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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
                                                                                          DATED AND RELEASED
                                                                                                                                                 NOTICE
                                                                                          July 8, 1997
                                                                                          A  party  may  file  with  the  Supreme  Court  a      This opinion is subject to further editing. If
                                                                                          petition  to  review  an  adverse  decision  by  the   published, the official version will appear in
                                                                                          Court of Appeals.   See § 808.10 and RULE 809.62,      the bound volume of the Official Reports.
STATS.
No.                                                                                       96-3213
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                        IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                          DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
ALLAN D. SCHOPPER,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Outagamie County:
HAROLD V. FROEHLICH, Judge.  Affirmed.
MYSE, J.     Allan D. Schopper appeals an order finding that his
refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test was unreasonable.   Schopper contends that
the refusal hearing was untimely and in violation of his constitutional right to a
speedy  trial,  that  the  trial  court  improperly  refused  to  grant  his  requested
discovery, including the sheriff’s department’s 911 tapes covering the evening of
his arrest, and appears to argue that his conviction of operating while under the




NO.                                                                                        96-3213
influence was erroneous.   Because this court concludes that the right to a speedy
trial does not apply to administrative hearings governing refusals to submit to
blood alcohol tests, that the availability of the 911 tapes to Schopper was subject
to a separate appeal already resolved and Schopper’s conviction for operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol is a separate action that must be
separately appealed, the order finding his refusal to be unreasonable is affirmed.
Allan  Schopper  alleges  a  series  of  complaints  concerning  the
processing  of  his  operating  a  motor  vehicle  while  under  the  influence  of  an
intoxicant charge and a related administrative hearing on his refusal to submit to
blood alcohol tests.   In his pro se brief, Schopper alleges a series of improprieties
and  allegations  of  unfairness  in  these  proceedings  but  fails  to  develop  these
arguments with sufficient specificity that they can be addressed by this court.
Accordingly, this court limits its consideration to the issues it can identify in
Schopper’s brief.
Schopper was arrested on November 29, 1995, for operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.   Because Schopper refused to submit
to blood alcohol tests, a notice of intent to revoke operating privileges based on
this refusal was served on November 30, 1995.   A refusal hearing was requested
and originally scheduled for February 2, 1996, but then postponed and ultimately
commenced on March 29.   At this hearing, officers Gregory Goodavish and Fred
Laitinen gave   testimony and were cross-examined.   Before Schopper was able to
present his evidence as to the reasonableness of his refusal, however, the court was
required to continue the matter to another date based upon exigency of the court’s
calendar.     The  hearing  was  continued  to  May                                        31,  but  was  subsequently
rescheduled based upon Schopper’s first attorney’s request to withdraw as his
counsel.   On March 29, a second attorney was appointed for Schopper through the
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NO.                                                                                           96-3213
public  defender’s  office.    At  the  May                                                   31  refusal  hearing,  however,  counsel
requested leave to withdraw and, with Schopper’s consent, counsel’s withdrawal
was approved by the court.   The matter was then rescheduled to July 12.   A third
attorney  was  appointed  on  June                                                            27  and  the  refusal  hearing  ultimately  was
continued on September 27.   The hearing was held before the court commissioner
who concluded that the refusal was unreasonable.   Schopper made a request for a
de novo review before the circuit court and a hearing was scheduled for October
28, 1996.   At the hearing, the court ruled that Schopper’s refusal was unreasonable
and entered an order affirming the administrative revocation of his license.
Schopper first argues that a refusal hearing ultimately held almost
one year after his initial arrest is a denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial
under the Wisconsin Constitution   and §   971.10, STATS.   The right to speedy trial,
however, is limited to criminal matters.   WISCONSIN CONST. art. I, § 7.   Article I, §
7 expressly states: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
… a speedy public trial.”   The administrative hearing on the reasonableness of
Schopper’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test is not a criminal proceeding.
See §§   343.305(9) and (10), STATS.   The record shows the administrative hearing
requested by Schopper was postponed on numerous occasions in part, at least, due
to Schopper’s numerous changes of counsel and the request for a de novo hearing
before the circuit court.   The elapsed time, however, is not subject to challenge
based upon speedy trial rights because such rights only attend criminal matters.
WISCONSIN CONST. art. I, § 7.   Without attempting to assess the reasons for the
delay or their reasonableness, this court concludes that Schopper enjoys no right to
a   speedy   trial   hearing   on   administrative   determinations   regarding   the
reasonableness  of  his  refusal  to  submit  to  blood  alcohol  tests.    Accordingly,
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NO.                                                                                         96-3213
Schopper’s claim of a constitutional violation because of the delay in scheduling
the administrative hearing is without merit.
Schopper also contends that he was denied appropriate discovery
including the release of the 911 tape covering the evening of his arrest.   While his
claim to rights of discovery may be more extensive than the 911 tape, the brief is
so unfocused it is difficult to determine whether any other claims are included
within  his  discovery  challenge  based  upon  denial  of  appropriate  discovery.
Reference was made to the availability of the officers at the rescheduled hearing,
but  it  appears  that  ultimately the  officers  were  presented  by the  State  at  the
rescheduled  hearing  for  use  by  Schopper  in  his  presentation  concerning  the
reasonableness of his refusal.   The discoverability of the 911 tape was addressed in
Schopper  v.  Gehring,  No.  96-2782  (Wis.  Ct.  App.  April  15,  1997,  ordered
published May 27, 1997).   Because that issue was addressed in an independent
appeal, this court need not address the merits of that contention again in this
matter.
It appears that Schopper is also attempting to reach the merits of his
conviction for the offense charged.    An appeal from that conviction  must be
separately filed and consists of a separate and independent judgment that may not
be reached by this court based upon an appeal from the results of a refusal hearing.
Section 809.10, STATS. This matter therefore cannot be determined as a part of
this appeal.
Schopper does raise serious problems with the delay and frequent
postponement  of  his  refusal  hearing.    For  example,  several  witnesses  were
subpoenaed by him who attended various hearings but whose testimony was not
submitted because of limitations of time and adjournments required for a variety
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NO.                                                                                     96-3213
of other reasons, some of which are attributable to Schopper himself.   This court
does not mean to trivialize the difficulty a lay person has in presenting evidence
and  the  expense  and  inconvenience  attendant  to  an  extended  number  of
continuances  that  may  be  required  in  a  specific  matter.    These  complaints,
however, are not a basis upon which Schopper may claim reversible error.   The
two officers were ultimately presented by the State for Schopper’s use at the
hearing, albeit one which was postponed.   Schopper’s witnesses, including one
from the telephone company, were ultimately ruled not to be relevant to the merits
of the refusal hearing then being entertained by the court.   Because Schopper does
not identify the witnesses or the expected testimony to be elicited from them, this
court cannot reach the merits of any claim that it was error not to receive the
evidence from these witnesses.
Because  the  right  to  a  speedy  trial  does  not  apply  to  a  refusal
hearing, this court concludes that Schopper’s right to speedy trial was not violated.
This court also concludes that Schopper’s contention that discovery was wrongly
withheld was addressed in an early appeal and that his other contentions are not
sufficiently developed to be addressed.  This court, therefore, affirms the order.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published.   RULE 809.23(1)(b)4, STATS.
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