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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND RELEASED
NOTICE
DECEMBER 12, 1995
A party may file with the Supreme Court                                              This opinion is subject to further editing.
a petition to review an adverse decision                                             If  published,  the  official  version  will
by   the Court of Appeals.   See § 808.10                                            appear  in  the  bound  volume  of  the
and RULE 809.62, STATS.                                                              Official Reports.
No. 95-1369-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                   IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JANE M. RONEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Brown County:
DONALD J. HANAWAY, Judge.  Reversed.
CANE, P.J.     The State appeals the trial court's order suppressing
Jane Roney's written statement where she admitted to stealing money from her
employer.    The trial court concluded that because the officer's statement to
Roney was inherently coercive and violated fundamental fairness, her written
admissions must be suppressed.  The order is reversed.
The facts are undisputed.    Officer Michael Van Rooy went to
Roney's home to interview her about some money missing from her employer,
the Bridal Chateau.   Roney invited the officer into her home, and they sat in her
kitchen where Van Rooy explained to her that she was not under arrest and that
he just wanted to talk to her about some inconsistencies in the bridal shop




No.   95-1369-CR
records.    Roney  concedes  that  she  was  not  placed  under  arrest  and  that
Miranda1 warnings were not required.   She also agrees that the officer made no
improper threats or promises to induce the written statement.   However, she
argued successfully to the trial court that when Van Rooy admitted that in order
to get a statement from Roney, he told her that she seemed like a good person
and asked her if she just borrowed the money with the intent to pay it back, this
police  strategy  was  inherently  coercive  and  violated  fundamental  fairness.
Consequently,  the  trial  court  ordered  that  Roney's  written  admissions  to
stealing money from her employer were inadmissible.
The  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  United  States  Constitution
prohibits involuntary statements because of their inherent unreliability and the
judicial system's unwillingness to tolerate illegal police behavior.  State v. Pheil,
152 Wis.2d 523, 535, 449 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Ct. App. 1989).  As our supreme court
stated in State v. Hunt, 53 Wis.2d 734, 740, 193 N.W.2d 858, 863 (1972), "The
essential question, in determining the voluntariness of a confession, is whether
the confession was coerced, or the product of improper pressures exercised by
the police.   To be admissible into evidence, a confession must be the voluntary
product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice."
Roney argues that the issue is not one of a coercive atmosphere,
but  whether  Van  Rooy's  subtle  strategy  in  obtaining  a  confession  was  an
improper strategy rendering the written confession inadmissible.   Because the
underlying facts relative to the taking of the statement are undisputed, whether
the police conduct rendered the statement involuntary presents an issue of law
this court reviews independently of the trial court's determination.   See State v.
Clappes, 136 Wis.2d 222, 235, 401 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1987).
At a suppression hearing, the State has the burden of proving the
voluntariness of a statement by a preponderance of the evidence.    State v.
Rewolinski,  159  Wis.2d  1,  16  n.7,  464  N.W.2d  401,  407  n.7  (1990).    When
determining voluntariness, courts examine the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the statement, weighing the defendant's personal characteristics
against the pressures imposed upon the defendant by the police, in order to
1  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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No.   95-1369-CR
induce  a response to the  questioning.    Clappes,  136  Wis.2d at  236-37,  401
N.W.2d at 766.  In Clappes, our supreme court stated:
The relevant personal characteristics of the confessor include his
age, his education and intelligence, his physical and
emotional condition, and his prior experience with
the police.   These factors must be balanced against
the  police  pressures  and  tactics  which  have  been
used to induce the admission, such as the length of
the  interrogation,  any  delay  in  arraignment,  the
general conditions under which the confessions took
place,  any  excessive  physical  or  psychological
pressure  ...  any  inducements,  threats,  methods  or
strategies utilized by the police to compel a response,
and whether the individual was informed of his right
to counsel and right against self-incrimination.
Id. (Citation omitted.)
In State v. Albrecht, 184 Wis.2d 287, 300, 516 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Ct.
App. 1994), we recognized that in the battle against crime, the police, within
reasonable bounds, may use misrepresentations, tricks and other methods of
deception to obtain evidence.
A  review  of  the  circumstances  surrounding  Roney's  written
confession  does  not  suggest  any  improper  policy  strategy  constituted  an
inherently  coercive  approach  or  violated  fundamental  fairness.    Here,  the
interview lasted for approximately thirty minutes at Roney's home.  She is forty-
seven years old and has two years of college education.  She was not in custody
or under arrest.   The discussion about the inconsistencies in the bridal shop
receipts and whether she took any money took place in the kitchen while Roney
dyed and rinsed her hair.   There was no physical pressure placed on Roney.
Although Van Rooy told Roney that he did not think she stole the money, he
never made any promises or threats against her.   Roney has no characteristics
that  would  suggest  she  is unusually  susceptible  to  psychological pressure.
When reviewing Roney's testimony at the suppression hearing, conspicuously
absent is any statement or suggestion from her that Van Rooy's strategy of
telling her that she must have borrowed the money without any intent to steal it
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No.   95-1369-CR
caused her to make any incriminating statement.   The thrust of her testimony
was that she did not make the incriminating statements contained in the written
confession.  That is a matter left for the trier of fact at trial.
Under these circumstances, this court concludes that Van Rooy's
conduct  was  within  the  permissible  bounds  of  interviewing  Roney,  an
individual suspected of stealing from her employer.   The officer's strategy was
not the type of conduct or pressure that is inherently coercive or a violation of
fundamental fairness.   Therefore, the trial court's order suppressing Roney's
incriminating statements is reversed.
By the Court.—Order reversed.
This opinion will not be published.  RULE 809.23(1)(b)4, STATS.
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