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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
NOTICE
DATED AND FILED
This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in the
bound volume of the Official Reports.
September 15, 1998
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
                                                                       Marilyn L. Graves         petition  to  review  an  adverse  decision  by  the
                                                                       Clerk, Court of Appeals   Court of Appeals.  See § 808.10 and RULE 809.62,
                                                                       of Wisconsin              STATS.
No.                                                                    98-0526-FT
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                     IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                       DISTRICT III
OWEN R. WILLIAMS,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
GERALD VAN CAMP,
DEFENDANT-THIRD-
PARTY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
V.
WILLIAMS & KORF AND WISCONSIN MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS-
RESPONDENTS.
APPEAL  from  an  order  of  the  circuit  court  for  Polk  County:
PAUL J. LENZ, Judge.   Affirmed.
Before Cane, C.J., Myse, P.J., and Hoover, J.




No(s). 98-0526-FT
PER CURIAM.    Gerald Van Camp appeals an order denying his
motion  to  vacate  a  summary  judgment  that  dismissed  his  legal  malpractice
counterclaim against Owen Williams.1   Williams moved for summary judgment on
the  ground  that  Van  Camp  did  not  have  an  expert  witness  to  support  his
malpractice claim.   Van Camp defaulted on the motion because his attorney, Paul
Horvath, did not open his mail for several months.   The trial court concluded that
Horvath’s  inexcusable  neglect  should  be  imputed  to  Van  Camp  because  Van
Camp was not reasonably diligent.   The court also found that Van Camp failed to
show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his counterclaim.   We
conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied the
motion to reopen.
A  motion  to  vacate  a  judgment  is  addressed  to  the  trial  court’s
discretion and this court will not disturb the trial court’s determination absent an
erroneous exercise of that discretion.   See Miro Tool & Mfg., Inc. v. Midland
Machinery, Inc., 205 Wis.2d 650, 654-55, 556 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Ct. App. 1996).
A discretionary order will be affirmed if there is any reasonable basis for it.   See
Littman v. Littman, 57 Wis.2d 238, 250, 203 N.W.2d 901, 907 (1973).
The trial court reasonably imputed Horvath’s inexcusable neglect to
Van  Camp.    An  attorney’s  neglect  is  ordinarily  imputed  to  his  client.    An
exception is recognized when the client has acted as a reasonable and prudent
person engaging a lawyer of good reputation, has relied on the lawyer to protect
his rights, and has made reasonable inquiry concerning the proceedings.    See
Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. Wiegel, 92 Wis.2d 498, 514, 285 N.W.2d
1  This is an expedited appeal under RULE 809.17, STATS.
2




No(s). 98-0526-FT
720,  727-28  (1979).    Van  Camp’s  affidavit  does  not  establish  that  he  made
reasonable inquiry concerning the proceedings.   While the affidavit is difficult to
understand and lacking in detail, it appears that Van Camp repeatedly attempted to
contact Horvath at his office with no success.   From this, the trial court reasonably
determined  that  Van  Camp  should  have  realized  that  Horvath  was  no  longer
appropriately functioning as his attorney.
In addition to establishing excusable neglect or a reason for not
imputing  inexcusable  neglect  to  him,  Van  Camp  was  required  to  establish  a
meritorious defense to the summary judgment motion.   See J.L. Phillips & Assos.,
Inc. v. E. & H. Plastic Corp., 217 Wis.2d 348, 355, 577 N.W.2d 13, 16 (1998).
Summary  judgment  was  granted  because  Van  Camp  was  required  to  present
expert testimony to support his counterclaim for legal malpractice because his
claim against Williams involved matters outside the realm of ordinary persons.
See Pierce v. Coldwell, 209 Wis.2d 355,  362,  563 N.W.2d 166,  169 (Ct. App.
1997).   In order to support his motion to reopen the default summary judgment,
Van  Camp  was  required  to  respond  to  the  summary  judgment  motion  by
presenting  expert  testimony  in  support  of  his  counterclaim.    The  trial  court
properly  exercised  its  discretion  when  it  refused  to  reopen  the  malpractice
counterclaim because the claim would fail for lack of evidence.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published.  See RULE 809.23(1)(b)5, STATS.
3

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