Preview:

2005  WI  67
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:                                                                       2004AP0740
COMPLETE TITLE:
Progressive  Northern  Insurance  Company,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Richard  P.  Romanshek,
Defendant-Appellant,
Blue  Cross  Blue  Shield  United  of  Wisconsin,
Defendant.
ON  BYPASS  FROM  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS
OPINION FILED:                                                                  June  7,  2005
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:                                                                  February  4,  2005
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:                                                                          Circuit
COUNTY:                                                                         Waukesha
JUDGE:                                                                          Lee  S.  Dreyfus
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:                                                                      ABRAHAMSON,  C.J.,  dissents  (opinion  filed).
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For  the  defendant-appellant  there  was  a  brief  (in  the  court
of  appeals)  by  Charles  H.  Bohl,  Michael  R.  Sarner  and  Whyte,
Hirschboeck  Dudek  S.C.,  Milwaukee,  and  oral  argument  by  Tamara
Hayes  O’Brien.
For   the   plaintiff-respondent   there   was   a   brief                      (in   the
court   of   appeals)   by   Robert   J.   Lauer,   Patti   J.   Kurth,   and
Kasdorf,  Lewis  &  Swietlik,  S.C.,  Milwaukee,  and  oral  argument  by
Robert  J.  Lauer.
An  amicus  curiae  brief  was  filed  by  Michael  Riley  and  Axley
Brynelson,  LLP,  Madison,  on  behalf  of  Wisconsin  Academy  of  Trial
Lawyers.




An  amicus  curiae  brief  was  filed  by  Noreen  J.  Parrett,
James  A.  Friedman  and  LaFollette  Godfrey  &  Kahn,  Madison,  on
behalf  of  the  Wisconsin  Insurance  Alliance.
2




2005  WI  67
NOTICE
This  opinion  is  subject  to  further
editing  and  modification.    The  final
version   will   appear   in   the   bound
volume of the official reports.
No.                                                                          2004AP740
(L.C.  No.                                                                   03  CV  1265)
STATE  OF  WISCONSIN                                                         :                                                    IN  SUPREME  COURT
Progressive  Northern  Insurance  Company,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.                                                                           FILED
Richard  P.  Romanshek,
JUN  7,  2005
Defendant-Appellant,
Cornelia G. Clark
Clerk of Supreme Court
Blue  Cross  Blue  Shield  United  of
Wisconsin,
Defendant.
APPEAL  from  an  order  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  Waukesha
County,  Lee  S.  Dreyfus,  Judge.    Affirmed.
¶1    JON  P.  WILCOX,  J.      This  case  is  before  the  court  on  a
motion  to  bypass,  pursuant  to  Wis.  Stat.  §  808.05  (2001-02)1  and
Wis.  Stat.  §  (Rule)                                                       809.60.     We  are  once  again  called  upon  to
determine  whether  the  phrase  "hit-and-run"  within  the  definition
of   "uninsured   motor   vehicle"   in   Wis.  Stat.  §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.
1  All  subsequent  references  to  the  Wisconsin  Statutes  are  to
the  2001-02  version  unless  otherwise  indicated.




No.  2004AP740
requires  an  insurer  to  provide  uninsured  motorist                        (UM)  coverage
when  its  insured  is  the  victim  of  a  "miss-and-run"  accident.    We
decline   to   overrule   our   long   line   of   precedent   requiring
physical  contact  in  an  accident  involving  an  unknown  vehicle  in
order  for  there  to  be  a  "hit-and-run"  within  the  meaning  of
§  632.32(4)(a)2.b.                                                            Therefore,   we   affirm   the   order   of   the
circuit  court.
I
¶2    On   May                                                                 28,                                                             2003,   Progressive   Northern   Insurance
Company  (Progressive)  filed  a  complaint  for  declaratory  judgment
against  its  insured,  Richard  P.  Romanshek  (Romanshek),  seeking  a
declaration  of  the  rights  of  the  parties  under  its  insurance
policy.                                                                        The   following   facts   were   alleged   in   Progressive's
complaint  and  admitted  in  Romanshek's  answer.
¶3    Progressive  is  a  domestic  insurance  company  licensed
to  do  business  in  Wisconsin.    Romanshek  is  an  adult  resident  of
Wisconsin.      Romanshek  had  a  Progressive  motorcycle  liability
insurance  policy  in  full  force  and  effect  at  all  relevant  times.
The  policy  contained  a  provision  providing  UM  coverage.      On
December                                                                       28,                                                             2002,   Romanshek  was  driving  his  Harley-Davidson
motorcycle   in   Naples,   Florida,   and   was   involved   in   a   motor
vehicle  accident.2    The  accident  involved  an  unidentified  vehicle
that   turned   in   front   of   Romanshek's   motorcycle,   causing
Romanshek  to  lose  control  of  his  machine,  fall  to  the  ground,
2  Progressive's   policy   contained   a   clause   requiring   all
disputes  to  be  settled  according  to  the  law  of  the  state  in
which  the  insured  resides.
2




No.  2004AP740
and  suffer  injuries.     Romanshek's  motorcycle  never  came  into
physical  contact  with  the  unidentified  vehicle  or  any  part  of
said  vehicle.    The  unknown  vehicle  drove  away  and  has  never  been
identified.3
¶4    Romanshek  subsequently  made  a  claim  with  Progressive
under  the  UM  portion  of  his  policy.     Progressive  denied  his
claim  in  a  letter  dated  February  3,  2003,  on  the  ground  that  the
unknown  vehicle  was  not  an  "uninsured  motor  vehicle"  as  defined
in   the   policy.                                                             Progressive's   policy   provides,   in   pertinent
part:
INSURING  AGREEMENT-UNINSURED  MOTORIST  COVERAGE
ADDITIONAL  DEFINITIONS
3.                                                                             "Uninsured   motor   vehicle"   means   a   land   motor
vehicle  of  any  type  or  a  trailer  while  used  with
a  land  motor  vehicle:
c.    that  is  a  hit-and-run  vehicle  whose  operator
or   owner   cannot   be   identified   and   which
strikes
i.    you  or  a  relative;
ii.   a  vehicle  that  you  or  a  relative  are
occupying;  or
iii.  a  covered  vehicle;
3  Progressive   apparently   does   not   contest   Romanshek's
version  of  events.
3




No.  2004AP740
provided  that  the  insured  person,  or  someone
on  his  or  her  behalf,  reports  the  accident
to  the  police  or  civil  authority  as  soon  as
practicable  after  the  accident.
(Underscoring  added.)      Progressive  subsequently  commenced  the
present  action,  seeking  a  declaration  that  no  UM  coverage  is
provided  under  the  policy  for  a  miss-and-run  accident.
¶5    On  October                                                              22,                                              2003,  Progressive  filed  a  motion  for
declaratory/summary  judgment,  arguing  that  its  policy  did  not
provide  UM  coverage  because  the  unknown  vehicle  did  not  strike
Romanshek's   motorcycle   and   thus   was   not   an   "uninsured   motor
vehicle"  as  defined  in  its  policy.     In  its  brief  in  opposition
to  Progressive's  motion  for  summary  judgment,  Romanshek  did  not
contest  that  Progressive's  policy  requires  physical  contact  in
order  for  an  unidentified  vehicle  to  qualify  as  an  "uninsured
motor   vehicle"   under   the   "hit-and-run"   definition.                   Rather,
Romanshek    argued    that    by    requiring    physical    contact,
Progressive's  policy  impermissibly  attempts  to  narrow  the  scope
of  UM  coverage  mandated  by                                                 §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.,  which,  according
to   Romanshek,   should   not   be   read   as   containing   a   physical
contact  requirement.     Specifically,  Romanshek  argued  that  Hayne
                                                                               v.   Progressive   Northern   Insurance   Co.,   115   Wis.  2d  68,                         339
N.W.2d  588                                                                    (1983),   which   interpreted                    §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.   to
require  physical  contact,  "has  been  eroded  to  the  point  that  it
has  no  meaning."
¶6    At  the  hearing  on  the  motion,  the  circuit  court  noted
that  "it  seems  to  me  it  would  be  appropriate  to  include  [a  miss-
and-run]  in  the  definition  for  uninsured  motorist  coverage  at
4




No.  2004AP740
this  point  in  time.     But  at  least  right  now  that's  not  the
definition  as  it  exists  in  the  State  of  Wisconsin."     The  court
ruled:    "The  State  of  Wisconsin  clearly  requires  that  there  be  a
physical  contact  component,  if  you  will,  between  the  vehicle  or
the   injured   party   and   what   is   the   uninsured   vehicle  .  .  .
And,  quite  clearly,  that  has  been  the  law  for  the  past  twenty
years."
¶7    Thus,  on  January                                                       28,                                 2004,  the  circuit  court  entered
an    order    for    declaratory/summary    judgment    in    favor    of
Progressive.     Romanshek  appealed,  and  this  court  granted  his
petition  to  bypass  on  October  19,  2004.
II
¶8    The  sole  question  presented  on  this  appeal  is  whether
§  632.32(4)(a)2.b.    mandates    UM    coverage    for    an    accident
involving  an  unidentified  motor  vehicle  and  an  insured's  vehicle
when  there  is  no  physical  contact.     In  other  words,  we  must
determine  whether  the  phrase  "hit-and-run"  within  the  definition
of  "uninsured  motor  vehicle"  in                                            §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  requires  an
insurer  to  provide  UM  coverage  when  its  insured  is  the  victim  of
a  "miss-and-run"  accident.    Statutory  interpretation  is  an  issue
of  law,  reviewed  de  novo  by  this  court.     State  v.  Waushara
County  Bd.  of  Adjustment,  2004  WI  56,  ¶14,  271  Wis.  2d  547,  679
N.W.2d  514.    Further:
In  a  declaratory  judgment  action,  the  granting  or
denying  of  relief  is  a  matter  within  the  discretion  of
the  circuit  court.    This  court  reviews  such  decisions
to   determine   whether   the   circuit   court   erroneously
exercised   its   discretion.                                                  If   the   circuit   court
5




No.  2004AP740
proceeds  on  an  erroneous  interpretation  of  the  law,
the  exercise  of  discretion  is  erroneous.
Theis  v.  Midwest  Sec.  Ins.  Co.,  2000  WI  15,  ¶8,  232  Wis.  2d  749,
606  N.W.2d  162(citations  omitted).
¶9    The  standards  for  granting  summary  judgment  are  well
known    and    need    not    be    set    forth    in    full.                See
Wis.  Stat.  §  802.08.                                                         When   the   facts   are   undisputed,   the
interpretation   and   application   of   a   statute   to   these   facts
present  a  question  of  law  appropriate  for  summary  judgment.    See
Tri-Tech  Corp.  of  Am.  v.  Americomp  Servs.,  Inc.,                         2002  WI                                                            88,
¶19,  254  Wis.  2d  418,  646  N.W.2d  822;  Fore  Way  Express,  Inc.  v.
Bast,  178  Wis.  2d  693,  701,  505  N.W.2d  408  (Ct.  App.  1993);  Hake
v.  Zimmerlee,                                                                  178  Wis.  2d  417,                                                 421,    504  N.W.2d  411   (Ct.  App.
1993).
                                                                                                                                                    III
¶10   Wisconsin  Stat.  §  632.32(1)  provides  that  every  policy
of    insurance    issued    in    Wisconsin    must    contain    certain
provisions.                                                                     Among                                                               these   mandatory          provisions   is
Wis.  Stat.  §  632.32(4),   which   requires   insurance   policies   to
provide  UM  coverage  and  medical  payments  coverage.     Wisconsin
Stat.                                                                           §  632.32(4)(a)   governs   UM   coverage   and   provides   that
insurance  policies  must  contain  a  provision:
1.                                                                              For  the  protection  of  persons  injured  who
are  legally  entitled  to  recover  damages  from  owners  or
operators   of   uninsured   motor   vehicles   because   of
bodily  injury,  sickness  or  disease,  including  death
resulting  therefrom,  in  limits  of  at  least  $25,000  per
person  and  $50,000  per  accident.
2.                                                                              In  this  paragraph  "uninsured  motor  vehicle"
also  includes:
6




No.  2004AP740
a.    An  insured  motor  vehicle  if  before  or  after
the   accident   the   liability   insurer   of   the   motor
vehicle  is  declared  insolvent  by  a  court  of  competent
jurisdiction.
b.    An  unidentified  motor  vehicle  involved  in  a
hit-and-run  accident.
3.                                                                           Insurers  making  payments  under  the  uninsured
motorists'  coverage  shall,  to  the  extent  of  payment,
be  subrogated  to  the  rights  of  their  insureds.
(Emphasis  added.)
¶11   Romanshek  argues  that  Wisconsin  courts  have  eroded  the
physical  contact  requirement  set  forth  in  Hayne  and  that  this
court   should   therefore   abandon   it.                                   He   also   argues   that
requiring   physical   contact   contravenes   the   intent   of   UM
coverage.     Finally,  he  asserts  that  a  majority  of  other  states
have  held  that  requiring  physical  contact  in  order  for  there  to
be  a  hit-and-run  is  against  public  policy.
¶12   In    contrast,    Progressive    argues    that    case    law
interpreting                                                                 §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.    has    consistently    required
physical  contact  in  order  for  UM  coverage  to  be  required.     It
also  argues  that  because  the  court  has  consistently  interpreted
the  statute,  any  change  in  the  statutory  requirements  must  come
from  the  legislature.    Moreover,  Progressive  states  that  because
its  policy  clearly  requires  physical  contact  in  order  for  there
to   be   a   hit-and-run,   Romanshek   could   not   reasonably   expect
coverage   where   there   was   no   physical   contact.                    Progressive
states   that   the   parties   are   bound   by   their   contractual
agreement,  and  the  court  cannot  rewrite  the  insurance  contract
to  eliminate  the  physical  contact  requirement.
7




No.  2004AP740
¶13   We  begin  by  emphasizing  that  the  sole  issue  on  appeal
is  the  proper  construction  of                                               §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.      Therefore,
"[t]he  question  to  be  decided  here  .  .  .  is  not  the  construction
of  the  policy,  but  what  the  law  requires.    Thus,  the  reasonable
expectation  of  the  insured  regarding  the  language  of  the  policy
is                                                                              not                                   relevant                                                 to                  our   analysis    of
Wis.  Stat.  §  632.32(4)(a)2.b."      Smith  v.  Gen.  Cas.  Ins.  Co.,
2000  WI  127,  ¶27,  239  Wis.  2d  646,  619  N.W.2d  882.    "[C]overages
omitted  from  an  insurance  contract  may  nevertheless  be  compelled
and  enforced  as  though  a  part  thereof  where  the  inclusion  of
such   coverage   is   required   by   a   properly   enacted   statute."
Amidzich  v.  Charter  Oak  Fire  Ins.  Co.,                                    44  Wis.  2d  45,                     53,                                                      170
N.W.2d  813  (1969).
¶14   The   first   case   relevant   to   our   discussion   of   the
meaning  of  the  term  "hit-and-run"  is  Amidzich.     Amidzich  was
decided  prior  to  the  enactment  of  §  632.32.    See  §  171,  ch.  102,
Laws   of                                                                       1979.                                 In   Amidzich,   the   insurance   policy   at   issue
provided  coverage  for  damages  caused  by  a  hit-and-run  vehicle,
which  was  defined  as  an  automobile  that  "'causes  bodily  injury
to   an   insured   arising   out   of   physical   contact   of   such
automobile  .  .  .                                                             .'"                                   Amidzich,                                                44   Wis.  2d  at   48    (emphasis
supplied  by  Amidzich).
¶15   The   insured   contended   that   the   phrase   "physical
contact"  should  be  interpreted  so  as  to  provide  coverage  where  a
vehicle  forces  an  insured  off  the  road  without  actually  striking
the  insured's  vehicle.    Id.  at  49.    The  insured  also  argued  that
"the  only  justification  for  the  'physical  contact'  requirement
8




No.  2004AP740
is  the  prevention  of  fraudulent  claims"  and  that  because  there
was  no  evidence  of  fraud,  the  requirement  was  inapplicable.    Id.
¶16   The  court  rejected  the  insured's  argument,  ruling:
We  are  satisfied  that  the  phrase  in  the  policy,
"physical  contact,"  is  intended  to  express  no  other
meaning  than  that  which  is  plainly  apparent  on  its
face.                                                                        Despite    the    forceful    arguments    of    the
appellants,  we  conclude  that  there  is  no  reasonable
construction  to  this  phrase  that  supports  other  than
the   requirement   that   there   be   an   actual   striking
between  the  "hit-and-run  automobile"  and  the  insured's
vehicle,   at   least   in   a   situation   where   only   two
vehicles  are  involved.     The  very  term,  "hit-and-run,"
contained   in   the   policy   itself   supports   the   plain
meaning   that   we   attribute   to   the   term   "physical
contact."     The  word,  "hit,"  is  defined  in  Webster's
Third  New  International  Dictionary  as:
"1a:                                                                         a   blow   striking   an   object   aimed   at——
                                                                             contrasted  with  miss  .  .  .  b:    an  impact  of  one  thing
against  another:    collision  .  .  .                                                                                                          ."
Id.  at  51  (first  emphasis  added).
¶17   In   closing,   the   court   noted   that   "[p]ersuasive
arguments  could  be  made  that  statutory  requirements  to  afford
coverage   to   the   plaintiff   should   be   provided.                    The   present
statute,  however,  does  not  require  such  coverage,  nor  does  the
policy  as  written  provide  for  it."    Id.  at  54.
¶18   Subsequently,  the  legislature  enacted                               §  632.32,  which
included  in  the  definition  of  uninsured  motor  vehicle,  "[a]n
unidentified  motor  vehicle  involved  in  a  hit-and-run  accident."
§  171,  ch.                                                                 102,  Laws  of                                                      1979.     The  Legislative  Council  Note  to
this  section  stated,  in  pertinent  part:     "A  precise  definition
of  hit-and-run  is  not  necessary  for  in  the  rare  case  where  a
9




No.  2004AP740
question   arises   the   court   can   draw   the   line."                    Legislative
Council  Note,  1979,  §  632.32,  Stats.
¶19   Following   the   enactment   of   this   new   statute,   this
court  decided  Hayne.     "The  sole  issue  on  appeal"  in  Hayne  was
"whether   sec.                                                                632.32(4)                                              (a)2.b.,   Stats.,   requires   uninsured
motorist  coverage  for  an  accident  involving  an  insured's  vehicle
and  an  unidentified  motor  vehicle  when  there  was  no  physical
contact  between  the  two  vehicles."     Hayne,                              115  Wis.  2d  at                                      69.
The  relevant  facts  of  Hayne  were  almost  identical  to  the  facts
presented  in  the  present  case.     Id.     The  precise  question  in
Hayne  was  "whether  the  term  'hit-and-run'  includes  'miss-and-
run'  or  whether  it  requires  an  actual  physical  striking."     Id.
at  73.
¶20   We  examined  a  variety  of  dictionary  definitions  of
"hit-and-run"    and    concluded    "[t]hese    definitions    clearly
indicate  that  the  plain  meaning  of  'hit-and-run'  consists  of  two
elements:    a  'hit'  or  striking,  and  a  'run',  or  fleeing  from  the
scene  of  an  accident."    Id.  at  73-74.    Thus,  we  concluded:
[T]he   statutory   language   of   sec.                                       632.32(4)                                              (a)2.b.,
Stats.,  is  unambiguous.     We  therefore  arrive  at  the
legislature's   intent   by   according   the   language   its
common  and  accepted  meaning.    As  previously  noted,  the
common  and  accepted  meaning  of  the  term  "hit-and-run"
includes   an   element   of   physical   contact.                             Section
632.32(4)                                                                      (a)2.b.  mandates  coverage  only  for  "hit-and-
run"    accidents    involving    an    unidentified    motor
vehicle.                                                                       The   clear   statutory   language   of   sec.
632.32(4)                                                                      (a)2.b.   reflects   a   legislative   intent   that
the  statute  apply  only  to  accidents  in  which  there  has
been  physical  contact.    Because  there  was  no  physical
contact  under  the  circumstances  of  this  case,  sec.
632.32(4)                                                                      (a)2.b.  does  not  support  Hayne's  claim  for
coverage.
10




No.  2004AP740
Id.  at  74  (citation  omitted).
¶21   Further,  we  reasoned:
If  the  legislature  had  intended  its  mandated  uninsured
motorist  coverage  to  apply  to  any  accident  involving
an   unidentified   motorist,   as   Hayne   asserts,   that
result  could  have  been  reached  merely  by  deleting  the
term  "hit-and-run"  from  the  language  in  [the  statute],
and   having   that   provision   read:                                 "an   unidentified
motor    vehicle    involved    in    an    accident."                  The
legislature  did  not,  however,  omit  the  term  "hit-and-
run".                                                                   Therefore,   to   define   "hit-and-run"   in   sec.
632.32(4)                                                               (a)2.b.  to  include  the  type  of  accident  Hayne
was  involved  in  or  any  other  accident  involving  an
unidentified  motor  vehicle  where  there  is  no  physical
contact  would  be  to  render  the  term  "hit-and-run"  in
the  statute  mere  surplusage.    That  we  cannot  do.
Id.  at  76.
¶22   We   also   rejected   Hayne's   argument   that   we   should
interpret  the  phrase  "hit-and-run"  to  include  a  "miss-and-run"
because  other  jurisdictions  had  reached  a  similar  conclusion:
We  also  note  that  courts  in  other  states  have
concluded   that   the   term   "hit-and-run"   in   their
uninsured  motorist  statutes  does  not  connote  physical
contact.    This  conclusion  is  based,  in  part,  on  other
statutes  imposing  a  duty  on  a  driver  involved  in  an
accident   to   stop,   provide   certain   information,   and
render    aid.  .  .                                                    .  Wisconsin's    version    of    these
statutes,   however,   is   entitled   "Duty   upon   striking
                                                                        person   or   attended   or   occupied   vehicle."                                                   Section
346.67,                                                                 Stats.                                                     (Emphasis    added.)                      Section
346.67(1)                                                               (a)  provides,  in  part:    "  .  .  .  he  shall  give
his  name,  address  and  the  registration  number  of  the
vehicle  he  is  driving  to  the  person  struck  .  .  .              ."
The  reference  to  "striking"  in  sec.                                346.67  supports
our  conclusion  that  the  plain  meaning  of  "hit-and-run"
in  sec.                                                                632.32(4)                                                  (a)2.b.  includes  a  physical  contact
element.
Id.  at  75  (footnote  omitted).
11




No.  2004AP740
¶23   We  also  rejected  Hayne's  argument  that  the  legislature
intended  to  overturn  the  result  we  reached  in  Amidzich  when  it
enacted  §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.    Id.  at  76-79.    As  noted  previously,
in  Amidzich,  we  specifically  stated  that  the  legislature  could
mandate   UM   coverage   for   miss-and-run   accidents   by   statute.
Amidzich,  44  Wis.  2d  at  54.    In  Hayne,  we  concluded:
If,  in  fact,  the  legislature  had  that  statement  from
Amidzich                                                                    in                                                                 mind                            when   it   enacted   sec.
632.32(4)                                                                   (a)2.b.,   then   it   also   was   aware   of   the
discussion  in  Amidzich  of  the  term  "hit  and  run".    Had
the    legislature    intended    Hayne's    assertion,    the
clearest  way  to  effectuate  that  intent  was  simply  to
not  include  the  term  "hit-and-run",  thereby  mandating
coverage  for  "miss-and-run  accidents"  as  well.     The
legislature  did  not  do  that,  but  instead  deliberately
included  in  sec.                                                          632.32(4)                                                          (a)2.b.  the  term  "hit-and-
run".    The  unambiguous  meaning  of  the  term  includes  a
physical  contact  element.
The  legislature  presumably  was  aware  of  the  discussion
in  Amidzich  concerning  the  literal  meaning  of  "hit-
and-run",    and    certain    policy    arguments    favoring
inclusion   within   the   statutory   uninsured   motorists
provision  of  coverage  for  "miss-and-run"  accidents.
Hayne,  115  Wis.  2d  at  79,  84.
¶24   Furthermore,  we  concluded  that  the  legislative  history
of                                                                          §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  supported  the  conclusion  that  the  term
hit-and-run  included  a  physical  contact  requirement:      "[The]
Legislative  Council  report  to  the  legislature  indicate                [sic]
that  those  responsible  for  the  revision  adding  'hit-and-run'
accidents  as  a  category  to  be  included  in  required  uninsured
motorist   coverage   were   simply   incorporating   a   category   of
coverage  into  the  statute  that  most  standard  insurance  policies
12




No.  2004AP740
already  contained."     Id.  at                                            83.     We  also  stated  that  miss-and-
                                                                            run  accidents  were  not  among  the  "rare"  cases  referred  to  in  the
Legislative  Council  Note  to                                              §  632.32.     Id.  at                                                        82-83  n.8.     In
sum,  we  concluded:
[T]he   legislature   was   confronted   with   two   distinct
policy  choices:    One,  it  could  define  uninsured  motor
vehicle   to   include   an   unidentified   motor   vehicle
involved   in   an   accident,   regardless   of   whether
physical  contact  occurred;  or  two,  it  could  define
uninsured   motor   vehicle   to   include   an   unidentified
motor  vehicle  involved  in  a  "hit-and-run"  accident.
The  legislature  chose  the  second  alternative.
Id.  at  84.
¶25   Then  Justice  Shirley  S.  Abrahamson  dissented  from  the
majority    opinion,    arguing    that    several    policy    arguments
supported  including  miss-and-run  accidents  within  UM  coverage
for  hit-and-run  accidents.     Id.  at                                    85-99.     In  response,  the
majority  noted:
Many  of  the  policy  arguments  favoring  uninsured
motorist    coverage    for    "miss-and-run"    accidents
involving  unidentified  motor  vehicles  are  addressed  in
the  dissent.     We  cannot,  however,  change  the  wording
of  a  statute  by  liberal  construction  to  mean  something
that  the  legislature  did  not  intend,  or  that  the  plain
language   of   the   statute   will   not   support.   The
legislature  can,  if  it  so  desires,  amend  the  uninsured
motorist  statute  to  reflect  those  policy  arguments.
Id.  at  85  n.11  (citation  omitted)(emphasis  added).
¶26   Following  our  decision  in  Hayne,  the  court  of  appeals
                                                                                                                                                          decided    Wegner    v.    Heritage    Mutual    Insurance    Co.,                                                    173
                                                                                                                                                          Wis.  2d  118,  496  N.W.2d  140  (Ct.  App.  1992),  and  Dehnel  v.  State
                                                                                                                                                          Farm   Mutual   Automobile   Insurance   Co.,                                  231   Wis.  2d  14,                    604
N.W.2d  575                                                                 (Ct.  App.                                                                    1999).                                                                         The  issue  in  Wegner  was  whether
13




No.  2004AP740
§  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  mandated  UM  coverage  in  an  accident  involving
three  vehicles  where  the  first  car  swerved  into  the  lane  of  the
second  car,  causing  the  second  car  to  swerve  into  the  lane  of
the   insured's   car,   resulting   in   the   insured's   vehicle   being
forced  off  the  road.    Wegner,  173  Wis.  2d  at  121.    The  court  of
appeals,   relying   on   Hayne,   concluded   that   "the   uninsured
motorist  insurance  laws  do  not  provide  coverage  for  a  hit-and-
run  driver  that  does  not  'hit'  another  vehicle[.]"    Id.  at  120.
¶27   In   Dehnel,   the   insured's   vehicle   was   damaged   as   a
result  of  a  piece  of  ice  that  fell  off  of  a  passing  semitrailer.
Dehnel,                                                                         231  Wis.  2d  at                                   15.     The  court  of  appeals  held  that  UM
coverage   was   not   mandated   by                                            §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.   under   these
facts   because   a   piece   of   ice   falling   from   an   unidentified
                                                                                vehicle   was   not   a   hit-and-run   accident.                                                                  Id.                         The   court
reasoned:
                                                                                                                                    The  type  of  physical  contact  which  is  required  under
                                                                                                                                    §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  has  been  described  by  the  supreme
                                                                                                                                    court   as   a   "touching   between   the   vehicles."                                    See
Hayne,                                                                          115   Wis.  2d  at                                  78.                                                            However,   the   physical
contact  that  occurred  here  was  not  between  any  part  of
the  semi  and  Dehnel's  vehicle.      Rather,  it  was  an
indirect  touching,  in  that  the  ice  was  not  even  an
integral  part  of  the  unidentified  vehicle,  such  as  a
tire  that  had  become  unattached.
We   also   note   that   enlarging   the   statutory
interpretation   established   by   the   supreme   court   to
cover   extraneous   objects   that   may   be   carried   by
vehicles  would  have  no  reasonable  ending  point  for
coverage.
Id.  at  21-22.
¶28   The   next   occasion   this   court   had   to   interpret
§  632.32(4)(a)2.b.   was   in   Theis.                                         In   Theis,   the   insured's
14




No.  2004AP740
vehicle  was  struck  by  a  leaf  spring,  a  part  of  a  semi-tractor,
although  it  was  unclear  whether  the  object  fell  off  a  passing
semi-tractor   or   came   from   another   vehicle   and   merely   was
propelled  by  the  passing  semi-tractor.    Theis,                            232  Wis.  2d  749,
¶¶4-5.
¶29   In    analyzing    whether                                                §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.    mandated
coverage  for  this  type  of  accident,  we  noted  that  "[o]ur  court
and   the   court   of   appeals   have   'drawn   a   line'   on   uninsured
motorist  claims  .  .  .                                                       ."    Id.,  ¶19.    However,  we  stated:
Although  the  Wisconsin  cases  have  interpreted  the  hit-
and-run  provision  of  Wis.  Stat.  §  632.32(4)  to  require
physical  contact  between  an  insured's  motor  vehicle
and   an   unidentified   motor   vehicle,   they   have   not
interpreted  the  statute  to  negate  "physical  contact"
between  the  insured's  motor  vehicle  and  a  part  of  an
unidentified  motor  vehicle.
Id.,                                                                            ¶26.     In  addition,  we  distinguished  Dehnel,  noting  "[i]n
the  present  case,  unlike  in  Dehnel,  a  piece  detached  from  an
unidentified  motor  vehicle  was  propelled  into  the  plaintiff's
motor  vehicle  by  an  unidentified  motor  vehicle."      Id.,                ¶25.
Finally,  we  concluded  that  mandating  coverage  for  this  type  of
accident   would   be   consistent   with   the   purposes   of   the   UM
statute.                                                                        Id.,                                                                ¶¶28-31.   Thus,   we   concluded:
"Wis.  Stat.  §  632.32(4)   requires   that   the   uninsured   motorist
clauses  of  an  insurance  policy  provide  coverage  when  a  detached
piece  of  an  unidentified  motor  vehicle  is  propelled  into  the
insured's  motor  vehicle  by  an  unidentified  motor  vehicle."    Id.,
¶11.
15




No.  2004AP740
¶30   Finally,  in  Smith,  this  court  was  presented  with  a
variation  of  the  facts  in  Wegner.     Smith  involved  a  three-car
accident  that  began  when  an  unidentified  car  in  the  left  lane  of
the  interstate  struck  a  tractor-double  trailer  in  the  center
lane,  which,  in  turn,  struck  the  insured's  vehicle  in  the  right
lane.     Smith,                                                               239  Wis.  2d  646,                                                     ¶3.     The  question  presented  was
                                                                               "whether  this  chain  reaction  collision  is  a  'hit'  within  the
meaning  of  the  statute."    Id.,  ¶8.
                                                                               ¶31   We  began  our  analysis  by  noting  that  "[a]  hit-and-run
occurs  when  three  elements  are  satisfied:                                                                                                                                                   (1)   there  is  an
unidentified   motor   vehicle;                                                                                                                        (2)   the   unidentified   vehicle   is
involved  in  a  hit;  and  (3)  the  unidentified  motor  vehicle  'runs'
from  the  scene  of  the  accident."     Id.,                                 ¶10                                                                     (citing  Theis,                           232
Wis.  2d  749,                                                                 ¶¶14-16).     In  addition,  we  reiterated  that  "[w]e
have    previously    held    that    the    phrase    hit-and-run    in
Wis.  Stat.  §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  unambiguously  'includes  a  physical
contact  element.'"    Id.,  ¶11  (quoting  Hayne,  115  Wis.  2d  at  79).
We   stated   that   the   issue   involved   was   whether   the   physical
contact  requirement  was  satisfied  under  the  facts  presented.
Id.
¶32   Examining   the   plain   language   of   the   statute,   we
reasoned:
Wisconsin  Stat.  §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.                                          defines                                                                 an
uninsured  motor  vehicle  as  "an  unidentified"  vehicle
"involved  in  a  hit  and  run  accident."    The  use  of  the
word  "involved"  does  not  strike  us  as  a  word  that
should   be   narrowly   applied   only   to   a   hit-and-run
accident   involving   a   direct   hit   to   the   insured
vehicle.     Here,  the  unidentified  vehicle  was  clearly
16




No.  2004AP740
"involved":                                                                   it   precipitated   the   accident   through
contact  with  the  intermediate  vehicle.
Id.,  ¶12.
¶33   Next,  we  examined  our  UM  jurisprudence  and  stated  that
our  prior  cases  fell  within  two  categories:     cases  involving
miss-and-runs  and  cases  involving  flying  objects.    Id.,  ¶14.    We
stated  that  both  lines  of  cases  involved  the  physical  contact
requirement:                                                                  "While   the   miss-and-run   cases   establish   the
physical  contact  requirement,  the  second  line  of  cases  presents
examples  of  where  the  court  was  required  to  consider  whether
that  requirement  was  satisfied."     Id.,                                  ¶22.     We  distinguished
the  miss-and-run  cases  because  "in  the  instant  case  there  was  a
contact;    the    unidentified    vehicle    had    contact    with    the
intermediate  vehicle,  which  in  turn  had  contact  with  the  insured
vehicle.     The  miss-and-run  cases  do  not  foreclose  interpreting
Wis.  Stat.  §  632.32(4)   as   mandating   coverage   in   this   case."
Id.,  ¶21.
¶34   Finally,  we  examined  the  policies  underlying                       §  632.32
and   concluded   that   "the   public   policy   concern   of   preventing
fraudulent  claims"  would  be  satisfied  by  mandating  coverage  in
this  type  of  accident  and  that  mandating  such  coverage  would
further  the  policy  of  providing  an  injured  motorist  the  same
compensation  as  if  the  uninsured  motorist  were  insured.     Id.,
¶28.     Thus,  we  concluded  that  "when  an  unidentified  driver  is
involved  in  a  chain  reaction  collision,  the  physical  contact
requirement  for  a  'hit-and-run'  is  satisfied  and  coverage  is
mandated  under  Wis.  Stat.  §  632.32(4)(a)2.b."    Id.
17




No.  2004AP740
¶35   Romanshek's  principal  argument  on  this  appeal  is  that
we  should  overrule  Hayne  because  our  cases  subsequent  to  that
decision  have  eroded  the  physical  contact  requirement  to  the
point  where  it  has  no  meaning.    We  reject  this  argument  because,
as  the  above  discussion  demonstrates,  both  our  cases  and  the
court  of  appeals'  decisions  have  consistently  adhered  to  the
interpretation  of                                                             §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  set  forth  in  Hayne,  which
requires  physical  contact  in  accidents  involving  an  unidentified
vehicle   in   order   for   there   to   be   a   hit-and-run   under   the
statute.    Smith,  239  Wis.  2d  646,  ¶11  ("We  have  previously  held
that   the   phrase   hit-and-run   in   Wis.  Stat.  §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.
unambiguously  'includes  a  physical  contact  element.'")(quoting
Hayne,  115  Wis.  2d  at  79);  Theis,  232  Wis.  2d  749,  ¶26  (accord);
Dehnel,                                                                        231  Wis.  2d  at                                    21                     (accord);  Wegner,   173  Wis.  2d  at   121
("[T]he   uninsured   motorist   insurance   laws   do   not   provide
coverage  for  a  hit-and-run  driver  that  does  not  'hit'  another
vehicle[.]").
¶36   Further,    the    results    in    these    cases    have    not
undermined   the   physical   contact   requirement.                           The   "flying
objects"   cases,   such   as   Theis   and   Dehnel,   reaffirmed   the
physical  contact  requirement  and  simply  applied  that  rule  to
unusual   factual   scenarios.                                                 See   Smith,                                         239   Wis.  2d  646,   ¶22
("While  the  miss-and-run  cases  establish  the  physical  contact
requirement,  the                                                              [flying  objects]  cases  presents  examples  of
where   the   court   was   required   to   consider   whether   that
requirement  was  satisfied.").
18




No.  2004AP740
¶37   Dehnel  found  that  UM  coverage  was  not  mandated  when  a
foreign   object,   a   piece   of   ice,   fell   from   an   unidentified
vehicle  onto  the  insured's  vehicle.    Dehnel,  231  Wis.  2d  at  21.
In  contrast,  Theis  found  that  the  physical  contact  requirement
was  satisfied  because  a  part  of  an  unidentified  vehicle  made
                                                                                physical   contact   with   the   insured's   vehicle.   Theis,                                         232
Wis.  2d  749,                                                                  ¶25.                                                     Both   cases   are   consistent   with   the
requirement  set  forth  in  Hayne  that  physical  contact  "requires  a
hit  or  touching  between  the  vehicles."     Hayne,                          115  Wis.  2d  at
78.
¶38   Cases  subsequent  to  Hayne  not  involving  flying  objects
have  consistently  adhered  to  the  physical  contact  requirement.
In  Wegner,  the  court  of  appeals  concluded  that  UM  coverage  was
not  mandated  because  a  car  that  was  forced  off  the  road  as
another  swerved  into  its  lane  was  not  involved  in  a  hit-and-run
accident  due  to  the  fact  that  there  was  no  physical  contact
between   the   vehicles.                                                       Wegner,                                                  173   Wis.  2d  at                             120.   "[T]he
uninsured  motorist  insurance  laws  do  not  provide  coverage  for  a
hit-and-run  driver  that  does  not  'hit'  another  vehicle[.]"    Id.
In  contrast,  Smith  found  UM  coverage  was  mandated  in  a  chain
reaction  accident  because  the  uninsured  vehicle  struck  another
vehicle,   which,   in   turn,   struck   the   insured's   vehicle   and
because  §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  explicitly  covers  vehicles  "involved"
in  a  hit-and-run  accident.     Smith,                                        239  Wis.  2d  646,                                      ¶¶12,                                          28.
Thus,   Smith   did   not   erode   the   holding   of   Hayne;   it   merely
applied  that  holding  to  a  new  set  of  facts  that  implicated  the
additional  statutory  language  "involved."    As  such,  both  Wegner
19




No.  2004AP740
and  Smith  were  perfectly  consistent  with  Hayne,                          115  Wis.  2d  at
74,  which  concluded  that  "[t]he  clear  statutory  language  of  sec.
632.32(4)                                                                      (a)2.b.  reflects  a  legislative  intent  that  the  statute
apply   only   to   accidents   in   which   there   has   been   physical
contact."
¶39   Thus,  for  over                                                         20  years  this  court  has  consistently
adhered  to  the  plain,  unambiguous  meaning  of  §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.,
as  set  forth  in  Hayne.     We  have  consistently  ruled  that  UM
coverage  was  not  mandated  under                                            §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  in  miss-and-
run  accidents.    The  cases  in  which  we  found  that  UM  coverage  was
mandated  by                                                                   §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  all  involved  circumstances  where
an  unidentified  vehicle,  or  part  thereof,  made  contact  with  the
insured's    vehicle    or    where    an    unidentified    vehicle    was
"involved"  in  an  accident  in  which  there  was  physical  contact.
In   short,   as   we   recognized   in   Theis,                               232   Wis.  2d  749,                                            ¶19,
"[o]ur  court  and  the  court  of  appeals  have  'drawn  a  line'  on
uninsured  motorist  claims[,]"  by  requiring  physical  contact  in
order    to    fall    within    the    mandated    UM    coverage    in
§  632.32(4)(a)2.b.     We  simply  have  not  deviated  from  that  line
when  it  comes  to  miss-and-run  cases.
¶40   Romanshek   next   argues   that   we   should   abandon   our
holding  in  Hayne  because  a  majority  of  other  states                    (27)  have
held  that  physical  contact  "is  an  impermissible  limitation  on
uninsured  or  unknown  motorist  statutes  and  is  against  public
policy."                                                                       Pet'r   Br.   at                                                5.     In   addition,   he   asserts   that
requiring   physical   contact   contravenes   the   intent   of   UM
20




No.  2004AP740
coverage.     We  are  not  persuaded  by  these  arguments  for  several
reasons.
¶41   Any  time  this  court  is  asked  to  overturn  a  prior  case,
we   must   thoroughly   consider   the   doctrine   of   stare   decisis.
"This  court  follows  the  doctrine  of  stare  decisis  scrupulously
because  of  our  abiding  respect  for  the  rule  of  law."     Johnson
Controls  v.  Employers  Ins.  of  Wausau,                                   2003  WI                                                     108,                      ¶94,                                               264
Wis.  2d  60,                                                                665  N.W.2d  257.     It  is  a  "longstanding  rule  that
this  court  'is  bound  by  its  own  precedent.'"     State  v.  Hansen,
2001  WI                                                                                                                                  53,                       ¶52,                                               243  Wis.  2d  328,                                                                                                                                 627  N.W.2d  195                                      (Wilcox,  J.,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       dissenting)(quoting  Rose  Manor  Realty  Co.  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,
                                                                                                                                                                    272  Wis.  339,  346,  75  N.W.2d  274  (1956)).
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ¶42   "Fidelity  to  precedent  ensures  that  existing  law  will
                                                                                                                                                                    not   be   abandoned   lightly.                                                                                                                                                                        When   existing   law   'is   open   to
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       revision  in  every  case,  "deciding  cases  becomes  a  mere  exercise
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       of  judicial  will,  with  arbitrary  and  unpredictable  results."'"
                                                                                                                                          Schultz   v.   Natwick,                                                      2002   WI                                                                      125,                                                                 ¶37,                                                  257   Wis.  2d  19,                 653
N.W.2d  266                                                                                                                                                         (footnotes   omitted).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Failing   to   abide   by   stare
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       decisis   raises   serious   concerns   as   to   whether   the   court   is
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       "implementing  'principles  .  .  .  founded  in  the  law  rather  than
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       in  the  proclivities  of  individuals.'"     Payne  v.  Tennessee,                                                                                                                                                                           501
U.S.                                                                         808,                                                         853                                                                                                                                                                                                                              (1991)(Marshall,  J.,  dissenting)(quoting  Vasquez
                                                                                                                                                                    v.  Hillery,  474  U.S.  254,  265  (1986)).
¶43   "[F]requent   and   careless   departure   from   prior   case
precedent   undermines   confidence   in   the   reliability   of   court
decisions."     Johnson  Controls,                                           264  Wis.  2d  60,                                           ¶95.     "'Stare
decisis  is  the  preferred  course  of  judicial  action  because  it
21




No.  2004AP740
promotes  evenhanded,  predictable,  and  consistent  development  of
legal   principles  .  .  .  and   contributes   to   the   actual   and
                                                                             perceived   integrity   of   the   judicial   process.'"                                                        Id.,               ¶95
(quoting  State  v.  Ferron,                                                 219  Wis.  2d  481,                                                         504,                                579  N.W.2d  654
(1998)(quoting  Payne,                                                       501  U.S.  at                                                               827)).     Thus,  "'the  doctrine
                                                                             of  stare  decisis  is  of  fundamental  importance  to  the  rule  of
                                                                             law.'"     Hilton  v.  S.C.  Pub.  Rys.  Comm'n,                            502  U.S.                           197,               202
                                                                             (1991)(quoting  Welch  v.  Tex.  Dept.  of  Highways  and  Pub.  Transp.,
483  U.S.  468,  494  (1987)).
¶44   Additionally,
[O]ne  of  the  fundamental  justifications  for  the  rule
of    stare    decisis    is    to    provide    a    consistent
predictable  rule  of  law  upon  which  society  .  .  .  may
properly  order  [its]  affairs,  i.e.,  engage  in  rational
business   decision-making,   without   the   continuous[,]
ominous  threat  of  the  legal  bases  for  those  decisions
being  changed.
Johnson  Controls,  264  Wis.  2d  60,  ¶149  (Wilcox,  J.,  dissenting).
Thus,  stare  decisis  is  particularly  controlling  where  the  legal
rule    impacts    contractual    relationships,    Antoniewicz    v.
Reszcynski,                                                                  70  Wis.  2d  836,                                                          869,                                236  N.W.2d  1     (1975),  and  has
been  relied  upon  by  industry,  Quill  Corp.  v.  North  Dakota,          504
U.S.  298,  317  (1992).    As  such,  proper  respect  for  the  doctrine
of  stare  decisis  means  that  this  court  will  rarely  overturn
prior  decisions  and  only  when  certain  criteria  are  met.    Johnson
Controls,  264  Wis.  2d  60,  ¶¶98-99.    "The  decision  to  overturn  a
prior  case  must  not  be  undertaken  merely  because  the  composition
of  the  court  has  changed."     Id.,                                      ¶95                                                                         (citing  State  v.  Stevens,
22




No.  2004AP740
181   Wis.  2d  410,                                                            442,                                                            511   N.W.2d  591      (1994)(Abrahamson,   J.
concurring)).
¶45   Moreover,  stare  decisis  concerns  are  paramount  where  a
court   has   authoritatively   interpreted   a   statute   because   the
legislature  remains  free  to  alter  its  construction.    Hilton,  502
U.S.  at  202.    When  a  party  asks  this  court  to  overturn  a  prior
interpretation  of  a  statute,  it  is  his  "burden  .  .  .  to  show  not
only  that                                                                      [the  decision]  was  mistaken  but  also  that  it  was
objectively  wrong,  so  that  the  court  has  a  compelling  reason  to
overrule   it."                                                                 Wenke   v.   Gehl   Co.,                                        2004   WI              103,                      ¶21,   274
Wis.  2d  220,  682  N.W.2d  405.
¶46   Thus,   the   function   of   this   court   today   is   not   to
interpret                                                                       §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  de  novo.     It  is  not  a  sufficient
basis   to   overrule   Hayne   that   this   court   disagrees   with   its
rationale.     Johnson  Controls,                                               264  Wis.  2d  60,                                              ¶93.     Rather,  we
must  determine  whether  Romanshek  has  met  his  burden  and  provided
sufficient  justification  to  overturn                                         20  years  of  jurisprudence
construing  a  statute.    We  conclude  he  has  not  done  so.
¶47   Our   interpretation   of                                                 §  632.32(4)   in   Hayne   clearly
involves  contracts  and  implicates  reliance  interests.     Section
632.32(4)    governs    insurance    contracts    and    mandates    that
insurance   policies   provide   certain   types   of   coverage.               This
court  has  consistently  ruled  that  UM  coverage  is  not  mandated
under                                                                           §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  where  there  is  no  physical  contact.
Insurers,  like  Progressive,  have  no  doubt  relied  on  these  cases
and  retained  a  physical  contact  requirement  in  their  UM  policy
provisions.    "It  is  more  than  likely  that  some  of  the  companies
23




No.  2004AP740
utilizing   such                                                                [a   clause]   have   established   premium   rates   in
reliance  upon  the  validity  of  such  a  clause  being  upheld  by  the
decisions  of  this  court."    Bauman  v.  Gilbertson,  7  Wis.  2d  467,
469,  96  N.W.2d  854  (1959).    Moreover,  the  reliance  interests  of
other   parties   aside,   Progressive   was   the   very   insurer   whose
policy  was  implicated  in  Hayne.
¶48   Romanshek's  reliance  on  foreign  jurisprudence  is  also
not  a  sufficient  reason  to  depart  from  our  ruling  in  Hayne.    "It
is   not   a   sufficient   reason   for   this   court   to   overrule   its
precedent  that  a  large  majority  of  other  jurisdictions,  with  no
binding    authority    on    this    court,    have    reached    opposing
conclusions."                                                                   Johnson   Controls,                                        264   Wis.  2d  60,   ¶100.   As
noted,  the  physical  contact  requirement  derives  from  the  plain
meaning  of  the  phrase  "hit-and-run"  in                                     §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  as
found  in  Hayne.    Romanshek  merely  cites  to  broad  statements  from
foreign  cases  concerning  the  purpose  of  UM  statutes  generally;
he  has  not  offered  any  textually-based  arguments  not  considered
in  Hayne  that  undercut  the  rationale  of  that  decision.    The  fact
that  some  states  have  reached  a  different  conclusion  involving
their   statutes   is   not   germane   to   the   legitimacy   of   our
interpretation  of  Wisconsin's  UM  statute.
¶49   In  addition,  Hayne  itself  was  cognizant  that  other
states   had   rejected   a   physical   contact   requirement   for   UM
coverage  in  hit-and-run  accidents.     As  discussed  supra,  Hayne
noted  that  these  states  have  statutes  requiring  motorists  to
stop  and  render  aid  when  involved  in  an  accident  and  that  courts
in  these  states  have  construed  these  statutes  to  apply  to  all
24




No.  2004AP740
accidents,  not  simply  those  involving  physical  contact.    Hayne,
115  Wis.  2d  at  75.    In  declining  to  follow  these  jurisdictions,
Hayne   reasoned:                                                              "Wisconsin's   version   of   these   statutes,
however,  is  entitled  'Duty  upon  striking  person  or  attended  or
occupied  vehicle.'    Section  346.67  Stats.  .  .                           .  The  reference  to
'striking'  in  sec.  346.67  supports  our  conclusion  that  the  plain
meaning  of  'hit-and-run'  in  sec.                                           632.32 (4)                                                                (a)2.b.  includes  a
physical  contact  element."    Id.4
¶50   Further,  many  of  the  general  policy  statements  from
the  cases  upon  which  Romanshek  relies  were  articulated  in  the
dissent  in  Hayne  and  rejected  by  the  majority.     Compare  id.  at
95                                                                             ("[I]t   is   inconsistent   with   the   remedial   purpose   of   the
uninsured  motorist  statute  to  permit  the  insurance  company  to
evade   coverage   by   using   the   fraud   argument   and   erecting   an
arbitrary  distinction  between  accidents  with  physical  contact
and  those  without.")  (Abrahamson,  J.,  dissenting)  with  id.  at  85
n.11  (rejecting  these  policy  arguments).    Moreover,  even  if  this
court  were  now  persuaded  by  those  policy  arguments  rejected  in
Hayne,  that  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  to  overturn  the  decision.
¶51   Romanshek  has  not  demonstrated  that  our  interpretation
of                                                                             §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  in  Hayne  has  failed  "to  provide  suitable
direction  and  consistency  to  this  area  of  the  law."     Johnson
Controls,                                                                      263   Wis.  2d  60,                                                       ¶106.      All  he  has  presented  is  a
4  Hayne  also  noted  that  "[s]ection  346.67(1)(a)  provides,  in
part:                                                                          '.  .  .  he   shall   give   his   name,   address   and   the
registration  number  of  the  vehicle  he  is  driving  to  the  person
struck  .  .  .  '."    Hayne    v.    Progressive    N.    Ins.    Co.,       115
Wis.  2d  68,  75,  339  N.W.2d  588  (1983).
25




No.  2004AP740
string  of  foreign  cases  and  generalized  statements  about  the
underlying  purposes  of  statutes  that  mandate  UM  coverage.     He
has  not  presented  any  new  facts  that  undermine  Hayne's  analysis
of                                                                             §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.                                         See   id.,   ¶98.   As   discussed   supra,
Romanshek   has   not   demonstrated   that   our   cases   subsequent   to
Hayne  have  undermined  the  rationale  behind  that  decision,  which
rationale  was  based  on  the  plain  language  of                            §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.
See   id.                                                                      He   has   not   shown   that   our   interpretation   of
§  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  in  Hayne  is  unworkable  in  practice.    See  id.,
¶99.     As  noted,  our  courts  have  regularly  applied  the  physical
contact  requirement  to  miss-and-run  accidents  and  other  types  of
cases  in  a  consistent  manner.      In  short,  Romanshek  has  not
presented   us   with   a   compelling   reason   to   overrule   Hayne's
application    of    the    plain    language    of                            §  632.32(4)(a)2.b.
Romanshek    simply    disagrees    with    our    interpretation    of
§  632.32(4)(a)2.b.  in  Hayne.
¶52   Furthermore,  unlike  Johnson

Download 18433.pdf

Wisconsin Law