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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                              This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 6, 2005
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Cornelia G. Clark                                                                                                                                                  petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                                                                                          Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                                   and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                                   Cir. Ct. No.   2004CT153
Appeal No.                                                                                   2005AP1386-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                                 IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
CHAD E. LAMBERIES,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Shawano County:
JAMES R. HABECK, Judge.   Affirmed.
¶1                                                                                           PETERSON,  J.1    Chad  Lamberies  appeals  an  order  denying  his
motion  collaterally  attacking  a  judgment  of  conviction  for  operating  a  motor
1  This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2).  All references
to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.




No.   2005AP1386-CR
vehicle while intoxicated.   Lamberies asserts that he did not validly waive his
constitutional right to an attorney in that case.   We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
¶2                                                                                        On May 19, 2004, Lamberies was charged with operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated  (third offense) and operating a motor vehicle with a
prohibited  alcohol  concentration  (third  offense).    On  November  1,  he  filed  a
motion collaterally attacking a  1997 conviction for operating while intoxicated,
which  was  his  second  offense.    The  motion  asserted  that  Lamberies  did  not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel in the 1997
case.   Based upon the 1997 plea hearing transcript, Lamberies asserted that the
court  did  not  adequately  explain  the  difficulties  and  disadvantages  of  self-
representation.   At a hearing on his motion, Lamberies testified that he was not
aware of the advantages of having an attorney in 1997, and he also stated that he
did not know what attorneys do.
¶3                                                                                        At the motion hearing, the parties debated the correct standard of
review in a collateral attack.   Lamberies argued that he need only show that the
plea hearing colloquy in 1997 did not comply with our supreme court’s decision in
State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).   The State argued that
the colloquy requirements of Klessig were overruled by the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004), which concluded that plea
colloquy  requirements  similar  to  those  in  Klessig  were  not  constitutionally
required.   The circuit court ultimately agreed with the State.   The court denied
Lamberies’  motion  based  upon  the                                                      1997  hearing  transcript  and  Lamberies’
testimony at the motion hearing, which the court believed lacked credibility.   In
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No.   2005AP1386-CR
the  alternative,  the  court  concluded  that  the                                      1997  colloquy  satisfied  the
requirements of Klessig.   Lamberies appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶4                                                                                       As we explain below, the circuit court was incorrect in concluding
that Tovar overruled Klessig’s colloquy requirements.   The court did not have the
benefit of our supreme court’s analysis in State v. Ernst,  2005 WI  107,  699
N.W.2d 92, which was decided after the circuit court’s decision.   Nevertheless, the
court  ultimately  applied  the  correct  standard—whether  Lamberies’  waiver  of
counsel  was  knowing,  intelligent,  and  voluntary.    We  agree  with  the  court’s
application of that standard.
¶5                                                                                       In Klessig, our supreme court held that in order for an accused’s
waiver of counsel to be valid, the record must reflect: (1) a deliberate choice to
proceed without counsel; (2) an awareness of the difficulties and disadvantages of
self-representation; (3) an awareness of the seriousness of the charge or charges;
and  (4) an awareness of the general range of possible penalties.    Klessig,  211
Wis. 2d at 206.   Klessig also required that courts determine whether a defendant is
competent to represent oneself.   Id. at 212.
¶6                                                                                       Lamberies  first  argues  that  the                                   1997  court  failed  to  adequately
explain the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation.   He also contends
that the record does not indicate that he was aware of the penalties he faced.
Finally,  Lamberies  argues  that  the  court  did  not  determine  whether  he  was
competent to represent himself.
¶7                                                                                       The State argues the court’s colloquy satisfied the requirements of
Klessig.   The State also argues that Lamberies’ motion failed to make a prima
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No.   2005AP1386-CR
facie showing that he was entitled to relief and, therefore, the burden of proof
never shifted to the State, citing Ernst, 699 N.W.2d 92, ¶27.
¶8                                                                                                  A defendant who faces an enhanced sentence based upon a prior
conviction may only collaterally attack the prior conviction based upon a denial of
the constitutional right to counsel.   State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶¶17, 28, 238
Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528.   The right to counsel under the federal and state
constitutions is identical.   Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 202-03.   To pursue a collateral
attack, the defendant must first make a prima facie showing that he or she did not
know  or  understand  the  information  that  should  have  been  provided  in  the
previous  proceeding  and,  as  a  result,  did  not  knowingly,  intelligently,  and
voluntarily waive  the  right  to  counsel.    Ernst,  699  N.W.2d  92,  ¶25.    In  the
collateral attack in Ernst, the defendant alleged that the circuit court’s colloquy
failed  to  comply with  Klessig.    Id.,  ¶26.    Our  supreme  court concluded that
alleging a Klessig violation was not sufficient to make a prima facie showing that
waiver of counsel was invalid.   Id.   Instead, the court required that a defendant
allege specific facts showing that the waiver was not, in fact, knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent.   Id.   If a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the State
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s waiver of counsel
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.   Id., ¶27.2
2  This burden shifting procedure is similar to that applied on direct appeal under Klessig.
The main difference is that, on direct appeal, a defendant can make a prima facie showing and
shift the burden of proof to the State by merely alleging a violation of Klessig’s colloquy
requirements.   State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206-07, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).   Once a prima
facie showing is made, however, the burden on the State is the same on direct appeal and
collateral attack; the State must prove that the defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.  Id.; State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶¶27, 31 699 N.W.2d 92.
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No.   2005AP1386-CR
¶9                                                                                                   Because this burden shifting procedure was promulgated in Ernst,
which was decided after the circuit court ruled on Lamberies’ motion, we do not
base  our  decision  on  Lamberies’  failure  to  make  a  prima  facie  showing  by
affidavit.   The circuit court allowed Lamberies to testify, and his testimony made a
prima facie showing because he stated that he did not know what lawyers do or
how an attorney could help him.   Thus, our review focuses on the circuit court’s
finding  that  the  State  proved  that  Lamberies  knowingly,  intelligently,  and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
¶10   In devising the burden shifting procedure in Ernst, our supreme
court was determining the correct standard in light of Hahn and Tovar.   Hahn
only permits a collateral attack where a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel
was violated.   Hahn, 238 Wis. 2d 889, ¶17.   In Tovar, the United States Supreme
Court   held   that   colloquy   requirements   similar   to   Klessig’s   were   not
constitutionally required.   See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81; see Ernst, 699 N.W.2d 92,
¶¶15, 22.   In Ernst, our supreme court concluded that Tovar did not eliminate
Klessig’s  requirements  because  those  requirements  comprise  a  court-made
procedural rule, promulgated under the court’s superintending and administrative
authority, rather than constitutional requirements.3   Id., ¶18.   The court in Ernst
then determined what role, if any, noncompliance with Klessig should play in a
collateral attack:
[a]n alleged violation of the requirements of Klessig can
form  the  basis  of  a  collateral  attack,  as  long  as  the
defendant makes a prima facie showing, pointing to facts
3 If our supreme court had concluded otherwise, the colloquy requirements of Klessig
might have been overruled by Tovar, just as the circuit court believed in this case.   See Iowa v.
Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004) (stating “We have not ... prescribed any formula or script to be
read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel.”).
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No.   2005AP1386-CR
that  demonstrate  that  he  or  she  did  not  knowingly,
intelligently,  and  voluntarily  waive  his  or  her  right  to
counsel.                                                                                 …  [W]hen the defendant successfully makes a
prima facie showing, the burden to prove that the defendant
validly waived his or her right to counsel shifts to the State.
Id., ¶37.
¶11    The  parties  seemingly  read  this  language  to  mean  that  once  a
defendant makes a prima facie showing, the State, as part of its burden of proof,
must  prove  that  the  court’s  colloquy satisfied  the  Klessig  requirements.    We
disagree with this interpretation and conclude that the State must only prove that
Lamberies knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional right
to counsel.
¶12    Whether   there   has   been   a   valid   waiver   of   a   defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel will “depend, in each case, upon the particular facts
and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused.”   Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).   This
is the standard our supreme court envisioned in Ernst, where it adopted from State
v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274-75, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), the proposition that
the State may use any evidence which substantiates that a waiver was knowingly
and voluntarily made.   Ernst, 699 N.W.2d 92, ¶31.   This standard does not require
showing compliance with Klessig’s colloquy requirements.
¶13    Further, to require proof of compliance with Klessig in a collateral
attack  would  be  to  interpret  Ernst  as  overruling  Hahn.    Hahn  held  that  a
defendant can only collaterally attack a prior conviction where the defendant’s
constitutional  right  to  counsel,  not  Klessig’s  court-made  procedural  rule,  is
violated.    There is no indication in Ernst that our supreme court intended to
overrule Hahn.
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No.   2005AP1386-CR
¶14    We also reject Lamberies’ argument that the State must prove the
higher standard of competency outlined in Klessig.   In Klessig, our supreme court
stated that “In Wisconsin, there is a higher standard for determining whether a
defendant  is  competent  to  represent  oneself  than  for  determining  whether  a
defendant is competent to stand trial.”   Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 212.                    “This higher
standard is not based on the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, but stems from
the independent adoption of the higher standard by the State as allowed under
Godinez.”   Id.   In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397-98 (1993), the United
States Supreme Court concluded that competency to waive one’s constitutional
right  to  counsel  is  not  measured  by  a  higher  standard  than  for  determining
competency to stand trial.   Because Klessig’s requirement that courts determine
that a defendant is competent to waive counsel exceeds what is constitutionally
required, it would be contrary to Hahn to require the State to prove the higher
standard of competency in a collateral attack.
¶15    Again, the question on review is whether the State proved by clear
and convincing evidence that Lamberies knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived  his  constitutional  right  to  counsel.                                          This  involves  application  of
constitutional principles to facts, which we review independent of the circuit court.
Klessig,  211 Wis.  2d at  204.    We will uphold findings of historic facts unless
clearly erroneous.   WIS. STAT.  §  805.17.   Unlike on direct appeal, there is no
presumption  against  the  defendant’s  waiver  of  counsel  in  a  collateral  attack.
Ernst, 699 N.W.2d 92, ¶31, n.9.
¶16    The circuit court found Lamberies’ statements at his motion hearing
lacked credibility.   The court gave more weight to Lamberies’ statements recorded
when he  entered his  plea in  1997.    At the  1997 hearing, the  court informed
Lamberies that he may qualify for a public defender and that an attorney might
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No.   2005AP1386-CR
help him with defenses of which he was not aware.   The court told Lamberies that
if he wanted an attorney, the court would take steps to help him get one.   Then,
when asked whether he wanted an attorney, Lamberies declined.
¶17    In  response  to  other  questions,  Lamberies  indicated  that  he  was
twenty-four  years  old,  completed  high  school,  could  read  and  write,  and
understood  the  charges.    Lamberies  affirmed  that  he  read  the  complaint  and
understood  the  penalties.    Lamberies  declined  the  court’s  offer  to  read  the
complaint aloud.
¶18    After the court explained Lamberies’ right to a jury trial and what
the State would be required to prove, along with other rights Lamberies would be
waiving, the court confirmed that Lamberies had not been treated for mental,
alcohol, or drug problems, and that he had not been coerced into waiving his
rights.   The court accepted Lamberies’ waiver of rights and accepted his no contest
plea.
¶19    While Lamberies testified at his motion hearing that he was not
“mainstreamed” in high school, he also admitted that he had not been diagnosed
with any type of learning disability.   Lamberies further testified that at his prior
employment where he delivered building materials, he was able to keep track of
records,  deliver  the  correct things to  the  correct places,  and read instructions
specifying which and how many items to deliver.   Finally, Lamberies admitted
that he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the 1997 hearing.
¶20    Based  upon  the  circuit  court’s  credibility  determinations  and
Lamberies’ statements at the  1997 plea hearing and at his motion hearing, we
agree with the court’s conclusion that Lamberies validly waived his constitutional
right to counsel.
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No.   2005AP1386-CR
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
                                This  opinion  will  not  be  published.     See  WIS.  STAT.  RULE
809.23(1)                       (b)4.
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