Preview:

COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                     This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 3, 2010
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
A. John Voelker                                                                                                                                    petition to review an adverse decision by the
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                                                                   Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                   and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                   Cir. Ct. No.   2007CV523
Appeal No.                                                                          2009AP1027
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                 IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III
SHANNON EVENSON,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
LUCK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment of  the circuit court for Polk County:
ROBERT H. RASMUSSEN, Judge.   Reversed and cause remanded.
Before Hoover, P.J., Brunner and Vergeront, JJ.
¶1                                                                                  PER  CURIAM.    Luck  Mutual  Insurance  Company  appeals  a
summary judgment declaring that Shannon Evenson is not an “insured” under the
homeowner’s policy issued to Scott and Harmony Warren and, therefore, is not
precluded  from  seeking  liability  and  medical  payments  coverage  under  the




No.   2009AP1027
policy’s terms.   Luck Mutual argues that because Evenson was “caring for” the
Warrens’ dog, she satisfies the policy’s definition of an “insured.”   We agree and
therefore reverse the judgment.
BACKGROUND
¶2                                                                                      The  circuit  court  found  that  Evenson  house-sat  for  the  Warrens
during an approximately twenty-four-hour period in August 2005.   It is undisputed
that Evenson was neither employed by the  Warrens nor compensated for her
overnight stay.   In addition to generally watching over the house, Evenson was
asked to take the laundry to the dry cleaner and vacuum  “if she felt like it.”
Although the Warrens did not ask Evenson to feed or water their three cats and
one dog, they did ask Evenson to let the dog out of its kennel so it could go
outside to relieve itself.   When Evenson ultimately let the dog out of its kennel to
go outside, the dog bit her and she sustained injuries from the bite.   When Luck
Mutual denied Evenson’s claim under the policy, Evenson filed the underlying
action  for  summary  declaratory  judgment.     The  court  granted  judgment  in
Evenson’s favor and this appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
¶3                                                                                      We review a circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment
independently, applying the same methodology as the circuit court.   Fifer v. Dix,
2000 WI App 66, ¶5, 234 Wis. 2d 117, 608 N.W.2d 740.   Summary judgment is
2




No.   2009AP1027
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2).1
¶4                                                                                        Further,  the  construction or  interpretation of  an insurance  policy
presents a question of law that we review independently.   Hull v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 636, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998).   Any ambiguity in
the policy language is to be construed in favor of coverage.    See Cardinal v.
Leader Nat’l Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 375, 382, 480 N.W.2d 1 (1992).   The fact that
a word has more than one meaning, however, does not make the word ambiguous
if  only  one  meaning  comports  with  the  parties’  objectively  reasonable
expectations.   United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 164 Wis. 2d 499,
503, 476 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 1991).   Where language in an insurance contract is
unambiguous, we simply apply the policy language to the facts of the case.   See
Grotelueschen v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.,  171 Wis. 2d  437,  447,  492
N.W.2d 131 (1992).   In doing so, we give the policy terms their plain meaning—
the meaning a reasonable person in the position of the insured would give them.
See id.
¶5                                                                                        Relevant  to  this  appeal,  the  subject  policy  defines                    “insured”  as
“persons  using  or  caring  for  vehicles,  watercraft,  or  animals  owned  by  any
‘insured.’”                                                                               (Emphasis  added.)    The  policy  further  specifies  that  liability  and
medical  payment  coverage  is  excluded  for                                             “bodily  injury  to  any  insured.”
Although Evenson claims the term “caring for” is ambiguous, it has an objective
dictionary definition—the verb “care” is defined as follows:                              “to give care (as to
1  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise
noted.
3




No.   2009AP1027
the safety, well-being or maintenance of a charge): provide for or attend to needs
or perform personal services (as for a patient or a child).”   WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 338 (1993).
¶6                                                                                            Here, the court found that Evenson’s primary duty was to “watch
over”  the  home  and  its  contents,  including  the  Warrens’  animals.    Evenson
contends that because she did nothing more than let the dog out of its kennel to
relieve itself, her conduct did not meet the definition of “caring for.”   We disagree.
This conduct alone satisfies the common meaning of  “caring for.”   Further, by
agreeing to watch the Warrens’ home, Evenson was effectively caring for the
animals that were an integral part of that home.   Because there is no ambiguity to
the term  “caring for” as applied to Evenson’s actions, we conclude she is an
“insured” under the subject policy, thereby precluding her from seeking liability
and medical payment coverage under the policy.2
By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
                                                                                              This  opinion  will  not  be  published.     See  WIS.  STAT.  RULE
809.23(1)                                                                                     (b)5.
2 Because we conclude Evenson’s actions satisfy the definition of “caring for” under the
policy, we need not address Luck Mutual’s alternative argument that Evenson was an insured
because she was performing “domestic duties.”   See Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61, 67, 334
N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1983) (only dispositive issues need be addressed).
4

Download 52898.pdf

Wisconsin Law