Preview:

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND RELEASED
NOTICE
December 7, 1995
A party may file with the Supreme Court                                             This opinion is subject to further editing.
a petition to review an adverse decision                                            If  published,  the  official  version  will
by the Court of Appeals.  See § 808.10 and                                          appear  in  the  bound  volume  of  the
RULE 809.62(1), STATS.                                                              Official Reports.
No.   95-0638-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                  IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                    DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GEORGE W. ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Rock County:
JAMES E. WELKER, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.
Before Eich, C.J., Gartzke, P.J., and Sundby, J.
PER CURIAM.    George W. Allen challenges a suppression order.
The issue is whether the affidavit provided probable cause to issue a search
warrant.   Because of the affidavit's stale, irrelevant and conclusory averments,
we conclude that the affidavit does not provide a sufficient basis for probable
cause to issue a search warrant.   Therefore, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings, including withdrawal of Allen's guilty plea.




No.                                                                               95-0638-CR
The affidavit on which the warrant to search Allen's house was
based included the following information:
1. Allen produced $745 in cash--which he retrieved
from  his  bathroom--as  a  warrant  payment  to  a
warden from DNR who had gone to Allen's house to
arrest him for a boating violation; the warden also
observed that Allen had a number of $100 bills on
hand;
2. Allen sold marijuana from the same address nine
months earlier, according to a reliable confidential
informant;
3. a police dog, trained and experienced in drug
searches, alerted to the currency collected from Allen;
4. Allen was convicted of the manufacture/ delivery
of a controlled substance in 1989;
5. Allen was "involved" with the reckless use of a
weapon in 1989;
6. police suspected that Allen sells cocaine;
7. Allen was employed at a topless bar.
The trial court considered the totality of the circumstances and
denied Allen's suppression motion, primarily on the basis of the large amount
of cash in Allen's bathroom and the information from the informant.   The trial
court refused to allow expert testimony on the reliability of a dog alerting to
cash because the court didn't "think that the dog makes any difference."   The
court also disregarded the "gun episode [as] surplusage."
A court must determine whether the commissioner who issued the
warrant was "apprised of sufficient facts to excite an
honest belief in a reasonable mind that the objects
sought are linked with the commission of a crime,
and  that  they  will  be  found  in  the  place  to  be
-2-




No.                                                                                    95-0638-CR
searched."   The   warrant-issuing   commissioner's
determination of probable cause cannot be upheld,
however, if the affidavit provides nothing more than
the legal conclusions of the affiant.
The  task  of  the  warrant-issuing  commissioner  "is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit                                                                              ...,  including  the   `veracity'  and   `basis  of
knowledge'    of    persons    supplying    hearsay
information,   there   is   a   fair   probability   that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place."
State v. Kerr, 181 Wis.2d 372, 378-79, 511 N.W.2d 586, 588 (1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2245 (1995) (citations omitted).  On review, we decide whether there was a
"substantial basis" for the probable cause determination.   Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983); State v. Anderson, 138 Wis.2d 451, 469, 406 N.W.2d 398,
406 (1987).
We conclude that the $745 in cash found in a somewhat unusual
location is insufficient to establish probable cause to search Allen's house for
evidence of drug dealing.    We also conclude that the information from the
informant  was  stale.    The  allegations  supporting  probable  cause  must  be
sufficiently recent to provide a  reasonable  basis to believe that  the objects
sought remain in the area subject to search.   See United States v. Johnson, 461
F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972).  An alleged sale of marijuana is too remote in time
to provide probable cause to search Allen's house for contraband ten months
later.
The  State  urges  us  to  apply  the  canine  alert  evidence  to
supplement the other facts in the affidavit.  Allen cites persuasive authority that
"the evidentiary value of the narcotics dog's alert [is] minimal."  United States v.
$5,000 in U.S. Currency, 40 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1994).   We conclude that the
canine alert evidence in this  record is insufficient to establish probable cause.
-3-




No.                                                                                             95-0638-CR
Allen's 1989 conviction is relevant but independently insufficient
to establish probable cause.   The l989 involvement with a weapon is too vague
to establish probable cause.  The Rock County Metro Unit files reflect that Allen
is suspected of selling cocaine.   However, the affidavit must provide more than
mere suspicions to demonstrate probable cause.  See State v. Higginbotham, 162
Wis.2d 978, 992, 471 N.W.2d 24, 30 (1991).   There also is an averment that Allen
was employed as a disc jockey at a topless bar.   No one attempts to assert that
such employment is relevant to probable cause.
The State urges us to consider the totality of the circumstances,
rather than the averments individually, citing State v. Kerr, 181 Wis.2d 372, 380,
511 N.W.2d 586, 589 (1994) (totality of circumstances permits probable cause
determination because affidavit supporting search warrant "contains a minimal
factual basis to support probable cause").   However, even the "minimal factual
basis" in the Kerr affidavit exceeded the totality of the instant averments.1   We
conclude  that  the  marginally  relevant  averments—Allen's  1989  conviction,
coupled with his keeping  $745 in cash in his bathroom—even if considered
collectively, do not establish probable cause.
The  State  alternatively  urges  us  to  recognize  the  good  faith
exception to the exclusionary rule.   United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897,                                                                                            922-24  (1984).    We  decline  to  do  so  because  "effectively
overrul[ing]  a  controlling  decision  of  the  Wisconsin  Supreme
Court is patently erroneous and usurpative."2   State v. Grawien,
123  Wis.2d  428,  432,  367  N.W.2d  816,  818                                                 (Ct.  App.                                                          1985).
Therefore,  we  reverse  and  remand  for  further  proceedings,
including withdrawal of Allen's guilty plea.
1  In State v. Kerr,  181 Wis.2d  372,  377,  511 N.W.2d  586,  588  (1994), the affidavit
supporting the search warrant contained averments that defendant:   (1) was carrying large
amounts of cash, from which he paid for his airline tickets and motel room; (2) had not
made prior reservations or specified a departure date; (3) carried a metal suitcase of a type
known to be used by drug traffickers; and (4) was suspected of possession of a concealed
firearm.   These averments, which collectively fit the profile of a drug trafficker, were
current, relevant and factually specific, unlike those in the instant case.
2  Before we recognize the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, State v.
Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 215 N.W. 896 (1927), and Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W.
89 (1923), must be overruled.
-4-




No.                                                                   95-0638-CR
By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
This opinion will not be published.  See RULE 809.23(1)(b)5, STATS.
-5-

Download 8724.pdf

Wisconsin Law