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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND RELEASED
NOTICE
March 12, 1996
A party may file with the Supreme Court                                              This opinion is subject to further editing.
a petition to review an adverse decision                                             If  published,  the  official  version  will
by the Court of Appeals.  See § 808.10 and                                           appear  in  the  bound  volume  of  the
RULE 809.62, STATS.                                                                  Official Reports.
No.   95-0819-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                   IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                     DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JACK KINNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL  from  judgments  of  the  circuit  court  for  Milwaukee
County:    PATRICIA D. McMAHON, Judge.  Affirmed.
Before Sullivan, Fine and Schudson, JJ.
PER  CURIAM.      Jack  Kinney  appeals  from  judgments  of
conviction,  following  a  jury  trial,  for  first-degree  sexual  assault          (causing
pregnancy) and second-degree sexual assault.   He argues that the trial court
improperly limited the defense in its voir dire.   He also argues that trial court
erroneously exercised its discretion in allowing one of the State's witnesses to
testify.  We reject both arguments and affirm.




No.   95-0819-CR
Janna H. was sentenced to prison in 1978 for first-degree murder.
In  1992, she was transferred from Taycheedah to the Milwaukee Women's
Correctional Center and she began working at the Rodeway Inn.   When she
discovered  that  she  was  pregnant,  she  had  an  abortion,  fearing  that  her
pregnancy  would  jeopardize  her  chance  for  parole.    She  later  denied  the
pregnancy  but,  after a  physical examination  confirmed  the  pregnancy  and
abortion, she accused Kinney, who also worked at the Rodeway Inn, of sexually
assaulting her on July 4 and September 6, 1992.   Following a jury trial, Kinney
was convicted.
Kinney first argues that the trial court denied his right to a fair jury
by  limiting  defense  voir  dire.     Kinney  primarily  bases  this  claim  on  a
comparison of the length of time allowed each side in voir dire.    He also
contends that the trial court limited defense voir dire by interrupting defense
counsel three or four times.
The  scope  of  voir  dire,  including  the  form  and  number  of
questions to be asked, rests within the discretion of the trial court.   State v.
Koch, 144 Wis.2d 838, 847, 426 N.W.2d 586, 590 (1988).   The trial court's broad
discretion is subject to essential demands of fairness, however.   Id.   We will not
interfere with a trial court's ruling on voir dire absent an erroneous exercise of
that discretion.  Id.
We reject Kinney's arguments regarding voir dire.   First, the trial
court and the State asked many questions, obviating the need for more lengthy
defense voir dire.  Second, the trial court's interruptions of defense counsel were
either cautions against being repetitive, see § 805.08, STATS. (voir dire “shall not
be repetitious”), particularly due to the late hour into which voir dire was
progressing, or mere interjections of “Anything further, counsel?” when defense
counsel paused.   Finally, Kinney does not point to any questions that defense
counsel wished to ask that were not permitted to be asked.
Kinney also argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its
discretion by allowing Rhonda Ambuehl to testify.   The State sought to have
Ambuehl  testify  as  an  expert  on  the  behavior  of  women  who  have  been
incarcerated,  long  term,  for  violent  offenses.    The  State  used  Ambuehl's
testimony to rebut the defense theory of consent.  The trial court concluded that
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No.   95-0819-CR
Ambuehl was qualified as an expert witness based on her years of experience as
an inmate in a women's prison system and on parole, and based on her studies
and  research  regarding  the  status  of  female  inmates  subsequent  to  their
incarceration.  The trial court ruled:
This testimony is offered to assist the jury in understanding the ...
reactions  and  conduct  of  inmates  committed  for
violent  crimes,  their  typical  reactions  or  conduct
which  may  not  be  consistent  with  the  juror's
common  understanding  based  on  their  lack  of
knowledge.  It is not offered to assess or comment on
the credibility of [the victim] in this case, and such
testimony would not be permitted, but to provide
information to assist the jury on matters not in their
common knowledge as to the reactions and affects on
inmates convicted of violent crimes....   The challenge
concerning  the  strength,  the  consistency  of  her
opinions and the ... challenges concerning her depth
of experience or the methodology for determining
her opinions all go to her weight and credibility, not
to the admissibility of that testimony ... [and] are all
fair issues to be explored on cross-examination.
We have recently stated the applicable standard of review:
“Expert testimony is admissible only if it is relevant.”                            “‘Relevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
A trial court's determination on the relevancy of the
proffered evidence is a discretionary decision.    In
addition, relevant expert evidence must also “assist
the  trier  of  fact  to  understand  the    evidence  or
determine   a   fact   in   issue.”                                                 A   trial   court's
determination on whether the evidence will assist the
trier of fact is also a discretionary determination.
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No.   95-0819-CR
State v. Morgan, 195 Wis.2d 388, 416-417, 536 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Ct. App. 1995)
(citations omitted).
The State argues:
Ambuehl did not testify that [the victim] displayed the extreme
conflict-avoiding   characteristics   that   she   had
described, nor did she express an opinion on any of
the facts alleged in this case.   She merely offered her
own  observations  and  experience  of  distinctive
behavior  typically  exhibited  by  women  inmates
convicted of violent offenses.    A trial court could
reasonably  conclude                                                               ...  that  Ambuehl's  and   [the
victim]'s  prison  experiences  were  almost  certainly
outside  the  knowledge  of  the  jury,  and  that
Ambuehl's testimony could help the jury place [the
victim]'s   conduct   and   testimony   in   proper
perspective.
Based upon our review of Ambuehl's testimony, we agree with the
State's argument.  Therefore, we find no erroneous exercise of discretion and we
affirm the judgments.
By the Court.—Judgments affirmed.
This opinion will not be published.  See RULE 809.23(1)(b)5, STATS.
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