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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                        This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 20, 2011
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
A. John Voelker                                                                                                                                           petition to review an adverse decision by the
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                                                                          Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                          and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                          Cir. Ct. No.   2010CF40
Appeal No.                                                                             2010AP2609-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                        IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                                                                                          DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
JEFFREY POLAK,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL  from  a  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  for  Milwaukee
County:   RICHARD J. SANKOVITZ, Judge.   Affirmed.
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Kessler, JJ.
¶1                                                                                     PER  CURIAM.      Jeffrey  Polak  appeals  from  a  judgment  of
conviction entered upon his guilty plea to one count of operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated as a sixth offense.   He claims that the circuit court erroneously
denied his motion to suppress evidence.   We disagree and affirm.




No.   2010AP2609-CR
BACKGROUND
¶2                                                                                      South Milwaukee Police Officer Craig Perkowski arrested Polak late
in the evening of December  31,  2009, on suspicion of driving a motor vehicle
while intoxicated.   A blood alcohol test administered within three hours after the
arrest disclosed that Polak had a blood alcohol content of .219 percent.   The State
charged Polak with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating a
motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol content.   Polak moved to suppress
the evidence against him on the ground that Perkowski conducted an unlawful
traffic stop.
¶3                                                                                      At   the   suppression   hearing,   Perkowski   testified   that   on
December 31, 2009, he was patrolling in a squad car when he observed a white
Chevrolet in front of him traveling northbound on North Chicago Avenue in the
city of South Milwaukee.    Perkowski noted that he could see a seatbelt strap
crossing the shoulder of the Chevrolet’s driver but that he could not see a similar
strap crossing the shoulder of the front seat passenger.   Perkowski thought that the
front seat passenger was not wearing a seatbelt, a violation of Wisconsin law.
According  to  Perkowski,  he  followed  the  Chevrolet  until  it  reached  the
intersection of College and North Chicago Avenues.   Perkowski testified that he
“pulled next to the vehicle” at the intersection.   He explained that when he did so
he “looked down.                                                                        [He] observed the passenger, there was no belt.”   Perkowski
therefore stopped the Chevrolet.
¶4                                                                                      When  Perkowski  spoke  to  the  occupants  of  the  Chevrolet,  they
appeared intoxicated.    Perkowski arrested the driver, later identified as Polak.
Perkowski permitted the passenger, Joseph Hauke, to leave the scene.   Perkowski
acknowledged that he did not issue Hauke a citation for a seatbelt violation.
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No.   2010AP2609-CR
¶5                                                                                                  Polak and Hauke both testified at the suppression hearing.    Each
man told the circuit court that Hauke wore a seatbelt while he was a passenger in
Polak’s car on December  31,  2009.    They also testified that Hauke habitually
fastens his seatbelt when he rides in a car.
¶6                                                                                                  The circuit court credited Perkowski’s testimony and rejected the
testimony of Polak and Hauke.   The circuit court concluded that the traffic stop
was justified based on Perkowski’s reasonable suspicion that a passenger was not
wearing a seatbelt as required by Wisconsin law.    The circuit court therefore
denied the motion to suppress.   Polak pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated, and this appeal followed.1
DISCUSSION
¶7                                                                                                  A  police  officer  may  conduct  a  traffic  stop  when  the  officer
“reasonably  suspect[s]  that  a  crime  or  traffic  violation  has  been  or  will  be
committed.”   State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶23, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569.
The State has the burden of proving that a stop was reasonable.   State v. Post,
2007 WI 60, ¶12, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634.                                                     “[W]hether a traffic stop is
reasonable is a question of constitutional fact.   A question of constitutional fact is
a  mixed  question  of  law  and fact to which  we  apply a  two-step  standard of
review.”    Id.,  ¶8  (citation omitted).    We uphold the circuit court’s findings of
historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.   Id.   We independently apply the
facts found to constitutional principles.   Id.
1  We  may  review  the  circuit  court’s  order  denying  Polak’s  suppression  motion
notwithstanding Polak’s guilty plea.   See WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10) (2009-10).   All references to
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise noted.
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No.   2010AP2609-CR
¶8                                                                                           Polak does not dispute that an officer may reasonably suspect a
traffic violation when the officer sees a moving car with a front seat passenger
who  is  not  wearing  a  seatbelt.    Wisconsin  law  provides  that  all  automobiles
bought, sold, leased, traded, or transferred in Wisconsin must be equipped with
seatbelts, and further provides that no person who is at least eight years old may
ride in the front passenger seat of an automobile that must be equipped with
seatbelts  unless  the  person  is  restrained.     See  WIS.  STAT.                         §§ 347.48(1)(b),
347.48(2m)(d).
¶9                                                                                           Polak argues, however, that the State failed to prove Perkowski’s
observation of a seatbelt violation.    Polak emphasizes that both he and Hauke
testified that Hauke wore a seatbelt on the night of the stop.   Further, Polak points
out that both he and Hauke also testified that Hauke has a habit of fastening his
seatbelt.   In Polak’s view, the circuit court erred by believing Perkowski and by
“ignor[ing] the nature of the testimony presented by Mr. Polak and Mr. Hauke.”
¶10    The circuit court did not ignore the testimony of Polak and Hauke.
Rather, the circuit court deemed those witnesses less credible than Perkowski.
“‘[I]t is well settled that the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the
witnesses are matters peculiarly within the province of the [circuit] court acting as
the trier of fact.’”   State v. Young, 2009 WI App 22, ¶17, 316 Wis. 2d 114, 762
N.W.2d 736 (citation and one set of brackets omitted).   We defer to “the superior
opportunity of the  [circuit] court to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to
gauge the persuasiveness of their testimony.”   Kleinstick v. Daleiden, 71 Wis. 2d
432, 442, 238 N.W.2d 714 (1976).
¶11    Here, the circuit court explained that Hauke “admitted he was drunk
[at  the  time  of  the  traffic  stop,]  and  a  drunk  person  does  not  make  reliable
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No.   2010AP2609-CR
observations.”   Additionally, the circuit court found that Polak was also drunk at
the time of the traffic stop because “just an hour later, [he] tested with a .219 blood
alcohol level.”   The circuit court determined that Polak’s intoxication undermined
his credibility.
¶12    Polak suggests that the circuit court was required to conduct some
additional analysis before concluding that the credibility of Polak and Hauke was
adversely  affected  by  their  intoxication  at  the  time  of  the  traffic  stop.    We
disagree.   Wisconsin courts have long recognized that “‘[t]he fact that a witness
was intoxicated, on or about the time of  the happening of  the incident he is
testifying to, would affect the accuracy and credibility of his testimony.’”   See
Chapin  v.  State,  78  Wis. 2d  346,  354-55,  254  N.W.2d  286  (1977)  (citations
omitted).    The  circuit  court  could  properly conclude  that,  because  Polak  and
Hauke were intoxicated when they were stopped on December  31,  2009, their
observations and recollections were less trustworthy than those of the on-duty
police officer who stopped them.
¶13    When   making   its   credibility   assessment,   the   circuit   court
acknowledged that Perkowski did not issue a citation based on Hauke’s failure to
wear a seatbelt, but the circuit court did not view that omission as inconsistent
with Perkowski’s claim that he observed a seatbelt violation.   As the circuit court
explained, “[p]olice officers don’t always issue ever[y] last ticket that they can.
It’s a lot more paperwork for them.   They’ve got their hands full of other things.”
The circuit court concluded that Perkowski was credible and that “his story makes
sense as a whole.”   We accept the circuit court’s conclusion.                               “[T]his court will
‘not  reweigh  the  evidence  or  reassess  witnesses’  credibility.’”    Young,             316
Wis. 2d 114, ¶17 (citation omitted).
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No.   2010AP2609-CR
¶14    We turn to Polak’s contention that the circuit court erred by relying
on its own knowledge of the geography of South Milwaukee.   The circuit court
explained that it was  “familiar with this stretch,” had  “actually traveled these
streets”  and  had  a                                                                      “familiarity  with  the   [c]ity.”    Polak  acknowledges  that  a
factfinder, including a circuit court, is entitled to “take into account matters of ...
common knowledge and [its] observations and experience in the affairs of life.”
See  WIS  JI—CRIMINAL  195.    Polak  asserts,  however,  that  the  circuit  court
exceeded  its  entitlement,  and  in  support  he  cites  the  following  circuit  court
findings:
maybe we’ll call it [a] dog leg there, may not be as sharp
dog  leg  as  this  diagram  reveals,  but  North  Chicago  is
headed in kind of a north, northwest direction and then it
head[s]  due  north  before  it  hits  the  intersection  with
College.
As  [Perkowski]  came  around  the  dog  leg,  that’s
where the road widens enough that there’s room for two
lanes, and there’s a stop light there, and  [Polak] did the
right thing, [he] pulled over at the stop light, and that gave
[Perkowski] the opportunity to pull next to  [Polak’s car]
and look down.
In Polak’s view, the circuit court could not properly take judicial notice of the
geographical descriptions in these findings.   He believes that the circuit court’s
alleged error warrants relief because  “one of the central issues in the motion
hearing was whether the police vehicle pulled alongside the Polak vehicle.”
¶15    We need not determine whether a circuit court could make findings
about the physical layout of a city intersection based on personal knowledge.
When we review findings of fact, we “search the record for evidence to support
findings reached by the [circuit] court.”   Noble v. Noble, 2005 WI App 227, ¶15,
287  Wis. 2d                                                                               699,                      706  N.W.2d  166.     Here,  the  findings  that  Polak  deems
objectionable  are  supported  by  the  physical  evidence  and  testimony.    First,
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No.   2010AP2609-CR
Perkowski testified that he had been a South Milwaukee police officer for nearly
two years, that he had lived in the area throughout his entire life, and that he had
travelled  North  Chicago  Avenue  “too  many  [times]  to  count.”    Second,  trial
exhibit  one,  a  diagram  that  Perkowski  drew  during  the  suppression  hearing,
reflects  that  North  Chicago  Avenue  runs  in  a  north-south  direction.    Third,
Perkowski testified that “at College, North Chicago goes into two lanes.”   Fourth,
Polak himself acknowledged that traffic at the intersection of North Chicago and
College Avenues is controlled by a traffic light.   The evidence fully supported the
circuit court’s findings regarding the intersection of North Chicago and College
Avenues.
¶16    In  sum,  the  circuit  court  properly  resolved  the  issues  at  the
suppression hearing, giving weight to the testimony that the circuit court deemed
credible.   We affirm.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
                                                                                         This  opinion  will  not  be  published.     See  WIS.  STAT.  RULE
809.23(1)                                                                                (b)5.
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