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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
NOTICE
DATED AND FILED
This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in the
bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 26, 1998
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Marilyn L. Graves                                    petition  to  review  an  adverse  decision  by  the
Clerk, Court of Appeals                              Court of Appeals.  See § 808.10 and RULE 809.62,
of Wisconsin                                         STATS.
No.                                                  97-2143
97-2409
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                   IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                     DISTRICT IV
No. 97-2143
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
JAMES P. SULLIVAN,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
No. 97-2409
DANE COUNTY,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
JAMES P. SULLIVAN,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.




No. 97-2143
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APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Dane
County:   MICHAEL N. NOWAKOWSKI, Judge.   Affirmed.
DEININGER, J.1    The trial court ordered James Sullivan’s operating
privileges  revoked  for  one  year  on  account  of  his  refusal  to  comply  with
§ 343.305, STATS.2   Subsequently, after a bench trial, the court entered a judgment
convicting  him  of  operating  a  motor  vehicle  while  under  the  influence  of
intoxicants                                                                                             (OMVWI).     Sullivan  appeals  both  the  order  and  the  judgment,
claiming that:                                                                                          (1) the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for summary
judgment in the refusal proceedings; and (2) the trial court improperly considered
his  refusal  as  evidence  of  his  guilt  in  the  OMVWI  trial.    We  conclude  that
summary judgment was properly denied because the motion is not available in
refusal proceedings under § 343.305(9), and further that the trial court did not err
in  considering  Sullivan’s  refusal  when  determining  his  guilt  of  OMVWI.
Accordingly, we affirm the order and the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On July 26, 1996, a Dane County sheriff’s deputy stopped Sullivan
on the suspicion that he was OMVWI.   The deputy administered field sobriety
tests to Sullivan, arrested him for OMVWI, and took him to the public safety
1  This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to § 752.31(2)(c), STATS.
2  Section 343.305(2), STATS., provides that an operator of a motor vehicle in Wisconsin
is “deemed to have given consent to one or more tests of his or her breath, blood or urine, for the
purpose of determining the presence or quantity … of alcohol … when requested to do so by a
law enforcement officer.”  If an operator improperly refuses to take a test, a court shall revoke his
or her operating privilege for a year, or longer, depending on the operator’s record of past
offenses and/or refusals.  Section 343.305(10).
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building to administer an Intoxilyzer test.   At the public safety building, the deputy
read Sullivan the  “Informing the Accused” form and asked him to submit to a
breath test.   After Sullivan refused to take the test, the deputy took Sullivan’s
driver’s  license  and  issued  him  a                                                    “Notice  of  Intent  to  Revoke  Operating
Privilege,” pursuant to § 343.305(9)(a), STATS.
Sullivan  properly  contested  the  revocation  by  timely  filing  a
“Demand for Refusal Hearing.”   Prior to the refusal hearing, Sullivan took the
deputy’s  deposition  and  the  State  deposed  Sullivan.    After  the  depositions,
Sullivan filed a motion for summary judgment.   Sullivan’s motion challenged the
existence of probable cause to arrest Sullivan for OMVWI.   The trial court denied
Sullivan’s summary judgment motion, concluding that the refusal hearing itself
was the exclusive procedure available to him under  § 343.305(9), STATS.   The
court  then  conducted  a  refusal  hearing  and  determined  that  the  deputy  had
probable  cause  to  arrest  Sullivan  for  OMVWI.    The  court  entered  an  order
revoking Sullivan’s operating privilege for one year and, following a bench trial,
convicted Sullivan of OMVWI.   Sullivan appeals both the revocation order and
the judgment of conviction.
ANALYSIS
Sullivan argues that a motion for summary judgment under § 802.08,
STATS., is available to parties to refusal proceedings because they are special
proceedings for which no “different procedure [regarding summary judgment] is
prescribed by statute or rule.”   See § 801.01(2), STATS.,3 and State v. Jakubowski,
3  Section 801.01(2), STATS., provides as follows:
Chapters  801 to  847 govern procedure and practice in circuit
courts of this state in all civil actions and special proceedings
(continued)
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61 Wis.2d 220, 223-24 n.2, 212 N.W.2d 155, 156-57 (1973) (a proceeding under
§ 343.305, STATS., is a special proceeding).   Resolution of this issue requires us to
interpret                                                                                § 343.305(9),  to  determine  whether  that  section  precludes  summary
judgment  motions  in  refusal  proceedings.    Statutory  interpretation  presents  a
question of law which we decide independently of the trial court.   Minuteman,
Inc. v. Alexander, 147 Wis.2d 842, 853, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (1989).
Sullivan’s argument relies heavily on this court’s decision in State v.
Schoepp, 204 Wis.2d 266, 554 N.W.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1996), where we held:
The plain language of § 801.01(2), STATS., provides
that Chapter 804, governs practice in circuit courts in all
special proceedings  “except where different procedure is
prescribed by statute or rule.”    Section  343.305, STATS.,
does not provide a different means for a defendant in a
refusal hearing to obtain depositions, interrogatories and
other discovery, nor does it provide that discovery is not
available prior to refusal hearings.   Because the statutes do
not  provide  different  discovery  procedures  for  refusal
hearings,  we  conclude  that  the  discovery  procedures  of
Chapter 804 apply.
Id. at  272,  554 N.W.2d at  238-39  (footnote omitted).    Sullivan asserts that to
decide the present issue, all we need do is “substitute  ‘summary judgment’ for
‘discovery’” in the preceding excerpt from Schoepp.   We disagree.
The  purpose  of  summary  judgment  procedure  is  to  determine
whether a factual dispute can be resolved without a trial.   In re Philip W., 189
Wis.2d 432, 436, 525 N.W.2d 384, 385 (Ct. App. 1994).   It is a method to “avoid
trial when there are no issues to be tried.”   In re the Estate of Martz, 171 Wis.2d
whether cognizable as cases at law, in equity or of statutory
origin except where different procedure is prescribed by statute
or rule.
(Emphasis added.)
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89, 94, 491 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Ct. App. 1992).   The refusal hearing provided for in
§ 343.305(9), STATS., is not a trial.   Rather, it is itself a summary proceeding with
a limited purpose involving limited issues.   See § 343.305(9)(a)5 and (c).4   It is not
a trial in the sense that a court or jury will be required to weigh credibility and
choose among competing versions of the facts, at least insofar as the issue of
probable cause for arrest is concerned.   State v. Nordness, 128 Wis.2d 15, 36, 381
N.W.2d 300, 308 (1986) (refusal hearing is “a determination merely of an officer’s
probable  cause,  not                                                                             …  a  forum  to  weigh  the  state’s  and  the  defendant’s
evidence”).    Thus, while refusal proceedings are special proceedings in which
“regular” civil procedures generally apply, since proceedings under § 343.305(9)
do not culminate in a trial, we conclude that civil procedures designed to avoid
trials  when  they  are  unnecessary  have  no  necessary  application  in  refusal
proceedings.
More importantly, however, we conclude that permitting summary
judgment  motions  would  be  contrary  to  the  legislative  intent  underlying  the
procedures set forth in § 343.305(9), STATS.   In ascertaining legislative intent, we
first look to the language of the statute.   State v. Rognrud, 156 Wis.2d 783, 787-
88, 457 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Ct. App. 1990).   We note initially that unless a person
requests “a hearing on the revocation,” a revocation for refusal to consent to a test
is effective thirty days from the date of the refusal.   Section 343.305(9)(a)4 and
(10).   The purpose of the refusal hearing is thus to provide procedural due process
to persons who have refused a test, that is,  “an opportunity to be heard at a
4  The issues at a refusal hearing are limited to “[w]hether the officer had probable cause
to believe the person was driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol … and whether the person was lawfully placed under arrest for [OMVWI];” whether the
officer complied with the “informing the accused” provisions of the statute; and “[w]hether the
person refused to permit the test.”  Section 343.305(9)(a)5, STATS.
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meaningful  time  and  in  a  meaningful  manner”  before  the  revocation  of  their
operating privilege is effected.   Nordness, 128 Wis.2d at 34, 381 N.W.2d at 308.
The  hearing  provides  a                                                                    “general  opportunity  to  present  evidence  and  cross-
examine the arresting officer.”   Id.
If  summary  judgment  procedure  is  available  to  Sullivan  under
§ 343.305(9), STATS., it would also be available to the State.   See In re F.Q., 162
Wis.2d  607,  612,  470 N.W.2d  1,  2-3  (Ct.  App.  1991)  (summary judgment is
available to the State in proceeding to find a child in need of protection or services
under Chapter 48).   Reading § 343.305(9) to permit summary judgment motions
would thus lead to an unreasonable result:    the State could thereby preempt a
hearing whose purpose is to ensure Sullivan’s due process rights.   But even where
a summary judgment motion is filed by a defendant, as in the present case, an
unreasonable  or  absurd  result  is  reached  under  Sullivan’s  interpretation:    the
statute,  which  expressly  grants  him  the  right  to                                      “request  a  hearing  on  the
revocation,” would then allow Sullivan to forfeit the very right he exercised, and
the  only  relief  to  which  the  statute  entitles  him.    We  thus  reject  Sullivan’s
interpretation because we avoid statutory constructions which lead to absurd or
unreasonable results.   State v. Mendoza, 96 Wis.2d 106, 115, 291 N.W.2d 478,
483 (1980).
Finally, we note that § 343.305(9), STATS., contemplates timely and
expeditious resolution of refusal issues.   A hearing must be requested within ten
days of the State’s notice of intent to revoke.   Section 343.305(9)(a)4.   The court
“shall be prepared to hold any requested hearing to determine if the refusal was
proper.”   Section 343.305(9)(c).   The court must decide the matter “[a]t the close
of the hearing, or within 5 days thereafter.”   Section 343.305(9)(d).   A revocation
is  effective                                                                                “immediately  upon  a  final  determination  that  the  refusal  was
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improper,”  provided  at  least  thirty  days  have  elapsed  since  the  refusal.
Section 343.305(10)(a).    In short, the provisions of the statute with respect to
refusal proceedings are consistent with the overall purpose of § 343.305, which is
“‘to get drunk drivers off the road as expeditiously as possible and with as little
possible disruption of the court’s calendar.’”   State v. McMaster, 206 Wis.2d 30,
46, 556 N.W.2d 673, 680 (1996) (quoted source omitted).   We agree with the trial
court that the purpose and timing provisions of the statute would be thwarted by
grafting onto it the more leisurely procedures of § 802.08, STATS., where a motion
for summary judgment may be filed within eight months of commencement of the
action, service must occur at least twenty days prior to the hearing on the motion,
and no specific timeline is established for a court to decide the motion.5
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err
in denying Sullivan’s motion for summary judgment.   Sullivan next argues that if
we  conclude  summary  judgment  procedure  is  available,  we  must  reverse  the
5  Although our review in this case requires a de novo interpretation of § 343.305(9),
STATS.,  we  benefit  from  the  trial  court’s  thoughtful  and  thorough  analysis.    See  Heier’s
Trucking, Inc. v. Waupaca County, 212 Wis.2d 593, 598, 569 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1997).
In its written decision denying Sullivan’s summary judgment motion, the trial court stated:
A refusal hearing, if held separately from the trial of an OWI
charge, rarely takes more than one hour.   If held in conjunction
with a trial, the refusal issues rarely add more than a few minutes
to the evidentiary presentations.   The use of summary judgment
methodology with all of its attendant time allowances will, as it
has done here, cause delay, unnecessary expense and a waste of
limited judicial and prosecutorial resources with no assurance
that it will in fact resolve the dispute.   It is likely that in many
cases summary judgment motions will be filed, briefed, perhaps
orally argued and ultimately considered and decided by the court
with  the  conclusion  that summary  judgment  is  inappropriate
because there are disputed issues of material fact.   A refusal
hearing  will  then  be  held  that  could  have  been  promptly
conducted many months earlier.   In short, even if a particular
case could appropriately be decided by summary judgment, it
would take longer, both in a calendar and a clock sense, to do so
than it would to simply hold the hearing.
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revocation order because his motion is meritorious and should have been granted
by the trial court.   He does not, however, challenge the trial court’s findings and
conclusions made at the close of the refusal hearing itself.                              (His second argument
is                                                                                        “THE   TRIAL   COURT   SHOULD   HAVE   GRANTED   SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANT,” and in the conclusion of his brief, he
requests a remand to the circuit court  “with directions to grant the defendant’s
summary judgment motion.”)   Since we have concluded that summary judgment is
not available under § 343.305(9), STATS., and since Sullivan does not attack the
revocation order on the basis of the evidence presented at the hearing, we need not
address his arguments for reversal based on the matters submitted in support of his
motion for summary judgment.   We thus affirm the revocation order.
By  the  same  token,  Sullivan’s  challenge  to  his  conviction  for
OMVWI is premised solely on the trial court’s allegedly improper consideration
of his refusal in determining his guilt.   Since we have affirmed the revocation
order,  and  with  it  the  court’s  underlying  conclusion  that  Sullivan  improperly
refused to consent to a breath test, the trial court did not err when it considered
Sullivan’s refusal as evidence of his “consciousness of guilt” at the trial on the
OMVWI offense.   State v. Crandall, 133 Wis.2d 251, 259, 394 N.W.2d 905, 908
(1986); and see State v. Schirmang, 210 Wis.2d 325, 333, 565 N.W.2d 225, 229
(Ct. App. 1997).   We thus affirm the judgment of conviction for OMVWI.
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published.  See RULE 809.23(1)(b)4, STATS.
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