, was injured
while a passenger in a vehicle driven by Rosann Buck, also a minor.   The vehicle
was insured by Buck’s father under a policy issued by American Family Insurance
Company, with liability limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.
McCann settled her claim with American Family for the $50,000 policy limits.
This amount, however, was inadequate to fully compensate McCann
for her injuries.   McCann therefore submitted a claim for UIM coverage against a
policy  issued  to  her  mother  from  Metropolitan.     That  policy  included  an
“Underinsured Motorists Coverage Endorsement,” which stated that “[w]e agree
with you that Section IV, Protection Against Uninsured Motorists Coverage is
amended to include Protection Against Underinsured Motorists Coverage.”   The
UIM endorsement also included the following provisions:
We will pay bodily injury damages, caused by an accident
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an
underinsured highway vehicle, which you or a relative
are legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an
underinsured  highway  vehicle.     Any  other  person
occupying a covered automobile has the same rights as
you.
.…
Section VI, General Definitions, is amended as follows:
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NO.   97-0381
(1)                                                                                      Item (b) of the definition of “covered automobile” is
amended   to   add                                                                       “Protection   Against   Underinsured
Motorists Coverage.”
(2)                                                                                      “underinsured highway vehicle” means a motor
vehicle with respect to which insurance or other financial
security covering bodily injury is in effect at the time of
the accident, in at least the minimum amount specified in
the applicable motor vehicle financial responsibility law,
compulsory insurance law, or other applicable law, but as
to which the sum of the applicable limits of liability of such
insurance  and  other  financial  security  is  less  than  the
applicable limits of liability stated for Protection Against
Underinsured Motorists Coverage in the Declarations.   For
purposes  of  Protection  Against  Underinsured  Motorists
Coverage,   the   applicable   motor   vehicle   financial
responsibility  law,  compulsory  insurance  law,  or  other
similar applicable law shall be the law of the state in which
the covered automobile is principally garaged.
This policy listed UM liability limits of  $50,000 per person and  $100,000              per
accident, but does not list any limits for UIM coverage.
Metropolitan   denied   UIM   coverage   for   McCann’s   injuries.
McCann,  by  her  guardian  ad  litem,  filed  a  claim  in  circuit  court  demanding
coverage.   Metropolitan moved the court for summary judgment, which the court
granted.  McCann now appeals.
We  review  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  using  the  same
methodology as the trial court.   See M & I First Nat'l Bank v. Episcopal Homes
Mgmt., Inc., 195 Wis.2d 485, 496, 536 N.W.2d 175, 182 (Ct. App.1995); see also
§ 802.08(2), STATS.   That methodology is well known, and we will not repeat it
here except to observe that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.   See M & I First Nat'l Bank, 195 Wis.2d at 496-97, 536 N.W.2d at
182.    Although summary judgment presents a question of law that we review
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NO.   97-0381
de novo, we still value a trial court's decision on such a question. See id. at 497,
536 N.W.2d at 182.
The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that
this court decides independently of the trial court.    Lambert v. Wrensch,  135
Wis.2d 105, 115, 399 N.W.2d 369, 373-74 (1987).   The policy language, as the
agreed upon articulation of the bargain reached between the parties, is dispositive
to the extent it is plain and unambiguous.   See Smith v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.,
155 Wis.2d 808, 811, 456 N.W.2d 597, 599 (1990).
McCann's first argument seems to contend that because the UIM
endorsement explicitly states that the UM section of the policy “is amended to
include” UIM coverage, UIM coverage is provided by the policy in this case.   We
see no merit in this argument.      McCann does not, and cannot, argue that she
would be entitled to UM coverage in this case.   It is undisputed that the Buck
vehicle was insured for $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.   Because
Wisconsin merely requires a policy with limits of  “$25,000 because of bodily
injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to such limit for
one person, $50,000 because of bodily injury to or death of 2 or more persons in
any one accident,” the Buck vehicle could not be an uninsured vehicle under the
Metropolitan policy.1   See § 344.33, STATS.   Thus, the mere inclusion of UIM
coverage within UM coverage in this case is not helpful to McCann.
1 The Metropolitan policy defines “uninsured highway vehicle” as:
(a)                                                                                    A motor vehicle to which no insurance policy or other
financial security is applicable at the time of the accident;
(b)                                                                                    A motor vehicle with respect to which insurance or other
                                                                                       financial security covering bodily injury is in effect at the time
                                                                                       of the accident, but the amount of bodily injury coverage under
                                                                                                                                                            (continued)
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NO.   97-0381
McCann next argues that the policy is ambiguous and therefore must
be interpreted in favor of coverage.   See Kuhn v. Allstate, 193 Wis.2d 50, 53, 532
N.W.2d 124, 128 (1993).   We disagree that the policy is ambiguous.   The UIM
endorsement explicitly states that it provides UIM coverage for  “bodily injury
damages, caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use
of  an underinsured  highway vehicle  ….”    The  term  “underinsured                 highway
vehicle” is explicitly defined, in relevant part, as
a motor vehicle with respect to which insurance or other
financial security covering bodily injury is in effect at the
such  insurance  and  other  financial  security  is  less  than  the
amounts  specified  by  an  applicable  motor  vehicle  financial
responsibility law, motor vehicle compulsory insurance law, or
similar applicable law.   For the purposes of Protection Against
Uninsured Motorists Coverage, the applicable law shall be the
law of the state in which the covered automobile is principally
garaged;
(c)                                                                                   A motor vehicle which has a bodily injury liability
bond or insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident, but
the company writing such bond or policy denies coverage, or is
or becomes insolvent; or
(d)                                                                                   A hit and run highway vehicle which causes bodily
injury to an insured as the result of striking the insured or a
motor vehicle which he is occupying at the time of the accident,
if:
i.                                                                                    The identity of either the driver or owner of the
hit and run vehicle is unknown;
ii.                                                                                   The accident is reported within  24 hours to a
police officer, a peace or judicial officer, or the Commissioner or
Director of Motor Vehicles;
iii.                                                                                  The insured or someone on his behalf files with
us within 30 days of the accident a statement under oath that the
insured or his legal representative has a cause of action due to
the accident for damages against a person or persons whose
identity is unknown; and
iv.                                                                                   The insured or his legal representative makes
available for inspection by us, when requested, the motor vehicle
occupied by the insured at the time of the accident.
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NO.   97-0381
time  of  the  accident,  in  at  least  the  minimum  amount
specified   in   the   applicable   motor   vehicle   financial
responsibility  law                                                                       …  but  as  to  which  the  sum  of  the
applicable limits of liability of such insurance and other
financial  security  is  less  than  the  applicable    limits  of
liability   stated   for   Protection   Against   Underinsured
Motorists Coverage in the Declarations.
Initially, we note that the Buck vehicle is not an “underinsured highway vehicle”
under the American Family policy definition if, under its  “applicable limits of
liability” that limit was not less than any applicable limits of liability found in the
Metropolitan policy.   Metropolitan contends that the limits of both policies were
$50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.   We agree.
McCann, however, argues that in order to qualify as “underinsured”
under the Metropolitan policy language, the tortfeasor’s limits must be less than
the                                                                                       “applicable  limits  of  liability  stated  for  Protection  Against  Underinsured
Motorists  Coverage  in  the  Declarations.”    McCann  then  points  out  that  the
Metropolitan declarations page lists no limits for UIM coverage, thereby creating
an ambiguity within the policy.      It is true that the declarations page does not
include a reference to UIM limits but only UM limits.   McCann would end the
inquiry here and have us conclude that the ambiguity must be construed in favor of
coverage.   However, in construing a written contract, the entire instrument must be
considered as a whole in order to give each of its provisions the meaning intended
by the parties.    Ketay v. Gorenstein,  261 Wis.  332,  333-34,  53 N.W.2d  6,  7
(1952).
When read in context, we conclude that the reference to UIM limits
must mean the UM limits of  $50,000/$100,000.    We believe this is the only
reasonable reading for several reasons.   First, the UIM endorsement is tied directly
to the UM provisions.   The policy states that the “Protection Against Uninsured
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NO.   97-0381
Motorists  Coverage”  section  is  amended  to  include                                      “Protection  Against
Underinsured Motorists Coverage.”
Second, if the UM declaration coverage is not what was intended, it
would  render  the  UIM  reference  to  the  declarations  page  meaningless.    That
construction of an insurance contract should be avoided which renders portions of
the  contract  meaningless,  inexplicable  or  mere  surplusage.    Rockline  Inc.  v.
Wisconsin Physicians Serv. Ins., 175 Wis.2d 583, 593, 499 N.W.2d 292, 297 (Ct.
App. 1993).   The UIM provisions of the policy endorsement, read in context of the
entire policy, including the declarations page, leads us to one conclusion:   The
policy provides UM and UIM limits of  $50,000 per person and  $100,000 per
accident.
We  also  point  out  that  the  definition  of  “underinsured  highway
vehicle”  in  the  Metropolitan  policy  is  substantially  similar  to  the  definitions
discussed in a series of cases beginning with Smith v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 155
Wis.2d 808, 456 N.W.2d 597 (1990).   Our supreme court in Smith examined a
policy, which defined “underinsured motor vehicle” as:   "A land motor vehicle …
to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident,
but its liability for bodily injury liability is less than the limit of liability for this
coverage."   Id. at 811, 456 N.W.2d at 599 (emphasis in original).   This definition
is  similar  to  the  definition  in  this  case  because  both  define  an  underinsured
situation as one where the tortfeasor’s liability limits are less than the victim’s
limits.    The Smith court found the above  definition unambiguous and denied
coverage.   Id.
The same result was reached by this court in Link v. General Cas.
Co., 185 Wis.2d 394, 518 N.W.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1994); Krech v. Hanson,                        164
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NO.   97-0381
Wis.2d 170, 473 N.W.2d 600 (1991); and Engstrom v. MSI Ins. Co., 198 Wis.2d
195, 542 N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1995).   In each case, this court found substantially
similar  definitions  of  underinsured  motor  vehicle  to  be  unambiguous.    We
conclude that these cases govern the instant case.
Next, McCann attempts to apply the holdings of Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Gifford,  178  Wis.2d  341,  504 N.W.2d  370  (Ct.  App.  1993),  and Sobieski  v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 181 Wis.2d 324, 510 N.W.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1993), to the
facts of this case.   We conclude that those cases are not applicable to the instant
controversy.
Gifford rejected the insured’s attempt to stack two UIM provisions
so as to meet the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle.   That court decided,
however,  that the  policy was illusory because  it defined coverage  so that, in
practice, it will never be triggered, citing Hoglund v. Secura Ins., 176 Wis.2d
265,  271,  500  N.W.2d  354,  356-57  (Ct.  App.  1993),  as  governing  authority.
Gifford, 178 Wis.2d at 349, 504 N.W.2d at 373.   Sobieski refused to allow the
insurer to rely upon a “drive other cars” exclusion because such exclusions were
deemed valid only in UIM and not UM situations.   Because the policy in question
in that case stated that an uninsured (UM) motor vehicle means a vehicle which is
underinsured (UIM),   the policyholder was entitled to the benefits of Wisconsin
UM law and the exclusion was invalid. Id. at 330, 510 N.W.2d at 798.   Neither
Gifford nor Sobieski compel a construction of the Metropolitan policy so as to
provide UIM coverage under the present facts.   The tortfeasor's policy was not
"less than the applicable limits of liability stated" in the Metropolitan policy.
McCann  next  asks  this  court  to  find  UIM  coverage  because  a
reasonable insured would expect UIM coverage under the facts of this case.   It
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NO.   97-0381
cites our supreme court’s statement in Matthiesen v. Continental Cas. Co., 193
Wis.2d 192, 204, 532 N.W.2d 729, 734 (1995), that the “underlying purpose” of
UIM  coverage  “is  to  compensate  the  victim  of  an  underinsured  motorist’s
negligence  where  the  third  party’s  liability  limits  are  not  adequate  to  fully
compensate the victim for his or her injuries.”   McCann asserts that Metropolitan’s
definition of “underinsured highway vehicle” is in conflict with this purpose and
therefore with a reasonable insured’s expectation of coverage.   See Krech, 164
Wis.2d at 175 n. 2, 473 N.W.2d at 602-03 n.2.
We reject this argument.   When an insurance policy is unambiguous,
this court cannot look beyond the language employed to the parties’ expectations.
Smith, 155 Wis.2d at 811, 456 N.W.2d at 599.   We therefore end our analysis of
the Metropolitan policy with its unambiguous language.
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
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