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State v. Johnny J. Waldner
State: Wisconsin
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 1995AP001291-CR
Case Date: 12/13/1996
Plaintiff: State
Defendant: Johnny J. Waldner
Preview:NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing and
modification.   The final version will appear
in the bound volume of the official reports.
No.  95-1291-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                             :                                               IN  SUPREME  COURT
FILED
State  of  Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
DEC 13, 1996
v.
Marilyn L. Graves
Clerk of Supreme Court
Johnny  J.  Waldner,
Madison, WI
Defendant-Appellant.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.    Reversed.
WILLIAM  A.  BABLITCH,  J.      The  State  of  Wisconsin  seeks  review
of  a  court  of  appeals'  decision  concluding  that  police  officer
Sergeant  John  Annear                                                         (Sgt.  Annear)  did  not  have  a  reasonable
suspicion   justifying   the   investigative   stop   of   the   defendant
Johnny  J.  Waldner  (Waldner)  which  led  to  his  arrest  for  operating
a  vehicle  while  under  the  influence  of  an  intoxicant.  We  conclude
that   the   totality   of   the   circumstances,   including   Waldner's
unusual  driving  at  a  late  hour  and  his  dumping  of  liquid  and  ice
from  a  plastic  cup,  coalesced  to  form  the  basis  for  a  reasonable
suspicion  grounded  in  specific,  articulable  facts  and  reasonable
inferences   from   those   facts.                                             Sergeant   Annear   was   therefore
justified  in  temporarily  stopping  Waldner,  thereby  freezing  the
situation   in   order   to   further   investigate.                           Accordingly,   we
reverse.
As  summarized  by  the  court  of  appeals,  the  facts  developed  in




95-1291-CR
the record are as follows:
[At                                                                            12:30  a.m.,  Sgt.  Annear]  of  the  Richland  Center
Police Department  .  .  . saw Waldner's  car  traveling on a
main  street  in  Richland  Center  at  a  slow  rate  of  speed.
The  car  stopped  briefly  at  an  intersection  where  there
was  no  stop  sign  or  light  and  then  turned  onto  a  cross-
street,  where,  according  to  Annear,  it  then  accelerated
“at  a  high  rate  of  speed”                                                 --  which  he  described  as
reaching  20  to  25  miles  per  hour  in  “several  seconds.”
He acknowledged that no laws had been broken.
Following  the  car,  Annear  saw  it  pull  into  a  legal
streetside parking  space.    The  driver's-side door  opened
and  Annear  saw  Waldner,  in  the  driver's  seat,  pour  some
liquid  --  which  he  described  as  looking  like  “a  mixture
of  liquid  and  ice”                                                          --  out  of  a  plastic  glass  onto  the
roadway.
Annear  pulled  up  behind  the  car,  noticing  that
Waldner  had  gotten  out  of  the  car.     He  described  what
happened next:
He                                                                             [Waldner]  began  walking  around  the  front  of        [his
car],  and  when  I  pulled  up  and  identified  myself,  he
began to walk away from the squad car.
At  that  point  Annear  asked  Waldner  to  stop,  which  he
did.
State  v.  Waldner,  No.  95-1291-CR, unpublished  slip op.  at  1-2
(Wis.  Ct.  App.  Sept.  21,  1995).    Sergeant  Annear  did  not  activate
his flashing lights nor his siren.
After  a  hearing  in  the  circuit  court  of  Richland  County,
Circuit  Judge  Kent  C.  Houck  denied  Waldner's  pretrial  motion  to
suppress,  concluding  that  reasonable  inferences  from  the  facts
supported  Sgt.  Annear's  suspicion  that  Waldner  had  committed  a
crime   and,   therefore,   the   investigative   stop   was   lawful.
Subsequently,  Waldner  pleaded  no  contest  and  was  convicted  of
operating  a  motor  vehicle  while  under  the  influence  of  intoxicants
pursuant to Wis. Stat.  §  346.63(1)(a)(1991-92).
The  court  of  appeals  reversed  Waldner's  conviction,  finding
that  neither  the  facts  nor  reasonable  inferences  drawn  from  the
facts  raised  Sgt.  Annear's  inchoate  hunch  to  the  level  of  a
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reasonable suspicion.    We in turn reverse the court of appeals.
In  reviewing  a  denial  of  a  motion to  suppress,  we  will  uphold
the  circuit  court's  findings  of  fact  unless  they  are  against  the
great  weight  and  clear  preponderance  of  the  evidence.     Whether
those    facts    satisfy    the    constitutional    requirement    of
reasonableness  is  a  question  of  law  and  therefore  we  are  not  bound
by  the  lower  court's  decisions  on  that  issue.    State  v.  Guzy,  139
Wis.                                                                            2d                                                                663,                                                                    671,     407  N.W.2d                            548  (1987),  cert.  denied,   484  U.S.
979.
The  Fourth  Amendment  protects  “the  right  of  the  people  .  .  .
against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  .  .  .                         .”    U.S.  Const.
amend.  IV.    In  Terry  v.  Ohio,  392  U.S.  1,  22  (1968),  the  United
States  Supreme  Court  recognized  that  although  an  investigative
stop  is  technically  a                                                        “seizure”  under  the  Fourth  Amendment,  a
police  officer  may,  under  the  appropriate  circumstances,  detain  a
person  for  purposes  of  investigating  possible  criminal  behavior
even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.
In  State  v.  Chambers,                                                        55  Wis.                                                          2d                                                                      289,     294,                                   198  N.W.2d                    377
(1972),  we  adopted  the  position  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court
that  a  police  officer  may  in  appropriate  circumstances  temporarily
stop  an  individual  when,  at  the  time  of  the  stop,  he  or  she
possesses  specific  and  articulable  facts  which  would  warrant  a
                                                                                reasonable   belief   that   criminal   activity   was   afoot.                                                                                                                           Our
                                                                                                                                                  legislature  codified  the  constitutional  standard  established  in
Terry  in  Wis.  Stat.                                                                                                                            §                                                                       968.24   (1993-94),  cited  in  full  below.1
1                                                                               Temporary  questioning  without  arrest.     After  having
identified   himself   or   herself   as   a   law   enforcement
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Section                                                                           968.24   is   the                                      “statutory   expression”   of   the   Terry
requirements,  and  in  interpreting  the  scope  of  the  statute,  resort
must  be  made  to  Terry  and  the  cases  following  it.     State  v.
Jackson,  147 Wis.  2d  824,  830,  434 N.W.2d  386  (1989).
The  fundamental  focus  of  the  Fourth  Amendment,  and Wis.  Stat.
§                                                                                 968.24  is  reasonableness.     Chambers,              55  Wis.                                      2d  at   84.   The
court   of   appeals   accurately   stated   the   test   to   be   used   for
determining whether an investigatory stop was reasonable:
The   test   is   an   objective   one,   focusing   on   the
reasonableness   of   the   officer's   intrusion   into   the
defendant's   freedom   of   movement:                                            “Law   enforcement
officers  may  only  infringe  on  the  individual's  interest
to  be  free  of  a  stop  and  detention  if  they  have  a
suspicion  grounded  in  specific,  articulable  facts  and
reasonable   inferences   from   those   facts,   that   the
individual  has  committed  [or  was  committing  or  is  about
to  commit]  a  crime.    An  'inchoate  and  unparticularized
suspicion or  “hunch”  .  .  . will not suffice.'”
Waldner,  No.                                                                     95-1291-CR,  unpublished  slip  op.  (quoting  Guzy,   139
Wis.  2d at  675, quoting Terry v. Ohio,  392 U.S. at  27  .
The  question  of  what  constitutes  reasonableness  is  a  common
sense  test.    State  v.  Anderson,  155  Wis.  2d  77,  83,  454  N.W.2d  763
(1990).    What  would  a  reasonable  police  officer  reasonably  suspect
in  light  of  his  or  her  training  and  experience.     Id.  at               83-84.
This  common  sense  approach  strikes  a  balance  between  individual
privacy   and   the   societal   interest   in   allowing   the   police   a
reasonable scope of action in discharging their responsibility.
officer,  a law enforcement officer may  stop  a person  in  a
public  place  for  a  reasonable  period  of  time  when  the
officer   reasonably   suspects   that   such   a   person   is
committing,  is  about  to  commit  or  has  committed  a  crime,
and  may  demand  the  name  and  address  of  the  person  and  an
explanation  of  the  person's  conduct.    Such  detention  and
temporary  questioning  shall  be  conducted  in  the  vicinity
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95-1291-CR
The   societal   interest   involved   is,   of   course,   that   of
effective    crime    prevention    and    detection    consistent    with
constitutional  means.     It  is  this  interest  which  underlies  the
recognition  that  a  police  officer  may  in  appropriate  circumstances
and  in  an  appropriate  manner  approach  a  person  for  purposes  of
investigating  possible  criminal  behavior  even  though  there  is  no
probable cause to make an arrest.
Waldner  contends  that  the  investigatory  stop  was  unlawful  for
two  reasons:                                                                    (1)  the  stop  was  based  merely  on  Sgt.  Annear's
inchoate                                                                         “hunch”  that  Waldner  was  engaged  in  criminal  activity;
and                                                                              (2)   since   the   conduct   observed   by   Sgt.   Annear   was   not
unlawful,  there  was  no  basis  for  the  stop.     We  conclude  that
Waldner  misinterprets  the  totality  of  the  facts  and  misunderstands
the  law  of  investigatory  stops.     The  record  reveals  that  Sgt.
Annear's   decision   to   stop   Waldner   was   based   on   more   than   a
“hunch.”    The  law  allows  a  police  officer  to  make  an  investigatory
stop  based  on  observations  of  lawful  conduct  so  long  as  the
reasonable  inferences  drawn   from   the  lawful  conduct  are  that
criminal activity is afoot.
We  first  address  Waldner's  argument  that  the  stop  was  based
merely  on  a  hunch,  not  a  reasonable  suspicion.    A  central  concern
of  the  Supreme  Court  is  to  assure  that  an  individual's  reasonable
expectation  of  privacy  is  not  subject  to  arbitrary  invasion  at  the
unfettered  discretion  of  officers  in  the  field.    Brown  v.  Texas,
443  U.S.                                                                        47                                                                        (1979).     Waldner  argues  that  the  investigatory  stop
which  led  to  his  arrest  was  based  on  Sgt.  Annear's                      “hunch”  and
of where the person was stopped.    Wis. Stat.  §  968.24.
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95-1291-CR
that  a  police  officer's  hunch  can  never  justify  an  investigatory
stop  because  it  would  lead  to  unfettered  discretion  of  police
officers  in  the  field.    While  we  agree  with  Waldner  and  the  court
of  appeals  that  an  inchoate  and  unparticularized  suspicion  will
not  support  an  investigatory  stop,  Guzy,  139  Wis.  2d  at  675,  Sgt.
Annear  had  much  more  than  a  “hunch”  when  he  stopped  Waldner.    His
suspicion   was   based   on   specific,   articulable   facts   and   the
reasonable inferences drawn from those facts.
As the circuit court explained:
Normally, a  person  drives at  a rate  of speed,  comes to  a
corner,  they  want to  turn  and  they turn the corner. They
may  slow  down,  but  they  don't  drive  in  this  manner.    So
I  think  at  that  point  the  officer  had  a  reasonable
grounds   for   a   reasonable   suspicion   that   there   was
something  wrong  with  the  person's  driving.    Could  have
been  a  person  that  was  overtired;  could  have  been  a
person    that    was    suffering    from    carbon    monoxide
poisoning,  something  like  that.    Also  could  have  been  a
person  who  had  been  drinking.    It  was  also,  I  believe,
12:30  in  the  morning  where  it  is  more  likely  where  a
person who  has  been  drinking  might be  on  the  road.                        [The
drink  poured  from  the  cup]  could  have  been  ginger  ale,
it  could  have been  water,  but  when coupled  with the kind
of   driving,   it   could   also   have   been   an   alcoholic
beverage.  .  .                                                                  .    But  when  you  put  all  of  them  together,
I  think  the  officer  did  have  a  basis  for  a  reasonable
belief that  this driver was impaired  and very well could
have been intoxicated.
We  agree  with  the  circuit  court  that  these  facts,  looked  at
together,  formed  a  reasonable  basis  for  Sgt.  Annear's  suspicion
that  this  driver  was  impaired  and  very  well  could  have  been
intoxicated.    Any  one  of  these  facts,  standing  alone,  might  well
be  insufficient.    But  that  is  not  the  test  we  apply.    We  look  to
the  totality  of  the  facts  taken  together.    The  building  blocks  of
fact  accumulate.     And  as  they  accumulate,  reasonable  inferences
about  the  cumulative  effect  can  be  drawn.    In  essence,  a  point  is
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95-1291-CR
reached  where  the  sum  of  the  whole  is  greater  than  the  sum  of  its
individual  parts.    That  is  what  we  have  here.    These  facts  gave
rise  to  a  reasonable  suspicion  that  something  unlawful  might  well
be afoot.
This  takes  us  to  Waldner's  second argument.    Waldner  contends
that  lawful  acts  cannot  form  the  basis  for  a  reasonable  suspicion
justifying  a  stop.     We  agree  that  these  acts  by  themselves  were
lawful  and  that  each  could  well  have  innocent  explanations.    But
that  is  not  determinative.     Waldner's  argument  is  contrary  to
well-settled  law.    When  an  officer  observes  unlawful  conduct  there
is  no  need  for  an  investigative  stop:  the  observation  of  unlawful
conduct  gives  the  officer  probable  cause  for  a  lawful  seizure.    If
Waldner  were  correct  in  his  assertion  of  the  law,  there  could
never   be   investigative   stops   unless   there   was   simultaneously
sufficient  grounds  to  make  an  arrest.    That  is  not  the  law.  The
Fourth  Amendment  does  not  require  a  police  officer  who  lacks  the
precise   level  of   information  necessary  for  probable  cause  to
arrest  to  simply  shrug  his  or  her  shoulders  and  thus  possibly
allow  a  crime  to  occur  or  a  criminal  to  escape.     The  law  of
investigative  stops  allow  police  officers  to  stop  a  person  when
they  have  less  than  probable  cause.    Moreover,  police  officers  are
not  required  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  innocent  behavior
before  initiating  a  brief  stop.    Chambers,  55  Wis.  2d  at  85.    The
facts in Terry illustrate the inaccuracy of Waldner's argument.
The  Terry  Court  upheld  the  legality  of  an  investigative  stop
by  a  police  officer  who  observed  the  defendants  repeatedly  walk
back   and   forth   in   front   of   a   store   window   at                   2:30   in   the
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95-1291-CR
afternoon,  and  then  confer  with  each  other.    The  officer  suspected
the  two  of  contemplating  a  robbery  and  stopped  them  to  investigate
further.
Walking  back  and  forth  in  front  of  a  store  on  a  public
sidewalk  is  perfectly  legal  behavior.     Nonetheless,  reasonable
inferences  of  criminal  activity  can  be  drawn  from  such  behavior.
As  this  court  noted  in  Jackson,  “the  suspects  in  Terry  'might  have
been  casing  the  store  for  a  robbery,  or  they  might  have  been
window-shopping   or   impatiently   waiting   for   a   friend   in   the
store.'”                                                                          Jackson,              147   Wis.   2d   at   835   (citation   omitted).
Nonetheless,  the  Court  concluded  that  the  investigative  stop  of
the  Terry  defendants  was  permissible  because,  based  on  the  police
officer's  training  and  experience,  their  lawful  conduct  gave  rise
to  a  reasonable  inference  that  criminal  activity  was  afoot.     In
short, Terry's conduct though lawful was suspicious.
Suspicious  conduct  by  its  very  nature  is  ambiguous,  and  the
principal  function  of  the  investigative  stop  is  to  quickly  resolve
that  ambiguity.    Anderson,  155  Wis.  2d  at  84.    Thus,  when  a  police
officer  observes  lawful  but  suspicious  conduct,  if  a  reasonable
inference   of   unlawful   conduct   can   be   objectively   discerned,
notwithstanding  the  existence  of  other  innocent  inferences  that
could  be  drawn,  police  officers  have  the  right  to  temporarily
detain  the  individual  for  the  purpose  of  inquiry.     Id.     Police
officers  are  not  required  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  innocent
behavior   before   initiating   a   brief   stop.                                If   a   reasonable
inference   of   unlawful   conduct   can   be   objectively   discerned,
notwithstanding  the  existence  of  other  innocent  inferences  that
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could  be  drawn,  the  officers  have  the  right  to  temporarily  detain
the individual for the purpose of inquiry.    Id.
Sergeant  Annear  was  discharging  a  legitimate  investigative
function  when  he  decided  to  approach  Waldner.     He  had  observed
Waldner  go  through  a  series  of  acts,  each  perhaps  innocent  in
itself,  but  which  taken  together  warranted  further  investigation.
There  is  nothing  unusual  nor  unlawful  in  a  car  driving  down  the
street  at  12:30  a.m.  in  Richland  Center.     Nor  is  there  anything
unlawful   about   an   individual   in   these   circumstances   driving
slowly,  then  suddenly  accelerating.     Unusual  perhaps,  suspicious
maybe,  but  not  unlawful.     Likewise,  it  is  not  unlawful  for  this
same  car  to  stop at  an  intersection  before  making  a  left  turn  when
there   is   no   oncoming   traffic   and   no   stop   sign.                   Unusual?
Certainly.    Suspicious?  Maybe.    But  unlawful?    No.    Nor  is  there
anything  unlawful  about  this  driver  stopping  the  car  at  this  time
of  night  and  dumping  a  mixture  of  liquid  and  ice  out  of  a  plastic
cup  into  the  roadway.    Unusual?    Absolutely.    Suspicious?    Under
these circumstances, certainly.    Unlawful?    No.
Any  one  of  these  facts,  standing  alone,  might  not  add  up  to
reasonable  suspicion.2    But,  as  stated  above  in  the  discussion  of
issue one, they do coalesce to add up to a reasonable suspicion.
Although  many  innocent  explanations  could  be  hypothesized  as
the  reason  for  Waldner's  actions,  a  reasonable  police  officer
2  The  walking  away  is  of  slight,  if  any,  consideration  here.
Nothing  in  the  record  indicates  that  Waldner  was  even  aware  of
the  officer's  presence  until  told  to  stop.     Officer  Annear  had
not  used  his  flashing  lights  or  siren  when  following  Waldner.  Nor
is  there  any  indication  that  Waldner  was  aware  of  Sgt.  Annear's
presence  until  asked  by  him  to  stop.    When  asked  to  stop,  he  did.
9




95-1291-CR
charged   with   enforcing   the   law   cannot   ignore   the   reasonable
inference that they might also stem from unlawful behavior.
Confronted  with  these  facts,  we  conclude  that  it  was  entirely
reasonable  for  Sgt.  Annear  to  stop  Waldner  and  make  inquiry.    In
other  words,  Sgt.  Annear  was  entirely  reasonable  in  freezing  the
situation  at  that  moment  in  time.    The  essence  of  good  police  work
under  these  circumstances  is  to  briefly  stop  the  individual  in
order  to  maintain  the  status  quo  temporarily  while  obtaining  more
information.    State  v.  Williamson,  58  Wis.  2d  514,  518,  206  N.W.2d
613                                                                              (1973).     Under  these  circumstances,  it  would  have  been  poor
police  work  for  Sgt.  Annear  to  have  failed  to  investigate.     He
would have been remiss in his duty to have acted otherwise.
By  the  Court.                                                                  -  The  decision  of  the  court  of  appeals  is
reversed.
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95-1291-CR
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
Case No.:                                                                    95-1291-CR
Complete Title
of Case:                                                                     State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
v.
Johnny J. Waldner,
Defendant-Appellant.
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at:                                                                 197  Wis.  2d  119,  541 N.W.2d  839
(Ct. App.  1995)
UNPUBLISHED
Opinion Filed:                                                               December  13,  1996
Submitted on Briefs:
Oral Argument:                                                               October  18,  1996
Source of APPEAL
COURT:                                                                       Circuit
COUNTY:                                                                      Richland
JUDGE:                                                                       KENT C. HOUCK
JUSTICES:
Concurred:
Dissented:
Not Participating:
ATTORNEYS:                                                                   For  the  plaintiff-respondent-petitioner  there  were
briefs   and   oral   argument   by   William   Andrew   Sharp,   district
attorney.
For  the  defendant-appellant  there  was  a  brief  by  Ralph  A.
Kalal  and  Kalal  &  Associates,  Madison  and  oral  argument  by  Ralph
A. Kalal.
11





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