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SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
Case No.:                                                            97-1337
Complete Title
of Case:
In  re  the  Commitment  of  Frank  Curiel:
State  of  Wisconsin,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Frank  Curiel,
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
ON  REVIEW  OF  A  DECISION  OF  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS
Reported  at:                                                        221  Wis.  2d  596,  586  N.W.2d  698
(Ct.  App.  1998,  Unpublished)
Opinion Filed:                                                       July  2,  1999
Submitted on Briefs:
Oral Argument:                                                       May  4,  1999
Source of APPEAL
COURT:                                                               Circuit
COUNTY:                                                              Milwaukee
JUDGE:                                                               Jeffrey  A. Kremers
JUSTICES:
Concurred:
Dissented:
Not Participating:  Prosser,  J.,  did  not participate.
ATTORNEYS:                                                           For the  respondent-appellant-petitioner there
were briefs by Jack C. Hoag and Sedor & Hoag, Janesville and oral
argument  by Jack  C. Hoag.
For the  petitioner-respondent  the  cause was
argued by Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorney  general, with whom
on the brief  was  James E.  Doyle, attorney  general.




No.                                                                         97-1337
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing and
modification.   The final version will appear in
the bound volume of the official reports.
No.                                                                         97-1337
                                                                            STATE  OF  WISCONSIN                                               :                          IN  SUPREME  COURT
                                                                                                                                                                          FILED
                                                                            In  re  the  Commitment  of  Frank  Curiel:
                                                                            State  of  Wisconsin,                                                                         JUL 2, 1999
                                                                            Petitioner-Respondent,                                                                        Marilyn L. Graves
Clerk of Supreme Court
Madison, WI
v.
Frank  Curiel,
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
REVIEW  of  a  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.    Affirmed.
¶1    DONALD    W.    STEINMETZ,    J.      The    petitioner,    Frank
Curiel,  seeks  review  of  an  unpublished  decision  of  the  court  of
appeals1  which  upheld  a  verdict  and  commitment  order  of  the
Circuit  Court  for  Milwaukee  County,  the  Honorable  Jeffrey  A.
Kremers.                                                                    The   circuit   court   found   Curiel   to   be   a   sexually
violent  person  under  Wis.  Stat.  ch.                                    980                                                                (1995-96)2  and  ordered
his  commitment.
                                                                            ¶2    We  are  presented  with  the  following  issues  for  our
review:
1  State  v.  Curiel,  No.                                                  97-1337,  unpublished  slip  op.                                   (Ct.
App.  July  21,  1998).
2  All  future  statutory  references  are  to  the  1995-96  volume
unless  otherwise  indicated.
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    No.              97-1337
¶3                                                                            1)                                                               What                                                             is   the   proper   interpretation             of
"substantially  probable"  as  the  term  is  used  in  Wis.  Stat.  ch.
980?    We  hold  that  "substantially  probable,"  construed  according
to  its  common  and  appropriate  usage,  means  "much  more  likely
than  not."
¶4                                                                            2)     Is  a  person's  right  to  equal  protection  violated
where  a  finding  of  dangerousness  under  Wis.  Stat.  ch.                 980  does
not  require  that  the  risk  that  the  person  will  engage  in  sexual
violence  is  to  a  degree  of  "extreme  likelihood?"     We  hold  that
the  standards  for  dangerousness  under  ch.                                980  do  not  violate
equal  protection.
¶5                                                                            3)                                                               Is  the  term  "substantially  probable"  as  used  to
determine  whether  a  defendant  is  dangerous  under  Wis.  Stat.  ch.
980    unconstitutionally    vague?                                           We    hold    that    the    term
"substantially  probable,"  when  construed  according  to  its  common
and  appropriate  usage  to  mean  "much  more  likely  than  not,"  is
not  unconstitutionally  vague.
¶6                                                                            4)                                                               Whether  the  proper  standard  of  review  to  apply  to
a  challenge  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  in  a  Wis.  Stat.
ch.  980  proceeding  is  that  used  in  criminal  or  civil  cases.    We
hold   that   appellate   court   review   of   challenges   to   the
sufficiency  of  the  evidence  in  ch.                                       980  proceedings  should  be
that  standard  applied  in  criminal  cases.
¶7                                                                            5)                                                               Is  the  verdict  of  the  court  supported  by  the
evidence?                                                                                                                                      We   hold   that   the   evidence   adduced   at   trial   was
sufficient  to  support  the  commitment  of  the  defendant  under  Wis.
Stat.  ch.  980.
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No.                                                                           97-1337
I
¶8    In  1989,  Frank  Curiel  (Curiel)  was  convicted  of  second
degree  sexual  assault  in  violation  of  Wis.  Stat.  §  940.225(2)(e)
(1985-86)  and  was  sentenced  to  prison  for  a  term  of  six  years.
Prior  to  his  scheduled  release,  the  State  petitioned  for  his
commitment  under  ch.  980,  which  governs  the  civil  commitment  of
sexually  violent  persons.    The  State  satisfied  the  circuit  court
that  Curiel  was  eligible  for  commitment  and,  following  a  number
of  adjournments,  a  trial  to  the  court  was  held  on  December          2,
1996.3
¶9    The  only  disputed  issue  at  trial  was  whether  it  was
substantially  probable  that  Curiel  would  engage  in  future  acts
of  sexual  violence.4     Both  witnesses  for  the  State  testified
that,  to  a  reasonable  degree  of  psychological  certainty,  it  was
substantially  probable  that  Curiel  would  engage  in  future  acts
of  sexual  violence.     The  one  witness  for  the  defense  testified
that  it  was  not.    None  of  the  witnesses,  however,  used  the  same
3                                                                             Curiel  waived  his  statutory  right  to  a  jury  trial.
4  Under  Wis.  Stat.  §  980.05(3)(a),  the  State  has  the  burden
of  proving  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  all  of  the  allegations  in
the  petition  for  commitment.    The  petition  "must  allege  that  the
person:                                                                       (1)   was   convicted,   found   delinquent,   or   found   not
guilty  by  reason  of  mental  disease  or  defect  of  a  sexually
violent   offense;                                                            (2)   is   within                                                 90   days   of   release   from   a
sentence,  commitment,  or  secured  correctional  facility  arising
from  a  sexually  violent  offense;  (3)  has  a  mental  disorder;  and
(4)   is   dangerous   because   that   mental   disorder   creates   a
substantial  probability  that  he  or  she  will  engage  in  acts  of
sexual  violence."     State  v.  Post,                                       197  Wis.                                                         2d                                    279,   297-98,   541
N.W.2d  115  (1995)  (footnotes  omitted);  Wis.  Stat.  §  980.02(2).
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No.                                                                             97-1337
working  definition  of  "substantially  probable"  in  reaching  their
conclusions.
¶10   The  State  called  Dr.  Frederick  Waddell                               (Waddell),  a
psychologist  with  the  Kettle  Moraine  Correctional  Institution,
as  its  first  witness.     Waddell  testified  that  he  had  concluded
to  a  reasonable  degree  of  psychological  certainty  that  Curiel
suffered  from  the  mental  disorder  known  as  pedophilia  and  that
it   was   substantially   probable   that   because   of   the   disorder
Curiel  would  engage  in  future  acts  of  sexual  violence.      He
explained   that   he   reached   these   conclusions   based   upon   an
approximately  one  hour  interview  with  Curiel  and  an  examination
of  Curiel's  social  services  and  clinical  services  files,  which
included  a  copy  of  Curiel's  presentence  investigation  report.
He  based  his  conclusion  that  it  was  substantially  probable  that
Curiel  would  reoffend  sexually  on  the  following  five  factors:  1)
Curiel    was    diagnosed    a    pedophile,                                   2)    had    episodes    of
exhibitionism,                                                                  3)   was   not   treated   for   either   pedophilia   or
exhibitionism,                                                                  4)  had  serious  problems  with  drugs  and  alcohol,
and                                                                             5)   his   known   sexual   offenses   demonstrated   a   pattern   of
increasing  severity.     Waddell  also  testified  that  his  personal
working  definition  of  "substantially  probable"  was  "more  likely
than   not"   and   that   he   did   not   think   it   was   "substantially
probable"  that  Curiel  would  engage  in  future  acts  of  sexual
violence  if  that  term  were  defined  as  "much  more  likely  than
not."    Following  his  testimony,  his  written  evaluation  of  Curiel
was  admitted  into  evidence.
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No.                                                                           97-1337
¶11   As  its  second  witness,  the  State  called  Dr.  Ronald
Sindberg                                                                      (Sindberg),   a   psychologist   employed   by   the   Mendota
Mental  Health  Institute.    As  did  Waddell,  Sindberg  testified  to
a  reasonable  degree  of  psychological  certainty  that  Curiel  had  a
mental    disorder    known    as    pedophilia    and    that    it    was
substantially  probable  that  Curiel  would  engage  in  future  acts
of   sexual   violence.                                                       He   based   his   conclusion   upon   his
examination   of   Curiel's   social   services   and   clinical   files;
Curiel,  on  the  advice  of  his  attorney,  refused  to  speak  with
Sindberg.   Sindberg's   opinion   was   developed   by   considering
whether  Curiel  met  the  criteria  for  a  number  of  risk  factors
used   to   predict   whether   a   person   was   likely   to   reoffend
sexually,  and  then  whether  treatment  that  Curiel  had  received
would  tend  to  diminish  the  weight  of  the  risk  factors.
¶12   Specifically,  Sindberg  testified  that  Curiel  met  the
criteria  for                                                                 17  of                                                           31  risk  factors  the  Mendota  Mental  Health
Institute   had   identified   as   predictors   that   a   person   would
commit  future  acts  of  sexual  violence.     He  further  testified
that  of  those                                                               31  risk  factors,                                               14  were  regarded  in  scientific
literature   as   highly   reliable   predictors   of   future   acts   of
sexual   violence.                                                            Of   those                                                                                                                                14   most   reliable   risk   factors,
                                                                                                                                               Sindberg  found  that  Curiel  met  the  criteria  for  the  following
ten:                                                                          1)   pretreatment   deviate   sexual   arousal,                                                                                           2)   non-sexual
criminality,                                                                                                                                   3)  denial  or  minimization  of  offenses,                                                                              4)  extra
familial    victims,                                                          5)                                                               never    very    married,                                                6)                                              multiple
paraphilias,                                                                                                                                   7)  attitudes  which  legitimize  crimes,                                8)  hands  on
and  hands  off  offenses,                                                                                                                                                                                              9)  history  of  sexual  abuse  as  a  child,
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No.                                                                           97-1337
and                                                                           10)  history  of  substance  abuse.     Sindberg  testified  that
together,  these  risk  factors  made  it  substantially  probable  that
Curiel  would  reoffend.     He  stated  that  he  did  not  believe  that
the  non-sex  offender  treatment  Curiel  had  received  offset  to  any
significant  degree  the  weight  of  these  risk  factors.     Finally,
he   explained   that   his   opinion   remained   the   same   whether
"substantially  probable"  was  defined  as  "more  likely  than  not"
or  "much  more  likely  than  not."     Sindberg's  written  evaluation
was  also  admitted  into  evidence.
¶13   At   the   close   of   the   State's   case,   defense   counsel
moved  for  a  directed  verdict,  arguing  that  the  evidence  was
insufficient    to    establish    that    there    was    a    substantial
probability  that  Curiel  would  reoffend.    Defense  counsel  argued
first  that  Sindberg's  testimony  could  not  support  a  finding  that
the  risk  that  Curiel  would  reoffend  sexually  was  substantially
probable  because  Sindberg's  method  of  evaluation  was  fraught
with  error:  he  did  not  personally  interview  Curiel  and  in  the
view  of  the  defense,  his  use  of  objectively-based  risk  factors
to  reach  his  conclusion  was  a  questionable  method  of  evaluation.
Then,  with  the  premise  that  the  term  "substantially  probable"
must  mean  a  degree  of  likelihood  no  less  probable  than  "much
more  likely  than  not,"  counsel  argued  that  Waddell's  testimony
was  insufficient  to  support  a  finding  of  "dangerousness."
¶14   The  circuit  court  denied  the  motion.     It  found  that
regardless  of  the  fact  that  the  witnesses  used  varied  working
definitions   of   the   term,   both   had   testified   that   it   was
substantially  probable  that  Curiel  would  reoffend.    Second,  the
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No.                                                                            97-1337
court  stated  that  even  if  "substantially  probable"  were  defined
as  "much  more  likely  than  not,"  that  standard  was  satisfied  by
Sindberg's  testimony  alone.
¶15   The  defense  called  a  single  witness  in  rebuttal,  Dr.
Charles  Lodl                                                                  (Lodl),  a  psychologist  in  private  practice.     Lodl
testified  that  he  had  met  with  Curiel  for  many  hours  and  that  he
performed  three  psychological  tests,  including  two  that  were
directed    toward    assessing    Curiel's    sexual    interests    and
knowledge.                                                                     Lodl   further   testified   that   based   on   this
background,   and   to   a   reasonable   degree   of   psychological
certainty,  it  was  not  substantially  probable  that  Curiel  would
engage  in  future  acts  of  sexual  violence.    He  had  concluded  that
Curiel  was  a  moderate  risk  for  reoffending  sexually.     He  also
testified  that  he  internalized  the  probability  of  future  acts  of
sexual  violence  as  a  five-point  scale  that  he  described  as  "low
risk,"  "low  to  moderate  risk,"  "moderate  risk,"  "moderate  to
high  risk,"  and  "high  risk."    He  believed  only  "moderate  to  high
risk"   and   "high   risk"   equated   with   the   term   "substantially
probable."
¶16   Lodl  also  cast  doubt  on  the  analysis  Sindberg  used  in
developing  his  expert  opinion.    Of  the  14  factors  which  Sindberg
had  claimed  most  accurately  predicted  whether  a  person  would
engage  in  a  future  act  of  sexual  violence,  Lodl  admitted  that
scientific  literature  had  once  given  its  support;  however,  some
of  the  factors  more  recently  had  been  called  into  doubt  as  less
predicative  of  such  behavior  than  once  thought.      He  further
testified   that   one's   consideration   of   all   the   risk   factors
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No.                                                                          97-1337
should  not  be  conducted  in  a  "check-mark"  manner  but  should
include  some  clinical  judgment  that  was  based  in  part  on  an
interview  with  the  subject.
¶17   Considering  the  evidence  before  it,  the  circuit  court
believed  that  the  State  had  carried  its  burden  to  prove  all  the
allegations  in  the  petition  for  commitment  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt.    As  relevant  to  its  decision  on  the  disputed  question  of
whether  it  was  substantially  probable  that  Curiel  would  engage
in  future  acts  of  sexual  violence,  the  circuit  court  expressed
its  reasoning  as  follows:
Now  what  I  have  then  is  someone  who,  according  to
everybody,  including  Dr.  Lodl,  is  at  a  high  risk  of
reoffending   criminally,   is   at   a   moderate   risk   of
reoffending   sexually,   if   you   look   at   Dr.   Lodl's
conclusions,  at  a  much  more  likely  than  not  risk  if
you  listen  to  Dr.  Sindberg  and  more  likely  than  not  if
you  listen  to  Dr.  Waddell.    Under  any  standard  that  I
thinkifif  the  standard  that's  in  chapter                              980  is
constitutional,    then    this    evidence    in    my    mind
establishes  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  Mr.  Curiel
as  he  presently  carries  himself  and  views  himself  and
deals  with  his  psychological  problems  is  dangerous  as
that  term  is  defined  in  chapter  980,  and  I  am  finding
that   the   State   has   proved   this   case   beyond   a
reasonable  doubt,  and  I  find  that  Mr.  Curiel  is  a
sexually  violent  person  as  alleged  in  the  petition.
The  circuit  court  then  committed  Curiel  to  the  custody  of  the
Department  of  Health  and  Social  Services  for  control.
¶18   The   court   of   appeals   affirmed   the   circuit   court's
verdict   and   commitment   order.                                          It   concluded   that   the   term
"substantially  probable"  required  no  further  definition  as  the
legislature    intended    the    phrase    to    mean    "substantially
probable."     State  v.  Curiel,  No.                                       97-1337,  unpublished  slip  op.
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No.                                                                            97-1337
at  8  (Ct.  App.  July  21,  1998).    It  also  concluded  that  Waddell's
and   Sindberg's   testimony   served   as   sufficient   evidence   to
support  the  circuit  court's  findings  that  Curiel  was  dangerous.
Id.  at                                                                        8-9.     As  one  point  of  error,  Curiel  had  also  appealed
the  circuit  court's  finding  that  Lodl  had  testified  that  Curiel
was  "at  a  high  risk  of  reoffending  criminally."     The  court  of
appeals   believed   that   the   circuit   court's   statement   was
inconsequential  to  its  decision  and  was  nonetheless  immediately
followed  by  accurate  facts  upon  which  its  decision  was  based.
Id.  at  9.
¶19   We  affirm  the  decision  of  the  court  of  appeals  but
disagree  that  the  term  “substantially  probable”  needs  no  further
definition.                                                                    We   conclude   that   when   the   legislature   used
"substantially  probable,"  it  intended  that  the  standard  be  read
according  to  its  common  and  appropriate  usage:  "much  more  likely
than  not."
II
¶20   On  appeal  to  this  court,  in  addition  to  the  issues
presented  in  the  court  of  appeals,  Curiel  for  the  first  time
challenges  the  constitutionality  of  ch.  980.    The  constitutional
challenges   Curiel   makes   here   are   also   presented   by   the
petitioner  Peter  Kienitz                                                     (Kienitz)  in  the  companion  case  State
v.  Kienitz,  No.  97-1460,  filed  this  same  date.    Those  statutory
and  constitutional  challenges  made  by  both  Curiel  and  Kienitz
are  addressed  here.
¶21   Lying  at  the  heart  of  each  of  Curiel's  arguments  on
appeal  is  the  meaning  of  "substantially  probable"  as  that  term
9




                                                                                                                                                  No.                                            97-1337
is  used  in  ch.                                                              980.                                                               First,  Curiel  argues  that  "substantially
probable"  means  "extreme  likelihood"  and  that  the  circuit  court
erred  in  failing  to  so  define  the  term.     Second,  Curiel  argues
that  the  failure  to  define  "substantially  probable"  as  meaning
"extreme  likelihood"  violates  his  right  to  equal  protection.
Third,   Curiel   argues   that   the   court   of   appeals'   failure   to
further    define    "substantially    probable"    leaves    ch.              980
unconstitutionally  vague.    And  finally,  Curiel  asserts  that  the
evidence  adduced  at  his  commitment  trial  was  insufficient  to
support  a  finding  that  to  the  degree  required  by  statute,  he
would  engage  in  future  acts  of  sexual  violence.
Statutory  Interpretation
¶22   Our  analysis  appropriately  begins  with  determining  the
meaning  of  "substantially  probable"  as  the  term  is  used  in  ch.
980.                                                                           Under   Wis.   Stat.                                               §  980.01(7),   a   person   "is   dangerous
because  he  or  she  suffers  from  a  mental  disorder  that  makes  it
substantially  probable  that  the  person  will  engage  in  acts  of
sexual  violence."  Id.                                                        (emphasis  supplied).     Pursuant  to  Wis.
Stat.                                                                          §  980.02(2)(c),  the  State  must  prove  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt  that  "[t]he  person  is  dangerous  to  others  because  the
person's  mental  disorder  creates  a  substantial  probability  that
he   or   she   will   engage   in   acts   of   sexual   violence."           Id.
(emphasis  supplied).    We  explicitly  note  this  difference  in  the
phrasing  of  the  term  to  emphasize  that  our  interpretation  of
"substantially  probable"  serves  equally  as  an  interpretation  of
"substantial  probability."
10




No.                                                                           97-1337
¶23   Curiel   presents   the   first   issue   on   review   as   one
involving  interpretation  of  the  term  "substantially  probable,"
although  throughout  his  brief  he  refers  to  that  phrasing  of  the
term  and  "substantial  probability"  indiscriminately.     The  State
notes  that  the  legislature  used  both  phrasings  in  ch.                 980,  and
suggests  that  the  difference  between  them  is  at  most  a  slight
one  and  should  not  be  given  any  significance;  it  proceeds  to  use
the   phrasings   of   the   term   interchangeably   throughout   its
argument.     We  also  note  that  both  the  circuit  court  and  the
court  of  appeals  used  the  terms  interchangeably.    Neither  party
suggests  that  the  phrasings  require  different  definitions,  and
we   are   convinced   that   the   legislature   intended   that   the
phrasings  share  a  common  meaning.
¶24   To  commit  a  person  as  sexually  violent,  the  State  must
prove   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt,   among   other   elements,   that
"[t]he  person  is  dangerous  to  others  because  the  person's  mental
disorder  creates  a  substantial  probability  that  he  or  she  will
engage  in  acts  of  sexual  violence."    Wis.  Stat.  §§  980.05(3)(a)
and  980.02(2)(c).    The  parties  dispute  the  degree  of  likelihood
required  to  satisfy  the  term  “substantially  probable.”
¶25   Curiel   argues   that   "substantially   probable"   means
"extreme   likelihood"   and   that,   therefore,   he   could   not   be
committed   under   ch.                                                       980   unless   the   State   proved   beyond   a
reasonable  doubt  that  he  was  dangerous  to  others  because  his
mental  disorder  created  an  "extreme  likelihood"  that  he  would
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No.                                                                          97-1337
engage  in  future  acts  of  sexual  violence.5    The  State  disagrees,
arguing   that   "substantially   probable"   means   "substantially
probable"  and  that  ordinary  persons  can  understand  and  apply
this  common  sense  term  without  further  elucidation;  it  urges
that  we  not  redefine  the  term.
¶26   The  degree  of  likelihood  intended  by  the  use  of  the
term  "substantially  probable"  requires  statutory  interpretation.
The  interpretation  of  a  statute  is  a  question  of  law  that  we
                                                                                                                                        review  de  novo.     State  v.  Setagord,                    211  Wis.                            2d             397,   406,      565
N.W.2d                                                                       506                                                        (1997).     The  purpose  of  statutory  interpretation  is
to  discern  the  intent  of  the  legislature.     Id.     In  discerning
the  intent  of  the  legislature,  we  first  consider  the  language  of
the   statute.                                                               If   the   language   of   the   statute   clearly   and
unambiguously  sets  forth  the  legislative  intent,  we  do  not  look
beyond  the  statutory  language  to  ascertain  its  meaning.    Id.
¶27   In  construing  a  statute,  the  general  rule  is  that  all
words  and  phrases  should  be  construed  according  to  common  and
approved  usage  unless  a  different  definition  has  been  designated
                                                                                                                                                                                                      by  the  statutes.     Wis.  Stat.                  §                990.01(1);     State  v.  Sher,   149
Wis.                                                                         2d                                                         1,                                                            9,                                   437   N.W.2d   878    (1989).   We  may  resort  to  a
dictionary  to  ascertain  the  common  and  approved  usage  of  a  term
not  defined  by  the  statute.     State  v.  Chrysler  Outboard  Corp.,
5  Curiel’s  position  on  this  point  is  difficult  to  pin  down.
He  at  times  argues  that  the  term  means                                “extreme  likelihood.”
At  other  times,  he  implicitly  suggests  that  the  term  means  “much
more    likely    than    not.”                                              Indeed,    his    only    suggested
interpretation  of  the  term  in  the  court  of  appeals  was              “much
more  likely  than  not.”
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                No.                                97-1337
219   Wis.                                                                    2d                          130,       168,                                             580   N.W.2d             203              (1998);   see   also   HM
                                                                                                                     Distrib.  of  Milwaukee  v.  Dept.  of  Agri.,                                  55  Wis.   2d                          261,   269,
198  N.W.2d  598  (1972).    Our  resort  to  a  dictionary  to  determine
the  common  and  approved  usage  of  the  term  does  not  render  the
term  ambiguous.     State  v.  Sample,                                       215  Wis.                   2d         487,                                             499,                     573
N.W.2d  187  (1998).
¶28   Because   "substantially   probable"   is   not   defined   by
statute,  we  turn  to  a  dictionary.     We  look  first  to  the  term
"probable"  and  conclude  that  its  most  common  and  appropriate
usage   is   "more   likely   than   not."                                    The   American   Heritage
Dictionary   defines   "probable"   as   an   adjective   meaning:   "1.
Likely  to  happen  or  to  be  true:  War  seemed  probable  in              1938.
The  home  team,  far  ahead,  is  the  probable  winner.                     2.  Likely  but
uncertain;  plausible."  The  American  Heritage  Dictionary  of  the
English  Language  at                                                         1443                        (3d  ed.   1992).                                           The  common  sense  of
"probable"  in  both  of  these  definitions  is  that  there  is  a
greater  likelihood  that  an  event  will  happen  than  that  it  will
not  happen:  that  is,  that  it  is  more  likely  than  not  that  the
event  will  happen.    Further,  in  keeping  with  our  conclusion  that
"probable"   and   "probability"   are   intended   to   share   a   common
meaning,   we   note   that   the   definitions   of   "probable"   and
"probability"  are  most  closely  analogous  where  "probable"  is
defined   as   "[h]aving   more   evidence   for   than   against"   and
"probability"  is  defined  as  "a  condition  or  state  created  when
there  is  more  evidence  in  favor  of  the  existence  of  a  given
proposition  than  there  is  against  it."     Black's  Law  Dictionary
at  1201  (6th  ed.  1990).
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No.                                                                           97-1337
¶29   The  term  "substantially"  must  also  be  given  effect,
otherwise   the   term   is   superfluous,   a   result   we   avoid   in
construing   a   statute.                                                     Sher,                                                       149   Wis.   2d   at   9.   Although
numerous  definitions  for  "substantially"  are  provided  by  The
American  Heritage  Dictionary,  we  conclude  that  the  most  common
and  appropriate  definition  of  the  term  as  used  in  ch.                980  is
"[c]onsiderable  in  importance,  value,  degree,  amount,  or  extent:
won  by  a  substantial  margin."    The  American  Heritage  Dictionary
of  the  English  Language  at  1791.    A  word  which  commonly  denotes
this  sense  of  "substantially"  is  the  term  "much,"  defined  as
"[g]reat  in  quantity,  degree,  or  extent."    Id.  at  1183.
¶30   Given  the  common  and  appropriate  usage  of  the  term,  we
interpret  "substantially  probable"  as  meaning  "much  more  likely
than  not,"  and  as  so  construed,  find  that  the  sections  in  which
this  term  is  found  to  be  unambiguous.    The  legislature  intended
that  the  State  prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  person
subject  to  the  commitment  proceedings  is  dangerous  because  his
or  her  mental  disorder  makes  it  “much  more  likely  than  not”  that
the  person  will  engage  in  future  acts  of  sexual  violence.
¶31   We  find  unpersuasive  both  of  Curiel's  arguments  in
support   of   defining   "substantially   probable"   as   "extreme
likelihood."                                                                  His   first   argument   implicitly   begins   with   the
premise  that  the  statute  is  not  ambiguous,  and  as  did  we,  he
turns  to  a  dictionary  to  identify  the  common  and  appropriate
usage  of  the  term.                                                         Curiel  agrees  with  our  conclusion  that
probable   means   "more   likely   than   not"   but   prefers   that
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No.                                                                            97-1337
"substantially"  be  defined  as  "extreme."6     We  disagree.     First,
he  provides  us  with  no  evidence  that  "extreme"  is  a  common  and
appropriate   usage   of   the   term   "substantially."                       Second,
"substantially"  and  "extreme"  are  not  synonyms"extreme"  appears
to  us  to  involve  a  degree  of  certainty  far  greater  than  that
suggested  by  the  term  "substantially".     Indeed,  The  American
Heritage  Dictionary  defines  "extreme"  as  an  adjective  meaning:
"1.  Most  remote  in  any  direction;  outermost  or  farthest."     "2.
Being   in   or   attaining   the   greatest   or   highest   degree;   very
intense."     "3.  Extending  far  beyond  the  norm."     "4.  Of  the
greatest  severity."     The  American  Heritage  Dictionary  of  the
English  Language,  at                                                         650.             None  of  these  definitions  suggests
that  "extreme"  is  a  common  and  appropriate  usage  of  the  term
"substantially."
¶32   In  a  second  argument,  now  with  a  view  to  the  statute's
ambiguity,  Curiel  offers  legislative  history  as  support  for  his
view  that  "substantially  probable"  means  "extreme  likelihood."
We   have   already   determined   that   the   term   "substantially
probable"  is  not  ambiguous;  in  most  circumstances  we  would  not
then  consider  matters  outside  the  language  of  the  statute  for
evidence  of  legislative  intent.    However,  because  Curiel's  equal
protection  argument  is  grounded  in  his  interpretation  of  the
legislative  history  of  both  ch.                                            980   and  ch.   51,   the  Mental
6  Although  when  arguing  that  the  evidence  was  not  sufficient
to  support  his  verdict,  he  explicitly  states  that                       “much  more
likely  than  not”  is  an  appropriate  legal  standard  for  the  term
“substantially  probable.”
15




No.                                                                            97-1337
Health   Act,   we   believe   that   his   argument   detailing   the
legislative   history   of   the   two   chapters   should   be   addressed
here.
¶33   We  understand  Curiel's  argument  to  be  the  following:
The  term  "substantially  probable"  was  adopted  in  ch.                    980  to
provide    consistency    with    ch.                                          51,    which    uses    the    term
"substantial  probability.”    Much  in  the  manner  in  which  the  term
is  used  in  ch.  980,  "substantial  probability"  is  used  in  ch.  51
to  describe  the  degree  to  which  a  person  is  likely  to  harm
himself,  herself,  or  others  before  he  or  she  could  be  found
"dangerous."7    In  1972,  the  predecessor  to  the  current  ch.  51  was
7                                                                              Wis.  Stat.  §  51.20(1)2.a-d  (1997-98),  provides  in  part:
2.  The  individual  is  dangerous  because  he  or  she
does  any  of  the  following:
a.    Evidences    a    substantial    probability    of
physical  harm  to  himself  or  herself  as  manifested  by
evidence  of  recent  threats  of  or  attempts  at  suicide
or  serious  bodily  harm.
b.    Evidences    a    substantial    probability    of
physical  harm  to  other  individuals  as  manifested  by
evidence    of    recent    homicidal    or    other    violent
behavior,  or  by  evidence  that  others  are  placed  in
reasonable   fear   of   violent   behavior   and   serious
physical  harm  to  them,  as  evidenced  by  a  recent  overt
act,  attempt  or  threat  to  do  serious  physical  harm.  .
c.  Evidences  such  impaired  judgment,  manifested
by  evidence  of  a  pattern  of  recent  acts  or  omissions,
that  there  is  a  substantial  probability  of  physical
impairment  or  injury  to  himself  or  herself.  .  .
d.  Evidences  behavior  manifested  by  recent  acts
or  omissions  that,  due  to  mental  illness,  he  or  she  is
unable  to  satisfy  basic  needs  for  nourishment,  medical
care,  shelter  or  safety  without  prompt  and  adequate
treatment   so   that   a   substantial   probability   exists
that  death,  serious  physical  injury,  serious  physical
debilitation    or    serious    physical    disease    will
16




No.                                                                            97-1337
held  unconstitutional  in  a  number  of  respects,  including  the
statute's    lack    of    a    requirement    that    the    State    prove
dangerousness.    See  Lessard  v.  Schmidt,  349  F.  Supp.  1078,  1093
(E.D.  Wis.  1972),  vacated  and  remanded,  Schmidt  v.  Lessard,  414
U.S.                                                                           473                                                                            (1974),  order  on  remand,                                 379  F.  Supp.                     1376         (E.D.  Wis.
                                                                                                                                                              1974),   vacated   and   remanded   on   other   grounds,                                      421   U.S.   957
(1975),  order  reinstated  on  remand,  413  F.  Supp.  1318  (E.D.  Wis.
1976).                                                                         In   discussing   the   degree   of   dangerousness   that   it
believed  was  constitutionally  required  before  a  person  could  be
involuntarily  deprived  of  liberty,  the  court  in  Lessard  used  the
term  "extreme  likelihood."     Referring  to  Humphrey  v.  Cady,            405
U.S.  504,  509  (1972),  the  court  wrote:
[I]ts  approval  of  a  requirement  that  the  potential  for
doing  harm  be  'great  enough  to  justify  such  a  massive
curtailment  of  liberty'  implies  a  balancing  test  in
which  the  state  must  bear  the  burden  of  proving  that
there  is  an  extreme  likelihood  that  if  the  person  is
not  confined  he  will  do  immediate  harm  to  himself  or
others.
Lessard,                                                                       349  F.  Supp.  at                                                             1093.                                                       Curiel  concludes  that  because
the  legislature  revised  ch.  51  in  response  to  Lessard,  the  term
"substantial  probability,"  used  to  define  the  likelihood  that
the  person  may  do  immediate  harm,  must  have  been  intended  to
mean  "extreme  likelihood."
                                                                               ¶34   We  have  reviewed  the  legislative  history  of  both  ch.
                                                                               980  and  ch.  51  and  are  not  convinced.    Moving  as  Curiel  asks  us
to  from  the  revision  of  ch.                                               51  in                                                                         1976  to  the  current  ch.                                 980
imminently  ensue  unless  the  individual  receives  prompt
and  adequate  treatment  for  this  mental  illness.
17




No.                                                                           97-1337
requires  us  to  take  too  many  leaps  of  faith  to  arrive  at  the
conclusion  he  would  have  us  reach.
¶35   Our  review  of  a  Drafters  Note  from  the  Legislative
Reference  Bureau  does  satisfy  us  that  the  term  "substantially
probable"  was  chosen  in  an  effort  to  use  terms  consistently
throughout  the  statutes.    The  author  of  the  note  explained  that
where  the  draft  of  ch.                                                    980  had  provided  that  "a  person  must  be
'likely'  to  commit  predatory  acts  of  sexual  violence,"  he  had
"changed  the  language  to  say  the  person  must  be  'substantially
probable'  to  commit  such  acts,"  and  in  doing  so  compared  the  new
language  to  that  found  in  Wis.  Stat.  §§  51.20  (1)(a)2.a-d.    See
LRB  Drafter's  Note  to                                                      1994  A.B.                                                                   3,                                                                      (LRB-2975/P2dn)                                    (Oct.   15,
1993).
                                                                                                                                                           ¶36   While  the  language  in  ch.  980  may  have  been  chosen  to
                                                                              be  consistent  with  language  in  ch.  51,  we  disagree  with  Curiel's
                                                                              proposition   that   "substantial   probability"   in   ch.                                                                                                                                                     51   means
"extreme   likelihood."                                                                                                                                                                                                            While   it   is   true   that   the   court   in
                                                                              Lessard    found    the    predecessor    to    the    current    ch.                                                                                                                                           51
unconstitutional  in  various  respects,  including  the  absence  of
proof  of  a  person's  dangerousness,  there  is  no  explicit  evidence
in    the    legislative    history    that    the    term    "substantial
probability"  was  chosen  by  the  legislature  as  a  term  synonymous
with  "extreme  likelihood."
¶37   First,  we  note  that  the  legislature  did  not  originally
choose  the  term  "substantial  probability”  in  ch.                        51,  it  chose
18




No.                                                                             97-1337
the  term  "substantial  risk."     See  Wis.  Stat.                            §  51.20(1)(a)2.8
Legislative  history  does  not  reveal  that  "substantial  risk"  was
chosen  to  meet  the  language  of  Lessard.    And  just  as  there  is  no
evidence  that                                                                  “substantial  risk”  was  chosen  as  a  synonym  of
“extreme   likelihood,”   there   is   no   evidence   that   when   the
                                                                                legislature  amended  Wis.  Stat.                                                                                §                              51.20  in                1977  and  replaced
“risk”   with                                                                                                                          “probability,”   it   did   so   with   a   view   that
"probability"   and   "risk"   were   synonymous,   or   the   view   that
"substantial    probability"    and    "extreme    likelihood"    were
synonymous.     See                                                             §                                                      29,  ch.                                                  428,  Laws  of                 1977  and  Legislative
Reference  Bureau  Analysis  of  1977,  Assembly  Bill  898.
¶38   We   also   find   persuasive   the   State’s   argument   that
legislative  intent  may  be  observed  in  the  legislature's  decision
not  to  use  the  term  "extreme  likelihood."     The  State  suggests
that  the  fact  that  the  legislature  chose  a  term  other  than  that
used  in  Lessard  is  evidence  that  the  legislature  did  not  intend
an  "extreme  likelihood"  standard.    The  State  further  points  out
that  when  the  legislature  was  revising  ch.  51,  Lessard  was  twice
8  Wis.  Stat.                                                                  51.20(1)                                               (a)2                                                      (1975-76)  provided  that  a
                                                                                person  is  dangerous  because  of:
a.  A  substantial  risk  of  physical  harm  to  the  subject
individual  as  manifested  by  evidence  of  recent  threats
of  or  attempts  at  suicide  or  serious  bodily  harm;  or
b.   A   substantial   risk   of   physical   harm   to   other
persons  as  manifested  by  evidence  of  recent  homicidal
or  other  violent  behavior,  or  by  evidence  that  others
are  placed  in  reasonable  fear  of  violent  behavior  and
serious   physical   harm   to   them,   as   evidenced   by   a
recent   overt   act,   attempt   or   threat   to   do   such
physical  harm;
19




No.                                                                            97-1337
appealed,   remanded,   and   vacated,   undermining   the   persuasive
authority  of  the  first  decision.     In  fact,  we  note  that  on
remand  in  Lessard  v.  Schmidt,  379  F.  Supp.  1376  (E.D.  1974),  the
court  did  not  again  use  the  term  "extreme  likelihood."      In
describing  the  findings  and  standard  of  proof  necessary  for  an
order  of  commitment,  the  court  wrote  that  they  were  "'mental
illness  and  imminent  dangerousness  to  self  or  others  beyond  a
reasonable  doubt'  based  at  minimum  upon  a  recent  act,  attempt  or
threat  to  do  substantial  harm."     Id.  at                                1381.     The  absence  of
the  "extreme  likelihood"  standard  in  this  opinion  does  place  a
cloud   upon   the   precedential   worth   of   the   court's   earlier
decision.
¶39   As  an  additional  document  in  support  of  his  position,
Curiel  refers  us  to  71  Op.  Att'y  Gen.  34  (1982).    We  agree  with
the  court  of  appeals  in  its  discussion  of  this  opinion  in  State
v.  Kienitz,                                                                   221  Wis.                                                         2d   275,    585  N.W.2d                 609                                   (Ct.  App.    1998),
                                                                               petition  for  review  granted,                                                221  Wis.     2d            653,                                  588  N.W.2d   631
(1998),  that  the  opinion  does  not  focus  upon  the  meaning  of
"substantial   probability"   and   therefore   its   worth   is   fairly
suspect  as  evidence  of  legislative  intent.     See  id.  at               299.
Furthermore,  we  do  not  find  that  an  attorney  general  opinion
filed   in                                                                     1982   is   evidence   of   the   legislature's   intent   when
drafting  a  statute  in                                                                                                                              1976.                               Cf.  Juneau  County  v.  Courthouse
Employees,                                                                     221  Wis.                                                         2d   630,    648,          585  N.W.2d   587                                   (1998)        (post-
enactment  interpretations  by  a  legislative  agency  that  worked
with   the   legislature   during   the   adoption   of   the   statutory
provisions   may   be   an   aid   in   determining   legislative   intent,
20




No.                                                                            97-1337
although  they  may  be  less  persuasive  than  reports  issued  prior
to  enactment).
¶40   As  do  we,  the  State  believes  that  the  statute  is  not
ambiguous,  and  that  in  the  event  that  legislative  history  is
considered,  Curiel's  position  is  without  support.     However,  it
argues   that   we   should   not   redefine   the   term   "substantially
probable"  but  leave  the  definition  to  the  trier  of  fact.    We  are
not  persuaded  by  the  State's  arguments.
¶41   First,    the    State    argues    that    since    the    term
"substantial   probability"   has   not   been   the   source   of   any
confusion  in  the  application  of  ch.                                       51  and  therefore  has  not
required   definition,   by   analogy   the   term   should   not   need
definition  here.    This  argument  fails  because  unlike  the  use  of
the  term  in  ch.  51,  its  use  in  ch.  980  has  created  difficulties:
in   this   case,   the   three   experts   offered   three   different
personal  working  definitions;  the  court  of  appeals  in  this  case,
and  the  court  of  appeals  in  Kienitz,  contributed  two  additional
definitions.
¶42   The  State  also  suggests  that  just  as  this  court  has
not  defined  other  legal  terms,  the  definitions  of  which  are
difficult  to  articulate,  we  should  avoid  doing  so  here.     It
offers  "reasonable  doubt"  and  "substantial  risk"  as  terms  which
although   difficult   to   articulate   have   not   been   redefined   in
favor  of  allowing  the  trier  of  fact  to  employ  his  or  her  own
understanding  of  the  terms.     That  we  have  chosen  not  to  define
the  terms  the  State  points  to  in  the  contexts  in  which  they  are
used  does  not  dissuade  us  from  defining  "substantially  probable"
21




No.                                                                            97-1337
here.    We  believe  that  it  is  incumbent  upon  this  court  to  define
“substantially  probable”  in  accord  with  legislative  intent.
¶43   In   sum,   we   do   not   find   that   matters   outside   the
language    of    the    statute    provide    any    evidence    of    the
legislature’s   intent   in   its   use   of   the   term                      “substantial
probability.”     We  do  believe  that  the  term  is  unambiguous,  its
common   and   appropriate   usage   meaning                                   “much   more   likely   than
not.”
Equal  Protection
¶44   As   we   have   not   defined   the   term   "substantially
probable"  in  ch.  980  as  "extreme  likelihood,"  Curiel  challenges
the  constitutionality  of  ch.  980  on  grounds  of  equal  protection.
He  claims  a  single  substantive  difference  between  the  statutory
schemes  for  commitment  under  ch.  51  and  ch.  980:  satisfying  the
standard  of  dangerousness  requires  the  State  prove  to  a  greater
likelihood   the   probability   that   a   person   will   harm   himself,
herself,  or  another  under  ch.  51  than  is  required  to  prove  that
a  person  will  sexually  reoffend  under  ch.  980.
¶45   Persons   committed   under   chapters                                   51   and                       980   are
similarly  situated  for  purposes  of  equal  protection  comparison.
State  v.  Post,  197  Wis.  2d  279,  318-19,  541  N.W.2d  115  (1995).
Equal   protection   guarantees   require   that   persons   similarly
situated  be  accorded  similar  treatment    State  v.  Avila,  192  Wis.
2d  870,  879,  532  N.W.2d  423  (1990)(citing  Walters  v.  City  of  St.
Louis,                                                                         347   U.S.                     231,        237   (1954)).   However,   this   does   not
require  that  all  persons  be  dealt  with  identically.    Id.    Equal
protection   is   not   violated   where   there   exist   reasonable   and
22




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        No.    97-1337
                                                                                                                                                          practical   grounds   for   the   classifications   created   by   the
                                                                                                                legislature.     State  v.  Hezzie  R.,   219  Wis.                                                                2d   849,   894,      580
N.W.2d                                                                         660                              (1998).                                   Nor   is   equal   protection   violated   where
similarly  situated  people  are  not  treated  differently.
¶46   "When  a  party  attacks  a  statute  on  the  grounds  that  it
denies   equal   protection   under   the   law,   the   party   must
demonstrate  that  the  state  unconstitutionally  treats  members  of
similarly  situated  classes  differently."     Post,                          197  Wis.                        2d  at
318.     Curiel's  equal  protection  challenge  fails  because  Curiel
has  not  demonstrated  that  persons  committed  under  ch.                   51  are
treated  differently  than  persons  committed  under  ch.  980.
¶47   We  have  already  considered  the  legislative  histories
of    ch.  980  and  ch.  51  and  have  concluded  that  the  histories  do
not  support  Curiel’s  claim  that  ch.                                       51  requires  that  the  State
prove  that  the  likelihood  that  a  person  will  harm  another  is
"extreme."                                                                     Both   ch.                       980   and   ch.                           51   employ   a   "substantial
probability"  standard.     We  held  that  the  term  "substantially
probable"  as  used  in  ch.  980  means  "much  more  likely  than  not."
As  the  terms  are  to  be  used  in  a  consistent  manner  between  the
chapters,  we  can  conceive  of  no  reason  why  the  term  as  used  in
ch.  51  should  be  construed  any  differently  than  it  is  under  ch.
980.
Void  for  Vagueness
¶48   Curiel  also  argues  that  the  court  of  appeals'  failure
to  define  "substantially  probable"  is  a  violation  of  his  right
to  due  processwe  recognize  his  argument  as  one  challenging  the
statute  on  grounds  that  it  is  void  for  vagueness.     Because  we
23




No.                                                                            97-1337
have  concluded  that  "substantially  probable"  means  "much  more
likely  than  not,"  Curiel's  void  for  vagueness  argument  fails  as
well.
¶49   The   "principles   underlying   the   void   for   vagueness
doctrine                                                                                               .  stem  from  concepts  of  procedural  due  process."
State  v.  Popanz,                                                             112  Wis.   2d   166,   172,                                                      332  N.W.2d   750   (1983).
"Due  process  requires  that  the  law  set  forth  fair  notice  of  the
conduct   prohibited   or   required   and   proper   standards   for
enforcement  of  the  law  and  adjudication."  Id.    Based  upon  these
concepts  of  due  process,  a  statute  is  void  for  vagueness  if  it
fails  to  give  notice  to  those  wishing  to  obey  the  law  that  their
conduct  falls  within  the  proscribed  area,  or  if  it  fails  to
provide   those   who   must   enforce   and   apply   the   law   objective
standards  with  which  to  do  so.    Id.  at  172-73.
¶50   Curiel  challenges  the  statute  because  he  believes  that
it  fails  to  provide  those  who  must  apply  the  law  objective
standards  with  which  to  do  so.    With  this  view  of  the  void  for
vagueness   doctrine   in   mind,   we   must   determine   whether   the
statute   fails   to   be   sufficiently   definite   to   allow   judges,
juries   and   expert   witnesses   to   apply   the   terms   of   ch.        980
objectively  to  the  question  before  them  in  order  to  determine
whether  to  commit  the  defendant  without  having  to  create  or
apply  their  own  standards.     See  Popanz,                                                         112  Wis.                                                 2d  at        173
(citing  State  v.  Courtney,                                                  74  Wis.    2d   705,   711,                                                      247  N.W.2d   714
(1976)).
¶51   As  "substantially  probable"  means  "much  more  likely
than  not,"  we  have  no  doubt  that  this  definition  provides  proper
24




No.                                                                            97-1337
standards  of  adjudication.     The  statute  as  defined  is  not  so
obscure  that  men  of  common  intelligence  must  necessarily  guess
at  its  meaning  and  differ  as  to  its  applicability.    See  Peissig
v.  Wisconsin  Gas  Co.,                                                       155  Wis.                  2d         686,                                                              699,                                                                        456  N.W.2d                                348
(1990).
Sufficiency  of  the  Evidence
¶52   The  parties  dispute  the  appropriate  standard  by  which
we  should  review  whether  the  evidence  is  sufficient  to  sustain
the     verdict.     Curiel  argues  that  because  ch.                        980  is  a  civil
commitment  proceeding,  the  standard  of  review  should  be  a  mixed
question  of  law  and  fact.     Curiel  relies  on  the  standard  of
review  articulated  by  the  court  of  appeals  in  K.N.K.  v.  Buhler,
139   Wis.                                                                     2d                         190,       407   N.W.2d                                                      281                                                                         (Ct.   App.                                1987),   a   case
                                                                                                                                                                                       involving   the   protective   placement   of   an   incompetent   person
under  ch.  55:
                                                                                                                                                                                       We  view  the  elements  of  protective  placement  set
                                                                               out  in  sec.                                                                                           55.06(2),  Stats.,  as  questions  of  fact.
                                                                               See  sec.                  55.06(7)                                                                                                                                                 (trier  of  fact  'must  find  by  clear
and    convincing    evidence'    the    elements    of    sec.
                                                                               55.06(2));    sec.                    880.33,                                                           Stats.                                                                                                                 (referring    to
                                                                                                                     'findings'  of  incompetency).  We  will  not  overturn  the
                                                                                                                     circuit   court's   findings   of   fact   unless   clearly
                                                                               erroneous.     Sec.                                                                                     805.17(2),  Stats.  However,  we  view
                                                                                                                     the   higher   question   regarding   the   necessity   for
                                                                                                                     protective  placement  as  one  of  law  because  it  involves
                                                                                                                     the  application  of  the  facts  as  found  by  the  court  to
                                                                               a   statutory   concept.                                                                                                                                                            See   Nottelson   v.   DIHLR,                                  94
Wis.2d                                                                         106,                       115-16,    287  N.W.2d                                                       763,                                                                        768                                        (1980).             We
review  questions  of  law  independently  from  a  circuit
court's  conclusions.     Ball  v.  District  No.                              4,  Area
Bd.,  117  Wis.  2d  529,  537,  345  N.W.2d  389,  394  (1984).
Id.  at  198.    The  State  disagrees  and  argue

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