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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                  This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 2, 2010
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
David R. Schanker                                                                                                                                petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                                                                        Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                 and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                 Cir. Ct. No.   2002CF186
Appeal No.                                                                       2009AP50-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
DON ALLAN RAY DOUGAN,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL  from a judgment and  an order  of  the circuit court for
St. Croix County:   ERIC J. LUNDELL, Judge.   Affirmed.
Before Hoover, P.J., Peterson and Brunner, JJ.
¶1                                                                               PER CURIAM.    Don  Allan  Ray  Dougan  appeals  a  judgment,
entered upon a jury’s verdict, convicting him of two counts of repeated sexual
assault of the same child and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon.
Dougan also challenges the order denying his motion for postconviction relief.




No.   2009AP50-CR
Dougan  argues  he  was  denied  the  effective  assistance  of  trial  counsel,  the
presentence report writer violated his constitutional rights, and the circuit court
erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion.   We reject these arguments and
affirm both the judgment and order.
BACKGROUND
¶2                                                                                      In May 2002, the State charged Dougan with two counts of repeated
sexual assault of the same child arising out of actions that occurred between May
2001 and May 2002 with his long-time girlfriend’s two daughters, Tessa K. (d.o.b.
09/91) and Mercedes K.  (d.o.b.  05/90).    The felon in possession of a firearm
charge arose after police searched Dougan’s home and found three firearms.   At
trial, Dougan denied the allegations and defended the firearm charge by arguing
that his felony had been reduced to a misdemeanor in Minnesota.   The jury found
Dougan guilty of the crimes charged and a presentence investigation report was
ordered.   The court ultimately imposed consecutive sentences totaling eighty-two
years’ initial confinement followed by forty-three years’ extended supervision.
Dougan’s postconviction motions were denied after a hearing and this appeal
follows.
DISCUSSION
I.   Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
¶3                                                                                      Dougan  claims  he  was  denied  the  effective  assistance  of  trial
counsel.   This court’s review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a
mixed question of fact and law.   State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596
N.W.2d 749 (1999).   The trial court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless
they are clearly erroneous.   Id.   However, the ultimate determination whether the
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No.   2009AP50-CR
attorney’s performance falls below the constitutional minimum is a question of
law that this court reviews independently.   Id.
¶4                                                                                      “The benchmark for judging whether counsel has acted ineffectively
is stated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).”   State v. Johnson,
153 Wis. 2d 121, 126, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990).   To succeed on his ineffective
assistance  of  counsel  claim,  Dougan  must  show  both                               (1)  that  his  counsel’s
representation was deficient and  (2) that this deficiency prejudiced him.    See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
¶5                                                                                      In order to establish deficient performance, a defendant must show
that                                                                                    “counsel  made  errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’  guaranteed  the  defendant  by  the  Sixth  Amendment.”    Id.  at           687.
However, “every effort is made to avoid determinations of ineffectiveness based
on hindsight … and the burden is placed on the defendant to overcome a strong
presumption that counsel acted reasonably within professional norms.”   Johnson,
153  Wis. 2d  at                                                                        127.                                                                        In  reviewing  counsel’s  performance,  we  judge  the
reasonableness of counsel’s conduct based on the facts of the particular case as
they existed at the time of the conduct and determine whether, in light of all the
circumstances,  the  omissions  fell  outside  the  wide  range  of  professionally
competent  representation.    Strickland,                                               466  U.S.  at  690.    Because  “[j]udicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential  … the defendant
must overcome the  presumption that, under  the circumstances, the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy.”   Id. at 689.   Further, “strategic
choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible
options are virtually unchallengeable.”   Id. at 690.
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No.   2009AP50-CR
¶6                                                                                         The prejudice prong of the Strickland test is satisfied where the
attorney’s error is of such magnitude that there is a reasonable probability that,
absent the error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.   Id. at
694.    We may address the tests in the order we choose.    If Dougan fails to
establish  prejudice,  we  need not address  deficient performance.    See  State  v.
Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 236, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996).
¶7                                                                                         Here,  Dougan  advances  several  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel
claims.   First, Dougan argues counsel was ineffective in his cross-examination of a
state crime lab analyst who examined the underwear Mercedes was wearing at the
time of one of the alleged assaults.   The analyst detected amylase—a digestive
enzyme  found  in  saliva  and  other  bodily fluids—on  the  underwear.    Dougan
contends his trial counsel failed to cross-examine the analyst regarding sources of
amylase other than saliva,  “including substances like urine, which would also
likely be present in the crotch of a young girl’s underwear.”
¶8                                                                                         The  state  crime  lab  analyst  prepared  a  written  report  that  was
received into evidence and sent to the jury during deliberations.   In the report, the
analyst noted that amylase is a digestive enzyme normally present in elevated
levels in saliva, however, “[a]mylase is also found in other body fluids.”   Both in
his  report  and  during  his  trial  testimony,  the  analyst  noted  that  Dougan  was
eliminated as the source of the DNA present in the crotch area of the underwear.
Dougan’s forensic scientist also noted amylase was found in various bodily fluids,
including urine.   Dougan’s forensic scientist likewise concluded the DNA profiles
developed from the underwear were not consistent with Dougan’s DNA profile.
¶9                                                                                         That  amylase  is  contained  in  substances  other  than  saliva  was
presented to the jury.   Moreover, because the evidence eliminated Dougan as a
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No.   2009AP50-CR
source of the DNA, counsel was not deficient for failing to cross-examine the
analyst about the various sources of amylase.    Although Dougan’s DNA was
obtained from a blood draw, he also argues counsel was deficient for failing to
obtain an additional DNA sample from his saliva.   Because a person’s DNA is the
same regardless whether it comes from that person’s saliva or blood, counsel was
not deficient for failing to request a superfluous sample.
¶10    Next, Dougan contends counsel was ineffective for failing to seek
pretrial dismissal of the felon in possession of a firearm charge.   This argument is
based  on  Dougan’s  belief  that  he  was  legally  permitted  to  possess  firearms.
Dougan is mistaken.   The felony conviction forming the basis for Dougan’s felon-
in-possession charge was his  1984 Minnesota conviction for the fourth-degree
sexual assault of his thirteen-year-old cousin.    According to the plea colloquy,
Dougan admitted touching his cousin on her breast in a sexual manner.   Because
under  Wisconsin  law  this  conduct  would  constitute  a  felony,  the  Minnesota
conviction was a proper basis for Dougan’s felon-in-possession charge.   See WIS.
STAT.                                                                                     § 940.225(2)(e)   (1983-84)1   (defining  second-degree  sexual  assault  as
“sexual contact … with a person who is over the age of 12 years and under the age
of  16  years”);  § 940.225(5)(a)  (defining  sexual  contact);  see  also  WIS.  STAT.
§ 941.29(1)(b) (prohibiting a person from possessing a firearm if he or she has
been convicted of a crime elsewhere that would be a felony if committed in this
state).
1  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise
noted.
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No.   2009AP50-CR
¶11    Dougan argues that because the 1988 Minnesota probation-discharge
order for this crime stated he could possess a firearm after  “[ten] years have
elapsed  since  restoration  of  civil  rights,”  he  reacquired  his  right  to  possess
firearms in both Minnesota and Wisconsin in  1998.    Citing federal case law,
Dougan contends the United States government must honor a state’s restoration of
firearm privileges.   See United States v. Brost, 807 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Circ. 1996).
We are not persuaded by Dougan’s citation to case law from a foreign jurisdiction.
Wisconsin’s felon-in-possession statute specifies the methods of obtaining relief
from the prohibition against firearm possession.    See WIS.  STAT.  § 941.29(5).
Neither of the specified methods were utilized here.   Because language from the
Minnesota  probation-discharge  order  did  not  remove  the  prohibition  against
firearm possession in Wisconsin, counsel was not deficient for failing to seek
dismissal of the charge.   See State v. Wheat, 2002 WI App 153, ¶14, 256 Wis. 2d
270, 647 N.W.2d 441 (counsel not deficient for failing to pursue meritless claim).
¶12    Dougan nevertheless claims counsel was deficient for failing to call
his Minnesota probation agent to testify regarding reinstatement of his firearm
privileges in that state.   As we have already noted, however, whatever effect the
Minnesota order restoring Dougan’s civil rights may have had in that state, it did
not remove his ineligibility to possess firearms in Wisconsin.
¶13    Dougan also claims counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
sever the felon-in-possession charge from the sexual assault charges.    Dougan
claims that had the charges been severed, the jury would never have learned he
had previously been convicted of a child sexual assault.   The prosecutor, however,
moved for admission of Dougan’s prior sexual assault as other acts evidence and
the trial court allowed it through a stipulation to the facts of the prior conduct.
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No.   2009AP50-CR
¶14    The  admissibility of  evidence  lies  within  the  trial  court’s  sound
discretion.    State v. Pepin,  110 Wis. 2d  431,  435,  328 N.W.2d  898  (Ct. App.
1982).                                                                                              The  court  must  engage  in  a  three-step  analysis  to  determine  the
admissibility of other acts evidence.   State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 771-73,
576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).   The first inquiry is whether the other acts evidence is
offered  for  an  acceptable  purpose  under  WIS.  STAT.                                           § 904.04(2),  such  as
establishing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.   Id. at 772-73.   After ascertaining whether the
other acts evidence is offered for a permissible purpose under  §  904.04(2), the
analysis turns to whether the other acts evidence is relevant2 and, finally, whether
its  probative  value  outweighs  the  danger  of  unfair  prejudice.    Id.    Further,
Wisconsin recognizes that in child sexual assault cases, courts permit  “greater
latitude of proof as to other like occurrences.”   State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91,
¶36, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606.
¶15    Here, Dougan does not appear to challenge the admissibility of the
Minnesota conviction as other acts evidence.   Even assuming his argument could
be construed as such a challenge, the argument fails.    First, the evidence was
admitted  for  an  acceptable  purpose—namely  Dougan’s  intent  to  commit  the
charged  assaults.     Second,  the  other  acts  evidence  was  relevant  given  the
similarities between the victims.   The victims were of similar ages and there was a
familial or quasi-familial relationship between Dougan and each of the victims.
2  In assessing relevance, we must first consider whether the other acts evidence relates to
a fact or proposition that is of consequence to the determination of the action.   The second
consideration in assessing relevance is whether the other acts evidence has a tendency to make
the consequential fact or proposition more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.  State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772-73, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).
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No.   2009AP50-CR
Although   the   prior   conviction   was   remote   in   time—having   occurred
approximately  nineteen  years  earlier—other  acts  evidence  is  not  rendered
irrelevant if the remoteness is balanced by the similarity of the incidents.   See
State v. Mink, 146 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 429 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App.  1988).   Here, the
earlier assault is relevant in that it suggests a pattern of seeking sexual gratification
from young girls with whom Dougan has a familial-type relationship.
¶16    With respect to the third step of the Sullivan analysis, the probative
value of the evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.   Our
supreme court has recognized that “similarities between the other crimes evidence
and the charged crime may render the other crimes evidence highly probative,
outweighing the danger of prejudice.”   Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶75.   Further, the
jury was specifically told not to consider the other acts evidence as proof “that the
defendant is a bad person and for that reason is guilty of the offense charged.”   We
presume  the  jury  followed  the  court’s  instructions,  see  State  v.  Adams,           221
Wis. 2d 1, 12, 584 N.W.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1998), and therefore conclude the trial
court reasonably exercised its discretion by admitting the other acts evidence.
Because  the  jury  was  going  to  learn  of  the  Minnesota  conviction  regardless
whether the felon-in-possession charge was severed, counsel was not deficient for
failing to move for its severance.
¶17    Dougan also claims counsel was ineffective for failing to hire a
private  investigator  or  pursue  an  alternate  presentence  investigation  report.
Dougan contends “[i]t appears a private investigator, and an alternate PSI might
have been beneficial here” because a private investigator or an alternate PSI might
have provided additional information concerning Dougan’s theories of defense:
that the girls fabricated the allegations as part of a scheme concocted by their
natural father to obtain a more favorable custody arrangement, or as part of a
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No.   2009AP50-CR
scheme concocted by their mother so she could sell a parcel of property without
sharing the proceeds with Dougan.   Dougan, however, does not specify what facts
either a private investigator or alternative PSI would have uncovered to support his
defense  theories.    Dougan’s speculative  claims do not  undermine  this court’s
confidence in the outcome of the trial.   See State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 48,
527 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1994).
II.   Presentence Investigation Report
¶18   Dougan claims the PSI writer violated his Fifth Amendment rights
by interviewing him without reciting his Miranda3 rights.   Our supreme court has
held that a presentence interview may be accusatorial thereby requiring Miranda
warnings where the interview “seeks statements from a defendant on an element
upon which the State still has the burden of proof.”   State v. Heffran, 129 Wis. 2d
156, 165, 384 N.W.2d 351 (1986).   Because no elements of the convicted crimes
were  outstanding  at  the  time  the  PSI  was  being  prepared,  Dougan’s  Fifth
Amendment claim fails.
III.  Sentencing
¶19    Finally,  Dougan  claims  the  trial  court  erroneously  exercised  its
discretion by imposing what he claims is an excessive sentence.   Sentencing lies
within the trial court’s discretion.   State v. Echols,  175 Wis. 2d  653, 681,  499
N.W.2d 631 (1993).   There is a strong public policy against interfering with the
trial court’s sentencing discretion, and sentences are afforded the presumption that
the trial court acted reasonably.   Id. at 681-82.   If the record contains evidence that
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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No.   2009AP50-CR
the trial court properly exercised its discretion, we must affirm.   State v. Cooper,
117  Wis. 2d  30,  40,                                                                  344  N.W.2d  194  (Ct.  App.  1983).    Proper  sentencing
discretion is demonstrated if the record shows that the court “examined the facts
and stated its reasons for the sentence imposed,  ‘using a demonstrated rational
process.’”    State v. Spears,  147 Wis. 2d  429,  447,  433 N.W.2d  595  (Ct. App.
1988) (citation omitted).                                                               “To overturn a sentence, a defendant must show some
unreasonable or unjustified basis for the sentence in the record.”   Cooper,  117
Wis. 2d at 40.
¶20    The three primary factors that a sentencing court must address are:
(1) the gravity of the offense;  (2) the character and rehabilitative needs of the
offender; and  (3) the need for protection of the public.    State v. Sarabia,  118
Wis. 2d 655, 673, 348 N.W.2d 527 (1984).   The weight to be given each of the
primary factors is within the discretion of the sentencing court and the sentence
may be based on any or all of the three primary factors after all relevant factors
have been considered.   State v. Wickstrom, 118 Wis. 2d 339, 355, 348 N.W.2d
183 (Ct. App. 1984).
¶21    In  considering  the  required  factors,  a  sentencing  court  can  also
consider other relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
(1)  Past  record  of  criminal  offenses;                                                                                                           (2)  history  of
undesirable   behavior   pattern;                                                       (3)                                                          the   defendant’s
personality,  character  and  social  traits;                                                                                                        (4)  result  of
presentence investigation; (5) vicious or aggravated nature
of  the  crime;                                                                         (6)  degree  of  the  defendant’s  culpability;
(7) defendant’s  demeanor  at  trial;                                                   (8)  defendant’s  age,
educational    background    and    employment    record;
(9) defendant’s  remorse,  repentance  and  cooperativeness;
(10)  defendant’s  need  for  close  rehabilitative  control;
(11) the rights of the public; and (12) the length of pretrial
detention.
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No.   2009AP50-CR
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 41, ¶43, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.   When a
defendant argues that his or her sentence is unduly harsh or excessive, we will
hold that the sentencing court erroneously exercised its discretion “only where the
sentence  is  so  excessive  and  unusual  and  so  disproportionate  to  the  offense
committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable
people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.”   Ocanas v.
State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975).
¶22    Here,  the  court  considered  the  appropriate  factors  in  imposing
sentence, noting that punishment and protection of the public were the factors it
deemed most important, especially given the gravity of the offenses.   The court
noted:                                                                                      “[F]or the matters that you did to these girls, you must be punished and
punished in a serious fashion.   This is the most serious of crimes happening to the
most vulnerable of victims by a person who should have and absolutely had to
know better.”   The court expressed particular concern with Dougan’s process of
“grooming” his victims over the course of months and years.
¶23    With respect to Dougan’s character, the court noted Dougan had
exhibited no remorse for his crime and, based on a letter Dougan submitted shortly
before  sentencing,  the  court  concluded  Dougan  was  merely  begging  for  yet
another  chance.    The  court  acknowledged  Dougan’s  prior  record  and  other
“examples of sexual deviancy” for which he was not prosecuted, which added up
to “a significant prior record … that can’t be ignored.”   Additionally, the court
considered  rehabilitation  as  a  sentencing  objective,  but  noted                       “probation  and
whatever counseling  [Dougan] went through did not work” and should not be
extended in this case.   With respect to deterrence as an objective of the sentence,
the  court  noted  that  given  the  nature  of  these  particular  crimes,  it  was  not
11




No.   2009AP50-CR
convinced  perpetrators  read  the  newspaper  to see  what kind of  sentences are
imposed on other perpetrators.   Ultimately, the court stated:
[Y]ou have received the maximum that I believe I can give
you for the reasons I have stated.   And for the appellate
courts, it is the maximum sentence because of the repeated
nature  of  the  counts  that  you  were  convicted  of,  and
because of your prior record, because of the seriousness of
the offense, because you lied on the stand, because of [the
letter sent to the court].   All of that and more ….   That’s
why you got the max.
¶24    To the extent Dougan argues that given his age, his sentence is
tantamount to a life sentence, the court is not required to consider a defendant’s
life expectancy at sentencing.    State v. Stenzel,  2004 WI App  181,  ¶20,  276
Wis. 2d 224, 688 N.W.2d 20.   That the court imposed a sentence greater than the
recommendations made by the PSI writer and the prosecuting attorney likewise
fails to establish that the sentence was excessive.                                       “As long as the trial judge
exercises discretion and sentences within the permissible range set by statute, the
court   need   not   explain   why   its   sentence   differs   from   any   particular
recommendation.”   State v. Johnson, 158 Wis. 2d 458, 469, 463 N.W.2d 352 (Ct.
App.  1990)  (internal quotations omitted).   Finally, although Dougan argues his
sentence is excessive when compared to the defendant in an unrelated case, the
trial court is not bound by the sentencing determination of the judge in that or any
other case.    See Ocanas,  70 Wis. 2d at  187-88.                                        “[T]he exercise of discretion
dictates that different judges will have different opinions as to what should be the
proper sentence in a particular case.”   Id.   Because the court considered the proper
factors  when  imposing  sentence,  we  conclude  that  it  properly  exercised  its
sentencing discretion.
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No.   2009AP50-CR
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
                                             This  opinion  will  not  be  published.     See  WIS.  STAT.  RULE
809.23(1)                                    (b)5.
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